b415c43bff
Add gitlab, cloudflare, ghactions (MOCK-ONLY) and appsecret (LIVE-VM) one-file Rotators, each with a table-driven cutover-proof + leak-check test. gitlab/ cloudflare/ghactions are in-place SaaS-token rolls (self/rotate, value-roll, sealed-secret overwrite) so RevokeOld is a no-op; ghactions seals via nacl/box.SealAnonymous (no new go.mod dep). appsecret regenerates a local app signing secret and rewrites it in place across every target file (atomic, mode- preserving, redacted errors), discoverable via exact-match app-signing key names in env.go. Keep real-rotation code distinct from mock code: how each driver's cutover was validated lives as DATA in internal/rotate/proofs.go (single source of truth) + docs/ROTATION-PROOFS.md, surfaced as a PROOF column in `incredigo rotate` so a MOCK-ONLY driver can never be mistaken for a LIVE-VM one. appsecret proven LIVE-VM against real local files in the sandbox VM. 82 tests green, -race clean on rotate/sink/vault. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
151 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
151 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
package rotate
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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"incredigo/internal/discover"
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"incredigo/internal/vault"
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)
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// glEmu is an in-process GitLab API emulator: it tracks one currently-valid token
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// and emulates self/rotate (mint new, revoke the caller's token) and GET /user.
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// It records every Authorization/PRIVATE-TOKEN value seen so a test can assert the
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// new token is never logged where it shouldn't be.
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type glEmu struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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cur string // the currently-valid token
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minted int // rotate counter, makes each new token unique
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seenTok []string // PRIVATE-TOKEN values observed
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}
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func (e *glEmu) valid(tok string) bool {
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e.mu.Lock()
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defer e.mu.Unlock()
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e.seenTok = append(e.seenTok, tok)
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return tok != "" && tok == e.cur
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}
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func (e *glEmu) rotate() string {
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e.mu.Lock()
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defer e.mu.Unlock()
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e.minted++
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e.cur = "glpat-rotated-" + strings.Repeat("z", 4) + itoa(e.minted)
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return e.cur
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}
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func itoa(n int) string {
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if n == 0 {
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return "0"
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}
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var b []byte
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for n > 0 {
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b = append([]byte{byte('0' + n%10)}, b...)
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n /= 10
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}
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return string(b)
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}
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func (e *glEmu) handler() http.Handler {
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("/api/v4/personal_access_tokens/self/rotate", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodPost || !e.valid(r.Header.Get("PRIVATE-TOKEN")) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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newTok := e.rotate() // also revokes the caller's (old) token
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"id": e.minted, "token": newTok, "revoked": false})
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})
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mux.HandleFunc("/api/v4/user", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !e.valid(r.Header.Get("PRIVATE-TOKEN")) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{"id": 1, "username": "labadmin"})
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})
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return mux
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}
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func TestGitLabDetect(t *testing.T) {
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g := &GitLab{}
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if !g.Detect(discover.Credential{Source: "gitlab"}) {
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t.Error("should detect Source=gitlab")
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}
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if g.Detect(discover.Credential{Source: "gitea"}) {
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t.Error("should not detect Source=gitea")
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}
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}
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func TestGitLabRotateRealCutover(t *testing.T) {
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emu := &glEmu{cur: "glpat-seedtoken-0001"}
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srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(emu.handler())
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defer srv.Close()
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host := strings.TrimPrefix(srv.URL, "https://")
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v := vault.New()
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defer v.Purge()
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oldTok := emu.cur
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cred := discover.Credential{
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Source: "gitlab",
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Identity: "gitlab pat",
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Secret: v.Store([]byte("gitlab://" + host + "/?tok=" + url.QueryEscape(oldTok))),
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}
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g := &GitLab{HTTPClient: srv.Client()}
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ctx := context.Background()
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newH, err := g.Rotate(ctx, cred, v)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Rotate: %v", err)
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}
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// Extract the new token from the rebuilt blob.
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nb, _ := v.Open(newH)
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nu, _ := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(string(nb.Bytes())))
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newTok := nu.Query().Get("tok")
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if newTok == "" || newTok == oldTok {
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t.Fatalf("blob carries no fresh token (got %q)", newTok)
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}
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if err := g.Verify(ctx, newH, v); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("Verify(new) should pass: %v", err)
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}
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// CUTOVER: the old token must be dead the moment Rotate returned (self/rotate
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// revokes it), independent of RevokeOld.
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if err := g.Verify(ctx, cred.Secret, v); err == nil {
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t.Error("Verify(old) must fail after rotation — old token should be revoked")
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} else if strings.Contains(err.Error(), newTok) {
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t.Error("error leaked the new token")
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}
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// RevokeOld is a no-op for this in-place engine.
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if err := g.RevokeOld(ctx, cred, v); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("RevokeOld (no-op) returned: %v", err)
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}
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// The new token must never have been handed to the emulator as the OLD token's
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// stand-in before it existed; and it must not appear in any leaked structure.
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for _, fld := range []string{cred.Identity} {
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if strings.Contains(fld, newTok) || strings.Contains(fld, oldTok) {
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t.Error("token leaked into credential metadata")
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}
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}
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}
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func TestGitLabRejectsBadSecret(t *testing.T) {
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g := &GitLab{}
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v := vault.New()
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defer v.Purge()
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cred := discover.Credential{Source: "gitlab", Secret: v.Store([]byte("gitlab://gitlab.example.com/"))} // no token
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if _, err := g.Rotate(context.Background(), cred, v); err == nil {
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t.Error("Rotate should reject a secret with no token")
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}
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}
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