71 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
KaraZajac	56f9e4d0dc	release: v0.10.0 — the exploit-verification release ... Bumps 0.9.14 -> 0.10.0 (skeletonkey.c, README, docs/index.html) and prepends v0.10.0 release notes. Milestone: the corpus moved from detect-verified to out-of-band exploit-verified. 11 modules confirmed landing uid=0 in a VM (witnessed independently, never self-reported); four modules that falsely reported EXPLOIT_OK without ever getting root were fixed (pwnkit, ptrace_traceme, dirty_pipe, dirty_cow); a full false-EXPLOIT_OK audit was closed (every success claim now backed by a real out-of-band check). New/rewritten working exploits: ptrace_traceme, sudo_samedit, overlayfs_setuid (libfuse), dirty_pipe, dirty_cow. Plus fixes to a systemic userns uid_map bug, the kptr_restrict offset resolver, a su-over-pty hang, a readback buffer overflow, and an old-header portability issue; overlayfs upgraded to a direct uid=0 witness. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-24 00:03:53 -04:00
KaraZajac	af01d112a5	docs: netfilter_xtcompat (CVE-2021-22555) — empirical note on primitive difficulty ... Attempted the most tractable kernel primitive to gauge the frontier. Kernel confirmed vulnerable (focal GA 5.4.0-26 and a provisioned mainline 5.8.0, both pre the 5.4.0-77/5.8.0-53 fix). But Andy Nguyen's well-regarded single-file public exploit consistently fails at STAGE 1 ("could not corrupt any primary message") on both — it is tuned for Ubuntu's exact 5.8.0-48-generic slab config (freelist randomisation / memcg kmem accounting / SLUB merge), which mainline kernels don't match, and Ubuntu's EOL 5.8.0-48 HWE debs aren't readily sourceable. Recorded in docs/EXPLOITED.md: kernel primitives are config-and-version-specific exploit-dev — even a reference exploit needs its exact target kernel image + per-target tuning + a full port, a per-primitive multi-session effort. No code change; documentation of the empirical result. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 23:49:28 -04:00
KaraZajac	73c7d09445	overlayfs: direct uid=0 witness; broaden false-OK audit (all OK sites clean) ... overlayfs previously claimed EXPLOIT_OK from a getxattr proxy (the persisted security.capability xattr is the bug's signature) then exec-transferred the cap'd payload. Tightened to a DIRECT witness: the payload now takes a proof-path arg and, running as root (setuid(0) works because of the persisted cap), drops a root-owned proof + setuid bash; the module forks it, then reports OK only after stat() confirms the proof is root-owned. Re-verified on focal 5.4.0-26 (uid 1000 -> root-owned proof + -rwsr-xr-x root:root bash). Broadened the false-EXPLOIT_OK audit from exec-transfer callers to EVERY EXPLOIT_OK return site. The copy_fail_family root-pop (exploit_su.c) runs verify_plant() — confirming the shellcode actually landed in the setuid binary's page cache, reverting otherwise — before exec'ing it, so it's proxy-verified like dirtydecrypt/fragnesia, not a blind exec-transfer. Conclusion recorded in docs/EXPLOITED.md: no false-OKs remain beyond the four already fixed; every OK is backed by a real out-of-band check (root-owned artifact stat, getxattr, passwd grep, setuid(0) gate, or page-cache verify_plant). Host build + unit harness green (33 + 115). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 23:37:57 -04:00
KaraZajac	65588599ff	dirty_cow: verify end-to-end on 4.8.0; robust su helper (dirty_pipe too) ... Verified the dirty_cow fix end-to-end on a genuinely Dirty-COW-vulnerable mainline 4.8.0 kernel (installed the kernel.ubuntu.com 4.8.0 deb on a 16.04 image + virtio-rng for entropy). A standalone built verbatim from the module's primitive + escalation raced root's password field, authenticated as root over a pty, planted a root-owned setuid bash, and left /etc/passwd byte-identical. (The full skeletonkey binary won't compile on xenial's 4.4-era uapi headers — unrelated nft_* modules use newer kernel constants — so the verbatim standalone stands in for --exploit dirty_cow there.) Robustness fix (both dirty_cow AND dirty_pipe): the su-over-pty step now POLLS for the password prompt and hard-caps at 20s. The previous fixed-delay write raced su's prompt setup and HUNG on xenial; without a cap that would block the revert and leave /etc/passwd poisoned. Now su can never hang the module, and the revert always runs. Also: netfilter_xtcompat now includes <linux/if.h> for IFNAMSIZ (ip_tables.h doesn't pull it transitively on older kernel headers, e.g. Ubuntu 16.04) — a real portability fix surfaced by building on xenial. Host build + unit harness green (33 + 115). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 23:26:12 -04:00
KaraZajac	68dac6c063	dirty_cow: fix false-EXPLOIT_OK (same 3 bugs as dirty_pipe) + audit the corpus ... False-EXPLOIT_OK audit: the dispatcher's run_callback_isolated reports OK when the exploit execve()s (FD_CLOEXEC closes the result pipe -> parent reads EOF), so any exploit whose main path execs a not-guaranteed-root target lies. Audited every exec*-calling module (results in docs/EXPLOITED.md). dirty_cow had the identical 3-bug pattern to the pre-fix dirty_pipe: 1. raced the CALLER's UID field to "0000" then ran `su self` -> still needs the caller's password, never rooted anything; 2. execlp'd su -> dispatcher's exec-transfer path reported a FALSE EXPLOIT_OK; 3. reverted via drop_caches (needs root) -> left the running /etc/passwd corrupted when run unprivileged. Plus a latent overflow: the success-check readback[16] was too small for a payload > 16 bytes. Fix (byte-for-byte the verified dirty_pipe technique): race ROOT's password field to a known $6$ hash -> authenticate as root over a pty -> plant a root-owned proof + setuid bash -> revert by racing the original bytes back through the Dirty COW primitive (no root / no drop_caches). Success judged only by the OOB artifact; readback buffer bumped to 512. cleanup() re-reverts idempotently. The escalation half is identical to dirty_pipe (verified end-to-end); the COW primitive itself needs a pre-4.8.3 kernel to land, which no cached VM has, so on patched hosts it now fails HONESTLY with no corruption. Unit harness green. Other exec-transfer modules audited clean or already-fixed; two (overlayfs proxy, sudoedit_editor unverified reporting) noted for tightening. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 23:01:54 -04:00
KaraZajac	678a37b2f5	dirty_pipe: fix 3 bugs — working CVE-2022-0847 exploit that lands real root ... Verified out-of-band on a genuinely pre-fix mainline 5.16.0 kernel (installed from kernel.ubuntu.com onto the jammy image; every cached cloud image was pre-5.8 or backport-patched). `skeletonkey --exploit dirty_pipe` (uid 1000) -> EXPLOIT_OK + a -rwsr-xr-x root:root bash, and /etc/passwd is byte-identical afterward. Three real bugs in the shipped module: 1. Wrong escalation: it flipped the CALLER's UID field to "0000" and ran `su <self>`, which still demands the caller's password -> never rooted anything. 2. False EXPLOIT_OK: it execlp'd su, so the dispatcher's "exec transferred -> clean exit = OK" path reported success even on su's auth failure. 3. Dangerous revert: revert_passwd_page_cache() used drop_caches, which needs root -> as an unprivileged caller it left the running system's /etc/passwd page cache corrupted (broke sshd user resolution in testing). Rewrite (AabyssZG-style, self-contained + verifying): - overwrite ROOT's password field with a known $6$ crypt hash via the Dirty Pipe primitive (the longer hash clobbers into following lines, transiently); - authenticate as root over a pty with the matching password (su reads the password from the controlling tty, not stdin); - plant a root-owned proof + setuid bash; judge success ONLY by stat()'ing the root-owned artifact; - revert the page cache by writing the saved original bytes back through the Dirty Pipe primitive itself — no root, no drop_caches, nothing persists. cleanup() re-reverts idempotently. Unit harness green (33 + 115). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 22:50:39 -04:00
KaraZajac	82ba6e0d08	sudo_samedit: working CVE-2021-3156 (Baron Samedit) exploit — lands real root ... The shipped module drove a structural sudoedit trigger with no heap-grooming offsets and honestly reported EXPLOIT_FAIL. Ported blasty's proven technique: the `sudoedit -s` set_cmnd() unescape overflow overwrites a glibc NSS service_user, so the subsequent NSS lookup dlopen's an attacker-planted libnss_X/'P0P_SH3LLZ_ .so.2' from CWD, whose constructor runs while sudo is still root. Implementation follows the corpus's runtime-compile pattern: build the NSS payload on the target (unique -DSK_PROOF/-DSK_ROOTBASH), lay out the libnss_X/ dir, exec sudoedit with the crafted argv (AAAA..\ / \ / BBBB..\) and env (null_stomp × "\\", "X/P0P_SH3LLZ_", padded LC_ALL) from that CWD, and verify root by stat()'ing the root-owned artifacts — never self-report. Grooming lengths are libc-family specific (Ubuntu 56/54/63/212, Debian 64/49/60/214); a null_stomp_len ±8 sweep (blasty brute.sh's axis) is the fallback for drift. Verified out-of-band on Ubuntu 18.04.0 / sudo 1.8.21p2 / libc-2.27, as uid 1000 (non-sudoer — the overflow precedes the sudoers/password check): `skeletonkey --exploit sudo_samedit` -> EXPLOIT_OK + a -rwsr-xr-x root:root bash, primary lengths landing first try. Gated on cc + sudoedit; cleanup() removes artifacts and the scratch build dir. Unit harness green (33 + 115). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 22:22:11 -04:00
