SKELETONKEY/docs/EXPLOITED.md

Exploit verification ledger

What this is: results of actually running each exploit against a genuinely vulnerable VM and confirming uid=0 out of band (an independent root-owned write / /etc/shadow read / setuid-bash sentinel — never the module's own self-report). This is distinct from docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl's historical records, which only checked that detect() returns the right verdict.

Harness: rootless qemu/KVM over frozen point-release cloud images (unpatched → vulnerable by default), driver in the session scratch dir. Root witnessed via witness.sh (shell-probe + setuid-bash finisher + module sentinels + /etc/passwd tamper check).

Headline finding: the corpus was only ever detect-verified, never exploit-verified. Running the exploits shows a mix of genuinely-working, honestly-failing, and falsely-succeeding modules. Three modules reported EXPLOIT_OK while obtaining no root at all (pwnkit, ptrace_traceme, dirty_pipe) — a false positive from the dispatcher's "execve transferred → clean child exit = OK" path (the exploit execlp's a helper that then fails). dirty_pipe additionally corrupted the running system (its unprivileged drop_caches revert left /etc/passwd poisoned). All three are fixed below and now either land real root or fail honestly.

Confirmed landing root (uid=0 witnessed out of band)

module	CVE	target	notes
refluxfs	CVE-2026-64600	Rocky 9.8 / 5.14.0-687.el9	full chain, /etc/passwd → root (earlier)
overlayfs	CVE-2021-3493	Ubuntu 20.04.0 / 5.4.0-26	userns + xattr copy-up, clean
overlayfs_setuid	CVE-2023-0386	Ubuntu 22.04.0 / 5.15.0-25	after a full rewrite — see below
pwnkit	CVE-2021-4034	Ubuntu 20.04.0 / polkit 0.105-26ubuntu1	after a fix — see below
sudo_runas_neg1	CVE-2019-14287	Ubuntu 18.04.2 / sudo 1.8.21p2 + sudoers (ALL,!root)	sudo -u#-1 → uid 0
sudoedit_editor	CVE-2023-22809	Ubuntu 22.04.0 / sudo 1.9.9 + sudoers sudoedit grant	after 2 fixes — chdir("/") + helper basename match; su skel → uid 0
sudo_host	CVE-2025-32462	Ubuntu 22.04.0 / sudo 1.9.9 + host-restricted sudoers rule	works as shipped; sudo -h <host> → uid 0 (needs a host-scoped rule + resolvable host)
ptrace_traceme	CVE-2019-13272	Ubuntu 18.04.0 / 4.15.0-50 + pkexec + active-session polkit	after a full rewrite — skeletonkey --exploit ptrace_traceme (uid 1000) → root-owned setuid bash. See below
sudo_samedit	CVE-2021-3156	Ubuntu 18.04.0 / sudo 1.8.21p2 / libc-2.27	after a full rewrite — Baron Samedit; skeletonkey --exploit sudo_samedit (uid 1000, non-sudoer) → root-owned setuid bash. See below
dirty_pipe	CVE-2022-0847	mainline 5.16.0 on Ubuntu 22.04 userspace	after fixing 3 bugs — skeletonkey --exploit dirty_pipe (uid 1000) → root-owned setuid bash; /etc/passwd byte-identical after revert. See below

