42 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
KaraZajac	03324c8542	modules: add ghostlock (CVE-2026-43499, "GhostLock" rtmutex/futex requeue-PI stack UAF) ... Adds the ghostlock module for CVE-2026-43499 ("GhostLock", VEGA / Nebula Security's "IonStack part II") — a ~15-year race UAF on kernel STACK memory in the rtmutex/futex requeue-PI path (kernel/locking/rtmutex.c). On the -EDEADLK deadlock-rollback, remove_waiter() runs against `current` instead of the waiter task, so a concurrent sched_setattr()-driven PI-chain priority walk on another CPU clears pi_blocked_on on the wrong task and leaves an on-stack rt_mutex_waiter dangling. Reachable by any unprivileged user (CVSS 7.8, PR:L) — plain futex(2) + sched_setattr(2), no userns/CONFIG beyond CONFIG_FUTEX_PI. The corpus's first rtmutex/futex-PI module and first kernel-stack UAF (all others are heap/slab). Introduced 2.6.39; fixed 3bfdc63936dd (7.1-rc1), stable backports 7.0.4 / 6.18.27 / 6.12.86 / 6.6.140 / 6.1.175; 5.15/5.10/5.4/4.19 affected with no upstream fix. CWE-416; not in KEV. detect() is a pure version gate over the five-branch backport table. exploit() forks an isolated child that (A) deterministically confirms the -EDEADLK remove_waiter() rollback path is reachable (safe — no concurrent walk means no dangling pointer; validated on real hardware) then (B) exercises the actual race a hard-bounded 24 iters / 2s with a sibling-CPU sched_setattr(SCHED_BATCH) storm, and stops. Deliberately under-driven: no copy_from_user widening, no stack-frame spray/reoccupation, and the KernelSnitch leak -> forged-waiter -> fops/ashmem/pipe R/W -> cred-patch chain (Android/Pixel-specific, per-build offsets) is NOT bundled. Returns EXPLOIT_FAIL. Lowest --auto safety rank (11) — a won race corrupts the kernel stack. Unlike most races it ships a real detection signature (futex requeue-PI returning EDEADLK + sibling sched_setattr); auditd/sigma anchor on sched_setattr, falco/eBPF on the EDEADLK tell; no yara. Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank 11, version 0.9.13, 9 detect() test rows (incl. 6.13.0 -> VULNERABLE, the multi-branch "newer than all" case), CVE metadata (CWE-416 / T1068 / not-KEV; cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md regenerated -> 13 of 40), README + CVES.md + website counts (45 modules / 40 CVEs), RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.13, verify-vm target. Also corrects pre-existing docs/index.html drift left by v0.9.12 (body counts stuck at 43/38 and a missing bad_epoll corpus pill). Tests: 33 kernel_range + 101 detect, all pass. Credit: VEGA / Nebula Security (nebusec.ai, NebuSec/CyberMeowfia, Apache-2.0); upstream fix 3bfdc63936dd (Keenan Dong / Thomas Gleixner). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KUq4DGXSPBmPkAyJ9WnM9n	2026-07-13 15:43:00 -04:00
KaraZajac	95589e26cb	modules: add bad_epoll (CVE-2026-46242, "Bad Epoll" epoll teardown race UAF) ... Jaeyoung Chung's kernelCTF "Bad Epoll": a race-condition use-after-free in fs/eventpoll.c. ep_remove() clears file->f_ep under f_lock but keeps using the file (hlist_del_rcu + unlock) while a concurrent __fput() frees the still-referenced struct eventpoll. Reachable by any unprivileged user with no userns / CONFIG / capability; weaponised via cross-cache to a struct file, /proc/self/fdinfo arb-read, and ROP. Introduced 58c9b016e128 (6.4), fixed a6dc643c6931 (7.1-rc1), stable backport 7.0.13. CWE-416; not in KEV. The corpus's first epoll / VFS-teardown module. Shipped as a reconstructed, deliberately under-driven trigger on the stackrot / nft_catchall contract: detect() is a pure version gate (>= 6.4 and below the on-branch fix; no userns precondition -- epoll needs none); exploit() forks a CPU-pinned child that exercises the ep_remove-vs-__fput close window a hard-bounded 48 attempts / 2s and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL. It does not grind the race to a win, does not do the cross-cache reclaim, and does not bundle the fdinfo R/W + ROP (a won race frees a live struct file and rarely trips KASAN -> silent-corruption risk). Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank (12 -- lowest in the corpus; a kernel race is the least predictable class), 5 detect() test rows (version gating), CVE metadata (sorted insert, CWE-416 / T1068 / not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts (44/39), RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.12, and a verify-vm target (sweep pending). Detection rules are intentionally weak/structural (epoll ubiquitous, rarely KASAN) -- post-exploitation euid-0 transition, no yara. Also corrects pre-existing README drift in the "not yet verified" count (8 -> 11). Not VM-verified, so the verified count stays 28 of 39. Version 0.9.12. Credit: Jaeyoung Chung (J-jaeyoung). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KUq4DGXSPBmPkAyJ9WnM9n	2026-07-04 19:35:33 -04:00
KaraZajac	4d0a0e2443	modules: add nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111, nf_tables catch-all abort UAF) ... The newest nftables LPE: a use-after-free in the nf_tables transaction- abort path. An inverted condition (a stray '!') in nft_map_catchall_activate() makes the abort path process active catch-all map elements instead of skipping them; a catch-all GOTO element drives a chain's use-count to zero so a following DELCHAIN frees it while the catch-all verdict still references it -> UAF, escalatable from an unprivileged user (userns + nftables) via modprobe_path/selinux_state ROP. Fixed upstream by f41c5d1; CWE-416, CVSS 7.8; not in CISA KEV. Public reproduction by FuzzingLabs. Takes the corpus to 43 modules / 38 CVEs. 🟡 reconstructed trigger, primitive-only, NOT VM-verified — same contract as nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086). detect() version-gates (catch-all elems ~5.13; Debian backports 6.1.164/6.12.73/6.18.10, 7.0+ inherits) AND requires unprivileged user_ns clone (else PRECOND_FAIL). exploit() forks an isolated child, builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO element, provokes an aborting batch to drive the abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo, and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL — the per-kernel leak + R/W + modprobe_path ROP is not bundled. kernel_range table verified drift-clean against the live Debian tracker (the 6.18 branch / 6.18.10 fix is the real forky/sid backport; the earlier 7.0.10 figure was wrong). Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank (35), 6 detect() test rows (version + userns gating), CVE_METADATA.json + cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md (sorted insert, CWE-416/T1068/not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts (43/38) + yellow pill, RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.11, verify-vm target. Credit: FuzzingLabs + upstream fix f41c5d1. Version 0.9.11.	2026-06-08 17:42:19 -04:00