KaraZajac	635f7d2d24	ptrace_traceme: working CVE-2019-13272 exploit — lands real root (x86_64) ... The bundled sequence had the mechanism backwards (it PTRACE_ATTACHed the now-root parent) and never rooted anything. Replaced it with the proven Jann Horn (Project Zero #1903) / bcoles technique: - a "middle" process execs setuid pkexec (euid 0 for a window); - its child spins until it sees middle is euid 0, calls PTRACE_TRACEME (recording middle's ROOT creds as ptracer_cred — the bug), then execs pkexec itself. The traced setuid exec is NOT degraded because ptracer_cred is root, so the child becomes real root, still traced; - staged execveat() self-re-exec injects the payload as root. The staged self-re-exec needs the exploit to exist as its own binary with an argv[0] stage dispatcher, so the proven PoC is embedded verbatim (ptrace_helper_src.h — only spawn_shell() changed, to plant a root-owned proof + setuid bash instead of only an interactive shell), compiled on the target at runtime with unique -DSK_PROOF/-DSK_ROOTBASH paths, run, and verified by stat()'ing the root-owned artifacts (never self-report). Verified out-of-band on Ubuntu 18.04.0 / 4.15.0-50: `skeletonkey --exploit ptrace_traceme` as uid 1000 -> EXPLOIT_OK + a -rwsr-xr-x root:root bash. Real-world precondition, honestly reported: pkexec must authorize an auto-discovered implicit-active=yes helper, which needs an active local session (desktop) or a permissive polkit policy; over inactive ssh it returns "Not authorized" and the module reports EXPLOIT_FAIL with that diagnosis. Gated on a C compiler + pkexec; x86_64 only (register-level injection). cleanup() removes the artifacts. Unit harness green (33 + 115). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 22:14:19 -04:00
KaraZajac	1bdbe011b0	docs: nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086) kernel confirmed vulnerable; module gap scoped ... Ran the full methodology on the flagship kernel primitive: - Built Notselwyn's public universal PoC on jammy 5.15.0-25 (below patched branch 5.15.149) and ran it: hit the deliberate post-root `kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:379` / panic — the cross-cache slab corruption fired. Kernel is genuinely exploitable. - Diffed technique: the module is an honest trigger+groom SCAFFOLD (real NFT_GOTO+NFT_DROP double-free + msg_msg cg-96 groom) whose pipapo arb-write is FALLBACK-DEPTH (exact pipapo_elem layout is a documented TODO) -> honest EXPLOIT_FAIL. Notselwyn uses a heavier universal cross-cache -> dirty-pagetable technique (~2000 LOC, multi-file, static libnftnl/libmnl, no per-kernel offsets). Completing the module's full-chain is substantial dedicated exploit-dev, not a spot-the-bug fix. The piece that was actually broken and is now fixed+pushed is the offset resolver (cd9bea6): env-provided offsets were wiped under kptr_restrict, which blocked the entire --full-chain path. Recorded in docs/EXPLOITED.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 21:55:39 -04:00
KaraZajac	cd9bea6399	offsets: fix env override being wiped under kptr_restrict (unblocks all full-chains) ... skeletonkey_offsets_resolve() runs sources in priority order: env vars first, then /proc/kallsyms. On any default host kallsyms returns all-zero addresses (kptr_restrict), and parse_symfile treated "all zero" by UNCONDITIONALLY zeroing modprobe_path/init_task — clobbering the values apply_env had just set from SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH / SKELETONKEY_INIT_TASK. Net effect: the documented env-var offset override silently did nothing, so every --full-chain kernel primitive reported "offsets couldn't be resolved" even when correct offsets were supplied. Now the all-zero path only clears fields it tagged OFFSETS_FROM_KALLSYMS itself, preserving env (and table/System.map) values. Verified on Ubuntu 22.04.0 / 5.15.0-25: with SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH set, the resolver now reports "modprobe_path=0x... (env)", the modprobe_path finisher engages, and nf_tables' pipapo arb-write fires. (nf_tables itself still returns an honest EXPLOIT_FAIL: the reconstructed double-free arb-write doesn't reliably land the write yet — recorded in docs/EXPLOITED.md.) This fix is the prerequisite for verifying any of the ~13 primitive full-chains. Unit harness green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 21:41:02 -04:00
KaraZajac	6960d2076d	docs: record sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462) confirmed landing root ... sudo_host works as shipped — no code change. VM-verified on Ubuntu 22.04.0 / sudo 1.9.9-1ubuntu2: with a host-restricted sudoers rule (scoped to a host that is neither the current hostname nor ALL) and a resolvable host name, `sudo -h <host> <cmd>` runs as uid 0 (the -h/--host authorization-logic flaw). Module confirmed EXPLOIT_OK with a real uid=0 witness and popped a root shell. The only preconditions are environmental (the host-restricted rule, common with fleet-wide/LDAP/SSSD sudoers, supplied via SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST) — not a bug. VERIFICATIONS.jsonl + EXPLOITED.md updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 21:34:24 -04:00
KaraZajac	70972e0c9d	sudoedit_editor: fix CVE-2023-22809 exploit to actually land root ... The module built the right EDITOR="helper -- /etc/passwd" injection but failed two ways, both now fixed (VM-verified root on Ubuntu 22.04.0 / sudo 1.9.9-1ubuntu2): 1. Writable-CWD guard: sudoedit refuses to edit any file whose parent dir is user-writable. The injected "--" is resolved relative to CWD, so running from home/tmp made sudoedit abort "--: editing files in a writable directory" before the editor ran. Fix: chdir("/") in the sudoedit child. 2. Wrong tmp copy: sudoedit hands the editor one tmp copy per file, named <basename>.XXXXXX. The helper wrote argv[argc-1] — the sudoers-authorized COVER file (e.g. motd), not the target. Fix: the helper now matches the target's basename prefix (passed via SKEL_TARGET) to pick the right copy. Result: /etc/passwd gains a skel::0:0 row; `su skel` -> uid=0(root). docs/EXPLOITED.md + VERIFICATIONS.jsonl updated. Unit harness green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 21:32:44 -04:00
KaraZajac	6edf78f765	overlayfs_setuid: working CVE-2023-0386 exploit (libfuse) — lands real root ... The shipped module used a bogus chown-the-merged-view technique that never worked. Rewrote it as a faithful port of the public PoC (xkaneiki): a libfuse filesystem exports a setuid-root /file (st_uid=0, mode 04777), mounted in the init ns via the setuid fusermount helper; then unshare(USER|NS) + overlay with that FUSE mount as lowerdir; open(merged/file, O_WRONLY) triggers copy-up which materialises upper/file as a genuine setuid-root binary; the unprivileged parent execs it for real root. VM-verified landing real root on Ubuntu 22.04.0 / 5.15.0-25 (uid=0 witnessed out-of-band: /tmp/skeletonkey-ovlsu-pwned shows uid=0(root), and the dropped setuid /tmp/.suid_bash runs with euid=0). Four things were each required and took isolation to find: 1. Overlay refuses a userns-mounted FUSE lowerdir (ENOSYS) -> FUSE must be mounted in the init ns via fusermount (libfuse). A raw /dev/fuse server was tried and abandoned (fragile; destabilised the kernel on malformed INIT). 2. fuse2 low-level API (fuse_mount/fuse_new/fuse_loop_mt, empty args); fuse_main advertises copy_file_range caps that ENOSYS at copy-up with no fallback. 3. read_buf callback (copy-up splice read path). 4. ioctl callback (copy-up's FS_IOC_GETFLAGS) — the last missing piece. libfuse is linked conditionally via pkg-config (fuse/fuse3), matching the pack2theroot+libglib precedent; without it the module stubs to PRECOND_FAIL. Makefile detects it and adds $(OSU_LIBS) to the link. Module header + opsec notes rewritten to the real technique; docs/EXPLOITED.md updated. 148-test unit harness green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 21:26:13 -04:00
KaraZajac	3edad37184	docs: overlayfs_setuid debug outcome — kernel confirmed vulnerable, raw /dev/fuse fragile, use libfuse ... Confirmed CVE-2023-0386 vulnerable on jammy 5.15.0-25.25 empirically (upstream xkaneiki libfuse PoC pops root). Isolated the raw /dev/fuse port's failures: overlay refuses a userns-mounted FUSE lowerdir (ENOSYS) so FUSE must be mounted in the init ns via the setuid fusermount3 helper; got the fd-passing handshake + mount working, but the server EINVALs on read after FUSE_INIT (non-blocking fd, needs poll) and the flaky raw server repeatedly wedged/rebooted the VM. Raw protocol reimplementation is fragile and can destabilise the target -> use libfuse (proven, matches pack2theroot conditional-lib precedent). Ledger updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 20:57:27 -04:00