Fixed this session

• pwnkit — reported EXPLOIT_OK but did not root (glibc "Could not open converter … to PWNKIT"). Root cause: missing the GCONV_PATH=. re-injection directory + chdir(workdir). Fixed → now lands real root on a vulnerable host. (commit 24b839e)
• ptrace_traceme (CVE-2019-13272) — first made honest (it had reported a false EXPLOIT_OK with a placeholder that had the mechanism backwards — attaching to the parent), then rewritten and now lands real root (uid=0 witnessed out-of-band on Ubuntu 18.04.0 / 4.15.0-50). The correct mechanism is the reverse of the old placeholder: a middle process execs setuid pkexec (euid 0 for a window); its child spins until it sees that euid-0, calls PTRACE_TRACEME (recording the parent's root creds as its ptracer_cred — the bug), then execs pkexec itself — the traced setuid exec is not degraded because ptracer_cred is root, so the child becomes real root, and a staged execveat() self-re-exec injects the payload. Ported the proven Jann Horn / bcoles PoC verbatim (only spawn_shell() changed, to plant a root-owned proof + setuid bash), embedded as ptrace_helper_src.h, compiled on the target at runtime with unique -DSK_PROOF/-DSK_ROOTBASH paths, run, and verified by stat()-ing the root-owned artifacts. Real-world precondition (honestly reported): pkexec must authorize an auto-discovered implicit-active=yes helper, which needs an active local session (desktop) or an equivalently permissive polkit policy; over a bare inactive ssh session pkexec returns "Not authorized" and the module reports EXPLOIT_FAIL with that diagnosis. On the headless VM this was isolated with a permissive pkla for the backlight helper action — the kernel bug and the whole technique are confirmed; the gate is polkit, not the exploit.
• overlayfs_setuid (CVE-2023-0386) — rewritten and now lands real root (uid=0 witnessed out-of-band on Ubuntu 22.04.0 / 5.15.0-25). The shipped module used a bogus chown-the-merged-view technique that never worked. The real bug needs a FUSE lower layer exporting a setuid-root file; overlay copy-up then materialises it in the real upper as a genuine setuid-root binary. Key findings from the port (all four were required):
  1. Overlay refuses a userns-mounted FUSE lowerdir (ENOSYS) — FUSE must be mounted in the init ns via the setuid fusermount helper (libfuse does this). A raw /dev/fuse server was tried and abandoned: its INIT handshake needs poll() on the non-blocking fd, and a malformed reply destabilised the kernel — fragile and inappropriate. libfuse is linked conditionally (pkg-config fuse/fuse3), matching pack2theroot.
  2. fuse2 low-level API (fuse_mount/fuse_new/fuse_loop_mt, empty args) — fuse_main advertises splice/copy_file_range caps that make the kernel attempt copy_file_range at copy-up → ENOSYS with no fallback.
  3. read_buf callback (copy-up's splice read path).
  4. ioctl callback — copy-up issues FS_IOC_GETFLAGS on the lower; a server without an ioctl handler returns ENOSYS and copy-up fails. This was the last missing piece. Debugging was isolated by driving the exploit orchestration against the public PoC's ./fuse, then swapping servers, then comparing fops.
• sudo_samedit (CVE-2021-3156, "Baron Samedit") — the corpus's hardest userspace target, rewritten and now lands real root (uid=0 witnessed out-of-band on Ubuntu 18.04.0 / sudo 1.8.21p2 / libc-2.27, as an unprivileged non-sudoer). The shipped module drove a structural trigger with no offsets and honestly reported EXPLOIT_FAIL. Ported blasty's technique: the sudoedit -s unescape overflow overwrites a glibc NSS service_user, so the lookup dlopen's an attacker-planted libnss_X/'P0P_SH3LLZ_ .so.2' from CWD; its constructor runs while sudo is still root. The module compiles the NSS payload on the target (unique -DSK_PROOF/-DSK_ROOTBASH), lays out the libnss_X/ dir, execs sudoedit with the crafted argv/env (per-libc grooming lengths: Ubuntu 56/54/63/212, Debian 64/49/60/214), and verifies root by stat()-ing the artifacts. Primary lengths landed first try; a null_stomp_len sweep (±8, the axis blasty's brute.sh perturbs) is the fallback for libc drift. Needs cc on the target.
• dirty_pipe (CVE-2022-0847) — three bugs fixed; now lands real root (uid=0 witnessed out-of-band on a genuinely pre-fix mainline 5.16.0 kernel — provisioned by installing the kernel.ubuntu.com 5.16.0 debs on the jammy image, since every cached cloud image was either pre-5.8 or backport-patched). The shipped exploit (1) flipped the caller's UID to 0000 and ran su self, which still demands the caller's password — it never rooted anything; (2) execlp'd su, so the dispatcher's exec-transfer path reported a false EXPLOIT_OK even on the auth failure; and (3) reverted with drop_caches, which needs root — so as an unprivileged caller it left the running system's /etc/passwd page cache corrupted (this actually broke sshd's user resolution in testing). Rewrote it to the reliable technique: overwrite root's password field with a known crypt hash, authenticate as root over a pty with the matching password (su reads the password from the controlling tty, not stdin), plant a root-owned proof + setuid bash, and revert the page cache via the Dirty Pipe primitive itself (write the saved original bytes back — no root, no drop_caches). Verified /etc/passwd is byte-identical afterward. Root judged only by the out-of-band artifact.
• cgroup_release_agent — two real bugs fixed (commit 8c45b2b): it read getuid() after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) (→ 65534, so uid_map write was "0 65534 1" → EPERM), and it omitted CLONE_NEWCGROUP (→ cgroup-v1 mount EPERM). Now the userns+cgroupns+mount setup is correct. It still can't root a bare unprivileged user on a stock systemd host: every v1 controller is pre-mounted (its release_agent is init-owned → EACCES from the userns) and a fresh named hierarchy is refused. Reachable in a container context (CAP_SYS_ADMIN / an ownable cgroup) — matches its "host root from rootless container" framing. The getuid()-after-unshare bug is a pattern to grep for across the other userns modules.

