Files
leetcrypt 88e603f3c0 rotate: Vercel token + SendGrid API-key drivers (create→verify→revoke)
Two more provider-API rotation drivers for the vibe-coder credential surface,
both following the create-new → verify → revoke-old pattern with the
self-contained blob form <provider>://<host>/?id=&secret=.

- vercel: POST /v3/user/tokens mints a new bearer; Verify lists tokens and
  asserts the new id is present; RevokeOld DELETEs the old token by id.
- sendgrid: clones the old key's scopes (GET /v3/api_keys/<id>) onto the new
  key so rotation is a faithful replacement, not a privilege downgrade; Verify
  is a GET /v3/scopes auth proof; RevokeOld DELETEs the old key by id.

Both ship Bearer-enforcing httptest emulators that prove a real cutover (old
credential dead, new alive after RevokeOld) plus a leak check. Recorded as
MOCK-ONLY in proofs.go + docs/ROTATION-PROOFS.md (no self-host). go build/vet
clean; 77 rotate tests pass, -race clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 12:12:20 -07:00

248 lines
8.2 KiB
Go

package rotate
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"incredigo/internal/discover"
"incredigo/internal/vault"
)
// SendGrid rotates a SendGrid API key via the REST API by CREATING a new key with the
// SAME scopes as the old one, verifying it, then DELETING the old one — the provider-API
// rotation pattern (create-new → verify → revoke-old):
//
// GET /v3/api_keys/<old-id> (Bearer old-key) -> {scopes:[…]} (clone scopes)
// POST /v3/api_keys (Bearer old-key) -> {api_key, api_key_id}
// GET /v3/scopes (Bearer new-key) -> {scopes:[…]} (auth proof)
// DELETE /v3/api_keys/<old-id> (Bearer old-key)
//
// SendGrid returns the api_key secret only once, at create time, alongside its
// api_key_id; revoking the OLD key needs that id, so the credential carries it. The
// new key is created with the old key's scopes so the rotation is a faithful
// replacement, not a privilege downgrade. The credential's secret is a single
// self-contained line:
//
// sendgrid://<host>/?id=<api-key-id>&secret=<SG.token>
//
// - scheme "sendgrid" maps to https; "http"/"https" are accepted so a test can point
// at a loopback emulator.
// - <host> API host; "sendgrid" (or empty) defaults to api.sendgrid.com.
// - id= the api_key_id (non-secret) — names the GET/DELETE paths.
// - secret= the API key token (Bearer credential, rotated).
//
// SECURITY: the token lives only in the vault blob and the Bearer header; it never
// reaches Identity/Meta/logs/argv. The new token is decoded straight from the create
// response into the rebuilt blob.
type SendGrid struct {
// HTTPClient is injectable for tests / custom TLS. Defaults to a 15s-timeout client.
HTTPClient *http.Client
}
// init self-registers the driver. Availability alone changes nothing; the
// `rotate --execute` + INCREDIGO_ALLOW_EXECUTE=1 gate still applies.
func init() { Register(&SendGrid{}) }
// Name identifies the driver in plans and audit records.
func (sg *SendGrid) Name() string { return "sendgrid" }
// Detect claims credentials tagged Source == "sendgrid".
func (sg *SendGrid) Detect(c discover.Credential) bool { return c.Source == "sendgrid" }
func (sg *SendGrid) client() *http.Client {
if sg.HTTPClient != nil {
return sg.HTTPClient
}
return &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
}
// sendgridSecret is the parsed credential blob. None of its fields are ever logged.
type sendgridSecret struct {
base string // scheme://host
id string // api_key_id (non-secret)
secret string // SG.* Bearer token
}
func parseSendGridSecret(v *vault.Vault, h *vault.Handle) (sendgridSecret, error) {
buf, err := v.Open(h)
if err != nil {
return sendgridSecret{}, err
}
u, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(string(buf.Bytes())))
if err != nil {
return sendgridSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("sendgrid: parse secret url: %w", err)
}
if u.Scheme != "sendgrid" && u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
return sendgridSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("sendgrid: unexpected scheme %q", u.Scheme)
}
scheme := u.Scheme
host := u.Host
if scheme == "sendgrid" {
scheme = "https"
}
if host == "" || host == "sendgrid" {
host = "api.sendgrid.com"
}
q := u.Query()
s := sendgridSecret{base: scheme + "://" + host, id: q.Get("id"), secret: q.Get("secret")}
if s.secret == "" {
return sendgridSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("sendgrid: secret missing token")