KaraZajac	58b44ebc43	docs: record overlayfs_setuid (FUSE port needed) + sudoedit_editor findings ... overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386) investigated on Ubuntu 22.04.0 / 5.15.0-25 (genuinely vulnerable): the non-FUSE chown copy-up yields upper/file owned by uid 1000 (no escalation), and overlay refuses a userns-mounted FUSE lowerdir with ENOSYS (plain overlay-in-userns works). A working exploit must mount FUSE in the init ns via the setuid fusermount helper (fd-passing protocol) then overlay in the userns — a substantial dedicated port. A raw /dev/fuse server was written and reverted after hitting the ENOSYS wall. sudoedit_editor (CVE-2023-22809) on sudo 1.9.9 returns EXPLOIT_FAIL — the SUDO_EDITOR/-- arg injection reaches sudoedit's writable-dir guard; needs target-file tuning and module debugging. Tractable next. Ledger + VERIFICATIONS.jsonl updated. No code change (overlayfs_setuid reverted to baseline; not committing a second non-working variant). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 20:34:58 -04:00
KaraZajac	e01aa99ec6	af_packet2: fix uid_map (read uid/gid before unshare) — same bug as cgroup ... af_packet2 read getuid()/getgid() AFTER unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), so it wrote "0 65534 1" to uid_map/gid_map (65534 = nobody, the initial unmapped id) and the write was rejected EPERM — the userns-root mapping silently failed and the CAP_NET_RAW primitive could not fire. Capture the outer uid/gid before unshare. Audited every userns module for the pattern; only cgroup_release_agent (fixed in 8c45b2b) and af_packet2 had it. Updated docs/EXPLOITED.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 20:18:03 -04:00
KaraZajac	8c45b2beb8	cgroup_release_agent: fix uid_map (read uid pre-unshare) + add CLONE_NEWCGROUP ... Two real bugs found via VM verification (Ubuntu 20.04.0 / 5.4.0-26): 1. uid_map EPERM: the child captured getuid()/getgid() AFTER unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), where they return 65534 (nobody, the initial unmapped id), so it wrote "0 65534 1" to uid_map — rejected with EPERM. Now the outer uid/gid are read BEFORE unshare, yielding the correct "0 <uid> 1" single-uid self-map. (overlayfs got this right, which is why it worked; this module didn't.) 2. mount EPERM: the unprivileged cgroup-v1 mount needs a private cgroup namespace. Added CLONE_NEWCGROUP (with a fallback) — mounting an unused v1 controller then succeeds. With both fixed the userns+cgroupns+mount setup is correct. Note: on a stock systemd host every v1 controller is already mounted (its release_agent is owned by init-root and unwritable from the userns) and creating a fresh named hierarchy is refused, so a bare unprivileged user cannot own release_agent — CVE-2022-0492 is reachable in a container context (CAP_SYS_ADMIN / an ownable cgroup), consistent with the module's "host root from rootless container" framing. Verified out-of-band; see docs/EXPLOITED.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 20:15:51 -04:00
KaraZajac	59cc2be065	ptrace_traceme: stop the false EXPLOIT_OK; add exploit-verification ledger ... ptrace_traceme reported EXPLOIT_OK while obtaining no root on a genuinely vulnerable host (Ubuntu 18.04.2 / 4.15.0-50). The bundled ptrace sequence is a non-working placeholder — it PTRACE_ATTACHes to the tracer, which by then has reparented to init, so the attach fails EPERM; the parent then execve'd the setuid trigger and the dispatcher's exec-transfer path reported a false OK. Now the parent fires the trigger in a grandchild, stays alive, and verifies euid==0 before claiming success — otherwise honest EXPLOIT_FAIL with a pointer to the real CVE-2019-13272 technique (Jann Horn / bcoles) that still needs porting. Adds docs/EXPLOITED.md: the exploit-verification ledger (root witnessed OUT OF BAND, not from the module's self-report). Confirmed landing root: refluxfs, overlayfs, pwnkit (after its gconv fix), sudo_runas_neg1. Needs PoC ports: ptrace_traceme, overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386 FUSE copy-up), sudo_samedit (heap), cgroup_release_agent. ~30 modules still exploit-untested. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 19:59:48 -04:00
KaraZajac	24b839eccf	pwnkit: fix the gconv re-injection layout so the exploit actually lands root ... The exploit reported EXPLOIT_OK but did NOT get root on a genuinely vulnerable target (Ubuntu 20.04.0, polkit 0.105-26ubuntu1). pkexec printed "Cannot run program pwnkit" + glibc "Could not open converter from UTF-8 to PWNKIT" and no root shell was obtained — a false positive from the dispatcher's "execve transferred → clean exit = OK" path. Root cause: the module built workdir/pwnkit/{gconv-modules,PWNKIT.so} correctly but omitted the two pieces that make the GCONV_PATH trick fire: 1. a directory literally named "GCONV_PATH=." containing an executable "pwnkit", so pkexec's g_find_program_in_path() resolves argv[0] and RE-INJECTS GCONV_PATH=./pwnkit into the sanitised environment; and 2. chdir(workdir) so the re-injected relative "./pwnkit" resolves to the gconv dir. It also set an absolute GCONV_PATH=<workdir>/pwnkit directly in envp, which pkexec strips (GCONV_PATH is on polkit's blacklist) — removed. VM-verified after the fix on Ubuntu 20.04.0 / 5.4.0-26 (polkit 0.105-26ubuntu1): unprivileged sk -> uid=0(root), confirmed out-of-band (wrote /root/, read /etc/shadow). overlayfs (CVE-2021-3493) also confirmed landing root on the same host; sudo_samedit returns an honest EXPLOIT_FAIL there (heap not landed). Found via the new qemu exploit-verification sweep (root confirmed out-of-band, not from the module's self-report). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 19:40:04 -04:00
KaraZajac	c55adc1840	refluxfs: drop the redundant standalone verify harness ... The own-files reachability harness tools/verify-vm/refluxfs_verify.c is superseded by the module itself: the safe default --exploit does the same own-files reachability confirmation, and --full-chain provides the stronger end-to-end proof (actual root). Remove the standalone and repoint the three doc references (MODULE.md, RELEASE_NOTES.md, targets.yaml) at the module's full-chain verification. The 4/4 own-files measurement it produced is kept as a historical data point, just without the now-deleted reproducer. No code depended on it; 148-test unit harness still green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 18:50:58 -04:00
KaraZajac	5c18b678a5	refluxfs: wire the --full-chain /etc/passwd root pop (🟡 trigger -> 🟢 full chain) ... Promotes refluxfs (CVE-2026-64600) to a 🟢 full-chain module. VM-verified end-to-end on Rocky Linux 9.8 / 5.14.0-687.10.1.el9_8.0.1.x86_64 under qemu/KVM, unprivileged uid=1000, SELinux Enforcing: skeletonkey --exploit refluxfs --i-know --full-chain reflink-clones /etc/passwd, races the CoW window (32 writers / 8 helpers), strips root's password field on-disk (root❌ -> root::, the public PoC's technique), evicts the stale page cache, verifies via O_DIRECT and returns EXPLOIT_OK. `su root` (empty password) then gives uid 0. 3/3 wins on a private-extent target (1244/3716/7913 rounds, 4-30s). Safety properties (this bug rewrites the block device permanently, unlike the page-cache 🟢 modules): - Crafts the payload FIRST and refuses unless it can preserve both root and the invoking user's line; every other passwd line is kept byte-for-byte. A tail-truncating port drops sshd/nobody/the caller and bricks login (hit exactly this during development). - Backs /etc/passwd up before the race; restores on failure; cleanup() restores it (run as root after the pop). - Destructive path gated behind --full-chain. Plain --exploit / --auto run only the safe own-files trigger (EXPLOIT_FAIL), unchanged. Exploitability constraint discovered during verification (NOT in the Qualys writeup): the race only fires when the target's extent is PRIVATE going in. The block starts at refcount 2 (target + attacker clone), the concurrent CoW drops it to 1, and the stale writer reads "1 -> private". A file already reflink-shared with a third file keeps a post-CoW refcount > 1 and is NOT attackable via that target. Stock Rocky 9 ships /etc/passwd pre-shared and was unattackable across ~41,000 rounds; rewriting it to a private extent (byte-identical content, as any useradd/passwd/vipw does) made it fall in ~2,000 rounds. So the exploitable state is the normal administered state. Also fixed a page-cache staleness bug in the win path: the overwrite bypasses the target inode, so its clean cached pages are never invalidated and a buffered read (getpwnam in `su`, or the module's own verify) would see the OLD passwd. The module now issues POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED on a win and verifies via O_DIRECT. detect() --active gains a per-target extent-privacy check: it reports whether /etc/passwd is private (attackable) or already-shared (not). 88-test unit harness still green (148 total). Docs updated: MODULE.md (full-chain flow, private-extent precondition, verification tables), NOTICE.md, CVES.md (🟢 + tier/ops tables), README (15 full-chain / 13 primitive; lands-root list), RELEASE_NOTES, targets.yaml. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 18:45:32 -04:00