KaraZajac	ada56b0db3	modules: add cifswitch (CVE-2026-46243, Asim Manizada's CIFSwitch) ... CIFSwitch is the newest kernel-7-era LPE not already in the corpus: a ~19-year-old logic flaw in fs/smb/client/cifs_spnego.c where the cifs.spnego request-key type accepts key descriptions created by userspace (add_key(2)/request_key(2)) without verifying the request came from the in-kernel CIFS client. The description's authority-bearing fields (pid/uid/creduid/upcall_target) are trusted by the root cifs.upcall helper; with user+mount namespace tricks an unprivileged user coerces cifs.upcall into loading an attacker NSS module as root. Fixed upstream by 3da1fdf4efbc (merged 7.1-rc5); CWE-20; not in CISA KEV. Takes the corpus to 42 modules / 37 CVEs. 🟡 honest port — full chain not VM-verified. detect() gates on the kernel version (Debian backports 5.10.257/6.1.174/6.12.90/7.0.10) AND on the cifs userspace path (cifs.upcall / cifs.spnego request-key rule), so a vulnerable kernel without cifs-utils is PRECOND_FAIL not a false positive (override via SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1/0). exploit() fires only the non-destructive add_key(2) cifs.spnego probe (no upcall, loads nothing, revoked immediately) and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL without a euid-0 witness — the namespace+NSS root-pop is not bundled until VM-verified. --mitigate blocklists the cifs module; --cleanup reverts. Wired everywhere: registry, Makefile, safety rank (86), 6 detect() test rows (env-driven precondition override), CVE_METADATA.json + cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md (sorted insert, CWE-20/T1068/not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts (42/37) and a yellow module pill, RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.10, verify-vm target (sweep pending). Credit: Asim Manizada. Version 0.9.10.	2026-06-08 11:07:27 -04:00
KaraZajac	e457b22c1f	release v0.9.9: install.sh needs no sudo + CVE metadata drift fix ... install.sh never escalates to sudo. The installer defaulted to /usr/local/bin and fell back to `sudo mv`, prompting for a password on exactly the unprivileged accounts a privilege-escalation tool targets. It now uses /usr/local/bin only when already writable and otherwise installs to a per-user $HOME/.local/bin (honoring XDG_BIN_HOME), no sudo ever. An explicit SKELETONKEY_PREFIX is honored and errors rather than escalating. The documented one-liner prepends ~/.local/bin to PATH so it resolves on a fresh login, and the quickstart drops the misleading sudo from --scan / --audit / --auto. CVE metadata drift (the failing weekly drift-check): - CVE-2022-0492 (cgroup_release_agent) entered CISA KEV 2026-06-02; corpus now 13 of 36 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs. - CVE-2026-46333 (ptrace_pidfd) gained CWE-269 from NVD (was unclassified at module-add time). Refreshed CVE_METADATA.json, generated cve_metadata.c, and KEV_CROSSREF.md; README + website KEV counts and version bumped to 0.9.9.	2026-06-08 10:16:24 -04:00
KaraZajac	60579f1602	release v0.9.8: two new LPE modules (ptrace_pidfd, sudo_host) ... Tags the two modules added this cycle (already on main): ptrace_pidfd (CVE-2026-46333, Qualys __ptrace_may_access/pidfd_getfd credential-fd theft, bd63aab) and sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462, Stratascale sudo -h/--host policy bypass, dd5f4fa). This commit bumps the version strings (skeletonkey.c, README, docs/index.html) and prepends the v0.9.8 RELEASE_NOTES entry. Corpus is now 41 modules / 36 CVEs / 28 verified. Tagging fires release.yml, which rebuilds + publishes the four prebuilt binaries via the Node-24 artifact actions bumped in v0.9.7.	2026-06-02 09:03:05 -04:00
KaraZajac	dd5f4fa06d	modules: add sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462, Stratascale sudo --host policy bypass) ... Second new module this cycle; sibling of sudo_chwoot (CVE-2025-32463, same Stratascale/Rich Mirch disclosure). sudo's -h/--host option — meant only to pair with -l/--list — was honored when running a command, so a sudoers rule scoped to a host other than the current machine (and not ALL) is usable via 'sudo -h <host> <cmd>' for local root. Affects sudo 1.8.8 -> 1.9.17p0; fixed 1.9.17p1. CWE-863, CVSS 8.8 (not in KEV). detect(): version-gate [1.8.8, 1.9.17p0] via ctx->host->sudo_version (the host-restricted rule itself isn't probeable unprivileged, so VULNERABLE means 'vulnerable sudo present'). exploit(): discovers an abusable host-restricted rule from readable sudoers (or SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST), witnesses with 'sudo -n -h <host> id -u', pops 'sudo -h <host> /bin/bash' (SKELETONKEY_SUDO_CMD) only on a uid-0 witness; honest EXPLOIT_FAIL + operator guidance otherwise. Shared 'sudo' family; structural, arch=any; safety rank 96. auditd/sigma/falco rules, NOTICE.md (Rich Mirch / Stratascale) + MODULE.md, 4 detect() test rows. Wiring: registry, Makefile, cve_metadata (+JSON), verify-vm/targets.yaml (ubuntu1804 sudo 1.8.21p2 target, sweep pending). Docs: README + CVES.md + docs/index.html counts 40->41 modules / 35->36 CVEs; not-yet-verified lists + corpus pill.	2026-06-02 08:43:09 -04:00
KaraZajac	bd63aabd64	modules: add ptrace_pidfd (CVE-2026-46333, Qualys ptrace/pidfd_getfd cred-steal) ... New module for Qualys's 2026-05-20 disclosure: a __ptrace_may_access logic flaw leaves a process dropping privileges briefly reachable past its dumpable boundary; pidfd_getfd(2) steals root-opened fds / authenticated channels from it. Default-distro, no userns, arch-agnostic (fd-steal, no shellcode). detect(): version-pinned, predates-gate at pidfd_getfd's 5.6 introduction; kernel_range from Debian backports (5.10.251/6.1.172/6.12.88/7.0.7), drift-check clean. exploit(): spawns a setuid victim, pidfd_open()s it, sweeps pidfd_getfd() over its fd table during the cred-drop window, reports any uid-0-owned fd captured from a non-root context. Honest EXPLOIT_FAIL without a euid-0 witness; not yet VM-verified. mitigate(): yama ptrace_scope=2; cleanup() reverts. auditd/sigma/falco rules, NOTICE.md (Qualys TRU credit) + MODULE.md, safety rank 84. Wiring: registry, Makefile, cve_metadata (+JSON source), verify-vm/targets.yaml (ubuntu2204 + mainline 5.15.5 target, sweep pending). Docs: README + CVES.md + docs/index.html counts 39->40 modules / 34->35 CVEs; added to not-yet-verified lists + corpus pill.	2026-06-02 08:26:24 -04:00
KaraZajac	1663df69d1	release v0.9.7: kernel_range drift fix + CI Node 24 readiness ... Tags the maintenance work landed since v0.9.6. The fragnesia drift fix (35c33df) and checkout v4->v6 bump (6c148e2) are already on main; this commit adds the remaining CI Node-24 bumps + version strings. release.yml: upload-artifact v4->v7, download-artifact v4->v8, softprops/action-gh-release v2->v3 (last of the Node-20-era actions; GitHub forces node24 on 2026-06-16). Reviewed each changelog — our default-zip/unique-name upload + full-set download is unaffected by the major-version breaking changes (opt-in direct uploads, download-by-ID path). Version bumped to 0.9.7 (skeletonkey.c, README, docs/index.html) + v0.9.7 RELEASE_NOTES entry. Tagging this commit fires release.yml — the end-to-end test of the new artifact actions, incl. the Alpine/musl static job under node24.	2026-06-01 11:55:31 -04:00
