rotate: LIVE-REAL proof level + execute-time proof gate (M2)

Add ProofLiveReal (highest level, no driver yet) and enforce it at
execute time: rotate --execute only runs drivers with proof >= LIVE-VM
(MinExecuteProof). MOCK-ONLY/UNPROVEN drivers are skipped before any
provider call unless --allow-mock-proven is passed. ExecuteResult gains
Skipped/SkipReason; the CLI reports and audit-logs skips separately from
failures. Closes the last structural gap where an emulator-only driver
could touch a real credential unattended. Covered by execute_gate_test.go.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CLAUDE.md

@@ -48,9 +48,12 @@ credentials that legitimately require a human. See `docs/ROTATION.md` Part II.
   `rotate --execute` runs behind `INCREDIGO_ALLOW_EXECUTE=1` **and** the mandatory
   verified-backup gate (`Snapshot`). Proof status is DATA (`internal/rotate/proofs.go`
   mirrored in `docs/ROTATION-PROOFS.md`): **8 LIVE-VM** (postgres, mysql, redis,
-  mongo, wireguard, gitea, appsecret, k8s), **14 MOCK-ONLY**. **No real (host)
-  credential has been rotated yet** — every real rotation still requires explicit
-  per-credential authorization (safe-candidate ladder, ROADMAP M2).
+  mongo, wireguard, gitea, appsecret, k8s), **14 MOCK-ONLY**, plus a `LIVE-REAL`
+  level no driver carries yet. `--execute` enforces a proof gate: only drivers
+  with proof ≥ LIVE-VM (`MinExecuteProof`) run; MOCK-ONLY/UNPROVEN are skipped
+  unless `--allow-mock-proven` is passed. **No real (host) credential has been
+  rotated yet** — every real rotation still requires explicit per-credential
+  authorization (safe-candidate ladder, ROADMAP M2).
 - **Guided manual layer done:** `internal/links` + `internal/worklist` +
   `internal/tui` → `incredigo worklist` / `incredigo guide` (read-only).
 - **Phase B scaffolded, not wired:** 12 pwstore adapters, pwgen, staging;