KaraZajac	e46a32f11e	modules: add refluxfs (CVE-2026-64600, "RefluXFS" XFS reflink CoW ILOCK race) ... Adds the corpus's first XFS module and its first data-oriented kernel bug — every other kernel entry corrupts memory; this one corrupts file contents. xfs_direct_write_iomap_begin() reads the data-fork extent map under ILOCK, then xfs_reflink_fill_cow_hole() drops ILOCK to wait for transaction log space. On reacquiring it, the code re-queries the refcount btree at the ORIGINAL imap->br_startblock and never re-reads the data fork. A second O_DIRECT writer holding only IOLOCK completes a whole CoW cycle in that window, so the first writer's stale mapping sees refcount 1, treats a still-shared block as private, and writes to it in place — landing its data on the reflink source file's on-disk blocks. The primitive is an arbitrary overwrite of the on-disk contents of any readable file, which has three consequences that drive the design: - No offsets, no ROP, no KASLR/SMEP/SMAP; SELinux, containers and seccomp are all irrelevant. - The victim's inode is never written, so mtime/ctime/size never change and nothing is logged — FIM and `-w /etc/passwd -p wa` cannot see it. - The change persists across reboots. Introduced 4.11 (3c68d44a2b49); fixed 2f4acd0fcd86 (mainline 7.2-rc4, merged 2026-07-16), stable backports 7.1.4 / 6.18.39 / 6.12.96. Exposure is distro-shaped: RHEL/CentOS/Rocky/Alma/Oracle/CloudLinux 8-10, Fedora Server >= 31 and Amazon Linux 2023 ship XFS+reflink by default. detect() is not a pure version gate — reachability here is safely observable, so it pairs the backport table with a real storage precondition (writable XFS via statfs XFS_SUPER_MAGIC, deliberately not via a successful FICLONE since btrfs implements that too and is unaffected). --active confirms reflink via FICLONE; SKELETONKEY_XFS_ASSUME_REFLINK=1/0 overrides. On rpm-family hosts it warns that vendors backport without bumping the upstream version, so the verdict speaks only to the upstream base. exploit() forks a child that works only in a private mkdtemp scratch dir on two files it owns: it establishes a shared extent (FICLONE, corroborated by FIEMAP_EXTENT_SHARED) plus an O_DIRECT gate, then races a hard-bounded 8 writers / 2 helpers / 16 rounds / 2s and stops, reading the donor back with O_DIRECT. Deliberately under-driven, and it never clones or targets a file it does not own — the /etc/passwd overwrite -> su -> root step is documented but NOT bundled. Always returns EXPLOIT_FAIL. Safety rank 55, far above bad_epoll (12) and ghostlock (11): a won race corrupts 4 KiB of our own scratch file and cannot touch kernel memory, so there is no oops/KASAN/panic path. Detection inverts the usual advice. auditd/sigma anchor on ioctl request 0x40049409 (FICLONE, matched exactly) and openat O_DIRECT; falco adds the cross-uid reflink condition; and the yara rule is genuinely the right tool here, matching the on-disk artifact because FIM is structurally blind. VM-VERIFIED 2026-07-23 — the corpus's first rpm-family verification, taking the empirical count to 29 of 41 CVEs. Rocky Linux 9.8 / 5.14.0-687.10.1.el9_8.0.1.x86_64 under qemu/KVM, stock GenericCloud layout with no provisioner changes (root is XFS with reflink=1 out of the box). detect() -> VULNERABLE, --active FICLONE witness confirmed reflink, phase A observed FIEMAP_EXTENT_SHARED on a real shared extent, scratch self-cleaned, clean build on el9 gcc. The underlying bug was separately confirmed winnable on that kernel via tools/verify-vm/refluxfs_verify.c at the public PoC's parameters (32 writers / 8 helpers, 60s): 4/4 runs won, first divergence after 69/114/170/494 rounds. The shipped under-driven trigger did NOT win in its 2s budget on that same vulnerable kernel — intended behaviour, and exactly why a non-win must never be read as "patched". 14 new detect() unit rows (148 tests total, 0 failures). Bumps to v0.9.14. Credit: Qualys Threat Research Unit (blog by Saeed Abbasi; the technical advisory credits model-assisted kernel analysis performed with Anthropic), and the upstream XFS maintainers who fixed it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y	2026-07-23 17:49:40 -04:00
Kara Zajac	d466fbfdcb	docs: cache-bust og:image to ?v=2 (force fresh card past Cloudflare/social cache) ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-13 17:27:15 -04:00
Kara Zajac	a8bc81c54c	docs: regenerate og.png with skeletonkey.netslum.io URL ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-13 17:25:55 -04:00
Kara Zajac	b7027a1749	docs: point OG/canonical URLs to skeletonkey.netslum.io (new home) ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-13 17:15:53 -04:00
KaraZajac	03324c8542	modules: add ghostlock (CVE-2026-43499, "GhostLock" rtmutex/futex requeue-PI stack UAF) ... Adds the ghostlock module for CVE-2026-43499 ("GhostLock", VEGA / Nebula Security's "IonStack part II") — a ~15-year race UAF on kernel STACK memory in the rtmutex/futex requeue-PI path (kernel/locking/rtmutex.c). On the -EDEADLK deadlock-rollback, remove_waiter() runs against `current` instead of the waiter task, so a concurrent sched_setattr()-driven PI-chain priority walk on another CPU clears pi_blocked_on on the wrong task and leaves an on-stack rt_mutex_waiter dangling. Reachable by any unprivileged user (CVSS 7.8, PR:L) — plain futex(2) + sched_setattr(2), no userns/CONFIG beyond CONFIG_FUTEX_PI. The corpus's first rtmutex/futex-PI module and first kernel-stack UAF (all others are heap/slab). Introduced 2.6.39; fixed 3bfdc63936dd (7.1-rc1), stable backports 7.0.4 / 6.18.27 / 6.12.86 / 6.6.140 / 6.1.175; 5.15/5.10/5.4/4.19 affected with no upstream fix. CWE-416; not in KEV. detect() is a pure version gate over the five-branch backport table. exploit() forks an isolated child that (A) deterministically confirms the -EDEADLK remove_waiter() rollback path is reachable (safe — no concurrent walk means no dangling pointer; validated on real hardware) then (B) exercises the actual race a hard-bounded 24 iters / 2s with a sibling-CPU sched_setattr(SCHED_BATCH) storm, and stops. Deliberately under-driven: no copy_from_user widening, no stack-frame spray/reoccupation, and the KernelSnitch leak -> forged-waiter -> fops/ashmem/pipe R/W -> cred-patch chain (Android/Pixel-specific, per-build offsets) is NOT bundled. Returns EXPLOIT_FAIL. Lowest --auto safety rank (11) — a won race corrupts the kernel stack. Unlike most races it ships a real detection signature (futex requeue-PI returning EDEADLK + sibling sched_setattr); auditd/sigma anchor on sched_setattr, falco/eBPF on the EDEADLK tell; no yara. Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank 11, version 0.9.13, 9 detect() test rows (incl. 6.13.0 -> VULNERABLE, the multi-branch "newer than all" case), CVE metadata (CWE-416 / T1068 / not-KEV; cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md regenerated -> 13 of 40), README + CVES.md + website counts (45 modules / 40 CVEs), RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.13, verify-vm target. Also corrects pre-existing docs/index.html drift left by v0.9.12 (body counts stuck at 43/38 and a missing bad_epoll corpus pill). Tests: 33 kernel_range + 101 detect, all pass. Credit: VEGA / Nebula Security (nebusec.ai, NebuSec/CyberMeowfia, Apache-2.0); upstream fix 3bfdc63936dd (Keenan Dong / Thomas Gleixner). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KUq4DGXSPBmPkAyJ9WnM9n	2026-07-13 15:43:00 -04:00
KaraZajac	95589e26cb	modules: add bad_epoll (CVE-2026-46242, "Bad Epoll" epoll teardown race UAF) ... Jaeyoung Chung's kernelCTF "Bad Epoll": a race-condition use-after-free in fs/eventpoll.c. ep_remove() clears file->f_ep under f_lock but keeps using the file (hlist_del_rcu + unlock) while a concurrent __fput() frees the still-referenced struct eventpoll. Reachable by any unprivileged user with no userns / CONFIG / capability; weaponised via cross-cache to a struct file, /proc/self/fdinfo arb-read, and ROP. Introduced 58c9b016e128 (6.4), fixed a6dc643c6931 (7.1-rc1), stable backport 7.0.13. CWE-416; not in KEV. The corpus's first epoll / VFS-teardown module. Shipped as a reconstructed, deliberately under-driven trigger on the stackrot / nft_catchall contract: detect() is a pure version gate (>= 6.4 and below the on-branch fix; no userns precondition -- epoll needs none); exploit() forks a CPU-pinned child that exercises the ep_remove-vs-__fput close window a hard-bounded 48 attempts / 2s and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL. It does not grind the race to a win, does not do the cross-cache reclaim, and does not bundle the fdinfo R/W + ROP (a won race frees a live struct file and rarely trips KASAN -> silent-corruption risk). Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank (12 -- lowest in the corpus; a kernel race is the least predictable class), 5 detect() test rows (version gating), CVE metadata (sorted insert, CWE-416 / T1068 / not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts (44/39), RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.12, and a verify-vm target (sweep pending). Detection rules are intentionally weak/structural (epoll ubiquitous, rarely KASAN) -- post-exploitation euid-0 transition, no yara. Also corrects pre-existing README drift in the "not yet verified" count (8 -> 11). Not VM-verified, so the verified count stays 28 of 39. Version 0.9.12. Credit: Jaeyoung Chung (J-jaeyoung). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KUq4DGXSPBmPkAyJ9WnM9n	2026-07-04 19:35:33 -04:00
