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hack-house/hh/scripts/sandbox-bootstrap.sh
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refactor(sandbox): remove container browser-GUI (noVNC), keep vbox VM GUI
The docker/podman headless-container desktop (XFCE + TigerVNC + websockify
+ noVNC published on host 127.0.0.1:6080) is removed. It was unreliable: the
desktop stack installed asynchronously during provisioning with every step
wrapped in `|| true` (silent failures), while the host port mapping existed
the moment the container ran — so opening the browser before websockify bound
6080 inside the container reset the connection (ERR_CONNECTION_RESET), with no
readiness signal and no loud failure. Containers also can't be rendered as a
real desktop by VirtualBox (no framebuffer/display), so the only desktop path
that stays is the native VirtualBox VM GUI.

Removed:
- sbx.rs: GUI_PORT const; PortHolder/port_holder()/kill_port_holder() (the
  port-consent gate existed only for the noVNC publish); the `gui` param +
  `-p 127.0.0.1:6080:6080` block in prepare(); HH_SBX_GUI env in dk_bootstrap();
  the `gui` param on provision().
- app.rs: PendingGuiLaunch + PortPrompt structs; the port_prompt App field; the
  `gui` field on PendingSudoLaunch; the port-consent modal + the sudo-submit
  port check; want_gui/gui parsing + the container-GUI launch message; `gui`
  threaded through spawn_launch and all call sites.
- sandbox-bootstrap.sh: the entire HH_SBX_GUI=1 desktop block.
- ui.rs / usage strings: dropped "[gui]"/"noVNC desktop" from the docker/podman
  help and the /sbx usage line.

Kept (unchanged): the VirtualBox VM GUI — gui_launch() (VBoxManage startvm
--type gui), launch_vbox_gui, `/sbx vbox gui <vm>` and the `/sbx gui` alias. The
`gui` keyword is still stripped from positionals so `/sbx vbox gui <vm>` parses.

cargo check passes clean (no warnings).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 11:38:43 -07:00

86 lines
3.8 KiB
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# sandbox-bootstrap.sh — install a baseline dev toolchain inside a hack-house
# Docker sandbox.
#
# It is piped to `bash -s` (as root) inside the container at provision time, so
# fresh sandboxes come up usable instead of bare. Idempotent + sentinel-guarded:
# a re-provision (new member joins) or a snapshot load is a fast no-op.
#
# When launched by hh, the package list comes from scripts/sandbox-tools.json
# (the canonical, editable schema) via $HH_SBX_PKGS. DEFAULT_PKGS below is only
# the fallback for running this script standalone. Per-launch override:
# HH_SBX_PKGS="vim tmux ripgrep" ./host-house.sh ...
set -uo pipefail
# -h/--help: print the usage header above and exit. (No effect in normal use —
# hh pipes this to `bash -s` inside the container with no args; the flag is for
# running it standalone to read what it does.)
case "${1:-}" in
-h|--help|-help) sed -n '2,/^set /{/^set /d;s/^# \{0,1\}//;p}' "$0"; exit 0 ;;
esac
SENTINEL=/var/lib/hh-bootstrap.done
[[ -f "$SENTINEL" ]] && exit 0 # this container is already provisioned
# Baseline dev tools: editors, fetchers, vcs, net + inspect utilities, json,
# archives. Keep names valid for the base image (ubuntu:24.04) — an unknown
# package would otherwise abort the whole batch install.
DEFAULT_PKGS="vim nano less curl wget ca-certificates git \
build-essential pkg-config \
procps iproute2 iputils-ping net-tools \
jq unzip zip tree htop file ripgrep \
python3 python3-pip python3-venv"
PKGS="${HH_SBX_PKGS:-$DEFAULT_PKGS}"
export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
# Refresh the index first (base images ship without /var/lib/apt/lists). If the
# update fails (e.g. no network) we bail WITHOUT writing the sentinel, so the
# next launch retries instead of leaving a half-provisioned shell.
apt-get update -qq || exit 0
# --no-install-recommends keeps the image lean. apt is atomic on resolution, so
# if one name is unavailable the batch aborts — fall back to one-by-one so a
# single bad/missing package can't deprive the shell of everything else.
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
if ! apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends $PKGS; then
for p in $PKGS; do
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends "$p" || true
done
fi
# ---- Goose harness (the /ai agent's sandbox `!task` path) --------------------
# Goose ships as a release binary (not apt), so install it via its official
# installer into a system path so every container user can run it. Best-effort:
# a failure here just means the agent falls back to its built-in one-shot
# injector, so it never blocks provisioning. Skip entirely with HH_SBX_GOOSE=0.
if [[ "${HH_SBX_GOOSE:-1}" != "0" ]] && ! command -v goose >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
GOOSE_BIN_DIR=/usr/local/bin CONFIGURE=false \
bash -c 'curl -fsSL https://github.com/block/goose/releases/download/stable/download_cli.sh | bash' \
|| true
fi
fi
# Container-side Goose config: point it at the host's Ollama via the engine's
# host gateway (passed in as $HH_OLLAMA_HOST by the launcher). The shared shell
# runs as root here, so write it under /root — only if absent, so a tuned config
# survives a re-provision.
if command -v goose >/dev/null 2>&1; then
GOOSE_CFG=/root/.config/goose/config.yaml
if [[ ! -f "$GOOSE_CFG" ]]; then
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$GOOSE_CFG")"
cat > "$GOOSE_CFG" <<EOF
# Written by hh sandbox-bootstrap.sh — Goose runs INSIDE this sandbox and reaches
# the host Ollama over the engine's host gateway. No host filesystem is mounted.
GOOSE_PROVIDER: ollama
GOOSE_MODEL: ${HH_GOOSE_MODEL:-qwen2.5:3b}
OLLAMA_HOST: ${HH_OLLAMA_HOST:-http://host.containers.internal:11434}
EOF
fi
fi
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$SENTINEL")"
date -u +%FT%TZ > "$SENTINEL" # mark done; skip on the next provision pass