KaraZajac	25c2afc3e9	release v0.9.6: --auto no longer prompts for sudo password ... sudo_runas_neg1 and sudoedit_editor's detect() bodies invoked 'sudo -ln' (intending list + non-interactive). Some sudoers / PAM configurations have been observed prompting for a password anyway when the flags are bundled. That meant skeletonkey --auto --i-know could hang on a sudo password prompt during the corpus scan — bad ergonomics for an LPE tool whose whole point is to get root without already having it. Fix: write '-n -l' as separate flags, redirect stdin from /dev/null so sudo cannot fall back to reading the tty even if PAM tries to coerce one. Belt-and-suspenders against any tty prompt during --auto.	2026-05-28 21:50:26 -04:00
KaraZajac	13fbbce618	release v0.9.5: kernel_range drift cleanup (12 modules) ... v0.9.4 fixed cve_metadata drift but exposed kernel_range drift which had been hidden behind it. Applied refresh-kernel-ranges.py --patch recommendations: 11 TOO_TIGHT findings (false-positive risk — our threshold later than Debian's earliest known fix) + 8 MISSING (Debian has fixes for branches we didn't model) across 12 modules. All changes are strictly correctness-improving: detect() now correctly returns OK on kernels Debian has on record as patched, instead of false-positiving VULNERABLE. The biggest single fix is reverting fragnesia from {7,0,10} (NVD) to {7,0,9} (Debian's backported fix). I introduced that off-by-one in v0.9.4 from misreading NVD's versionEndExcluding semantics. Build's kernel_range drift step now exits 0 with 0 TOO_TIGHT + 0 MISSING.	2026-05-28 14:51:15 -04:00
KaraZajac	4454d8148e	release v0.9.4: drift unblock, fragnesia range fix, infra docs ... - Sync docs/CVE_METADATA.json + KEV_CROSSREF.md to match the hand-applied core/cve_metadata.c entries from v0.9.3. Nightly drift-check (red since 2026-05-25) now passes. Pintheft's CWE landed as CWE-787 from NVD (was NULL in the hand-applied entry). - Fix fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) range table. Per NVD: bug entered at 5.11 SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, vulnerable through 5.15.207 / 6.1.173 / 6.6.140 / 6.12.90 / 6.18.32 / 7.0.9, fixed at .208/.174/.141/ .91/.33/.10. Prior table had one entry {7,0,9} — off-by-one and missing every other backport. Added predates-5.11 introduction gate + test row. - Update tools/verify-vm/README.md to document the v0.9.x infra: mainline kernel pinning via kernel.ubuntu.com, per-module provisioner hooks, two-phase prep→reboot→verify with post-reboot kernel confirmation, GRUB_DEFAULT pinning. - Add curl fallback for NVD lookups in refresh-cve-metadata.py. Mirrors the CISA path's existing fallback. Prevents the silent Python urlopen hang seen during v0.9.3 prep (55-min stuck on CLOSE_WAIT socket; 30s timeout never fired).	2026-05-28 13:33:28 -04:00
KaraZajac	fa0228df9b	release v0.9.3: CVE metadata refresh (KEV 10→12) + dirtydecrypt bug fix ... CVE metadata refresh: - Added 8 entries to core/cve_metadata.c for the v0.8.0 + v0.9.0 module CVEs. Two are CISA-KEV-listed: - CVE-2018-14634 mutagen_astronomy (2026-01-26, CWE-190) - CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot (2025-09-29, CWE-829) - Populated via direct curl when refresh-cve-metadata.py's Python urlopen hung on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint for ~55 min — same data, different transport. dirtydecrypt module bug fix: - dd_detect() was wrongly gating 'predates the bug' on kernel < 7.0 - Per NVD CVE-2026-31635: bug entered at 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable through 6.18.22 / 6.19.12 / 7.0-rc7; fixed at 6.18.23 / 6.19.13 / 7.0 - Fix: predates-gate now uses 6.16.1; patched_branches[] adds {6,18,23} - Re-verified: dirtydecrypt now correctly returns VULNERABLE on mainline 6.19.7 instead of OK. Previously a false negative on real vulnerable kernels. Footer goes from '10 in CISA KEV' to '12 in CISA KEV'. Verified count stays at 28 but dirtydecrypt's record is now a TRUE VULNERABLE match (was OK match).	2026-05-24 01:17:58 -04:00
KaraZajac	d52fcd5512	docs: sweep stale counts to match v0.9.2 binary state ... Audit found several user-facing surfaces still carrying old numbers from earlier releases. Brought everything in line with the binary's authoritative footer ('39 modules · 10 KEV · 28 verified · 7 any'). README.md: - Status section: v0.9.0 → v0.9.2 framing; describe the 22 → 28 verification arc (v0.9.1 + v0.9.2) - '119 detection rules' → 151 (current bundled count) - '10 of 26 KEV-listed' → '10 of 34' - 'Not yet verified (4 of 26 CVEs)' → '(6 of 34 CVEs)' with the new honest list (vmwgfx, dirty_cow, mutagen_astronomy, pintheft, vsock_uaf, fragnesia) and the reason each is blocked - Example --auto output: 31 → 39 modules docs/index.html: - '22 of 26 CVEs confirmed' → '28 of 34', mainline kernel list expanded (5.4.0-26 / 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 / 6.19.7) - Corpus section '26 CVEs across 10 years' → '34 CVEs' - '26 CVEs, 10-year span' (author list intro) → '34 CVEs' - Footer feature list '22 of 26' → '28 of 34' - KEV stat chip 11 → 10 (matches binary; the anticipated 11th from metadata refresh hasn't been added yet) - '119 detection rules' → '151' (two occurrences) docs/og.svg + og.png: - KEV chip 11 → 10 (matches binary) CVES.md: - '31 modules' → '39 modules covering 34 CVEs' - Rewrote the unverified-rows note to match the actual 6-module list No content changes to RELEASE_NOTES.md or ROADMAP.md — those entries correctly describe state at the time they were written.	2026-05-24 00:09:21 -04:00
KaraZajac	66cca39a55	release v0.9.2: dirtydecrypt verified on mainline 6.19.7 (22 → 28) ... Verifies CVE-2026-31635 dirtydecrypt's OK path on a kernel that predates the bug: 'kernel predates the rxgk RESPONSE-handling code added in 7.0' — match. Confirms detect() doesn't false-positive on older 6.x kernels. Attempted fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) but mainline 7.0.5 .debs depend on libssl3t64 / libelf1t64 (t64-transition libs from Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+). No Parallels-supported Vagrant box ships those yet — dpkg --force-depends leaves the kernel package in iHR state with no /boot/vmlinuz. Marked manual: true with rationale. Verifier infrastructure: pin-mainline now uses dpkg --force-depends as a fallback so partial-install state can at least be inspected.	2026-05-24 00:03:35 -04:00
KaraZajac	8ac041a295	release v0.9.1: VM verification sweep 22 → 27 ... Five more CVEs empirically confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs: - CVE-2019-14287 sudo_runas_neg1 (Ubuntu 18.04 + sudoers grant) - CVE-2020-29661 tioscpgrp (Ubuntu 20.04 pinned to 5.4.0-26) - CVE-2024-26581 nft_pipapo (Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline 5.15.5) - CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot (Ubuntu 22.04 + sudo 1.9.16p1 from source) - CVE-2025-6019 udisks_libblockdev (Debian 12 + udisks2 + polkit rule) Required real plumbing work: - Per-module provisioner hook (tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh) - Two-phase provision in verify.sh (prep → reboot if needed → verify) fixes silent-fail where new kernel installed but VM never rebooted - GRUB_DEFAULT pinning in both pin-kernel and pin-mainline blocks (kernel downgrades like 5.4.0-169 → 5.4.0-26 now actually boot the target) - Old-mainline URL fallback in pin-mainline (≤ 4.15 debs at /v$KVER/ not /amd64/) mutagen_astronomy marked manual: true — mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on Ubuntu 18.04's rootfs ('Failed to execute /init (error -8)' — kernel config mismatch). Genuinely needs a CentOS 6 / Debian 7 image.	2026-05-23 23:35:02 -04:00