KaraZajac	4d0a0e2443	modules: add nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111, nf_tables catch-all abort UAF) ... The newest nftables LPE: a use-after-free in the nf_tables transaction- abort path. An inverted condition (a stray '!') in nft_map_catchall_activate() makes the abort path process active catch-all map elements instead of skipping them; a catch-all GOTO element drives a chain's use-count to zero so a following DELCHAIN frees it while the catch-all verdict still references it -> UAF, escalatable from an unprivileged user (userns + nftables) via modprobe_path/selinux_state ROP. Fixed upstream by f41c5d1; CWE-416, CVSS 7.8; not in CISA KEV. Public reproduction by FuzzingLabs. Takes the corpus to 43 modules / 38 CVEs. 🟡 reconstructed trigger, primitive-only, NOT VM-verified — same contract as nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086). detect() version-gates (catch-all elems ~5.13; Debian backports 6.1.164/6.12.73/6.18.10, 7.0+ inherits) AND requires unprivileged user_ns clone (else PRECOND_FAIL). exploit() forks an isolated child, builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO element, provokes an aborting batch to drive the abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo, and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL — the per-kernel leak + R/W + modprobe_path ROP is not bundled. kernel_range table verified drift-clean against the live Debian tracker (the 6.18 branch / 6.18.10 fix is the real forky/sid backport; the earlier 7.0.10 figure was wrong). Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank (35), 6 detect() test rows (version + userns gating), CVE_METADATA.json + cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md (sorted insert, CWE-416/T1068/not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts (43/38) + yellow pill, RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.11, verify-vm target. Credit: FuzzingLabs + upstream fix f41c5d1. Version 0.9.11.	2026-06-08 17:42:19 -04:00
KaraZajac	050731396d	docs: record partial VM verification of cifswitch (CVE-2026-46243) ... Verified 2026-06-08 on Ubuntu 24.04.4 / kernel 6.8.0-117-generic under QEMU/HVF (offline: cloud image + payload iso, no guest networking): - modprobe cifs registers the cifs.spnego key type (cifs-utils not needed to reach the primitive). - Independent python3 ctypes add_key('cifs.spnego', forged uid/creduid/upcall_target) ACCEPTED (user-key control also accepted); module exploit() independently reported 'primitive CONFIRMED' then the honest EXPLOIT_FAIL. - detect() returned PRECOND_FAIL without cifs-utils and VULNERABLE under SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1. Still pending (so cifswitch stays 🟡 and is NOT counted as a verified end-to-end CVE; verified count stays 28 of 37): a patched kernel (>=6.12.90/7.0.10) to prove add_key is REJECTED there (probe discriminates fixed-from-vulnerable), and the full namespace+NSS root-pop. Recorded in NOTICE.md, CVES.md, RELEASE_NOTES.md, and tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml.	2026-06-08 13:53:29 -04:00
KaraZajac	ada56b0db3	modules: add cifswitch (CVE-2026-46243, Asim Manizada's CIFSwitch) ... CIFSwitch is the newest kernel-7-era LPE not already in the corpus: a ~19-year-old logic flaw in fs/smb/client/cifs_spnego.c where the cifs.spnego request-key type accepts key descriptions created by userspace (add_key(2)/request_key(2)) without verifying the request came from the in-kernel CIFS client. The description's authority-bearing fields (pid/uid/creduid/upcall_target) are trusted by the root cifs.upcall helper; with user+mount namespace tricks an unprivileged user coerces cifs.upcall into loading an attacker NSS module as root. Fixed upstream by 3da1fdf4efbc (merged 7.1-rc5); CWE-20; not in CISA KEV. Takes the corpus to 42 modules / 37 CVEs. 🟡 honest port — full chain not VM-verified. detect() gates on the kernel version (Debian backports 5.10.257/6.1.174/6.12.90/7.0.10) AND on the cifs userspace path (cifs.upcall / cifs.spnego request-key rule), so a vulnerable kernel without cifs-utils is PRECOND_FAIL not a false positive (override via SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1/0). exploit() fires only the non-destructive add_key(2) cifs.spnego probe (no upcall, loads nothing, revoked immediately) and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL without a euid-0 witness — the namespace+NSS root-pop is not bundled until VM-verified. --mitigate blocklists the cifs module; --cleanup reverts. Wired everywhere: registry, Makefile, safety rank (86), 6 detect() test rows (env-driven precondition override), CVE_METADATA.json + cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md (sorted insert, CWE-20/T1068/not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts (42/37) and a yellow module pill, RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.10, verify-vm target (sweep pending). Credit: Asim Manizada. Version 0.9.10.	2026-06-08 11:07:27 -04:00
KaraZajac	28a9289989	fix: normalize CVE_METADATA.json to sorted order (drift-check) ... The weekly drift-check stayed red after v0.9.9's KEV+CWE fixes because of a latent ordering bug: sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462), added in v0.9.8, was appended to the end of CVE_METADATA.json instead of its sorted position. check_drift compares the record list in discover_cves() sorted order, so the misplaced entry read as drift independent of its field values. Regenerated via tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py — sorted order restored, all field values reconfirmed against CISA KEV + NVD in a clean fetch.	2026-06-08 10:30:25 -04:00
KaraZajac	e457b22c1f	release v0.9.9: install.sh needs no sudo + CVE metadata drift fix ... install.sh never escalates to sudo. The installer defaulted to /usr/local/bin and fell back to `sudo mv`, prompting for a password on exactly the unprivileged accounts a privilege-escalation tool targets. It now uses /usr/local/bin only when already writable and otherwise installs to a per-user $HOME/.local/bin (honoring XDG_BIN_HOME), no sudo ever. An explicit SKELETONKEY_PREFIX is honored and errors rather than escalating. The documented one-liner prepends ~/.local/bin to PATH so it resolves on a fresh login, and the quickstart drops the misleading sudo from --scan / --audit / --auto. CVE metadata drift (the failing weekly drift-check): - CVE-2022-0492 (cgroup_release_agent) entered CISA KEV 2026-06-02; corpus now 13 of 36 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs. - CVE-2026-46333 (ptrace_pidfd) gained CWE-269 from NVD (was unclassified at module-add time). Refreshed CVE_METADATA.json, generated cve_metadata.c, and KEV_CROSSREF.md; README + website KEV counts and version bumped to 0.9.9.	2026-06-08 10:16:24 -04:00
KaraZajac	60579f1602	release v0.9.8: two new LPE modules (ptrace_pidfd, sudo_host) ... Tags the two modules added this cycle (already on main): ptrace_pidfd (CVE-2026-46333, Qualys __ptrace_may_access/pidfd_getfd credential-fd theft, bd63aab) and sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462, Stratascale sudo -h/--host policy bypass, dd5f4fa). This commit bumps the version strings (skeletonkey.c, README, docs/index.html) and prepends the v0.9.8 RELEASE_NOTES entry. Corpus is now 41 modules / 36 CVEs / 28 verified. Tagging fires release.yml, which rebuilds + publishes the four prebuilt binaries via the Node-24 artifact actions bumped in v0.9.7.	2026-06-02 09:03:05 -04:00
KaraZajac	dd5f4fa06d	modules: add sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462, Stratascale sudo --host policy bypass) ... Second new module this cycle; sibling of sudo_chwoot (CVE-2025-32463, same Stratascale/Rich Mirch disclosure). sudo's -h/--host option — meant only to pair with -l/--list — was honored when running a command, so a sudoers rule scoped to a host other than the current machine (and not ALL) is usable via 'sudo -h <host> <cmd>' for local root. Affects sudo 1.8.8 -> 1.9.17p0; fixed 1.9.17p1. CWE-863, CVSS 8.8 (not in KEV). detect(): version-gate [1.8.8, 1.9.17p0] via ctx->host->sudo_version (the host-restricted rule itself isn't probeable unprivileged, so VULNERABLE means 'vulnerable sudo present'). exploit(): discovers an abusable host-restricted rule from readable sudoers (or SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST), witnesses with 'sudo -n -h <host> id -u', pops 'sudo -h <host> /bin/bash' (SKELETONKEY_SUDO_CMD) only on a uid-0 witness; honest EXPLOIT_FAIL + operator guidance otherwise. Shared 'sudo' family; structural, arch=any; safety rank 96. auditd/sigma/falco rules, NOTICE.md (Rich Mirch / Stratascale) + MODULE.md, 4 detect() test rows. Wiring: registry, Makefile, cve_metadata (+JSON), verify-vm/targets.yaml (ubuntu1804 sudo 1.8.21p2 target, sweep pending). Docs: README + CVES.md + docs/index.html counts 40->41 modules / 35->36 CVEs; not-yet-verified lists + corpus pill.	2026-06-02 08:43:09 -04:00
