modules: add nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111, nf_tables catch-all abort UAF)
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The newest nftables LPE: a use-after-free in the nf_tables transaction-
abort path. An inverted condition (a stray '!') in
nft_map_catchall_activate() makes the abort path process active catch-all
map elements instead of skipping them; a catch-all GOTO element drives a
chain's use-count to zero so a following DELCHAIN frees it while the
catch-all verdict still references it -> UAF, escalatable from an
unprivileged user (userns + nftables) via modprobe_path/selinux_state ROP.
Fixed upstream by f41c5d1; CWE-416, CVSS 7.8; not in CISA KEV. Public
reproduction by FuzzingLabs.

Takes the corpus to 43 modules / 38 CVEs.

🟡 reconstructed trigger, primitive-only, NOT VM-verified — same contract
as nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086). detect() version-gates (catch-all elems
~5.13; Debian backports 6.1.164/6.12.73/6.18.10, 7.0+ inherits) AND
requires unprivileged user_ns clone (else PRECOND_FAIL). exploit() forks
an isolated child, builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO element,
provokes an aborting batch to drive the abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo,
and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL — the per-kernel leak + R/W + modprobe_path ROP
is not bundled. kernel_range table verified drift-clean against the live
Debian tracker (the 6.18 branch / 6.18.10 fix is the real forky/sid
backport; the earlier 7.0.10 figure was wrong).

Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank (35), 6 detect() test rows (version
+ userns gating), CVE_METADATA.json + cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md
(sorted insert, CWE-416/T1068/not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts
(43/38) + yellow pill, RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.11, verify-vm target. Credit:
FuzzingLabs + upstream fix f41c5d1. Version 0.9.11.
This commit is contained in:
KaraZajac
2026-06-08 17:42:19 -04:00
parent 050731396d
commit 4d0a0e2443
17 changed files with 880 additions and 31 deletions
+9
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@@ -278,6 +278,15 @@
"in_kev": false,
"kev_date_added": ""
},
{
"cve": "CVE-2026-23111",
"module_dir": "nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111",
"cwe": "CWE-416",
"attack_technique": "T1068",
"attack_subtechnique": null,
"in_kev": false,
"kev_date_added": ""
},
{
"cve": "CVE-2026-31635",
"module_dir": "dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635",
+2 -1
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Which SKELETONKEY modules cover CVEs that CISA has observed exploited
in the wild per the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
Refreshed via `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`.
**13 of 37 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.**
**13 of 38 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.**
## In KEV (prioritize patching)
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ and are technically reachable. "Not in KEV" is not the same as
| CVE-2024-50264 | CWE-416 | `vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264` |
| CVE-2025-32462 | CWE-863 | `sudo_host_cve_2025_32462` |
| CVE-2025-6019 | CWE-250 | `udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019` |
| CVE-2026-23111 | CWE-416 | `nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111` |
| CVE-2026-31635 | CWE-130 | `dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635` |
| CVE-2026-41651 | CWE-367 | `pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651` |
| CVE-2026-43494 | ? | `pintheft_cve_2026_43494` |
+33
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@@ -1,3 +1,36 @@
## SKELETONKEY v0.9.11 — new LPE module: nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111)
Adds **`nft_catchall` — CVE-2026-23111**, taking the corpus to **43
modules / 38 CVEs**. The newest nftables LPE: a **use-after-free** in the
nf_tables transaction-abort path. `nft_map_catchall_activate()` carries an
inverted condition (a stray `!`) so the abort path processes *active*
catch-all map elements instead of skipping them — a catch-all GOTO element
drives a chain's use-count to zero, and a following `DELCHAIN` frees the
chain while the catch-all verdict still references it → UAF. From an
unprivileged user (user namespaces + nftables) it escalates to root via a
`modprobe_path` / `selinux_state` ROP. Fixed upstream by commit `f41c5d1`;
CWE-416, CVSS 7.8; not in CISA KEV. Public reproduction + analysis by
**FuzzingLabs**.
🟡 **Trigger (reconstructed) — primitive-only, not VM-verified.** This is
one more UAF in the corpus's most-covered subsystem (`nf_tables`,
`nft_set_uaf`, `nft_payload`, `nft_pipapo`, …) and ships on the same
contract as `nf_tables` (CVE-2024-1086): a fork-isolated trigger that
fires the bug class and stops. `detect()` version-gates against the
Debian backports (upstream thresholds 6.1.164 / 6.12.73 / 6.18.10;
catch-all set elements arrived ~5.13) **and** requires unprivileged
user-namespace clone — a vulnerable kernel with userns locked down is
`PRECOND_FAIL`. `exploit()` builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO
element and provokes an aborting batch transaction to drive the abort-path
UAF, observes slabinfo, and returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL`. The per-kernel leak +
arbitrary-R/W + `modprobe_path` ROP is **not** bundled (per-build offsets
refused), and the trigger is reconstructed from the public analysis rather
than VM-verified — it never claims root it did not get. Ships auditd +
sigma + falco rules, ATT&CK T1068 + CWE-416 metadata, six new `detect()`
unit-test rows (version + userns gating), credits FuzzingLabs + the
upstream fix in `NOTICE.md`, and a verify-vm target (sweep pending). Not
VM-verified, so the verified count stays 28 of 38.
## SKELETONKEY v0.9.10 — new LPE module: cifswitch (CVE-2026-46243)
Adds **`cifswitch` — CVE-2026-46243 "CIFSwitch"** (Asim Manizada,
+14 -13
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@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
<title>SKELETONKEY — Linux LPE corpus, VM-verified, SOC-ready detection</title>
<meta name="description" content="One binary. 42 Linux privilege-escalation modules from 2016 to 2026. 28 of 37 CVEs empirically verified in real Linux VMs. 13 KEV-listed. 151 detection rules across auditd/sigma/yara/falco. MITRE ATT&CK and CWE annotated. --explain gives operator briefings.">
<meta name="description" content="One binary. 43 Linux privilege-escalation modules from 2016 to 2026. 28 of 38 CVEs empirically verified in real Linux VMs. 13 KEV-listed. 151 detection rules across auditd/sigma/yara/falco. MITRE ATT&CK and CWE annotated. --explain gives operator briefings.">
<meta property="og:title" content="SKELETONKEY — Linux LPE corpus, VM-verified">
<meta property="og:description" content="42 Linux LPE modules; 28 of 37 CVEs empirically verified in real VMs. 151 detection rules. ATT&CK + CWE + KEV annotated.">
<meta property="og:description" content="43 Linux LPE modules; 28 of 38 CVEs empirically verified in real VMs. 151 detection rules. ATT&CK + CWE + KEV annotated.">
<meta property="og:type" content="website">
<meta property="og:url" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/">
<meta property="og:image" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/og.png">
@@ -56,14 +56,14 @@
<div class="container hero-inner">
<div class="hero-eyebrow">
<span class="dot dot-pulse"></span>
v0.9.10 — released 2026-06-08
v0.9.11 — released 2026-06-08
</div>
<h1 class="hero-title">
<span class="display-wordmark">SKELETONKEY</span>
</h1>
<p class="hero-tag">
One binary. <strong>42 Linux LPE modules</strong> covering 37 CVEs —
<strong>every year 2016 → 2026</strong>. 28 of 34 confirmed against
One binary. <strong>43 Linux LPE modules</strong> covering 38 CVEs —
<strong>every year 2016 → 2026</strong>. 28 of 38 confirmed against
real Linux kernels in VMs. SOC-ready detection rules in four SIEM
formats. MITRE ATT&amp;CK + CWE + CISA KEV annotated.
<span class="hero-tag-pop">--explain gives a one-page operator briefing per CVE.</span>
@@ -81,9 +81,9 @@
</div>
<div class="stats-row" id="stats-row">
<div class="stat-chip"><span class="num" data-target="41">0</span><span>modules</span></div>
<div class="stat-chip"><span class="num" data-target="43">0</span><span>modules</span></div>
<div class="stat-chip stat-vfy"><span class="num" data-target="28">0</span><span>✓ VM-verified</span></div>
<div class="stat-chip stat-kev"><span class="num" data-target="12">0</span><span>★ in CISA KEV</span></div>
<div class="stat-chip stat-kev"><span class="num" data-target="13">0</span><span>★ in CISA KEV</span></div>
<div class="stat-chip"><span class="num" data-target="151">0</span><span>detection rules</span></div>
</div>
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
<div class="bento-icon"></div>
<h3>CISA KEV prioritized</h3>
<p>
13 of 37 CVEs in the corpus are in CISA's Known Exploited
13 of 38 CVEs in the corpus are in CISA's Known Exploited
Vulnerabilities catalog — actively exploited in the wild.
Refreshed on demand via <code>tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py</code>.
</p>
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
<code>tools/verify-vm/</code> spins up known-vulnerable
kernels (stock distro + mainline from kernel.ubuntu.com), runs
<code>--explain --active</code> per module, and records the
verdict. <strong>28 of 37 CVEs</strong> confirmed against
verdict. <strong>28 of 38 CVEs</strong> confirmed against
real Linux across Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12
+ mainline 5.4.0-26 / 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 / 6.19.7. Records baked into the binary;
<code>--list</code> shows ✓ per module.
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
<div class="container">
<div class="section-head">
<span class="section-tag">corpus</span>
<h2>37 CVEs across 10 years. ★ = actively exploited (CISA KEV).</h2>
<h2>38 CVEs across 10 years. ★ = actively exploited (CISA KEV).</h2>
</div>
<h3 class="corpus-h" data-color="green">
@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
<span class="pill yellow">vmwgfx</span>
<span class="pill yellow">ptrace_pidfd</span>
<span class="pill yellow">cifswitch</span>
<span class="pill yellow">nft_catchall</span>
</div>
<p class="corpus-foot">
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
<div class="audience-icon">🎓</div>
<h3>Researchers / CTF</h3>
<p>
37 CVEs, 10-year span, each with the original PoC author
38 CVEs, 10-year span, each with the original PoC author
credited and the kernel-range citation auditable.
<code>--explain</code> shows the reasoning chain; detection
rules let you practice both sides. Source is the documentation.
@@ -514,7 +515,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
<div class="tl-col tl-shipped">
<div class="tl-tag">shipped</div>
<ul>
<li><strong>28 of 37 CVEs empirically verified</strong> in real Linux VMs</li>
<li><strong>28 of 38 CVEs empirically verified</strong> in real Linux VMs</li>
<li><strong>kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/</strong> kernel fetch path — unblocks pin-not-in-apt targets</li>
<li>Per-module <code>verified_on[]</code> table baked into the binary</li>
<li><strong>--explain mode</strong> — one-page operator briefing per CVE</li>
@@ -601,7 +602,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
who found the bugs.
</p>
<p class="footer-meta">
v0.9.10 · MIT · <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY</a>
v0.9.11 · MIT · <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY</a>
</p>
</div>
</footer>