KaraZajac	d84b3b0033	release v0.9.0: 5 gap-fillers — every year 2016 → 2026 now covered ... Five new modules close the 2018 gap entirely and thicken 2019 / 2020 / 2024. All five carry the full 4-format detection-rule corpus + opsec_notes + arch_support + register helpers. CVE-2018-14634 — mutagen_astronomy (Qualys, closes 2018) create_elf_tables() int wrap → SUID-execve stack corruption. CISA KEV-listed Jan 2026 despite the bug's age; legacy RHEL 7 / CentOS 7 / Debian 8 fleets still affected. 🟡 PRIMITIVE. arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64. CVE-2019-14287 — sudo_runas_neg1 (Joe Vennix) sudo -u#-1 → uid_t underflow → root despite (ALL,!root) blacklist. Pure userspace logic bug; the famous Apple Information Security finding. detect() looks for a (ALL,!root) grant in sudo -ln output; PRECOND_FAIL when no such grant exists for the invoking user. arch_support: any (4 -> 5 userspace 'any' modules). CVE-2020-29661 — tioscpgrp (Jann Horn / Project Zero) TTY TIOCSPGRP ioctl race on PTY pairs → struct pid UAF in kmalloc-256. Affects everything through Linux 5.9.13. 🟡 PRIMITIVE (race-driver + msg_msg groom). Public PoCs from grsecurity / spender + Maxime Peterlin. CVE-2024-50264 — vsock_uaf (a13xp0p0v / Pwnie Award 2025 winner) AF_VSOCK connect-race UAF in kmalloc-96. Pwn2Own 2024 + Pwnie 2025 winner. Reachable as plain unprivileged user (no userns required — unusual). Two public exploit paths: @v4bel+@qwerty kernelCTF (BPF JIT spray + SLUBStick) and Alexander Popov / PT SWARM (msg_msg). 🟡 PRIMITIVE. CVE-2024-26581 — nft_pipapo (Notselwyn II, 'Flipping Pages') nft_set_pipapo destroy-race UAF. Sibling to nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086) from the same Notselwyn paper. Distinct bug in the pipapo set substrate. Same family signature. 🟡 PRIMITIVE. Plumbing changes: core/registry.h + registry_all.c — 5 new register declarations + calls. Makefile — 5 new MUT/SRN/TIO/VSK/PIP module groups in MODULE_OBJS. tests/test_detect.c — 7 new test rows covering the new modules (above-fix OK, predates-the-bug OK, sudo-no-grant PRECOND_FAIL). tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — verifier entries for all 5 with honest 'expect_detect' values based on what Vagrant boxes can realistically reach (mutagen_astronomy gets OK on stock 18.04 since 4.15.0-213 is post-fix; sudo_runas_neg1 gets PRECOND_FAIL because no (ALL,!root) grant on default vagrant user; tioscpgrp + nft_pipapo VULNERABLE with kernel pins; vsock_uaf flagged manual because vsock module rarely available on CI runners). tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py — added curl fallback for the CISA KEV CSV fetch (urlopen times out intermittently against CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint). Corpus growth across v0.8.0 + v0.9.0: v0.7.1 v0.8.0 v0.9.0 Modules 31 34 39 Distinct CVEs 26 29 34 KEV-listed 10 10 11 (mutagen_astronomy) arch 'any' 4 6 7 (sudo_runas_neg1) Years 2016-2026: 10/11 10/11 **11/11** Year-by-year coverage: 2016: 1 2017: 1 2018: 1 2019: 2 2020: 2 2021: 5 2022: 5 2023: 8 2024: 3 2025: 2 2026: 4 CVE-2018 gap → CLOSED. Every year from 2016 through 2026 now has at least one module. Surfaces updated: - README.md: badge → 22 VM-verified / 34, Status section refreshed - docs/index.html: hero eyebrow + footer → v0.9.0, hero tagline 'every year 2016 → 2026', stats chips → 39 / 22 / 11 / 151 - docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md: v0.9.0 entry added on top with year coverage matrix + per-module breakdown; v0.8.0 + v0.7.1 entries preserved below - docs/og.svg + og.png: regenerated with new numbers + 'Every year 2016 → 2026' tagline CVE metadata refresh (tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py) deferred to follow-up — CISA KEV CSV + NVD CVE API were timing out during the v0.9.0 push window. The 5 new CVEs will return NULL from cve_metadata_lookup() until the refresh runs (—module-info simply skips the WEAKNESS/THREAT INTEL header for them; no functional impact). Re-run 'tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py' when network cooperates. Tests: macOS local 33/33 kernel_range pass; detect-test stubs (88 total) build clean; ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy CI jobs still green from the v0.7.x setup.	2026-05-23 22:15:44 -04:00
KaraZajac	4af82b82d9	docs: post-v0.7.1 surface sync (README + site + ROADMAP) ... Three stale surfaces refreshed after the v0.7.1 cut + arm64 release: README.md — Status section was 'v0.6.0 cut 2026-05-23'; updated to v0.7.1 with the new prebuilt-binary inventory (4 artifacts: x86_64 + arm64, each dynamic + static-musl) and the CI hardening additions (ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy). docs/index.html — hero eyebrow chip and footer meta both showed v0.6.0; both bumped to v0.7.1. ROADMAP.md — entire v0.7.x phase added as 'Phase 9 — Empirical verification + operator briefing (DONE 2026-05-23, v0.7.1)'. Captures everything since Phase 7+/8 (which were the v0.5–v0.6 era): the VM verifier, mainline kernel fetch, 22 of 26 CVEs verified, --explain mode, OPSEC notes, CVE metadata pipeline (CISA KEV + NVD CWE), 119 detection rules, 88-test harness, arm64-static binary, arch_support field, marketing site. Plus an explicit 'open follow-ups' list (arm64 verification sweep, SIEM query templates, install.sh smoke test, PackageKit provisioner, custom <=4.4 kernel image for dirty_cow, 9 deferred drift findings) and the 'wait-for-upstream blockers' list (vmwgfx, dirtydecrypt, fragnesia).	2026-05-23 21:27:23 -04:00
KaraZajac	6e0f811a2c	README + site + binary: surface 22-of-26 VM-verified count ... Updates the visible 'how trustworthy is this' signal across all three touchpoints after the verifier sweep landed 22 modules confirmed in real Linux VMs: README.md - Badge: '28 verified + 3 ported' → '22 VM-verified / 26'. - Headline tagline: emphasizes the 22-of-26 empirical confirmation. - 'Corpus at a glance' restructured: tier counts unchanged, but the stale '3 ported-but-unverified' subsection is replaced by a new 'Empirical verification' table breaking the 22 records down by distro/kernel. - 'Status' section refreshed for v0.6.0 reality: 88 tests + 22 verifications + mainline kernel fetch + --explain + KEV/CWE/ATT&CK metadata + 119 detection rules. The four still-unverified entries (vmwgfx, dirty_cow, dirtydecrypt, fragnesia) are listed with their blocking reasons. docs/index.html - Hero stats row gets a new '22 ✓ VM-verified' chip (emerald-styled via new .stat-vfy CSS class), keeping modules/KEV/rules siblings. - Hero tagline calls out '22 of 26 CVEs empirically verified'. - Meta description + og:description updated. - Bento card 'Verifier ready' rewritten as '22 modules empirically verified' with concrete distro/kernel breakdown; styled with new .bento-vfy class for emerald accent (matches the stat chip). - Timeline 'shipped' column adds the verifier wins; 'in flight' swapped to current open items (drift fixes, packagekit provisioner, custom <=4.4 box for dirty_cow). docs/og.svg + docs/og.png - 4-chip stats row instead of 3: 31 modules · 22 ✓ VM-verified · 10 ★ in CISA KEV · 119 detection rules. Tagline now '22 of 26 CVEs verified in real Linux VMs.' Re-rendered to PNG via rsvg-convert. skeletonkey.c (binary) - --list footer now prints '31 modules registered · 10 in CISA KEV (★) · 22 empirically verified in real VMs (✓)'. Counts computed from the registry + cve_metadata + verifications tables at runtime (so it stays accurate as more verifications land — the JSONL refresh propagates automatically). No code logic changed; only surfacing.	2026-05-23 18:03:38 -04:00