KaraZajac	bd63aabd64	modules: add ptrace_pidfd (CVE-2026-46333, Qualys ptrace/pidfd_getfd cred-steal) ... New module for Qualys's 2026-05-20 disclosure: a __ptrace_may_access logic flaw leaves a process dropping privileges briefly reachable past its dumpable boundary; pidfd_getfd(2) steals root-opened fds / authenticated channels from it. Default-distro, no userns, arch-agnostic (fd-steal, no shellcode). detect(): version-pinned, predates-gate at pidfd_getfd's 5.6 introduction; kernel_range from Debian backports (5.10.251/6.1.172/6.12.88/7.0.7), drift-check clean. exploit(): spawns a setuid victim, pidfd_open()s it, sweeps pidfd_getfd() over its fd table during the cred-drop window, reports any uid-0-owned fd captured from a non-root context. Honest EXPLOIT_FAIL without a euid-0 witness; not yet VM-verified. mitigate(): yama ptrace_scope=2; cleanup() reverts. auditd/sigma/falco rules, NOTICE.md (Qualys TRU credit) + MODULE.md, safety rank 84. Wiring: registry, Makefile, cve_metadata (+JSON source), verify-vm/targets.yaml (ubuntu2204 + mainline 5.15.5 target, sweep pending). Docs: README + CVES.md + docs/index.html counts 39->40 modules / 34->35 CVEs; added to not-yet-verified lists + corpus pill.	2026-06-02 08:26:24 -04:00
KaraZajac	1663df69d1	release v0.9.7: kernel_range drift fix + CI Node 24 readiness ... Tags the maintenance work landed since v0.9.6. The fragnesia drift fix (35c33df) and checkout v4->v6 bump (6c148e2) are already on main; this commit adds the remaining CI Node-24 bumps + version strings. release.yml: upload-artifact v4->v7, download-artifact v4->v8, softprops/action-gh-release v2->v3 (last of the Node-20-era actions; GitHub forces node24 on 2026-06-16). Reviewed each changelog — our default-zip/unique-name upload + full-set download is unaffected by the major-version breaking changes (opt-in direct uploads, download-by-ID path). Version bumped to 0.9.7 (skeletonkey.c, README, docs/index.html) + v0.9.7 RELEASE_NOTES entry. Tagging this commit fires release.yml — the end-to-end test of the new artifact actions, incl. the Alpine/musl static job under node24.	2026-06-01 11:55:31 -04:00
KaraZajac	25c2afc3e9	release v0.9.6: --auto no longer prompts for sudo password ... sudo_runas_neg1 and sudoedit_editor's detect() bodies invoked 'sudo -ln' (intending list + non-interactive). Some sudoers / PAM configurations have been observed prompting for a password anyway when the flags are bundled. That meant skeletonkey --auto --i-know could hang on a sudo password prompt during the corpus scan — bad ergonomics for an LPE tool whose whole point is to get root without already having it. Fix: write '-n -l' as separate flags, redirect stdin from /dev/null so sudo cannot fall back to reading the tty even if PAM tries to coerce one. Belt-and-suspenders against any tty prompt during --auto.	2026-05-28 21:50:26 -04:00
KaraZajac	13fbbce618	release v0.9.5: kernel_range drift cleanup (12 modules) ... v0.9.4 fixed cve_metadata drift but exposed kernel_range drift which had been hidden behind it. Applied refresh-kernel-ranges.py --patch recommendations: 11 TOO_TIGHT findings (false-positive risk — our threshold later than Debian's earliest known fix) + 8 MISSING (Debian has fixes for branches we didn't model) across 12 modules. All changes are strictly correctness-improving: detect() now correctly returns OK on kernels Debian has on record as patched, instead of false-positiving VULNERABLE. The biggest single fix is reverting fragnesia from {7,0,10} (NVD) to {7,0,9} (Debian's backported fix). I introduced that off-by-one in v0.9.4 from misreading NVD's versionEndExcluding semantics. Build's kernel_range drift step now exits 0 with 0 TOO_TIGHT + 0 MISSING.	2026-05-28 14:51:15 -04:00
KaraZajac	4454d8148e	release v0.9.4: drift unblock, fragnesia range fix, infra docs ... - Sync docs/CVE_METADATA.json + KEV_CROSSREF.md to match the hand-applied core/cve_metadata.c entries from v0.9.3. Nightly drift-check (red since 2026-05-25) now passes. Pintheft's CWE landed as CWE-787 from NVD (was NULL in the hand-applied entry). - Fix fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) range table. Per NVD: bug entered at 5.11 SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, vulnerable through 5.15.207 / 6.1.173 / 6.6.140 / 6.12.90 / 6.18.32 / 7.0.9, fixed at .208/.174/.141/ .91/.33/.10. Prior table had one entry {7,0,9} — off-by-one and missing every other backport. Added predates-5.11 introduction gate + test row. - Update tools/verify-vm/README.md to document the v0.9.x infra: mainline kernel pinning via kernel.ubuntu.com, per-module provisioner hooks, two-phase prep→reboot→verify with post-reboot kernel confirmation, GRUB_DEFAULT pinning. - Add curl fallback for NVD lookups in refresh-cve-metadata.py. Mirrors the CISA path's existing fallback. Prevents the silent Python urlopen hang seen during v0.9.3 prep (55-min stuck on CLOSE_WAIT socket; 30s timeout never fired).	2026-05-28 13:33:28 -04:00
KaraZajac	fa0228df9b	release v0.9.3: CVE metadata refresh (KEV 10→12) + dirtydecrypt bug fix ... CVE metadata refresh: - Added 8 entries to core/cve_metadata.c for the v0.8.0 + v0.9.0 module CVEs. Two are CISA-KEV-listed: - CVE-2018-14634 mutagen_astronomy (2026-01-26, CWE-190) - CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot (2025-09-29, CWE-829) - Populated via direct curl when refresh-cve-metadata.py's Python urlopen hung on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint for ~55 min — same data, different transport. dirtydecrypt module bug fix: - dd_detect() was wrongly gating 'predates the bug' on kernel < 7.0 - Per NVD CVE-2026-31635: bug entered at 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable through 6.18.22 / 6.19.12 / 7.0-rc7; fixed at 6.18.23 / 6.19.13 / 7.0 - Fix: predates-gate now uses 6.16.1; patched_branches[] adds {6,18,23} - Re-verified: dirtydecrypt now correctly returns VULNERABLE on mainline 6.19.7 instead of OK. Previously a false negative on real vulnerable kernels. Footer goes from '10 in CISA KEV' to '12 in CISA KEV'. Verified count stays at 28 but dirtydecrypt's record is now a TRUE VULNERABLE match (was OK match).	2026-05-24 01:17:58 -04:00
KaraZajac	d52fcd5512	docs: sweep stale counts to match v0.9.2 binary state ... Audit found several user-facing surfaces still carrying old numbers from earlier releases. Brought everything in line with the binary's authoritative footer ('39 modules · 10 KEV · 28 verified · 7 any'). README.md: - Status section: v0.9.0 → v0.9.2 framing; describe the 22 → 28 verification arc (v0.9.1 + v0.9.2) - '119 detection rules' → 151 (current bundled count) - '10 of 26 KEV-listed' → '10 of 34' - 'Not yet verified (4 of 26 CVEs)' → '(6 of 34 CVEs)' with the new honest list (vmwgfx, dirty_cow, mutagen_astronomy, pintheft, vsock_uaf, fragnesia) and the reason each is blocked - Example --auto output: 31 → 39 modules docs/index.html: - '22 of 26 CVEs confirmed' → '28 of 34', mainline kernel list expanded (5.4.0-26 / 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 / 6.19.7) - Corpus section '26 CVEs across 10 years' → '34 CVEs' - '26 CVEs, 10-year span' (author list intro) → '34 CVEs' - Footer feature list '22 of 26' → '28 of 34' - KEV stat chip 11 → 10 (matches binary; the anticipated 11th from metadata refresh hasn't been added yet) - '119 detection rules' → '151' (two occurrences) docs/og.svg + og.png: - KEV chip 11 → 10 (matches binary) CVES.md: - '31 modules' → '39 modules covering 34 CVEs' - Rewrote the unverified-rows note to match the actual 6-module list No content changes to RELEASE_NOTES.md or ROADMAP.md — those entries correctly describe state at the time they were written.	2026-05-24 00:09:21 -04:00
KaraZajac	66cca39a55	release v0.9.2: dirtydecrypt verified on mainline 6.19.7 (22 → 28) ... Verifies CVE-2026-31635 dirtydecrypt's OK path on a kernel that predates the bug: 'kernel predates the rxgk RESPONSE-handling code added in 7.0' — match. Confirms detect() doesn't false-positive on older 6.x kernels. Attempted fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) but mainline 7.0.5 .debs depend on libssl3t64 / libelf1t64 (t64-transition libs from Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+). No Parallels-supported Vagrant box ships those yet — dpkg --force-depends leaves the kernel package in iHR state with no /boot/vmlinuz. Marked manual: true with rationale. Verifier infrastructure: pin-mainline now uses dpkg --force-depends as a fallback so partial-install state can at least be inspected.	2026-05-24 00:03:35 -04:00
KaraZajac	8ac041a295	release v0.9.1: VM verification sweep 22 → 27 ... Five more CVEs empirically confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs: - CVE-2019-14287 sudo_runas_neg1 (Ubuntu 18.04 + sudoers grant) - CVE-2020-29661 tioscpgrp (Ubuntu 20.04 pinned to 5.4.0-26) - CVE-2024-26581 nft_pipapo (Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline 5.15.5) - CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot (Ubuntu 22.04 + sudo 1.9.16p1 from source) - CVE-2025-6019 udisks_libblockdev (Debian 12 + udisks2 + polkit rule) Required real plumbing work: - Per-module provisioner hook (tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh) - Two-phase provision in verify.sh (prep → reboot if needed → verify) fixes silent-fail where new kernel installed but VM never rebooted - GRUB_DEFAULT pinning in both pin-kernel and pin-mainline blocks (kernel downgrades like 5.4.0-169 → 5.4.0-26 now actually boot the target) - Old-mainline URL fallback in pin-mainline (≤ 4.15 debs at /v$KVER/ not /amd64/) mutagen_astronomy marked manual: true — mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on Ubuntu 18.04's rootfs ('Failed to execute /init (error -8)' — kernel config mismatch). Genuinely needs a CentOS 6 / Debian 7 image.	2026-05-23 23:35:02 -04:00
