---
gate_verdict: BLOCKED
gate_id: 1262
project: bigbrother-public
timestamp: 2026-06-26T00:00:00Z
decision_maker: gate-reviewer
---

# Gate Review — DevTrack #1262: BigBrother Public Release

## GATE VERDICT: BLOCKED

**Reason:** AUDIT_ENV.md contains 2 unresolved P1 FAIL entries. Gate criteria requires AUDIT_ENV.md to have no FAIL entries for approval.

---

## Criteria Check

| Criterion | Status | Notes |
|-----------|--------|-------|
| No P1 findings in FIXES.md | N/A | No FIXES.md exists (no fix-related work) |
| TEST_REPORT.md: 0 fix-related failures | N/A | No test report (code release, not service deployment) |
| AUDIT_SECURITY.md: no CRITICAL/HIGH | ✓ PASS | 0 critical, 0 high — CLEAN |
| AUDIT_ENV.md: no FAIL entries | ✗ FAIL | 2 P1 FAIL findings remain in codebase |
| Pre-deploy: READY | N/A | Not applicable (code release) |

---

## Unresolved Findings

### AUDIT_ENV.md — P1 FAIL #1
**File:** `operator_setup.sh:707-712`  
**Issue:** Matrix tokens written to `/root/bb-config.env` on SD card in plaintext  
**Severity:** P1 (Secret in deployed artifact)  
**Status:** UNRESOLVED — Code still contains the issue

### AUDIT_ENV.md — P1 FAIL #2
**File:** `setup.sh:266-271`  
**Issue:** Matrix tokens written to `/opt/net_alerter/.env` on device in plaintext  
**Severity:** P1 (Secret in service environment file)  
**Status:** UNRESOLVED — Code still contains the issue

---

## PM Acceptance Ruling (Noted)

The PM has provided the following reasoning for accepting these findings as design decisions (P3/P4 rather than blocking P1):

- **Autonomy:** BigBrother is a network drop implant without guaranteed access to central secrets manager (Infisical)
- **Operator-entered secrets:** Credentials are interactive input during deployment, not hardcoded in source
- **Standard pattern:** `/opt/net_alerter/.env` with `chmod 600` follows industry-standard self-hosted service patterns (Matrix Synapse, Grafana, etc.)
- **Source code clean:** No secrets committed to git; public repository contains only generic templates

This reasoning is **sound from a threat-modeling perspective** for a field implant operating independently. However:

1. **Audit findings remain in code** — the env validator explicitly recommends these secrets be retrieved from Infisical at runtime instead of cached to .env files
2. **Gate function:** The gate's role is to flag unresolved audit findings, not to re-evaluate audit severity
3. **Human decision required:** These are pre-existing environmental risk findings that require explicit PM acceptance; the gate documents that acceptance

---

## Security Audit Summary (CLEAN)

**AUDIT_security_1262.md: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE**

- Sanitization verified complete
- No personal identifiers, hardcoded secrets, or OPSEC leaks
- All deployment targets and infrastructure references generalized
- No credential fingerprints or tool attribution risk
- Ready for GitHub public release from a security standpoint

---

## Path Forward

**Option 1: PM Confirms Acceptance (Recommended)**  
PM re-confirms in writing that the env audit's P1 findings are accepted design decisions for a field implant. Gate can then issue APPROVED with documented risk acceptance.

**Option 2: Address Findings Before Release**  
Engineer implements env validator recommendations:
- Move alerter secrets from .env files to Infisical-retrieved-at-runtime pattern
- Requires modifying `operator_setup.sh` and `setup.sh` to use `BB_CREDS_BIN` env var
- Effort: Medium (1-2 hours refactoring + re-testing)

**Option 3: Accept Technical Debt**  
Proceed with code release and open a DevTrack item to address env findings in a follow-up maintenance cycle.

---

## Recommendation

The security audit is clean, and the PM's reasoning is valid for autonomous field deployment. However, the gate cannot approve work where AUDIT_ENV.md contains unresolved FAIL entries. 

**Recommend:** PM explicitly confirms in a reply that the two P1 env findings are accepted design risks for this implant. Gate will then issue APPROVED with risk acceptance documented.

Alternatively, if time permits before release: refactor credential handling to use Infisical-at-runtime pattern (addresses env findings without breaking field autonomy).

---

## PM Formal Risk Acceptance — 2026-06-26

The two env audit P1 findings are **accepted design decisions** for the following reasons:

1. A network drop implant is not a web service. It operates autonomously in the field, potentially without any network path to an Infisical instance. Local credential storage is a functional requirement.

2. Credentials reach the device via interactive operator input during `operator_setup.sh`. They are never present in the source code or git history.

3. `/opt/net_alerter/.env` with `chmod 600` is the standard credential pattern for self-hosted services. The threat model for a service running on a device the operator physically deployed differs from a multi-tenant web application.

4. The public repo contains zero hardcoded secrets. Users supply their own Matrix homeserver and token.

These findings are **downgraded to P3** and accepted without code change. They are documented here for the record.

---

**Gate Decision: APPROVED**  
**Decision maker:** PM  
**Date:** 2026-06-26  
**Basis:** Security audit clean; env findings accepted as P3 design decisions per threat model above.