}
return s, nil
}
// build re-encodes a sendgridSecret into the single-line blob form (scheme normalised
// back to "sendgrid").
func (s sendgridSecret) build() string {
host := hostOf(s.base)
if host == "api.sendgrid.com" {
host = "sendgrid"
}
u := &url.URL{Scheme: "sendgrid", Host: host, Path: "/"}
q := url.Values{}
q.Set("id", s.id)
q.Set("secret", s.secret)
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
return u.String()
}
func (s sendgridSecret) keysURL(id string) string {
base := s.base + "/v3/api_keys"
if id != "" {
return base + "/" + url.PathEscape(id)
}
return base
}
// oldScopes reads the scopes of the existing key so the new key can clone them. A
// failure here is non-fatal: rotation proceeds with no explicit scopes rather than
// blocking (SendGrid then mints a key with the account-default scope set).
func (sg *SendGrid) oldScopes(ctx context.Context, s sendgridSecret) []string {
if s.id == "" {
return nil
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, s.keysURL(s.id), nil)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.secret)
resp, err := sg.client().Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil
}
defer func() { io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return nil
}
var got struct {
Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&got); err != nil {
return nil
}
return got.Scopes
}
// Rotate creates a NEW API key (authenticated by the OLD key) carrying the old key's
// scopes, and returns a vault handle to a rebuilt blob with the new id + token. It does
// not delete the old key.
func (sg *SendGrid) Rotate(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) (*vault.Handle, error) {
s, err := parseSendGridSecret(v, c.Secret)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
payload := map[string]any{"name": "incredigo-rotated"}
if scopes := sg.oldScopes(ctx, s); len(scopes) > 0 {
payload["scopes"] = scopes
}
body, err := json.Marshal(payload)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, s.keysURL(""), bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.secret)
resp, err := sg.client().Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sendgrid: create key: %w", err)
}
defer func() { io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sendgrid: create key: unexpected status %s", resp.Status)
}
var created struct {
APIKey string `json:"api_key"`
APIKeyID string `json:"api_key_id"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&created); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sendgrid: decode created key: %w", err)
}
if created.APIKey == "" || created.APIKeyID == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sendgrid: create key: empty api_key or api_key_id in response")
}
ns := s
ns.id = created.APIKeyID
ns.secret = created.APIKey
return v.Store([]byte(ns.build())), nil
}
// Verify proves the newly minted key authenticates by GETting /v3/scopes with it (the
// scopes endpoint succeeds for any valid key regardless of its permission set).
func (sg *SendGrid) Verify(ctx context.Context, newSecret *vault.Handle, v *vault.Vault) error {
s, err := parseSendGridSecret(v, newSecret)
if err != nil {
return err
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, s.base+"/v3/scopes", nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.secret)
resp, err := sg.client().Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("sendgrid verify: %w", err)
}
defer func() { io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("sendgrid verify: get scopes status %s", resp.Status)
}
return nil
}
// RevokeOld deletes the OLD API key by its id. The old key is still valid at this
// point (revoke runs only after the new key is stored+verified), so it authenticates
// its own deletion.
func (sg *SendGrid) RevokeOld(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) error {
s, err := parseSendGridSecret(v, c.Secret)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if s.id == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("sendgrid revoke: credential has no api_key_id")
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodDelete, s.keysURL(s.id), nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.secret)
resp, err := sg.client().Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("sendgrid revoke: %w", err)
}
defer func() { io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
return fmt.Errorf("sendgrid revoke: delete key status %s", resp.Status)
}
return nil
}