KaraZajac	d84b3b0033	release v0.9.0: 5 gap-fillers — every year 2016 → 2026 now covered ... Five new modules close the 2018 gap entirely and thicken 2019 / 2020 / 2024. All five carry the full 4-format detection-rule corpus + opsec_notes + arch_support + register helpers. CVE-2018-14634 — mutagen_astronomy (Qualys, closes 2018) create_elf_tables() int wrap → SUID-execve stack corruption. CISA KEV-listed Jan 2026 despite the bug's age; legacy RHEL 7 / CentOS 7 / Debian 8 fleets still affected. 🟡 PRIMITIVE. arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64. CVE-2019-14287 — sudo_runas_neg1 (Joe Vennix) sudo -u#-1 → uid_t underflow → root despite (ALL,!root) blacklist. Pure userspace logic bug; the famous Apple Information Security finding. detect() looks for a (ALL,!root) grant in sudo -ln output; PRECOND_FAIL when no such grant exists for the invoking user. arch_support: any (4 -> 5 userspace 'any' modules). CVE-2020-29661 — tioscpgrp (Jann Horn / Project Zero) TTY TIOCSPGRP ioctl race on PTY pairs → struct pid UAF in kmalloc-256. Affects everything through Linux 5.9.13. 🟡 PRIMITIVE (race-driver + msg_msg groom). Public PoCs from grsecurity / spender + Maxime Peterlin. CVE-2024-50264 — vsock_uaf (a13xp0p0v / Pwnie Award 2025 winner) AF_VSOCK connect-race UAF in kmalloc-96. Pwn2Own 2024 + Pwnie 2025 winner. Reachable as plain unprivileged user (no userns required — unusual). Two public exploit paths: @v4bel+@qwerty kernelCTF (BPF JIT spray + SLUBStick) and Alexander Popov / PT SWARM (msg_msg). 🟡 PRIMITIVE. CVE-2024-26581 — nft_pipapo (Notselwyn II, 'Flipping Pages') nft_set_pipapo destroy-race UAF. Sibling to nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086) from the same Notselwyn paper. Distinct bug in the pipapo set substrate. Same family signature. 🟡 PRIMITIVE. Plumbing changes: core/registry.h + registry_all.c — 5 new register declarations + calls. Makefile — 5 new MUT/SRN/TIO/VSK/PIP module groups in MODULE_OBJS. tests/test_detect.c — 7 new test rows covering the new modules (above-fix OK, predates-the-bug OK, sudo-no-grant PRECOND_FAIL). tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — verifier entries for all 5 with honest 'expect_detect' values based on what Vagrant boxes can realistically reach (mutagen_astronomy gets OK on stock 18.04 since 4.15.0-213 is post-fix; sudo_runas_neg1 gets PRECOND_FAIL because no (ALL,!root) grant on default vagrant user; tioscpgrp + nft_pipapo VULNERABLE with kernel pins; vsock_uaf flagged manual because vsock module rarely available on CI runners). tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py — added curl fallback for the CISA KEV CSV fetch (urlopen times out intermittently against CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint). Corpus growth across v0.8.0 + v0.9.0: v0.7.1 v0.8.0 v0.9.0 Modules 31 34 39 Distinct CVEs 26 29 34 KEV-listed 10 10 11 (mutagen_astronomy) arch 'any' 4 6 7 (sudo_runas_neg1) Years 2016-2026: 10/11 10/11 **11/11** Year-by-year coverage: 2016: 1 2017: 1 2018: 1 2019: 2 2020: 2 2021: 5 2022: 5 2023: 8 2024: 3 2025: 2 2026: 4 CVE-2018 gap → CLOSED. Every year from 2016 through 2026 now has at least one module. Surfaces updated: - README.md: badge → 22 VM-verified / 34, Status section refreshed - docs/index.html: hero eyebrow + footer → v0.9.0, hero tagline 'every year 2016 → 2026', stats chips → 39 / 22 / 11 / 151 - docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md: v0.9.0 entry added on top with year coverage matrix + per-module breakdown; v0.8.0 + v0.7.1 entries preserved below - docs/og.svg + og.png: regenerated with new numbers + 'Every year 2016 → 2026' tagline CVE metadata refresh (tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py) deferred to follow-up — CISA KEV CSV + NVD CVE API were timing out during the v0.9.0 push window. The 5 new CVEs will return NULL from cve_metadata_lookup() until the refresh runs (—module-info simply skips the WEAKNESS/THREAT INTEL header for them; no functional impact). Re-run 'tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py' when network cooperates. Tests: macOS local 33/33 kernel_range pass; detect-test stubs (88 total) build clean; ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy CI jobs still green from the v0.7.x setup.	2026-05-23 22:15:44 -04:00
KaraZajac	4af82b82d9	docs: post-v0.7.1 surface sync (README + site + ROADMAP) ... Three stale surfaces refreshed after the v0.7.1 cut + arm64 release: README.md — Status section was 'v0.6.0 cut 2026-05-23'; updated to v0.7.1 with the new prebuilt-binary inventory (4 artifacts: x86_64 + arm64, each dynamic + static-musl) and the CI hardening additions (ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy). docs/index.html — hero eyebrow chip and footer meta both showed v0.6.0; both bumped to v0.7.1. ROADMAP.md — entire v0.7.x phase added as 'Phase 9 — Empirical verification + operator briefing (DONE 2026-05-23, v0.7.1)'. Captures everything since Phase 7+/8 (which were the v0.5–v0.6 era): the VM verifier, mainline kernel fetch, 22 of 26 CVEs verified, --explain mode, OPSEC notes, CVE metadata pipeline (CISA KEV + NVD CWE), 119 detection rules, 88-test harness, arm64-static binary, arch_support field, marketing site. Plus an explicit 'open follow-ups' list (arm64 verification sweep, SIEM query templates, install.sh smoke test, PackageKit provisioner, custom <=4.4 kernel image for dirty_cow, 9 deferred drift findings) and the 'wait-for-upstream blockers' list (vmwgfx, dirtydecrypt, fragnesia).	2026-05-23 21:27:23 -04:00
KaraZajac	5d48a7b0b5	release v0.7.1: arm64-static binary + per-module arch_support ... Two additions on top of v0.7.0: 1. skeletonkey-arm64-static is now published alongside the existing x86_64-static binary. Built native-arm64 in Alpine via GitHub's ubuntu-24.04-arm runner pool (free for public repos as of 2024). install.sh auto-picks it based on 'uname -m'; SKELETONKEY_DYNAMIC=1 fetches the dynamic build instead. Works on Raspberry Pi 4+, Apple Silicon Linux VMs, AWS Graviton, Oracle Ampere, Hetzner ARM, etc. .github/workflows/release.yml refactor: the previous single build-static-x86_64 job becomes a build-static matrix with two entries (x86_64-static on ubuntu-latest, arm64-static on ubuntu-24.04-arm). Both share the same Alpine container + build recipe. 2. .arch_support field on struct skeletonkey_module — honest per-module labeling of which architectures the exploit() body has been verified on. Three categories: 'any' (4 modules): pwnkit, sudo_samedit, sudoedit_editor, pack2theroot. Purely userspace; arch-independent. 'x86_64' (1 module): entrybleed. KPTI prefetchnta side-channel; x86-only by physics. Already source-gated (returns PRECOND_FAIL on non-x86_64). 'x86_64+unverified-arm64' (26 modules): kernel exploitation code. The bug class is generic but the exploit primitives (msg_msg sprays, finisher chain, struct offsets) haven't been confirmed on arm64. detect() still works (just reads ctx->host); only the --exploit path is in question. --list now has an ARCH column (any / x64 / x64?) and the footer prints 'N arch-independent (any)'. --module-info prints 'arch support: <value>'. --scan --json adds 'arch_support' to each module record. This is the honest 'arm64 works for detection on every module + exploitation on 4 of them today; the rest await empirical arm64 sweep' framing — not pretending the kernel exploits already work there, but not blocking the arm64 binary on that either. arm64 users get the full triage workflow + a handful of userspace exploits out of the box, plus a clear roadmap for the rest. Future work to promote modules from 'x86_64+unverified-arm64' to 'any': add an arm64 Vagrant box (generic/debian12-arm64 etc.) to tools/verify-vm/ and run a verification sweep on Apple Silicon / ARM Linux hardware.	2026-05-23 21:10:54 -04:00
KaraZajac	264759832a	release v0.7.0: 22-of-26 VM-verified + --explain + OPSEC + KEV metadata ... Bumps SKELETONKEY_VERSION to 0.7.0 and adds docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md with the full v0.7.0 changelog. release.yml updated to use the hand-written notes file as the GitHub Release body (falls back to the auto-generated stub when docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md isn't present, so older tags still publish cleanly). Headline: empirical VM verification across 22 of 26 CVEs, plus the --explain operator briefing mode, OPSEC notes per module, CISA KEV + NVD CWE + MITRE ATT&CK metadata pipeline, 119 detection rules across all 4 SIEM formats, kernel.ubuntu.com mainline kernel fetch path, and the new marketing-grade landing page. Full breakdown in docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md. Tag v0.7.0 next; release workflow auto-builds + publishes the 3 binaries (x86_64 dynamic, x86_64 static-musl via Alpine, arm64 dynamic) with checksums.	2026-05-23 20:44:45 -04:00
