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modules: add nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111, nf_tables catch-all abort UAF)
The newest nftables LPE: a use-after-free in the nf_tables transaction-
abort path. An inverted condition (a stray '!') in
nft_map_catchall_activate() makes the abort path process active catch-all
map elements instead of skipping them; a catch-all GOTO element drives a
chain's use-count to zero so a following DELCHAIN frees it while the
catch-all verdict still references it -> UAF, escalatable from an
unprivileged user (userns + nftables) via modprobe_path/selinux_state ROP.
Fixed upstream by f41c5d1; CWE-416, CVSS 7.8; not in CISA KEV. Public
reproduction by FuzzingLabs.

Takes the corpus to 43 modules / 38 CVEs.

🟡 reconstructed trigger, primitive-only, NOT VM-verified — same contract
as nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086). detect() version-gates (catch-all elems
~5.13; Debian backports 6.1.164/6.12.73/6.18.10, 7.0+ inherits) AND
requires unprivileged user_ns clone (else PRECOND_FAIL). exploit() forks
an isolated child, builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO element,
provokes an aborting batch to drive the abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo,
and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL — the per-kernel leak + R/W + modprobe_path ROP
is not bundled. kernel_range table verified drift-clean against the live
Debian tracker (the 6.18 branch / 6.18.10 fix is the real forky/sid
backport; the earlier 7.0.10 figure was wrong).

Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank (35), 6 detect() test rows (version
+ userns gating), CVE_METADATA.json + cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md
(sorted insert, CWE-416/T1068/not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts
(43/38) + yellow pill, RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.11, verify-vm target. Credit:
FuzzingLabs + upstream fix f41c5d1. Version 0.9.11.
2026-06-08 17:42:19 -04:00

3.0 KiB

NOTICE — nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111)

Vulnerability

CVE-2026-23111 — a use-after-free in the Linux kernel nf_tables (netfilter) transaction-abort path. nft_map_catchall_activate() carries an inverted condition (a stray !): during a transaction abort it processes active catch-all set elements instead of skipping them. A catch-all element in an nftables map holds a verdict (GOTO/JUMP) referencing a chain; the wrong (de)activation drives the chain's use-count to zero, so a following DELCHAIN frees the chain while the catch-all verdict element still references it → UAF.

From an unprivileged local user — via user namespaces + nftables (needs CONFIG_USER_NS + CONFIG_NF_TABLES) — the UAF is escalatable to root: leak a kernel address, obtain arbitrary R/W, ROP over modprobe_path / selinux_state.

NVD class: CWE-416 (Use After Free). CVSS v3.1 7.8 HIGH (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). Affects current distros (Debian bookworm/trixie, Ubuntu 22.04/24.04). Not in CISA KEV.

The fix removed a single character (the inverted !).

Research credit

  • Fixed upstream by commit f41c5d151078c5348271ffaf8e7410d96f2d82f8 ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix … catch-all … activate"); reported and fixed through the Linux kernel security process (NVD lists the source as kernel.org; no public individual reporter name in the advisory).
  • Public reproduction + analysis by FuzzingLabshttps://fuzzinglabs.com/repro-cve-2026-23111/ — which the module's trigger reconstruction is informed by.
  • Debian security tracker (authoritative backport versions): https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-23111 — bookworm 6.1.164 / trixie 6.12.73 / forky·sid 6.18.10 (bullseye/5.10 still unfixed at time of writing).

All credit for finding and analysing this bug belongs to the upstream reporter and to FuzzingLabs for the public write-up. SKELETONKEY is the bundling and bookkeeping layer only.

SKELETONKEY role

🟡 Trigger (reconstructed) — primitive-only, not VM-verified. This is one more UAF in the corpus's most-covered subsystem (nf_tables, nft_set_uaf, nft_payload, nft_pipapo, …), shipped on the same contract as nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086): a fork-isolated trigger that fires the bug class and stops.

detect() version-gates against the Debian backports above (upstream thresholds 6.1.164 / 6.12.73 / 6.18.10; catch-all set elements arrived in ~5.13, so older kernels lack the path) and requires unprivileged user-namespace clone — a vulnerable kernel with userns locked down is PRECOND_FAIL. exploit() builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO element and provokes an aborting batch transaction to drive the abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo, and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL. The per-kernel leak + arbitrary-R/W + modprobe_path ROP that lands a root shell is not bundled (per-build offsets refused), and the trigger is reconstructed from the public analysis rather than VM-verified — it never claims root it did not get.