KaraZajac	ee3e7dd9a7	skeletonkey: --explain MODULE — single-page operator briefing ... One command that answers 'should we worry about this CVE here, what would patch it, and what would the SOC see if someone tried it'. Renders, for the specified module: - Header: name + CVE + summary - WEAKNESS: CWE id and MITRE ATT&CK technique (from CVE metadata) - THREAT INTEL: CISA KEV status (with date_added if listed) and the upstream-curated kernel_range - HOST FINGERPRINT: kernel + arch + distro from ctx->host plus every relevant capability gate (userns / apparmor / selinux / lockdown) - DETECT() TRACE (live): runs the module's detect() with verbose stderr enabled so the operator sees the gates fire in real time — 'kernel X is patched', 'userns blocked by AppArmor', 'no readable setuid binary', etc. - VERDICT: the result_t with a one-line operator interpretation that varies by outcome (OK / VULNERABLE / PRECOND_FAIL / TEST_ERROR each get their own framing) - OPSEC FOOTPRINT: word-wrapped .opsec_notes paragraph (from last commit) showing what an exploit would leave behind on this host - DETECTION COVERAGE: which of auditd/sigma/yara/falco have embedded rules for this module, with pointers to the --module-info / --detect-rules commands that dump the bodies Targeted at every audience the project is meant to serve: - Red team: opsec footprint + 'would this even reach' verdict in one screen - Blue team: paste-ready triage ticket with CVE / CWE / ATT&CK / KEV header and detection-coverage matrix - Researchers: the live trace shows the reasoning chain (predates check, kernel_range_is_patched lookup, userns gate) that drove the verdict — auditable without reading source - SOC analysts / students: a single self-contained briefing per CVE, no cross-referencing needed Implementation: - New mode MODE_EXPLAIN, new flag --explain MODULE - cmd_explain() composes the page from the existing module struct, cve_metadata_lookup() (federal-source triage data), ctx->host (cached fingerprint), and a live detect() call - print_wrapped() helper word-wraps the long .opsec_notes paragraph at 76 cols / 2-space indent - Help text + README quickstart + DETECTION_PLAYBOOK single-host recipe all updated to mention --explain Smoke tests: - macOS: --explain nf_tables shows full briefing; trace says 'Linux-only module — not applicable here'; verdict PRECOND_FAIL with the generic-precondition interpretation - Linux (docker gcc:latest): --explain nf_tables on a 6.12 host fires '[+] nf_tables: kernel 6.12.76-linuxkit is patched'; verdict OK with the 'this host is patched' interpretation - Both: --explain nope (unknown module) returns 1 with a clear 'no module ... Try --list' error - Both: 87 tests still pass (33 kernel_range + 54 detect on Linux, 33 + 0 stubbed on macOS) Closes the metadata + opsec + explain trio. The three together answer the 'best tool for red team, blue team, researchers, and more' framing.	2026-05-23 10:49:46 -04:00
KaraZajac	df4b879527	tools: refresh-kernel-ranges.py — Debian tracker drift detection ... Standalone Python script that pulls Debian's security-tracker JSON and compares each module's hardcoded kernel_patched_from table against the fixed-versions Debian actually ships. Surfaces real drift the no-fabrication rule needs us to fix: MISSING — Debian has a fix on a kernel branch we have no entry for. Module's detect() would say VULNERABLE on a host that's actually patched. TOO_TIGHT — Our threshold is later than Debian's earliest fix on the same branch. Module would call a patched host VULNERABLE. False-positive on production fleets. INFO — Our threshold is earlier than Debian's. We're more permissive; usually fine (we tracked a different upstream-stable cut), but flagged for review. Three output modes: default (text) — human-readable report on stderr --json — machine-readable for CI / dashboards --patch — unified-diff-style proposed C-source edits --refresh — bypass the 12h cache TTL and re-fetch Implementation: - urllib (no pip deps) fetches the ~70MB tracker JSON. - Cached at /tmp/skeletonkey-debian-tracker.json with 12h TTL. - Parses every modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.c for the .cve = '...' field + the kernel_patched_from <name>[] = { {M,m,p}, ... } array. - Per CVE, builds {debian_release -> upstream_version_tuple} from the tracker's 'releases.*.fixed_version' field (stripping Debian -N / +bN / ~bpoN suffixes to recover the upstream version). - Groups by (major, minor) branch; flags MISSING / TOO_TIGHT / INFO. - Exits non-zero when MISSING or TOO_TIGHT findings exist (suitable for a CI 'detect-drift' job). First-run output found drift in 17 of 20 modules with kernel_range tables — operator-reviewable. NOT auto-applied; this commit only ships the diagnostic tool, not the suggested fixes. README's Contributing section now points at the tool.	2026-05-23 00:52:10 -04:00
KaraZajac	97be306fd2	release: bump version to v0.6.0 ... This release captures the session's reliability + accuracy work on top of v0.5.0: - Shared host fingerprint (core/host.{h,c}): kernel/distro/userns gates / sudo + polkit versions, populated once at startup; every module consults ctx->host instead of doing its own probes. - Test harness (tests/test_detect.c, make test): 44 unit tests over mocked host fingerprints, wired into CI as a non-root step. - --auto upgrades: auto-enables --active, per-detect 15s timeout, fork-isolated detect + exploit so a crashing module can't tear down the dispatcher, per-module verdict table + scan summary. - --dry-run flag (preview without firing; --i-know not required). - Pinned mainline fix commits for the 3 ported modules (dirtydecrypt / fragnesia / pack2theroot) — detect() is now version-pinned with kernel_range tables, not precondition-only. - New modules: dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635), fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300), pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651). - macOS dev build works for the first time (all Linux-only code wrapped in #ifdef __linux__). - docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md: stable consumer contract for --scan --json. Version bump: - SKELETONKEY_VERSION = '0.6.0' in skeletonkey.c - README status line updated with the v0.6.0 changelog - docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md example refreshed	2026-05-23 00:22:18 -04:00