cmd/incredigo/main.go

@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ func importCmd() *cobra.Command {
 // are zero registered drivers, and --execute is refused.
 func rotateCmd() *cobra.Command {
 	var prefix, backupOut string
-	var execute, dryRun, blastScan bool
+	var execute, dryRun, blastScan, allowMock bool
 	var blastRoots []string
 	c := &cobra.Command{
 		Use:   "rotate",
@@ -389,7 +389,9 @@ func rotateCmd() *cobra.Command {
 			"full spine (rotate→verify→revoke) using the noop driver, touching no service.\n\n" +
 			"--execute performs REAL, destructive rotation of the gopass entries under --prefix\n" +
 			"(rotate→verify→store→re-read→revoke). It is refused unless INCREDIGO_ALLOW_EXECUTE=1\n" +
-			"is set and at least one driver is registered. See docs/ROTATION.md §16.",
+			"is set and at least one driver is registered. Only drivers proven against real\n" +
+			"target software (proof ≥ LIVE-VM) run; MOCK-ONLY drivers are skipped unless\n" +
+			"--allow-mock-proven is passed. See docs/ROTATION.md §16.",
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 			if execute {
 				// Real, destructive rotation. Gated by an explicit env authorization
@@ -448,29 +450,36 @@ func rotateCmd() *cobra.Command {
 					if err != nil {
 						return err
 					}
-					results := rotate.Execute(ctx, gp, ecreds, v)
+					results := rotate.Execute(ctx, gp, ecreds, v, allowMock)
 					ew := tabwriter.NewWriter(os.Stdout, 0, 2, 2, ' ', 0)
 					fmt.Fprintln(ew, "DRIVER\tPROOF\tENTRY\tROTATED\tVERIFIED\tSTORED\tREVOKED\tERROR")
-					var rotated, failed int
+					var rotated, failed, skipped int
 					for _, r := range results {
 						errStr := ""
-						if r.Err != nil {
+						outcome := "ok"
+						switch {
+						case r.Skipped:
+							errStr = "SKIPPED: " + r.SkipReason
+							outcome = errStr
+							skipped++
+						case r.Err != nil:
 							errStr = r.Err.Error()
+							outcome = errStr
 							failed++
-						} else {
+						default:
 							rotated++
 						}
 						fmt.Fprintf(ew, "%s\t%s\t%s\t%t\t%t\t%t\t%t\t%s\n",
 							r.Driver, rotate.ProofLevelOf(r.Driver).String(), r.StorePath, r.Rotated, r.Verified, r.Stored, r.Revoked, errStr)
-						out := "ok"
-						if r.Err != nil {
-							out = r.Err.Error()
-						}
 						log.Write(audit.Entry{Action: "rotate-execute", Source: r.Credential.Source,
-							Identity: r.StorePath, Location: backupOut, Outcome: out})
+							Identity: r.StorePath, Location: backupOut, Outcome: outcome})
 					}
 					ew.Flush()
-					fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\nROTATED %d credential(s), %d failed. Backup: %s\n", rotated, failed, backupOut)
+					fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\nROTATED %d credential(s), %d failed, %d skipped (proof gate). Backup: %s\n", rotated, failed, skipped, backupOut)
+					if skipped > 0 {
+						fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "%d credential(s) skipped: driver proof below %s. Re-run with --allow-mock-proven to rotate them anyway.\n",
+							skipped, rotate.MinExecuteProof)
+					}
 					if failed > 0 {
 						return fmt.Errorf("rotation completed with %d failure(s) — old credential(s) left intact; restore from backup if needed", failed)
 					}
@@ -563,6 +572,7 @@ func rotateCmd() *cobra.Command {
 	c.Flags().StringVar(&backupOut, "backup-out", "", "backup bundle path (default ~/.incredigo/rotation-backups/<ts>.age)")
 	c.Flags().BoolVar(&execute, "execute", false, "(reserved) perform rotation — refused in design phase")
 	c.Flags().BoolVar(&dryRun, "dry-run", false, "walk the full rotation spine with the noop driver (touches no service, persists nothing)")
+	c.Flags().BoolVar(&allowMock, "allow-mock-proven", false, "also execute drivers proven only against a mock/emulator (MOCK-ONLY); default skips them")
 	c.Flags().BoolVar(&blastScan, "blast", false, "map each credential's blast radius — which files consume it (read-only, non-secret markers)")
 	c.Flags().StringArrayVar(&blastRoots, "blast-root", nil, "directories to search for consumers (default: current directory)")
 	c.Flags().StringArrayVar(&flagPaths, "path", nil, "extra file or directory to include in the plan")

docs/ROADMAP.md

@@ -66,12 +66,13 @@ paths proven at the CLI level.
 Rule (unchanged): **one credential at a time, explicit authorization per
 credential, verified backup + restore-drill first, verify-new-before-revoke-old.**
 
-- [ ] Add `ProofLiveReal` to `proofs.go` (+ docs mirror + PROOF column) so
-      promotions are recorded as data.
-- [ ] Policy gate in `execute.go`: `--execute` only runs drivers with proof ≥
-      LIVE-VM; MOCK-ONLY requires an explicit `--allow-mock-proven` opt-in flag.
-      Today nothing distinguishes them at execute time — closing this is the last
-      structural safety gap.
+- [x] Add `ProofLiveReal` to `proofs.go` (+ docs mirror + PROOF column) so
+      promotions are recorded as data. (Level added, ordered highest; no driver
+      carries it yet — filled by the ladder below.)
+- [x] Policy gate in `execute.go`: `--execute` only runs drivers with proof ≥
+      LIVE-VM (`MinExecuteProof`); MOCK-ONLY/UNPROVEN are SKIPPED (Rotate never
+      called) unless `--allow-mock-proven` is passed. Result rows carry
+      `Skipped`/`SkipReason`; covered by `execute_gate_test.go`.
 - [ ] Climb the ladder, promoting proofs as you go (lowest blast radius, fastest
       recovery first):
   1. **appsecret** — local file, trivially reversible.

docs/ROTATION-PROOFS.md

@@ -19,16 +19,28 @@ stops a mock-only driver from ever being mistaken for a live one.
 