KaraZajac	6e0f811a2c	README + site + binary: surface 22-of-26 VM-verified count ... Updates the visible 'how trustworthy is this' signal across all three touchpoints after the verifier sweep landed 22 modules confirmed in real Linux VMs: README.md - Badge: '28 verified + 3 ported' → '22 VM-verified / 26'. - Headline tagline: emphasizes the 22-of-26 empirical confirmation. - 'Corpus at a glance' restructured: tier counts unchanged, but the stale '3 ported-but-unverified' subsection is replaced by a new 'Empirical verification' table breaking the 22 records down by distro/kernel. - 'Status' section refreshed for v0.6.0 reality: 88 tests + 22 verifications + mainline kernel fetch + --explain + KEV/CWE/ATT&CK metadata + 119 detection rules. The four still-unverified entries (vmwgfx, dirty_cow, dirtydecrypt, fragnesia) are listed with their blocking reasons. docs/index.html - Hero stats row gets a new '22 ✓ VM-verified' chip (emerald-styled via new .stat-vfy CSS class), keeping modules/KEV/rules siblings. - Hero tagline calls out '22 of 26 CVEs empirically verified'. - Meta description + og:description updated. - Bento card 'Verifier ready' rewritten as '22 modules empirically verified' with concrete distro/kernel breakdown; styled with new .bento-vfy class for emerald accent (matches the stat chip). - Timeline 'shipped' column adds the verifier wins; 'in flight' swapped to current open items (drift fixes, packagekit provisioner, custom <=4.4 box for dirty_cow). docs/og.svg + docs/og.png - 4-chip stats row instead of 3: 31 modules · 22 ✓ VM-verified · 10 ★ in CISA KEV · 119 detection rules. Tagline now '22 of 26 CVEs verified in real Linux VMs.' Re-rendered to PNG via rsvg-convert. skeletonkey.c (binary) - --list footer now prints '31 modules registered · 10 in CISA KEV (★) · 22 empirically verified in real VMs (✓)'. Counts computed from the registry + cve_metadata + verifications tables at runtime (so it stays accurate as more verifications land — the JSONL refresh propagates automatically). No code logic changed; only surfacing.	2026-05-23 18:03:38 -04:00
KaraZajac	312e7d89b5	verify-vm: kernel.ubuntu.com mainline integration — 22 modules verified ... Unblocks the 4 previously-PIN_FAIL modules by adding a fallback path to kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/ for any kernel no longer in apt. Adds 4 more matches to the verified_on table for a total of 22 modules confirmed against real Linux VMs: af_unix_gc ubuntu2204 + mainline 5.15.5 match nf_tables ubuntu2204 + mainline 5.15.5 match nft_set_uaf ubuntu2204 + mainline 5.15.5 match stackrot ubuntu2204 + mainline 6.1.10 match Mechanism: tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile — new 'pin-mainline-<X.Y.Z>' shell provisioner. Fetches the directory index at https://kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v<X.Y.Z>/amd64/, parses out the 4 canonical .deb filenames (linux-headers _all, linux-headers -generic _amd64, linux-image-unsigned -generic _amd64, linux-modules -generic _amd64; skips lowlatency), downloads them, runs 'dpkg -i' + 'update-grub', and prints a reboot hint. Mainline package version like '5.15.5-051505' sorts ABOVE Ubuntu's stock '5.15.0-91' in debian-version-compare (numeric 51505 > 91), so update-grub puts it at the top of the boot menu and the next 'vagrant reload' lands on it automatically. uname then reports '5.15.5-051505-generic' which our parser sees as 5.15.5 → in our kernel_range table's vulnerable window → empirical VULNERABLE. tools/verify-vm/verify.sh — new SKK_VM_MAINLINE_VERSION env passed to the Vagrantfile. Reload trigger now also fires when uname doesn't match the mainline target. tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — new 'mainline_version' field on the 4 PIN_FAIL targets. kernel_pkg is left empty; mainline_version drives the fetch. Picked 5.15.5 (Nov 2021) for the 5.15-line CVEs and 6.1.10 (Feb 2023) for stackrot — both below every relevant backport. Final sweep status (22 of 26 CVEs): ✓ MATCHES (22): pwnkit, cgroup_release_agent, netfilter_xtcompat, fuse_legacy, nft_fwd_dup, entrybleed, overlayfs, overlayfs_setuid, sudoedit_editor, ptrace_traceme, sudo_samedit, af_packet, pack2theroot, cls_route4, nft_payload, af_packet2, sequoia, dirty_pipe, nf_tables, af_unix_gc, nft_set_uaf, stackrot 🚫 NOT VERIFIED (4 — flagged in targets.yaml with rationale): vmwgfx — VMware-guest only; no public Vagrant box covers it dirtydecrypt — needs Linux 7.0; not shipping as any distro kernel fragnesia — needs Linux 7.0; same dirty_cow — needs ≤ 4.4 kernel; older than every supported Vagrant box (would need a custom image) copy_fail_family entries verified indirectly via the shared infrastructure tests in the kernel_range unit-test harness. The 22 records are baked into core/verifications.c and surface in --list (VFY ✓ column), --module-info (--- verified on --- section), --explain (VERIFIED ON section), and JSON output (verified_on array). 22/26 CVEs is the new trust signal; with the mainline fetch path production-ready, additional pin targets can be added to targets.yaml without code changes.	2026-05-23 17:35:13 -04:00
KaraZajac	2c131df1bf	verify-vm sweep complete: 18 modules confirmed across 5 Linux distros ... Full sweep results: MATCHES (18 — empirically confirmed in real Linux VMs): pwnkit ubuntu2004 5.4.0-169 VULNERABLE cgroup_release_agent debian11 5.10.0-27 VULNERABLE netfilter_xtcompat debian11 5.10.0-27 VULNERABLE fuse_legacy debian11 5.10.0-27 VULNERABLE nft_fwd_dup debian11 5.10.0-27 VULNERABLE entrybleed ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91 VULNERABLE overlayfs ubuntu2004 5.4.0-169 VULNERABLE overlayfs_setuid ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91 VULNERABLE sudoedit_editor ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91 PRECOND_FAIL (no sudoers grant) ptrace_traceme ubuntu1804 4.15.0-213 VULNERABLE sudo_samedit ubuntu1804 4.15.0-213 VULNERABLE af_packet ubuntu1804 4.15.0-213 OK (4.15 is post-fix) pack2theroot debian12 6.1.0-17 PRECOND_FAIL (no PackageKit installed) cls_route4 ubuntu2004 5.15.0-43 VULNERABLE nft_payload ubuntu2004 5.15.0-43 VULNERABLE af_packet2 ubuntu2004 5.4.0-26 VULNERABLE sequoia ubuntu2004 5.4.0-26 VULNERABLE dirty_pipe ubuntu2204 5.15.0-91 OK (silently backported) PIN_FAIL (4 — targeted HWE kernels no longer in apt; needs kernel.ubuntu.com mainline integration, deferred): nf_tables wanted ubuntu2204 + 5.15.0-43-generic af_unix_gc wanted ubuntu2204 + 5.15.0-43-generic stackrot wanted ubuntu2204 + 6.1.0-13-generic nft_set_uaf wanted ubuntu2204 + 5.19.0-32-generic MANUAL / SPECIAL TARGETS (5 — flagged in targets.yaml): vmwgfx — VMware-guest only; no Vagrant box covers it dirtydecrypt — needs Linux 7.0 (not shipping yet) fragnesia — needs Linux 7.0 (not shipping yet) dirty_cow — needs <= 4.4 (older than every supported Vagrant box) copy_fail family — multi-module family verification deferred Several findings the active-probe path surfaced vs version-only checks: - dirty_pipe (ubuntu2204): version-only check would say VULNERABLE (kernel 5.15.0 < 5.15.25 backport in our table), but Ubuntu has silently backported the fix into the -91 patch level. --active probe correctly identified the primitive as blocked → OK. - af_packet (ubuntu1804): the bug was fixed in 4.10.6 mainline + 4.9.18 backport. Ubuntu 18.04's stock 4.15.0 is post-fix — detect() correctly returns OK. The targets.yaml entry was originally wrong; fixed now. - sudoedit_editor: version-wise the host is vulnerable (sudo 1.9.9), but the bug requires an actual sudoedit grant in /etc/sudoers — and the default Vagrant user has none. detect() correctly returns PRECOND_FAIL ('vuln version present, no grant to abuse'). Same as one of our unit tests. - pack2theroot: needs an active PackageKit daemon on the system bus. Debian 12's generic cloud image is server-oriented and omits PackageKit. detect() correctly returns PRECOND_FAIL. Provisioning PackageKit in a follow-up Vagrant step would unblock the VULNERABLE path verification. Plumbing fixes that landed in the sweep: - core/nft_compat.h — NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS (kernel 5.7) + NFTA_CHAIN_ID (5.13). Without these, nft_fwd_dup fails to compile against Ubuntu 18.04's 4.15-era nf_tables uapi, which blocked the entire skeletonkey binary from building on that box and prevented verification of ptrace_traceme / sudo_samedit / af_packet. - tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile — 'privileged: false' on the build-and-verify provisioner. Vagrant's default runs as root; pack2theroot's detect() short-circuits with 'already root — nothing to do' when running as uid 0, which would invalidate every euid-aware module's verification. - tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml — corrected expectations for af_packet (stock 18.04 4.15 is post-fix), pack2theroot (no PackageKit on server cloud image), sudoedit_editor (no sudoers grant), and dirty_pipe (silent Ubuntu backport). - tools/refresh-verifications.py — dedup key changed from (module, vm_box, host_kernel, expect_detect) to (module, vm_box, host_kernel). When an expectation is corrected mid-sweep, the new record cleanly supersedes the old one instead of accumulating. The verifier loop is now production-ready and the trust signal in --list / --module-info / --explain reflects 18 modules confirmed against real Linux. Next-step bucket: - kernel.ubuntu.com mainline integration → unblock 4 PIN_FAIL pins. - Optional PackageKit provisioner on debian12 → unblock pack2theroot VULNERABLE path.	2026-05-23 16:29:50 -04:00