KaraZajac	c63ee72aa1	docs: JSON output schema (consumer contract for --scan --json) ... Adds docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md documenting the shape and stability promises of the JSON document --scan --json emits on stdout. The schema is already what the binary produces — this commit pins the contract so fleet-scan / SIEM consumers can rely on it across releases. What it covers: - Top-level object: { version, modules } and field stability. - Per-module entry: { name, cve, result } with type + stability. - The 6-value result enum (OK / TEST_ERROR / VULNERABLE / EXPLOIT_FAIL / PRECOND_FAIL / EXPLOIT_OK) and what each means semantically. - Process exit-code semantics for --scan (worst observed result becomes the exit code — lets a SIEM treat the binary exit as a single-host alert level). - Bash + jq one-liners for the common fleet-roll-up patterns. - A recommended Python consumer pattern with the forward-compat guidance (ignore unknown fields, treat unknown result strings as TEST_ERROR-equivalent). - Explicit stability promises: which fields cannot change without a major-version bump, what may be added in future minor releases, what consumers MUST tolerate. Verified against the live binary: --scan --json produces exactly the documented shape (top-level keys {modules, version}; per-module keys {cve, name, result}; result values come from the documented enum). 31 modules / 30 unique CVEs at v0.5.0. README's 'Sysadmins' audience row now links the schema doc: 'JSON output for CI gates ([schema](docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md))'.	2026-05-23 00:07:45 -04:00
KaraZajac	a26f471ecf	dirtydecrypt + fragnesia: pin CVE fix commits, version-based detect() ... Both modules' detect() was precondition-only because we didn't know the mainline fix commits at port time. Debian's security tracker now provides them — pinning here turns detect() into a proper version- based verdict (still with --active for empirical override). dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635): - Fix commit a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5 in mainline 7.0 ('rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check'). - Debian tracker confirms older stable branches (5.10 / 6.1 / 6.12) as <not-affected, vulnerable code not present>: the rxgk RESPONSE- handling code was added in 7.0. - kernel_range table: { {7, 0, 0} } - detect() pre-checks 'kernel < 7.0 -> SKELETONKEY_OK (predates)' then consults the table. With --active, the /tmp sentinel probe overrides empirically (catches pre-fix 7.0-rc kernels the version check reports as patched). fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300): - Fix in mainline 7.0.9 per Debian tracker ('linux unstable: 7.0.9-1 fixed'). Older Debian-stable branches (bullseye 5.10 / bookworm 6.1 / trixie 6.12) are still marked vulnerable as of 2026-05-22 - no backports yet. - kernel_range table: { {7, 0, 9} } - detect() keeps the userns + carrier preconditions, then consults the table: 7.0.9+ -> OK; older branches without an explicit backport entry -> VULNERABLE (version-only). --active confirms empirically. - Table is intentionally minimal so distros that DO backport in the future flow into 'patched' once their branch lands an entry; until then, the conservative VULNERABLE verdict on unfixed branches is correct. Other changes: - module struct .kernel_range strings updated from 'fix commit not yet pinned' to the actual pinned-version prose. - module_safety_rank bumped 86 -> 87 for both modules (version-pinned detect is now real; still below the verified copy_fail family at 88 so --auto prefers verified modules when both apply). - Both modules now #include core/kernel_range.h inside their #ifdef __linux__ block. - MODULE.md verification-status sections rewritten: detect() is now version-pinned; only the exploit body remains unverified. - CVES.md note + inventory rows updated: dropped the 'precondition- only' language for the pair; all three ported modules now have pinned fix references. - README ⚪ tier description + module list aligned to the new state. Both detect()s smoke-tested in docker gcc:latest on kernel 6.12.76- linuxkit: dirtydecrypt correctly reports OK ('predates the rxgk code added in 7.0'); fragnesia + pack2theroot correctly report PRECOND_FAIL (no userns / no D-Bus in container). Local macOS + Linux builds both clean.	2026-05-22 23:06:15 -04:00
KaraZajac	9a4cc91619	pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651) + --auto accuracy work ... Adds the third ported module — Pack2TheRoot, a userspace PackageKit D-Bus TOCTOU LPE — and spends real effort hardening --auto so its detect step gives an accurate, robust verdict before deploying. pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651): - Ported from the public Vozec PoC (github.com/Vozec/CVE-2026-41651). Original disclosure by the Deutsche Telekom security team. - Two back-to-back InstallFiles D-Bus calls (SIMULATE then NONE) overwrite the cached transaction flags between polkit auth and dispatch. GLib priority ordering makes the overwrite deterministic, not a timing race; postinst of the malicious .deb drops a SUID bash in /tmp. - detect() reads PackageKit's VersionMajor/Minor/Micro directly over D-Bus and compares against the pinned fix release 1.3.5 (commit 76cfb675). This is a high-confidence verdict, not precondition-only. - Debian-family only (PoC builds its own .deb in pure C; ar/ustar/ gzip-stored inline). Cleanup removes /tmp .debs + best-effort unlinks /tmp/.suid_bash + sudo -n dpkg -r the staging packages. - Adds an optional GLib/GIO build dependency. The top-level Makefile autodetects via `pkg-config gio-2.0`; when absent the module compiles as a stub returning PRECOND_FAIL. - Embedded auditd + sigma rules cover the file-side footprint (/tmp/.suid_bash, /tmp/.pk-*.deb, non-root dpkg/apt execve). --auto accuracy improvements: - Auto-enables --active before the scan. Per-module sentinel probes (page-cache /tmp files, fork-isolated namespace mounts) turn version-only checks into definitive verdicts, so silent distro backports don't fool the scan and --auto won't pick blind on TEST_ERROR. - Per-module verdict printing — every module's result is shown (VULNERABLE / patched / precondition / indeterminate), not just VULNERABLE rows. Operator sees the full picture. - Scan-end summary line: "N vulnerable, M patched/n.a., K precondition-fail, L indeterminate" with a separate callout when modules crashed. - Distro fingerprint added to the auto banner (ID + VERSION_ID from /etc/os-release alongside kernel/arch). - Fork-isolated detect() — each detector runs in a child process so a SIGILL/SIGSEGV in one module's probe is contained and the scan continues. Surfaced live while testing: entrybleed's prefetchnta KASLR sweep SIGILLs on emulated CPUs (linuxkit on darwin); without isolation the whole --auto died at module 7 of 31. With isolation the scan reports "detect() crashed (signal 4) — continuing" and finishes cleanly. module_safety_rank additions: - pack2theroot: 95 (userspace D-Bus TOCTOU; dpkg + /tmp SUID footprint — clean but heavier than pwnkit's gconv-modules-only path). - dirtydecrypt / fragnesia: 86 (page-cache writes; one step below the verified copy_fail/dirty_frag family at 88 to prefer verified modules when both apply). Docs: - README badge / tagline / tier table / ⚪ block / example output / v0.5.0 status — all updated to "28 verified + 3 ported". - CVES.md counts line, the ported-modules note (now calling out pack2theroot's high-confidence detect vs. precondition-only for the page-cache pair), inventory row, operations table row. - ROADMAP Phase 7+: pack2theroot moved out of carry-overs into the "landed (ported, pending VM verification)" group; added a new "--auto accuracy work" subsection documenting the dispatcher hardening landed in this commit. - docs/index.html: scanning-count example bumped to 31, status line updated to mention 3 ported modules. Build verification: full `make clean && make` in `docker gcc:latest` with libglib2.0-dev installed: links into a 31-module skeletonkey ELF (413KB), `--list` shows all modules including pack2theroot, `--detect-rules --format=auditd` emits the new pack2theroot section, `--auto --i-know --no-shell` exercises the new banner + active probes + verdict table + fork isolation + scan summary end-to-end. Only build warning is the pre-existing `-Wunterminated-string-initialization` in dirty_pipe (not introduced here).	2026-05-22 22:42:07 -04:00