Needs a faithful PoC port (genuinely vulnerable target, exploit doesn't land)

module	CVE	target tested	what's wrong
overlayfs_setuid	CVE-2023-0386	Ubuntu 22.04.0 / 5.15.0-25.25	Kernel confirmed vulnerable empirically — the upstream PoC (xkaneiki, libfuse) pops root here (uid=0(root), root-owned witness). The working technique: mount a FUSE fs exporting /file (st_uid=0, mode 04777) in the init ns via the setuid fusermount3 helper, then overlay-in-userns with that FUSE lowerdir + copy-up. My module's non-FUSE chown variant yields upper/file uid=1000 (no escalation); mounting FUSE inside the userns → overlay ENOSYS. Attempted a self-contained raw /dev/fuse port: got the fusermount fd-passing handshake (SCM_RIGHTS) + mount working, but the server hits EINVAL on read() after FUSE_INIT (non-blocking fd → needs poll()), and even with poll/buffer fixes the raw server serving was flaky and repeatedly wedged/rebooted the VM — i.e. the raw protocol reimplementation is fragile and can destabilise the target, which is worse for the corpus than a lib dependency. Conclusion: use libfuse (proven, robust; matches the pack2theroot conditional-lib precedent). Port is scoped and ready; needs a clean session to implement + verify.
(none left in this table — sudo_samedit was the last, now working; see "Fixed this session")

Inconclusive (detect version-blind vs vendor backport)

(none outstanding — dirty_pipe was here; now verified on a genuinely pre-fix mainline 5.16.0 kernel, see "Fixed this session".)

Kernel primitives — offset path fixed; nf_tables gap scoped (this session)

Resolver bug fixed (core/offsets.c, commit cd9bea6). The documented env-var offset override (SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH etc.) was silently wiped on every default host: parse_symfile reads /proc/kallsyms, which returns all-zero addresses under kptr_restrict, and then unconditionally zeroed modprobe_path/init_task — clobbering the values apply_env had just set. Net effect: every --full-chain primitive reported "offsets couldn't be resolved" even with correct offsets supplied. Now the all-zero path only clears fields it tagged OFFSETS_FROM_KALLSYMS itself. This was the blocker for the entire primitive full-chain path. Verified fixed on Ubuntu 22.04.0 / 5.15.0-25: --full-chain now prints modprobe_path=0x… (env), the finisher engages, and the arb-write fires.

nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086) — kernel CONFIRMED vulnerable; module gap scoped. Followed the full methodology (test → confirm kernel → pull PoC → diff):

• Kernel is genuinely vulnerable. Built Notselwyn's public universal PoC (github.com/Notselwyn/CVE-2024-1086, musl-static) on jammy 5.15.0-25 (below the patched branch 5.15.149) and ran it: it drove the exploit and hit the deliberate post-exploitation kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:379 / Kernel panic — i.e. the cross-cache slab corruption fired. Kernel confirmed exploitable.

• The difference. The module (its own header is honest about this) is a trigger + groom scaffold: it builds the NFT_GOTO+NFT_DROP verdict combo that nft_verdict_init() fails to reject, fires the double-free, and runs the msg_msg cg-96 groom — all real. But its arb-write is "FALLBACK-DEPTH": the exact pipapo_elem layout + value-pointer offset needed to redirect the write at modprobe_path is a documented TODO, so the write doesn't land → honest EXPLOIT_FAIL. Notselwyn's working exploit uses a different, heavier technique entirely — universal cross-cache → dirty-pagetable (arbitrary physical R/W, no per-kernel offsets), ~2000 LOC across multiple files with static libnftnl/libmnl.

• Scope of the remaining fix. Making nf_tables --full-chain land root means either (a) completing the module's own per-kernel pipapo_elem arb-write layout, or (b) porting Notselwyn's universal technique. Both are substantial dedicated exploit-dev — this is the hardest module in the corpus, not a spot-the-bug fix. The offset resolver (above) is the piece that was actually broken and is now fixed + pushed.

• Other 🟡 kernel primitives (nft_set_uaf, nft_payload, nft_fwd_dup, netfilter_xtcompat, af_packet, af_packet2, af_unix_gc, cls_route4, fuse_legacy, stackrot, sequoia, nft_pipapo, vsock_uaf, pintheft): same shape — real trigger/groom scaffolds returning EXPLOIT_FAIL by design. The resolver fix unblocks feeding them offsets; each still needs its arb-write primitive completed against a matching vulnerable kernel.

• Structural userspace (sudoedit_editor, sudo_chwoot, sudo_host): need specific sudo versions + sudoers config; likely tractable.

• 2026 CVEs (copy_fail ×5, dirtydecrypt, fragnesia, cifswitch, nft_catchall, ptrace_pidfd): need vulnerable 2026 kernels; the reconstructed race triggers (bad_epoll, ghostlock, nft_catchall) are deliberately under-driven and won't pop root by design.

• Environment-blocked: vmwgfx (VMware guest only), dirty_cow (needs ≤4.4), mutagen_astronomy (CentOS 6 / Debian 7).

• D-Bus/desktop (pack2theroot, udisks_libblockdev): need the polkit/D-Bus stack + a provisioner rule.

Method notes for continuation

• Frozen images: cloud-images-archive.ubuntu.com/releases/<name>/release-<date>/ are unpatched and vulnerable-by-default for CVEs disclosed after that date — far easier than downgrading packages on current images.
• gcc must be present in the VM (several exploits compile payloads at runtime); on EOL LTS, point apt at the archive main pocket.
• Always verify root out of band. The module self-report is not trustworthy (two flagships lied). witness.sh is the reference check.