841d43a3b3
Document operator dispositions from post-review session
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LUKS complexity deferred — operator uses disposable cloud VPS/Matrix infra
so on-device encryption provides diminishing returns. Captured device
exposes only target data + dead-end relay credentials.
autossh removal reclassified from detection risk to design violation —
persistent outbound tunnel contradicts passive/dormant architecture.
NOT-FIXING: Matrix homeserver default (opt-in only), creds in /dev/shm
(victim data by design), WireGuard key path (dead-end VPS mitigates).
2026-04-06 11:33:00 -04:00
a4edcf6e15
v3.2: Merge security review into design doc as single source of truth
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Integrate all findings from SECURITY_REVIEW.md inline into module specs:
- OPSEC warnings added to arp_spoof, responder_mgr, evil_twin, mitmproxy, tailscale, ble_emergency
- Accepted limitations noted in tls_sni_extractor (ECH, DoH, TLS 1.3), smb_monitor (SMB3), email_sniffer, credential_sniffer, process_disguise, bridge
- New modules: data_exfil.py (connectivity), wordlists in data/
- Design changes: tiered PCAP retention, ARP crash recovery, 802.1X full bypass, engagement phase gating, schema migration, setup reliability
- Hardware notes: USB power budget, Pi fingerprint mitigations, physical detection, SD write endurance
- Remove SECURITY_REVIEW.md and review_agent5_redteam.json
2026-03-17 11:11:25 -04:00
7915ef17de
Add consolidated security review from 6-agent tribe analysis
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91 raw findings from Security, OPSEC, Blue Team, APT, Red Team, and
Infra/Reliability analysts consolidated to 45 actionable items across
7 sections: new modules (9), design changes (10), infra fixes (6),
tool gaps (5), OPSEC warnings (10), and accepted limitations (7).
Key themes: LDAP/RDP monitoring gaps, PCAP storage crisis, data exfil
pipeline needed, ARP/Responder detection risk, Pi Zero memory budget
exceeded, multiprocess architecture required, config files outside LUKS.
2026-03-17 10:28:42 -04:00
Cobra