KaraZajac	ac557b67d0	review pass: fidelity + credits + count consistency for ported modules ... Three-agent rigorous review of the dirtydecrypt + fragnesia ports plus repo-wide doc consistency, followed by a full Linux build verification. dirtydecrypt (NOTICE + detection rules): - NOTICE.md: removed an unsupported "Zellic co-founder" detail and a fabricated disclosure-date narrative; tightened phrasing of the Zellic + V12 credit; noted that upstream poc.c carries no author/license header of its own. - Embedded auditd + sigma rules and detect/sigma.yml broadened to cover every binary in dd_targets[] (added /usr/bin/mount, /usr/bin/passwd, /usr/bin/chsh) and added the b32 splice rule, so the embedded ruleset matches the on-disk reference and the carrier list the exploit actually targets. - Exploit primitive verified byte-for-byte against the V12 PoC (tiny_elf[] identical, all rxgk/XDR/fire/pagecache_write logic token-identical). docker gcc:latest compile of the Linux path: COMPILE_OK, zero warnings. fragnesia: review found no defects. Exploit primitive byte-identical to the V12 PoC (shell_elf[] 192 bytes identical, AF_ALG GCM keystream table + userns/netns/XFRM + receiver/sender/run_trigger_pair all faithful). The deliberate omissions (ANSI TUI, CLI arg parsing) drop nothing exploit-critical. docker gcc:latest compile: COMPILE_OK; full project build links into a working skeletonkey ELF and --list shows the module registered correctly. Repo docs (README.md / CVES.md / ROADMAP.md): - Chose to keep "28 verified" as the headline; the two ported modules are represented as a separate clearly-labelled tier ("ported-but-unverified") that is explicitly excluded from the 28-module verified counts. README + CVES.md + ROADMAP.md now tell one consistent story. - Filled a pre-existing documentation gap: sudo_samedit, sequoia, sudoedit_editor, vmwgfx were registered + built but absent from CVES.md's inventory + operations tables. Added rows synthesized from each module's .cve / .summary / .kernel_range fields. - ROADMAP Phase 8 "7 🟡 PRIMITIVE modules" → "14"; added a "Landed since v0.1.0" group; moved vmwgfx out of the stale carry-overs. docs site (docs/index.html): - Stat box "28 / total modules" → "28 / verified modules" (the 14+14 breakdown now sums to the headline consistently). - Terminal example "scanning 28 modules" → "scanning 30 modules" (was factually wrong — the binary literally prints module_count() which is 30). - Status line: updated to mention the 2 ported-but-unverified modules and mirror the README phrasing. - docs/LAUNCH.md left as a dated v0.5.0 launch snapshot. Build verification: `docker run gcc:latest make clean && make` — links into a 30-module skeletonkey ELF on Linux. macOS dev box still hits the pre-existing dirty_pipe header gap; unchanged. .gitignore: added /skeletonkey to exclude the top-level build artifact (the existing modules/*/skeletonkey only covered per-module binaries; the root one was getting picked up by `git add -A`).	2026-05-22 18:41:37 -04:00
KaraZajac	2873133852	README: polish — accurate counts, audience table, corpus glance ... Module counts were stale: 13 🟢 + 11 🟡 → corrected to 14 🟢 + 14 🟡 (sudoedit_editor is new 🟢; sudo_samedit + sequoia + vmwgfx are new 🟡 from the v0.5.0 batch). Added 'Who it's for' table — red team / sysadmin / blue team / CTF each get a row. Added 'Corpus at a glance' section with explicit module lists per tier, replacing the prose paragraph that buried the names. Tightened Quickstart — removed duplicate one-liner block, single canonical command set. Worked example switched from fictional dirty_pipe to the actual --auto output shape (pwnkit pick on a vulnerable Ubuntu 5.15). Honest 'Status' framing — acknowledges no empirical end-to-end validation yet, calls it the next roadmap item. Replaces the aspirational 'CI-tested across a distro matrix' claim. Added 'How it works' (was 'Architecture' + 'Build & run' merged into a clearer flow) and 'The verified-vs-claimed bar' section explaining why most modules ship without per-kernel offsets.	2026-05-17 02:02:50 -04:00
KaraZajac	95135213e5	launch: README polish + CONTRIBUTING + LAUNCH.md ... README.md: badges (release / license / module-count / platform), sharpened hero stating value prop in one sentence, audience framing for red team / sysadmin / blue team. CONTRIBUTING.md (new): what we accept (offsets, modules, detection rules, bug reports) and what we don't (untested EXPLOIT_OK, fabricated offsets, 0days, undisclosed CVEs). docs/LAUNCH.md (new): ~600-word HN/blog launch post. Copy-paste ready. Explains the verified-vs-claimed bar + --auto + the operator-populated offset table approach. GitHub repo description + 11 topics set via gh repo edit so the repo is discoverable in topic searches (linux-security, privilege-escalation, cve, redteam, blueteam, etc.).	2026-05-17 01:59:25 -04:00
KaraZajac	0fbe1b058f	v0.5.0: --auto mode + sysadmin one-liner ... skeletonkey.c: new --auto subcommand. Scans every module's detect(), filters to VULNERABLE, ranks by safety (structural > page-cache > userspace > kernel-primitive > race), runs the safest exploit. Requires --i-know. If the safest fails, suggests next candidates. README.md: 'One-command root' Quickstart section showing curl … install.sh | sh && skeletonkey --auto --i-know — the sysadmin/red-team one-liner. Status: bumped 0.4.5 → 0.5.0; corpus 24 → 28 modules (4 new in parallel batch: sudo_samedit, sequoia, sudoedit_editor, vmwgfx).	2026-05-17 01:55:13 -04:00
KaraZajac	324b539d65	README: bump Status to v0.4.5	2026-05-16 23:09:19 -04:00
KaraZajac	e668c3301f	banner: drop ASCII art, plain text only ... Replace the skeleton-key ASCII art with a single-line text banner. Bump 0.4.4 → 0.4.5.	2026-05-16 23:05:40 -04:00
KaraZajac	347a9af832	banner: give the bit actual teeth ... Previous staircase pattern was just trailing decoration — not real key teeth. Redesigned the bit as a hanging rectangle with two clearly-projecting notch-teeth on its right edge (the part that engages a lock's wards). Switched to box-drawing chars for the bit since they make sharper notches than 8/b/d glyphs; bow stays ornate-ASCII style. Bump 0.4.3 → 0.4.4.	2026-05-16 23:04:14 -04:00
KaraZajac	023289a03a	banner: artwork is the focal point — plain SKELETONKEY text below ... Previous banner had a SKELETONKEY block-letter art that competed with the skeleton-key drawing for visual attention. Simplified: the key art is now the focal point, and SKELETONKEY is rendered as plain spaced text below the drawing. Slight refinement to the key art: bow is a bit larger (888 instead of 88) to feel more substantial. Bit/teeth pattern unchanged. Bump 0.4.2 → 0.4.3.	2026-05-16 23:01:14 -04:00