 ## Levels
 
+Ordered lowest → highest (a higher level is a strictly stronger cutover proof):
+
 | Level | Meaning |
 |-----------|---------|
-| **LIVE-VM** | Cutover proven against the **real target software** running in the sandbox VM (real PostgreSQL / MariaDB / Redis / `wg` / Gitea / local files). |
-| **MOCK-ONLY** | Cutover proven only against an **emulator** — our own `httptest` / in-process SSH server, **or a third-party mock** (e.g. `moto` for AWS). **NOT** proven against the real target service. |
 | **UNPROVEN** | No cutover proof recorded (e.g. the dry-run noop helper). |
+| **MOCK-ONLY** | Cutover proven only against an **emulator** — our own `httptest` / in-process SSH server, **or a third-party mock** (e.g. `moto` for AWS). **NOT** proven against the real target service. |
+| **LIVE-VM** | Cutover proven against the **real target software** running in the sandbox VM (real PostgreSQL / MariaDB / Redis / `wg` / Gitea / local files). |
+| **LIVE-REAL** | Cutover proven against a **real, host-owned credential at the real provider** (not the VM, not an emulator) — recorded only after an authorized per-credential rotation on the safe-candidate ladder (ROADMAP M2). **No driver carries this yet.** |
 
 > **Honesty note:** running in the VM does **not** automatically make a driver LIVE-VM.
 > AWS ran in the VM but only against **moto** (a mock AWS), so it is **MOCK-ONLY**. LIVE-VM
 > means the *real* target software validated the cutover.
 
+### Execute-time proof gate
+
+`rotate --execute` runs a driver **only if its proof is ≥ LIVE-VM** (`MinExecuteProof`
+in `proofs.go`). MOCK-ONLY and UNPROVEN drivers are **skipped** — their
+`Rotate`/`Verify`/`RevokeOld` are never called, so the old secret is left fully intact —
+unless the operator passes the explicit **`--allow-mock-proven`** opt-in. This closes the
+last structural gap where a driver proven only against an emulator could touch a real
+credential unattended.
+
 ## Current status
 
 ### LIVE-VM — proven against real target software in the sandbox VM

internal/rotate/execute.go

@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ type ExecuteResult struct {
 	Verified   bool   // the new secret authenticated
 	Stored     bool   // the new secret was written to gopass and re-read OK
 	Revoked    bool   // RevokeOld was invoked
+	Skipped    bool   // gated off by the proof policy — the driver was NOT run
+	SkipReason string // why it was gated (only when Skipped)
 	Err        error  // first error for this credential, if any
 }
 
@@ -35,7 +37,14 @@ type ExecuteResult struct {
 // The MANDATORY backup gate (Snapshot) MUST already have succeeded — Execute does
 // not perform it. Each credential's StorePath is taken from c.Location (the exact
 // gopass path it was sourced from), so the new secret overwrites the same entry.
-func Execute(ctx context.Context, gp *sink.Gopass, creds []discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) []ExecuteResult {
+//
+// Proof gate (Hard Rule spirit — no unattended real cutover through an unvalidated
+// path): a driver runs only if its recorded proof level is ≥ MinExecuteProof
+// (LIVE-VM). Drivers proven only against an emulator/mock (MOCK-ONLY) or with no
+// proof at all (UNPROVEN) are SKIPPED — their Rotate/Verify/RevokeOld are never
+// called — unless the caller passes allowMock, the explicit --allow-mock-proven
+// opt-in. Skipped credentials leave the old secret fully intact.
+func Execute(ctx context.Context, gp *sink.Gopass, creds []discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault, allowMock bool) []ExecuteResult {
 	drivers := Drivers()
 	var out []ExecuteResult
 	for _, c := range creds {
@@ -51,6 +60,16 @@ func Execute(ctx context.Context, gp *sink.Gopass, creds []discover.Credential,
 		}
 		res := ExecuteResult{Credential: c, Driver: d.Name(), StorePath: c.Location}
 
