docs(browserrot §1): authorized-principal reframe + human-second-factor
Mirrors the Hard Rule 5 softening (kept in the local CLAUDE.md): rotation scope is provable per-credential authorization (self-owned OR recorded client consent), not operator ownership — enabling managed client rotation. Second factors are never bypassed/harvested/auto-submitted/simulated; challenges hand off to the live account holder. Stuffing/takeover primitives stay structurally absent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -39,11 +39,15 @@ Node dependency, isolated behind an interface and a local socket.
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## 1. Non-negotiable reframe (carry into every task)
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incredigo is **not** a bot-bypass/scraping tool. Per CLAUDE.md Hard Rule 5:
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- **Self-owned accounts only, with the user's authorization.**
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- **Never bypass MFA / CAPTCHA / email-confirm** — when one appears, the success marker
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simply doesn't match, `Rotate` fails cleanly, the OLD secret is kept, and the human is
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handed the change-URL by the existing worklist. (Already how `Rotate` behaves,
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browserrot.go:175-180.)
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- **Authorized principals only** — self-owned, or a client's delegated + *recorded* consent.
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The invariant is provable, per-credential, auditable authorization, not operator ownership;
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managed client rotation is in scope on that basis.
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- **Never bypass, harvest, auto-submit, or simulate any second factor** (MFA / CAPTCHA /
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OTP / push / email-confirm) — when one appears, the success marker simply doesn't match,
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`Rotate` fails cleanly, the OLD secret is kept, and the challenge is handed to the **live
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account holder** to complete before the flow resumes. (Already how `Rotate` behaves,
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browserrot.go:175-180.) The two primitives a takeover/stuffing kit needs — unauthorized
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scale + an automated second-factor defeat — are structurally absent and must stay absent.
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- "Stealth" here = **do not get false-flagged as a bot while doing a legitimate self-login**,
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NOT defeating a challenge. For a user logging into their own account from their own machine,
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most of the anti-bot arms race is already moot (real IP, real device, real user).
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