From e8cae003cecc043d4149d0236e6bfd7564349e8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: ek0ms savi0r <4+ek0mssavi0r@noreply.git.churchofmalware.org>
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2026 01:25:40 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Add CVE-2026-50295_pre-release/readme.md

---
 CVE-2026-50295_pre-release/readme.md | 141 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 141 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 CVE-2026-50295_pre-release/readme.md

diff --git a/CVE-2026-50295_pre-release/readme.md b/CVE-2026-50295_pre-release/readme.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b9c2a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2026-50295_pre-release/readme.md
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+In the ZtDeviceStartModule() function of ztdns.sys, it calls IoCreateDevice() to create L"\\Device\\ZTDNS" device, and then calls NtSetSecurityObject() to a SecurityDescriptor to this device object. From this, only the members of Administrators, SYSTEM and Dnscache can open it.
+
+The code snippet and debugging information is as follows.
+int ZtDeviceStartModule(void)
+{
+  ...
+  DeviceName.Buffer = L"\\Device\\ZTDNS";
+  Status = IoCreateDevice(DriverObject, 0, &DeviceName, 0x12u, 0, 0, &DeviceObject);
+  Status = ObOpenObjectByPointer(DeviceObject, 0x240u, 0i64, 0x2000000u, 0i64, 0, &DeviceHandle);
+  Status = NtSetSecurityObject(DeviceHandle, 4u, &gDeviceSecurityDescriptor);
+  ...
+}
+
+1: kd> !object \device\ztdns
+Object: ffff850ad52366b0  Type: (ffff850acc6bfe00) Device
+    ObjectHeader: ffff850ad5236680 (new version)
+    HandleCount: 0  PointerCount: 4
+
+   Directory Object: ffffce0f782288f0  Name: ZTDNS
+1: kd> !devobj ffff850ad52366b0
+Device object (ffff850ad52366b0) is for:
+ ZTDNS \Driver\ZTDNS DriverObject ffff850ad49d9b90
+Current Irp 00000000 RefCount 1 Type 00000012 Flags 00000040
+SecurityDescriptor ffffce0f8d816560 DevExt 00000000 DevObjExt ffff850ad5236800 
+ExtensionFlags (0000000000)  
+Characteristics (0000000000)  
+Device queue is not busy.
+1: kd> !sd ffffce0f8d816560 0x1
+->Revision: 0x1
+->Sbz1    : 0x0
+->Control : 0x9004
+            SE_DACL_PRESENT
+            SE_DACL_PROTECTED
+            SE_SELF_RELATIVE
+->Owner   : S-1-5-32-544 (Alias: BUILTIN\Administrators)
+->Group   : S-1-5-18 (Well Known Group: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
+->Dacl    : 
+->Dacl    : ->AclRevision: 0x2
+->Dacl    : ->Sbz1       : 0x0
+->Dacl    : ->AclSize    : 0x5c
+->Dacl    : ->AceCount   : 0x3
+->Dacl    : ->Sbz2       : 0x0
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[0]: ->AceType: ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[0]: ->AceFlags: 0x0
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[0]: ->AceSize: 0x14
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[0]: ->Mask : 0x001f01ff
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[0]: ->SID: S-1-5-18 (Well Known Group: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM)
+
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[1]: ->AceType: ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[1]: ->AceFlags: 0x0
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[1]: ->AceSize: 0x18
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[1]: ->Mask : 0x001f01ff
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[1]: ->SID: S-1-5-32-544 (Alias: BUILTIN\Administrators)
+
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[2]: ->AceType: ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[2]: ->AceFlags: 0x0
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[2]: ->AceSize: 0x28
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[2]: ->Mask : 0x0012019f
+->Dacl    : ->Ace[2]: ->SID: S-1-5-80-859482183-879914841-863379149-1145462774-2388618682 (Well Known Group: NT SERVICE\Dnscache)
+
+->Sacl    :  is NULL
+
+
+
+But it does not specify FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN characteristic for the parameter DeviceCharacteristics of IoCreateDevice(). So unprivileged users can still use L"\\Device\\ZTDNS\\" or L"\\Device\\ZTDNS\\xxx" to open this device.
+
+
+
+
+Then sending Ioctl code 12800Bh calls ZtSetGlobalPropertiesFastIo() to set global properties:
+
+struct _ZT_GLOBAL_PROPERTIES
+{
+ bool fEnableFilters;
+ bool fPersistFilters;
+ bool fAuditMode;
+ bool fAllowMdns;
+ bool fAllowPlaintextDns;
+ bool fBlockLocalIps;
+ bool fAllowIcsDhcpServer;
+ DWORD dwUnicastLifetime;
+ DWORD MaxRecordAge;
+};
+
+BOOLEAN __fastcall ZtSetGlobalPropertiesFastIo(
+ ...
+ if ( InputBuffer && InputBufferLength32 == 0x10 && OutputBuffer && OutputBufferLength == 0x10 )
+ {
+   Status = ZtCaptureUserMemory(InputBuffer, 0x10ui64, 4u, PreviousMode, &CapturedProperties);
+   if ( Status >= 0 )
+   {
+     Status = ZtTryProbeAlignment(OutputBuffer, 0x10ui64, PreviousMode);
+     if ( Status >= 0 )
+     {
+       if...
+       g_fEnableFilters = CapturedProperties.fEnableFilters;
+       g_fPersistFilters = CapturedProperties.fPersistFilters;
+       g_fAuditMode = CapturedProperties.fAuditMode;
+       g_fAllowMdns = CapturedProperties.fAllowMdns;
+       g_fBlockLocalIps = CapturedProperties.fBlockLocalIps;
+       g_fAllowIcsDhcpServer = CapturedProperties.fAllowIcsDhcpServer;
+       g_dwUnicastLifetime = CapturedProperties.dwUnicastLifetime;
+       g_MaxRecordAge = CapturedProperties.MaxRecordAge;
+       AllowPlaintextDns = 0;
+       if ( g_fZtdnsSelfhostBranch )
+         LOBYTE(AllowPlaintextDns) = CapturedProperties.fAllowPlaintextDns;
+       *&g_fAllowPlaintextDns = AllowPlaintextDns;
+       Status = ZtWfpConfigureFilters(CapturedProperties.fEnableFilters, Unused, FilterIds, &FilterIds[1]);
+       if ( Status >= 0 )
+         Status = ZtTryCopyUserMemory(OutputBuffer, FilterIds, PreviousMode);
+     }
+   }
+ }
+ ...
+}
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+For example, setting g_fAuditMode=true can change the mode from Enforcement to Audit,  this will permit all outbound connections. 
+
+void __fastcall ZtCalloutConnectClassify(
+ ...
+ if ( ZtpAllowConnection(inFixedValues, inMetaValues) || g_fAuditMode )
+ {
+   actionType = 0x1002;                        // FWP_ACTION_PERMIT
+ }
+ else
+ {
+   actionType = 0x1001;                        // FWP_ACTION_BLOCK
+   Veto = 1;
+ }
+ classifyOut->actionType = actionType;
+ if ( Veto )
+   classifyOut->rights &= ~1u;
+ ...
+}