+		// Proof gate: refuse to run a driver that has not been proven against real
+		// target software, unless the operator explicitly opted in. This is checked
+		// BEFORE any provider call, so a gated driver touches nothing.
+		if lvl := ProofLevelOf(d.Name()); lvl < MinExecuteProof && !allowMock {
+			res.Skipped = true
+			res.SkipReason = fmt.Sprintf("proof %s < %s; pass --allow-mock-proven to override", lvl, MinExecuteProof)
+			out = append(out, res)
+			continue
+		}
+
 		newH, err := d.Rotate(ctx, c, v)
 		if err != nil {
 			res.Err = fmt.Errorf("rotate: %w", err)

internal/rotate/execute_gate_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+package rotate
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"incredigo/internal/discover"
+	"incredigo/internal/vault"
+)
+
+// spyGateDriver is a minimal registered driver used to observe whether Execute's
+// proof gate actually reached (or skipped) a driver's Rotate. It contacts no
+// service: Rotate records that it ran and returns rotateErr, short-circuiting the
+// spine before any gopass write, so allowMock=true can be proven without a store.
+type spyGateDriver struct {
+	name      string
+	source    string
+	rotateErr error
+	rotated   bool
+}
+
+func (s *spyGateDriver) Name() string                      { return s.name }
+func (s *spyGateDriver) Detect(c discover.Credential) bool { return c.Source == s.source }
+func (s *spyGateDriver) Verify(context.Context, *vault.Handle, *vault.Vault) error {
+	return nil
+}
+func (s *spyGateDriver) RevokeOld(context.Context, discover.Credential, *vault.Vault) error {
+	return nil
+}
+func (s *spyGateDriver) Rotate(context.Context, discover.Credential, *vault.Vault) (*vault.Handle, error) {
+	s.rotated = true
+	return nil, s.rotateErr
+}
+
+// TestExecuteProofGateSkipsMockOnly proves that by default (allowMock=false) a
+// driver whose proof is below MinExecuteProof is SKIPPED: its Rotate is never
+// called and the credential is reported as skipped, not rotated.
+func TestExecuteProofGateSkipsMockOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	v := vault.New()
+	defer v.Purge()
+
+	// Unknown name => ProofUnproven (< MinExecuteProof); unique source so no real
+	// driver claims it.
+	spy := &spyGateDriver{name: "spy-unproven", source: "faketest-gate-skip"}
+	Register(spy)
+
+	creds := []discover.Credential{{Source: "faketest-gate-skip", Identity: "x", Location: "imported/x"}}
+	res := Execute(context.Background(), nil, creds, v, false)
+
+	if len(res) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d results, want 1", len(res))
+	}
+	r := res[0]
+	if !r.Skipped {
+		t.Errorf("mock-only driver was not skipped: %+v", r)
+	}
+	if r.SkipReason == "" {
+		t.Error("skipped result has no SkipReason")
+	}
+	if r.Rotated || r.Err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("skipped credential should not be rotated or errored: %+v", r)
+	}
+	if spy.rotated {
+		t.Error("gate leaked: Rotate was called on a gated driver")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestExecuteProofGateAllowMockOverride proves --allow-mock-proven (allowMock=true)
+// lets a below-threshold driver through: Rotate IS called (we make it fail fast so
+// no gopass write is needed) and the result is not marked Skipped.
+func TestExecuteProofGateAllowMockOverride(t *testing.T) {
+	v := vault.New()
+	defer v.Purge()
+
+	spy := &spyGateDriver{name: "spy-unproven-override", source: "faketest-gate-allow", rotateErr: errors.New("boom")}
+	Register(spy)
+
+	creds := []discover.Credential{{Source: "faketest-gate-allow", Identity: "x", Location: "imported/x"}}
+	res := Execute(context.Background(), nil, creds, v, true)
+
+	if len(res) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d results, want 1", len(res))
+	}
+	r := res[0]
+	if r.Skipped {
+		t.Errorf("allowMock should not skip the driver: %+v", r)
+	}
+	if !spy.rotated {
+		t.Error("allowMock did not let the driver run: Rotate never called")
+	}
+	if r.Err == nil {
+		t.Error("expected the driver's Rotate error to surface")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestExecuteProofGateLiveVMRuns proves a driver at or above MinExecuteProof runs
+// WITHOUT the override. The spy takes the name "postgres" (LIVE-VM in proofs.go)
+// but a unique source so only it claims the credential; Rotate fails fast to avoid
+// any real service call.
+func TestExecuteProofGateLiveVMRuns(t *testing.T) {
+	if ProofLevelOf("postgres") < MinExecuteProof {
+		t.Skip("postgres proof level changed; test assumption invalid")
+	}
+	v := vault.New()
+	defer v.Purge()
+
+	spy := &spyGateDriver{name: "postgres", source: "faketest-gate-livevm", rotateErr: errors.New("boom")}
+	Register(spy)
+
+	creds := []discover.Credential{{Source: "faketest-gate-livevm", Identity: "x", Location: "imported/x"}}
+	res := Execute(context.Background(), nil, creds, v, false)
+
+	if len(res) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("got %d results, want 1", len(res))
+	}
+	if res[0].Skipped {
+		t.Errorf("LIVE-VM driver was gated by default: %+v", res[0])
+	}
+	if !spy.rotated {
+		t.Error("LIVE-VM driver did not run under the default gate")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestProofLevelOrderAndString locks the level ordering (Unproven < MockOnly <
+// LiveVM < LiveReal) and the LIVE-REAL token the CLI/manifest render.
+func TestProofLevelOrderAndString(t *testing.T) {
+	if !(ProofUnproven < ProofMockOnly && ProofMockOnly < ProofLiveVM && ProofLiveVM < ProofLiveReal) {
+		t.Fatal("proof levels are not ordered lowest→highest")
+	}
+	if MinExecuteProof != ProofLiveVM {
+		t.Errorf("MinExecuteProof = %v, want ProofLiveVM", MinExecuteProof)
+	}
+	want := map[ProofLevel]string{
+		ProofUnproven: "UNPROVEN",
+		ProofMockOnly: "MOCK-ONLY",
+		ProofLiveVM:   "LIVE-VM",
+		ProofLiveReal: "LIVE-REAL",
+	}
+	for lvl, s := range want {
+		if got := lvl.String(); got != s {
+			t.Errorf("%d.String() = %q, want %q", lvl, got, s)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/rotate/proofs.go