KaraZajac	e7ced5db7c	banner: more detailed ornate skeleton key ... The v0.4.1 box-drawing key was minimalist — round bow, line shaft, small bit. Replaced with a more detailed ornate skeleton-key silhouette in the classic ASCII-art-of-keys tradition: - Round bow with internal "hole" rendered via stylized 8/b/d/' pattern (suggests the decorative loop you'd grip) - Long shaft running right across the banner - Bit at the end with a staircase notch pattern (the iconic "key-tooth" descent showing the wards that engage the lock) Same height as the previous banner. SKELETONKEY block letters below unchanged. Bump 0.4.1 → 0.4.2.	2026-05-16 22:57:01 -04:00
KaraZajac	b5188b7818	banner: redesign skeleton key ASCII art ... Replace the previous "circle + shaft + curl" silhouette (which read more like a magnifying glass) with a proper skeleton-key anatomy: - BOW: round decorative loop with center hole (the part you hold) - SHAFT: long horizontal rod (= the body of the key) - BIT: notched tooth hanging down from the shaft end (the part that engages the lock — the iconic key-tooth profile) Same change in skeletonkey.c BANNER and README.md. Bump 0.4.0 → 0.4.1.	2026-05-16 22:52:13 -04:00
KaraZajac	9593d90385	rename: IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY across the entire project ... Breaking change. Tool name, binary name, function/type names, constant names, env vars, header guards, file paths, and GitHub repo URL all rebrand IAMROOT → SKELETONKEY. Changes: - All "IAMROOT" → "SKELETONKEY" (constants, env vars, enum values, docs, comments) - All "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" (functions, types, paths, CLI) - iamroot.c → skeletonkey.c - modules/*/iamroot_modules.{c,h} → modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.{c,h} - tools/iamroot-fleet-scan.sh → tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh - Binary "iamroot" → "skeletonkey" - GitHub URL KaraZajac/IAMROOT → KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY - .gitignore now expects build output named "skeletonkey" - /tmp/iamroot-* tmpfiles → /tmp/skeletonkey-* - Env vars IAMROOT_MODPROBE_PATH etc. → SKELETONKEY_* New ASCII skeleton-key banner (horizontal key icon + ANSI Shadow SKELETONKEY block letters) replaces the IAMROOT banner in skeletonkey.c and README.md. VERSION: 0.3.1 → 0.4.0 (breaking). Build clean on Debian 6.12.86. `skeletonkey --version` → 0.4.0. All 24 modules still register; no functional code changes — pure rename + banner refresh.	2026-05-16 22:43:49 -04:00
KaraZajac	1bcfdd0c9f	release: v0.3.0 — 4 new CVE modules (24 total) ... iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION 0.2.0 → 0.3.0 CVES.md: add inventory entries for nft_set_uaf, af_unix_gc, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload; extend operations table; bump counts (🟢 13 · 🟡 11 · 🔵 0 · ⚪ 1). README.md: update Status to 24 modules, list all 11 🟡 modules. Module families now spanning: - copy_fail_family (page-cache write) - nf_tables (4 modules: nf_tables, nft_set_uaf, nft_fwd_dup, nft_payload) - af_packet (2 modules: af_packet, af_packet2) - overlayfs (2 modules: overlayfs CVE-2021-3493, overlayfs_setuid) - af_unix (new in v0.3.0) - plus 10 single-CVE families	2026-05-16 22:25:15 -04:00
KaraZajac	e2a3d6e94f	release: v0.2.0 — --full-chain root-pop opt-in across 7 🟡 modules ... iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION 0.1.0 → 0.2.0 CVES.md: redefine 🟡 to note --full-chain capability + docs/OFFSETS.md README.md: update Status section for v0.2.0 docs/OFFSETS.md: new doc — env-var/kallsyms/System.map/embedded-table resolution chain + operator workflow for populating offsets per kernel build + sentinel-based success arbitration. All 7 🟡 modules now expose `--full-chain`. Default behavior unchanged.	2026-05-16 22:06:14 -04:00
KaraZajac	3a5105c84c	README: clarify iamroot runs unprivileged + add non-root → root demo ... The whole point of an LPE tool is going from unprivileged to root, but the Quickstart was leading with `sudo iamroot --scan`. Fix: - Drop sudo from --scan / --audit / --exploit / --detect-rules. These work without root (--scan reads /proc + /etc; --audit walks the FS via stat; --exploit IS the privilege escalation; --detect-rules emits to stdout). - Keep sudo only where it's actually needed: --mitigate (writes /etc/modprobe.d + sysctl) and tee'ing rule files into /etc/audit/rules.d/. - Add a worked example showing `id` as uid=1000, then `iamroot --exploit dirty_pipe --i-know`, then `id` as uid=0. - Fix the Build & run section's `sudo ./iamroot` too.	2026-05-16 21:51:32 -04:00
KaraZajac	dce158e33a	release: v0.1.0 — 20-module corpus, 13 root-pop + 7 primitive ... iamroot.c: bump IAMROOT_VERSION from 0.1.0-phase1 → 0.1.0 README.md: replace "bootstrap phase" status with v0.1.0 corpus breakdown (13🟢 / 7🟡 across 2016→2026 timeline) CVES.md: redefine 🟡 to mean "primitive fires + groom + witness, stops short of cred-overwrite chain — refuses to claim root unless empirically demonstrated"; flip 7 entries from 🔵 → 🟡; add the two missing 🟢 entries (cgroup_release_agent, overlayfs_setuid); extend the operations matrix from 7 → 20 rows. ROADMAP.md: mark all Phase-7 items landed; add Phase 8 covering full-chain promotions (nf_tables / xtcompat / af_packet prioritized — each has a public reference exploit; IAMROOT's no-fabricated-offsets rule means each needs an env-var offset table or System.map auto-resolve). Build clean on Debian 6.12.86; iamroot --version reports 0.1.0.	2026-05-16 21:40:51 -04:00
KaraZajac	b24934156a	Install ergonomics: GitHub release workflow + install.sh + README quickstart ... For 'people should say just use iamroot' framing, the install gate is the single biggest discoverability bottleneck. This commit makes it: curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/IAMROOT/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh .github/workflows/release.yml: - Triggers on semver tag push (v*.*.*) + manual dispatch. - Matrix build for x86_64 (gcc) and arm64 (aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc cross). - Per-arch sha256sum alongside the binary. - Auto-generates release notes pointing at CVES.md / ROADMAP.md and including the install one-liner with the version-specific URL. - Publishes via softprops/action-gh-release@v2. install.sh (also uploaded as a release artifact, so the curl|sh above is stable): - Detects arch (x86_64 / aarch64 → arm64). - Pulls iamroot-<arch> + iamroot-<arch>.sha256 from the requested version (default: latest). - Verifies sha256 via sha256sum or shasum -a 256. - Installs to /usr/local/bin/iamroot (or $IAMROOT_PREFIX). Uses sudo iff /usr/local/bin isn't already writable. - Prints quickstart hints + ethics pointer at the end. - Env knobs: IAMROOT_VERSION, IAMROOT_PREFIX, IAMROOT_REPO. README.md gains a 'Quickstart' section at the top with the four canonical commands: install, --scan, --audit, --detect-rules, fleet-scan. Lands the 'curl|bash and go' UX as the first thing visitors see.	2026-05-16 21:01:34 -04:00
KaraZajac	cf30b249de	Initial skeleton: README, CVE inventory, roadmap, ARCH, ethics + copy_fail_family module absorbed from DIRTYFAIL	2026-05-16 19:26:24 -04:00