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ package rotate
 // ProofLevel records how a driver's real-cutover behaviour has been validated.
 type ProofLevel int
 
+// Ordered lowest→highest: a higher level is a strictly stronger cutover proof.
+// The execute-time gate (see execute.go) compares against ProofLiveVM.
 const (
 	// ProofUnproven: no cutover proof recorded (e.g. the dry-run noop helper).
 	ProofUnproven ProofLevel = iota
@@ -26,11 +28,24 @@ const (
 	// ProofLiveVM: cutover proven against the REAL target software running in the
 	// sandbox VM (real PostgreSQL/MariaDB/Redis/wireguard-tools/Gitea/local files).
 	ProofLiveVM
+	// ProofLiveReal: cutover proven against a REAL, host-owned credential at the
+	// real provider (not the VM, not an emulator) — the highest level, recorded
+	// only after an authorized per-credential rotation on the safe-candidate ladder
+	// (ROADMAP M2). No driver carries this yet; promotions land here as data.
+	ProofLiveReal
 )
 
+// MinExecuteProof is the minimum proof level a driver must carry to run under
+// `rotate --execute` WITHOUT the explicit --allow-mock-proven opt-in. Anything
+// below this (MOCK-ONLY, UNPROVEN) is gated off by default so a driver never
+// proven against real target software cannot touch a real credential unattended.
+const MinExecuteProof = ProofLiveVM
+
 // String renders the level as the token shown in the CLI and the manifest.
 func (p ProofLevel) String() string {
 	switch p {
+	case ProofLiveReal:
+		return "LIVE-REAL"
 	case ProofLiveVM:
 		return "LIVE-VM"
 	case ProofMockOnly: