release v0.9.6: --auto no longer prompts for sudo password

sudo_runas_neg1 and sudoedit_editor's detect() bodies invoked
'sudo -ln' (intending list + non-interactive). Some sudoers / PAM
configurations have been observed prompting for a password anyway
when the flags are bundled. That meant skeletonkey --auto --i-know
could hang on a sudo password prompt during the corpus scan — bad
ergonomics for an LPE tool whose whole point is to get root without
already having it.

Fix: write '-n -l' as separate flags, redirect stdin from /dev/null
so sudo cannot fall back to reading the tty even if PAM tries to
coerce one. Belt-and-suspenders against any tty prompt during --auto.

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ on:
     # Runs Monday 06:00 UTC; reports any new backports / KEV additions
     # that haven't propagated into the corpus yet.
     - cron: '0 6 * * 1'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    # Lets us trigger the drift-check job on demand (e.g. after a
+    # metadata refresh) without waiting for the weekly cron. The
+    # drift-check job's `if:` gate honors this trigger.
 
 jobs:
   build:

CVES.md

@@ -23,16 +23,17 @@ Status legend:
 - 🔴 **DEPRECATED** — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for
   historical reference only
 
-**Counts:** 31 modules total — 28 verified (🟢 14 · 🟡 14) plus 3
+**Counts:** 39 modules total covering 34 CVEs; **28 of 34 CVEs
-ported-but-unverified (`dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`, `pack2theroot` —
+verified end-to-end in real VMs** via `tools/verify-vm/`. 🔵 0 · ⚪ 0
-see note below). 🔵 0 · ⚪ 0 planned-with-stub · 🔴 0. (One ⚪ row
+planned-with-stub · 🔴 0. (One ⚪ row below — CVE-2026-31402 — is a
-below — CVE-2026-31402 — is a *candidate* with no module, not counted
+*candidate* with no module, not counted as a module.)
-as a module.)
 
-> **Note on `dirtydecrypt` / `fragnesia` / `pack2theroot`:** all three
+> **Note on unverified rows:** `vmwgfx` / `dirty_cow` /
-> are ported from public PoCs. The **exploit bodies** are not yet
+> `mutagen_astronomy` / `pintheft` / `vsock_uaf` / `fragnesia` are
-> VM-verified end-to-end, so they're listed 🟡 but excluded from the
+> blocked by their target environment (VMware-only, kernel < 4.4,
-> 28-module verified corpus.
+> mainline panic, kmod not autoloaded, or t64-transition libs),
+> not by missing code. See
+> [`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml).
 >
 > All three now have **pinned fix commits and version-based
 > `detect()`**:

README.md

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
 
 [![Latest release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY?label=release)](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest)
 [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
-[![Modules](https://img.shields.io/badge/CVEs-22%20VM--verified%20%2F%2034-brightgreen.svg)](docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl)
+[![Modules](https://img.shields.io/badge/CVEs-28%20VM--verified%20%2F%2034-brightgreen.svg)](docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl)
 [![Platform: Linux](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-linux-lightgrey.svg)](#)
 
 > **One curated binary. 39 Linux LPE modules covering 34 CVEs from 2016 → 2026.
-> Every year 2016 → 2026 covered. 22 confirmed end-to-end against real Linux
+> Every year 2016 → 2026 covered. 28 confirmed end-to-end against real Linux
 > VMs via `tools/verify-vm/`. Detection rules in the box. One command picks
 > the safest one and runs it.**
 
@@ -44,10 +44,11 @@ for every CVE in the bundle — same project for red and blue teams.
 
 ## Corpus at a glance
 
-**31 modules covering 26 distinct CVEs** across the 2016 → 2026 LPE
+**39 modules covering 34 distinct CVEs** across the 2016 → 2026 LPE
-timeline. **22 of the 26 CVEs have been empirically verified** in real
+timeline. **28 of the 34 CVEs have been empirically verified** in real
-Linux VMs via `tools/verify-vm/`; the 4 still-pending entries are
+Linux VMs via `tools/verify-vm/`; the 6 still-pending entries are
-blocked by their target environment, not by missing code.
+blocked by their target environment (legacy hypervisor, EOL kernel, or
+the t64-transition libc rollout), not by missing code.
 
 | Tier | Count | What it means |
 |---|---|---|
@@ -65,23 +66,26 @@ af_packet · af_packet2 · af_unix_gc · cls_route4 · fuse_legacy ·
 nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · nft_fwd_dup · nft_payload ·
 netfilter_xtcompat · stackrot · sudo_samedit · sequoia · vmwgfx
 
-### Empirical verification (22 of 26 CVEs)
+### Empirical verification (28 of 34 CVEs)
 
 Records in [`docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl`](docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl) prove
 each verdict against a known-target VM. Coverage:
 
 | Distro / kernel | Modules verified |
 |---|---|
-| Ubuntu 18.04 (4.15.0) | af_packet · ptrace_traceme · sudo_samedit |
+| Ubuntu 18.04 (4.15.0, sudo 1.8.21p2) | af_packet · ptrace_traceme · sudo_samedit · sudo_runas_neg1 |
-| Ubuntu 20.04 (5.4 stock + 5.15 HWE) | af_packet2 · cls_route4 · nft_payload · overlayfs · pwnkit · sequoia |
+| Ubuntu 20.04 (5.4.0-26 pinned + 5.15 HWE) | af_packet2 · cls_route4 · nft_payload · overlayfs · pwnkit · sequoia · tioscpgrp |
-| Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15 stock + mainline 5.15.5 / 6.1.10) | af_unix_gc · dirty_pipe · entrybleed · nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · overlayfs_setuid · stackrot · sudoedit_editor |
+| Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15 stock + mainline 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 / 6.19.7) | af_unix_gc · dirty_pipe · dirtydecrypt · entrybleed · nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · nft_pipapo · overlayfs_setuid · stackrot · sudoedit_editor · sudo_chwoot |
 | Debian 11 (5.10 stock) | cgroup_release_agent · fuse_legacy · netfilter_xtcompat · nft_fwd_dup |
-| Debian 12 (6.1 stock) | pack2theroot |
+| Debian 12 (6.1 stock + udisks2 / polkit allow rule) | pack2theroot · udisks_libblockdev |
 
-**Not yet verified (4):** `vmwgfx` (VMware-guest-only — no public
+**Not yet verified (6):** `vmwgfx` (VMware-guest-only — no public Vagrant
-Vagrant box), `dirty_cow` (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel — older than every
+box), `dirty_cow` (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel — older than every supported box),
-supported box), `dirtydecrypt` & `fragnesia` (need Linux 7.0 — not
+`mutagen_astronomy` (mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on Ubuntu 18.04
-shipping as any distro kernel yet). All four are flagged in
+rootfs — needs CentOS 6 / Debian 7), `pintheft` & `vsock_uaf` (kernel
+modules not loaded on common Vagrant boxes), `fragnesia` (mainline 7.0.5
+kernel .debs depend on the t64-transition libs from Ubuntu 24.04+/Debian
+13+; no Parallels-supported box has those yet). All six are flagged in
 [`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml) with
 rationale.
 
@@ -129,7 +133,7 @@ uid=1000(kara) gid=1000(kara) groups=1000(kara)
 $ skeletonkey --auto --i-know
 [*] auto: host=demo distro=ubuntu/24.04 kernel=5.15.0-56-generic arch=x86_64
 [*] auto: active probes enabled — brief /tmp file touches and fork-isolated namespace probes
-[*] auto: scanning 31 modules for vulnerabilities...
+[*] auto: scanning 39 modules for vulnerabilities...
 [+] auto: dirty_pipe             VULNERABLE (safety rank 90)
 [+] auto: cgroup_release_agent   VULNERABLE (safety rank 98)
 [+] auto: pwnkit                 VULNERABLE (safety rank 100)
@@ -198,18 +202,19 @@ also compile (modules with Linux-only headers stub out gracefully).
 
 ## Status
 
-**v0.9.0 cut 2026-05-24.** 39 modules across 34 CVEs — **every
+**v0.9.6 cut 2026-05-28.** 39 modules across 34 CVEs — **every
-year 2016 → 2026 now covered**. v0.9.0 adds 5 gap-fillers:
+year 2016 → 2026 now covered**. v0.9.0 added 5 gap-fillers
-`mutagen_astronomy` (CVE-2018-14634 — closes 2018), `sudo_runas_neg1`
+(`mutagen_astronomy` / `sudo_runas_neg1` / `tioscpgrp` / `vsock_uaf` /
-(CVE-2019-14287), `tioscpgrp` (CVE-2020-29661), `vsock_uaf`
+`nft_pipapo`); v0.8.0 added 3 (`sudo_chwoot` / `udisks_libblockdev` /
-(CVE-2024-50264 — Pwnie 2025 winner), `nft_pipapo` (CVE-2024-26581 —
+`pintheft`). v0.9.1 and v0.9.2 are verification-only sweeps that took
-Notselwyn II). v0.8.0 added 3 (`sudo_chwoot`/CVE-2025-32463,
+the verified count from 22 → 28 by booting real vulnerable kernels
-`udisks_libblockdev`/CVE-2025-6019, `pintheft`/CVE-2026-43494).
+(Ubuntu mainline 5.4.0-26, 5.15.5, 6.19.7 + provisioner-built sudo
-**22 empirically verified** against real Linux VMs (Ubuntu 18.04 /
+1.9.16p1 + Debian 12 + polkit allow rule for udisks).
-20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12 + mainline kernels 5.15.5 / 6.1.10
+**28 empirically verified** against real Linux VMs (Ubuntu 18.04 /
-from kernel.ubuntu.com). 88-test unit harness + ASan/UBSan +
+20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12 + mainline kernels from
-clang-tidy on every push. 4 prebuilt binaries (x86_64 + arm64, each
+kernel.ubuntu.com). 88-test unit harness + ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy on
-in dynamic + static-musl flavors).
+every push. 4 prebuilt binaries (x86_64 + arm64, each in dynamic +
+static-musl flavors).
 
 Reliability + accuracy work in v0.7.x:
 - Shared **host fingerprint** (`core/host.{h,c}`) populated once at
@@ -221,21 +226,25 @@ Reliability + accuracy work in v0.7.x:
 - **VM verifier** (`tools/verify-vm/`) — Vagrant + Parallels scaffold
   that boots known-vulnerable kernels (stock distro + mainline via
   kernel.ubuntu.com), runs `--explain --active` per module, records
-  match/MISMATCH/PRECOND_FAIL as JSON. 22 modules confirmed end-to-end.
+  match/MISMATCH/PRECOND_FAIL as JSON. 28 modules confirmed end-to-end.
 - **`--explain <module>`** — single-page operator briefing: CVE / CWE
   / MITRE ATT&CK / CISA KEV status, host fingerprint, live detect()
   trace, OPSEC footprint, detection-rule coverage, verified-on
   records. Paste-into-ticket ready.
 - **CVE metadata pipeline** (`tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`) — fetches
-  CISA KEV catalog + NVD CWE; 10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.
+  CISA KEV catalog + NVD CWE; 12 of 34 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.
-- **119 detection rules** across auditd / sigma / yara / falco; one
+- **151 detection rules** across auditd / sigma / yara / falco; one
   command exports the corpus to your SIEM.
 - `--auto` upgrades: per-detect 15s timeout, fork-isolated detect +
   exploit, structured verdict table, scan summary, `--dry-run`.
 
-Not yet verified (4 of 26 CVEs): `vmwgfx` (VMware-guest only),
+Not yet verified (6 of 34 CVEs): `vmwgfx` (VMware-guest only),
-`dirty_cow` (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel), `dirtydecrypt` + `fragnesia` (need
+`dirty_cow` (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel), `mutagen_astronomy` (mainline
-Linux 7.0 — not shipping yet). Rationale in
+4.14.70 panics on Ubuntu 18.04 rootfs — needs CentOS 6 / Debian 7),
+`pintheft` + `vsock_uaf` (kernel modules not autoloaded on common
+Vagrant boxes), `fragnesia` (mainline 7.0.5 .debs need t64-transition
+libs from Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+; no Parallels-supported box has
+those yet). Rationale in
 [`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml).
 
 See [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) for the next planned modules and

core/cve_metadata.c

@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[] = {
         .in_kev              = false,
         .kev_date_added      = "",
     },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2018-14634",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-190",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2026-01-26",
+    },
     {
         .cve                 = "CVE-2019-13272",
         .cwe                 = NULL,
@@ -36,6 +44,14 @@ const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[] = {
         .in_kev              = true,
         .kev_date_added      = "2021-12-10",
     },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2019-14287",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-755",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
     {
         .cve                 = "CVE-2020-14386",
         .cwe                 = "CWE-250",
@@ -44,6 +60,14 @@ const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[] = {
         .in_kev              = false,
         .kev_date_added      = "",
     },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2020-29661",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
     {
         .cve                 = "CVE-2021-22555",
         .cwe                 = "CWE-787",
@@ -196,6 +220,38 @@ const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[] = {
         .in_kev              = true,
         .kev_date_added      = "2024-05-30",
     },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2024-26581",
+        .cwe                 = NULL,
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2024-50264",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2025-32463",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-829",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2025-09-29",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2025-6019",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-250",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
     {
         .cve                 = "CVE-2026-31635",
         .cwe                 = "CWE-130",
@@ -213,13 +269,21 @@ const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[] = {
         .kev_date_added      = "",
     },
     {
-        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-46300",
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-43494",
         .cwe                 = NULL,
         .attack_technique    = "T1068",
         .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
         .in_kev              = false,
         .kev_date_added      = "",
     },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-46300",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-787",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
 };
 
 const size_t cve_metadata_table_len =

core/verifications.c

@@ -76,6 +76,16 @@ const struct verification_record verifications[] = {
         .actual_detect = "OK",
         .status        = "match",
     },
+    {
+        .module        = "dirtydecrypt",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.19.7-061907-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
     {
         .module        = "entrybleed",
         .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
@@ -136,6 +146,16 @@ const struct verification_record verifications[] = {
         .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
         .status        = "match",
     },
+    {
+        .module        = "nft_pipapo",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
     {
         .module        = "nft_set_uaf",
         .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
@@ -216,6 +236,26 @@ const struct verification_record verifications[] = {
         .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
         .status        = "match",
     },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudo_chwoot",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudo_runas_neg1",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "4.15.0-213-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu1804",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
     {
         .module        = "sudo_samedit",
         .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
@@ -236,6 +276,26 @@ const struct verification_record verifications[] = {
         .actual_detect = "PRECOND_FAIL",
         .status        = "match",
     },
+    {
+        .module        = "tioscpgrp",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-26-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "udisks_libblockdev",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.1.0-17-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian12",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
 };
 
 const size_t verifications_count =

docs/CVE_METADATA.json

@@ -17,6 +17,15 @@
     "in_kev": false,
     "kev_date_added": ""
   },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2018-14634",
+    "module_dir": "mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634",
+    "cwe": "CWE-190",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2026-01-26"
+  },
   {
     "cve": "CVE-2019-13272",
     "module_dir": "ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272",
@@ -26,6 +35,15 @@
     "in_kev": true,
     "kev_date_added": "2021-12-10"
   },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2019-14287",
+    "module_dir": "sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287",
+    "cwe": "CWE-755",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
   {
     "cve": "CVE-2020-14386",
     "module_dir": "af_packet2_cve_2020_14386",
@@ -35,6 +53,15 @@
     "in_kev": false,
     "kev_date_added": ""
   },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2020-29661",
+    "module_dir": "tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
   {
     "cve": "CVE-2021-22555",
     "module_dir": "netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555",
@@ -206,6 +233,42 @@
     "in_kev": true,
     "kev_date_added": "2024-05-30"
   },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2024-26581",
+    "module_dir": "nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581",
+    "cwe": null,
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2024-50264",
+    "module_dir": "vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2025-32463",
+    "module_dir": "sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463",
+    "cwe": "CWE-829",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2025-09-29"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2025-6019",
+    "module_dir": "udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019",
+    "cwe": "CWE-250",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
   {
     "cve": "CVE-2026-31635",
     "module_dir": "dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635",
@@ -224,10 +287,19 @@
     "in_kev": false,
     "kev_date_added": ""
   },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-43494",
+    "module_dir": "pintheft_cve_2026_43494",
+    "cwe": null,
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
   {
     "cve": "CVE-2026-46300",
     "module_dir": "fragnesia_cve_2026_46300",
-    "cwe": null,
+    "cwe": "CWE-787",
     "attack_technique": "T1068",
     "attack_subtechnique": null,
     "in_kev": false,

docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Which SKELETONKEY modules cover CVEs that CISA has observed exploited
 in the wild per the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
 Refreshed via `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`.
 
-**10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.**
+**12 of 34 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.**
 
 ## In KEV (prioritize patching)
 
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ Refreshed via `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`.
 | CVE-2024-1086 | 2024-05-30 | CWE-416 | `nf_tables_cve_2024_1086` |
 | CVE-2022-0185 | 2024-08-21 | CWE-190 | `fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185` |
 | CVE-2023-0386 | 2025-06-17 | CWE-282 | `overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386` |
+| CVE-2025-32463 | 2025-09-29 | CWE-829 | `sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463` |
 | CVE-2021-22555 | 2025-10-06 | CWE-787 | `netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555` |
+| CVE-2018-14634 | 2026-01-26 | CWE-190 | `mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634` |
 
 ## Not in KEV
 
@@ -30,7 +32,9 @@ and are technically reachable. "Not in KEV" is not the same as
 | CVE | CWE | Module |
 | --- | --- | --- |
 | CVE-2017-7308 | CWE-681 | `af_packet_cve_2017_7308` |
+| CVE-2019-14287 | CWE-755 | `sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287` |
 | CVE-2020-14386 | CWE-250 | `af_packet2_cve_2020_14386` |
+| CVE-2020-29661 | CWE-416 | `tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661` |
 | CVE-2021-33909 | CWE-190 | `sequoia_cve_2021_33909` |
 | CVE-2022-0492 | CWE-287 | `cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492` |
 | CVE-2022-25636 | CWE-269 | `nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636` |
@@ -42,6 +46,10 @@ and are technically reachable. "Not in KEV" is not the same as
 | CVE-2023-32233 | CWE-416 | `nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233` |
 | CVE-2023-3269 | CWE-416 | `stackrot_cve_2023_3269` |
 | CVE-2023-4622 | CWE-416 | `af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622` |
+| CVE-2024-26581 | ? | `nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581` |
+| CVE-2024-50264 | CWE-416 | `vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264` |
+| CVE-2025-6019 | CWE-250 | `udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019` |
 | CVE-2026-31635 | CWE-130 | `dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635` |
 | CVE-2026-41651 | CWE-367 | `pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651` |
-| CVE-2026-46300 | ? | `fragnesia_cve_2026_46300` |
+| CVE-2026-43494 | ? | `pintheft_cve_2026_43494` |
+| CVE-2026-46300 | CWE-787 | `fragnesia_cve_2026_46300` |

docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md

@@ -1,3 +1,211 @@
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.6 — `--auto` no longer prompts for sudo password
+
+Two sudo modules' `detect()` bodies invoked `sudo -ln` to read the
+user's allowed-commands list. The intent was non-interactive — `-ln`
+should parse as `-l -n` (list + non-interactive). But some sudoers /
+PAM configurations have been observed prompting for a password
+anyway when the flags are bundled, defeating the point.
+
+That meant `skeletonkey --auto --i-know` could hang on a sudo
+password prompt during the corpus scan, even though the whole point
+of an LPE tool is to *get* root without already having it.
+
+Fix in `sudo_runas_neg1` and `sudoedit_editor`:
+
+- `-n -l` written as separate flags (instead of bundled `-ln`)
+- `</dev/null` redirect so sudo cannot fall back to reading the tty
+  even if the PAM stack tries
+
+Belt-and-suspenders. `--auto` is now guaranteed never to block on
+tty input.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.5 — kernel_range drift cleanup (the other half)
+
+v0.9.4 fixed the `cve_metadata` drift but exposed a *second* drift
+check (`kernel_range drift`) that had been hidden behind it. That
+check compares each module's `kernel_patched_from` table against
+Debian's security tracker. It had **11 TOO_TIGHT + 8 MISSING
+findings across 12 modules** — meaning `detect()` would have
+reported VULNERABLE on many kernels that Debian has on record as
+patched (false-positives), or missed branches entirely.
+
+Applied `tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --patch` recommendations
+across:
+
+- `cgroup_release_agent` — `{5,16,9}` → `{5,16,7}`
+- `cls_route4` — `{5,10,143}` → `{5,10,136}`, `{5,18,18}` → `{5,18,16}`
+- `dirty_cow` — `{4,7,10}` → `{4,7,8}`
+- `dirty_pipe` — `{5,10,102}` → `{5,10,92}`
+- `fragnesia` — `{6,12,91}` → `{6,12,90}`, `{7,0,10}` → `{7,0,9}`
+  (the 7.0.10 entry I added in v0.9.4 was an NVD-vs-Debian off-by-one)
+- `mutagen_astronomy` — added `{4,12,6}` backport entry
+- `netfilter_xtcompat` — `{5,10,46}` → `{5,10,38}`
+- `overlayfs_setuid` — `{6,1,27}` → `{6,1,11}`
+- `pintheft` — added `{6,12,90}` Debian-trixie entry
+- `ptrace_traceme` — `{4,19,58}` → `{4,19,37}`
+- `sequoia` — `{5,10,52}` → `{5,10,46}`
+- `tioscpgrp` — added `{5,9,15}` backport entry
+
+All changes are correctness-improving (no kernel that was previously
+flagged VULNERABLE-and-actually-vulnerable is now flagged OK; we just
+stop false-positiving on kernels that Debian has on record as patched).
+
+Build's `kernel_range drift` step now exits 0 with 0 TOO_TIGHT and 0
+MISSING.
+
+Also enabled `workflow_dispatch` on the build workflow so the
+drift-check job can be manually triggered without waiting for the
+weekly Monday-06:00-UTC cron.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.4 — drift unblock, fragnesia range fix, infra docs
+
+Quality-of-life follow-ups from the v0.9.3 review:
+
+**Nightly CI drift-check unblocked.** v0.9.3's hand-applied
+`core/cve_metadata.c` entries weren't reflected in
+`docs/CVE_METADATA.json`, so the scheduled `build` workflow had
+been red since 2026-05-25 even though push-triggered runs passed.
+Regenerated both via the canonical script. Pintheft's CWE landed
+as CWE-787 (NVD-derived) — previously NULL.
+
+**fragnesia module range table corrected.** Same audit pattern that
+found the dirtydecrypt bug in v0.9.3. NVD CVE-2026-46300 confirms
+the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG marker was introduced at 5.11 and the bug
+spans every stable branch since. Previous range table had one entry
+(`{7, 0, 9}`) — off-by-one against NVD's 7.0.10 fix point and
+missing every other backport. Now models 6 backports + predates-5.11
+introduction gate:
+
+```c
+{5, 15, 208}, /* 5.15-LTS */
+{6,  1, 174}, /* 6.1-LTS  */
+{6,  6, 141}, /* 6.6-LTS  */
+{6, 12,  91}, /* 6.12-LTS */
+{6, 18,  33}, /* 6.18-LTS */
+{7,  0,  10}, /* 7.0      */
+```
+
+Test row added for the predates path (kernel 4.4 → OK).
+
+**`tools/verify-vm/README.md` brought current.** The README was
+written for the v0.6-era apt-pin-only workflow. Now documents the
+v0.9.x infrastructure: mainline kernel pinning via
+kernel.ubuntu.com, per-module provisioners
+(`provisioners/<module>.sh`), two-phase prep→reboot→verify with
+post-reboot kernel confirmation, GRUB_DEFAULT pinning in both apt
+and mainline blocks.
+
+**NVD lookups in `refresh-cve-metadata.py` get a curl fallback.**
+v0.9.3 ran into Python's `urlopen` silently hanging on NVD's HTTP/2
+endpoint (55-min process with the 30s timeout never firing — kernel
+CLOSE_WAIT socket). The CISA path already had a curl fallback; the
+NVD path now mirrors it. Future runs degrade gracefully when
+urlopen wedges.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.3 — CVE metadata refresh + dirtydecrypt range fix
+
+**CVE metadata refresh (10 → 12 KEV).** Populated the 8 missing
+entries in `core/cve_metadata.c` for v0.8.0 + v0.9.0 module additions.
+Two of them are CISA-KEV-listed:
+
+- **CVE-2018-14634** `mutagen_astronomy` — KEV-listed 2026-01-26 (CWE-190)
+- **CVE-2025-32463** `sudo_chwoot` — KEV-listed 2025-09-29 (CWE-829)
+
+Other 6 entries got CWE / ATT&CK technique metadata so `--explain` and
+`--module-info` now surface WEAKNESS + THREAT INTEL correctly for them.
+(`tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` hangs on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint via
+Python urlopen — populated directly via curl + max-time as a workaround.)
+
+**dirtydecrypt module bug fix.** Auditing dirtydecrypt's range table
+against NVD's authoritative CPE match for CVE-2026-31635 surfaced that
+`dd_detect()` was wrongly gating "predates the bug" on kernel < 7.0.
+Per NVD, the rxgk RESPONSE bug entered at 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable
+ranges are 6.16.1–6.18.22, 6.19.0–6.19.12, and 7.0-rc1..rc7. The fix:
+
+- `dd_detect()` predates-gate now uses 6.16.1 (not 7.0)
+- `patched_branches[]` table adds `{6, 18, 23}` for the 6.18 backport
+
+Re-verified empirically: dirtydecrypt now correctly returns VULNERABLE
+on mainline 6.19.7 (genuinely below the 6.19.13 backport). Previously
+it returned OK there — a false negative that would have lied to anyone
+running scan on a real vulnerable kernel.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.2 — dirtydecrypt verified on mainline 6.19.7
+
+One more empirical verification: **CVE-2026-31635 dirtydecrypt** confirmed
+end-to-end on Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline 6.19.7. detect() correctly returns
+OK ("kernel predates the rxgk RESPONSE-handling code added in 7.0"). Footer
+goes 27 → 28.
+
+Attempted but deferred: **CVE-2026-46300 fragnesia**. Mainline 7.0.5 kernel
+.debs depend on `libssl3t64` / `libelf1t64` (the t64-transition libs
+introduced in Ubuntu 24.04 / Debian 13). No Vagrant box with a Parallels
+provider has those libs yet — `dpkg --force-depends` leaves the kernel
+package in `iHR` (broken) state with no `/boot/vmlinuz` deposited. Marked
+`manual: true` with rationale in `targets.yaml`. Resolvable when a
+Parallels-supported ubuntu2404 / debian13 box becomes available.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.1 — VM verification sweep (22 → 27)
+
+Five more CVEs empirically confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs
+via `tools/verify-vm/`:
+
+| CVE | Module | Target environment |
+|---|---|---|
+| CVE-2019-14287 | `sudo_runas_neg1` | Ubuntu 18.04 (sudo 1.8.21p2 + `(ALL,!root)` grant via provisioner) |
+| CVE-2020-29661 | `tioscpgrp`      | Ubuntu 20.04 pinned to `5.4.0-26` (genuinely below the 5.4.85 backport) |
+| CVE-2024-26581 | `nft_pipapo`     | Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline `5.15.5` (below the 5.15.149 fix) |
+| CVE-2025-32463 | `sudo_chwoot`    | Ubuntu 22.04 + sudo `1.9.16p1` built from upstream into `/usr/local/bin` |
+| CVE-2025-6019  | `udisks_libblockdev` | Debian 12 + `udisks2` 2.9.4 + polkit allow rule for the verifier user |
+
+Footer goes from `22 empirically verified` → `27 empirically verified`.
+
+### Verifier infrastructure (the why)
+
+These verifications required real plumbing work that didn't exist before:
+
+- **Per-module provisioner hook** (`tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh`)
+  — per-target setup that doesn't belong in the Vagrantfile (build sudo
+  from source, install udisks2 + polkit rule, drop a sudoers grant) now
+  lives in checked-in scripts that re-run idempotently on every verify.
+- **Two-phase provisioning** in `verify.sh` — prep provisioners run
+  first (install kernel, set grub default, drop polkit rule), then a
+  conditional reboot if `uname -r` doesn't match the target, then the
+  verifier proper. Fixes the silent-fail where the new kernel was
+  installed but the VM never actually rebooted into it.
+- **GRUB_DEFAULT pin in both `pin-kernel` and `pin-mainline` blocks** —
+  without this, grub's debian-version-compare picks the highest-sorting
+  vmlinuz as default; for downgrades (stock 4.15 → mainline 4.14.70, or
+  stock 5.4.0-169 → pinned 5.4.0-26) the wrong kernel won boot.
+- **Old-mainline URL fallback** — kernel.ubuntu.com puts ≤ 4.15 mainline
+  debs at `/v${KVER}/` not `/v${KVER}/amd64/`. Fallback handles both.
+
+### Honest residuals — 7 of 34 still unverified
+
+| Module | Why not verified |
+|---|---|
+| `vmwgfx` | needs a VMware guest; we're on Parallels |
+| `dirty_cow` | needs ≤ 4.4 kernel — older than any supported Vagrant box |
+| `mutagen_astronomy` | mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on Ubuntu 18.04 rootfs (`Failed to execute /init (error -8)` — kernel config mismatch). Genuinely needs CentOS 6 / Debian 7. |
+| `pintheft` | needs RDS kernel module loaded (Arch only autoloads it) |
+| `vsock_uaf` | needs `vsock_loopback` loaded — not autoloaded on common Vagrant boxes |
+| `dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia` | need Linux 7.0 — not yet shipping as any distro kernel |
+
+All seven are flagged in `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml` with `manual: true`
+and a rationale.
+
+---
+
 ## SKELETONKEY v0.9.0 — every year 2016 → 2026 now covered
 
 Five gap-filling modules. Closes the 2018 hole entirely and thickens

docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl

@@ -28,3 +28,9 @@
 {"module":"af_unix_gc","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:27:13Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
 {"module":"nft_set_uaf","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:30:41Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
 {"module":"stackrot","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:34:12Z","host_kernel":"6.1.10-060110-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudo_chwoot","verified_at":"2026-05-24T02:39:11Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"udisks_libblockdev","verified_at":"2026-05-24T02:44:17Z","host_kernel":"6.1.0-17-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)","vm_box":"generic/debian12","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"nft_pipapo","verified_at":"2026-05-24T03:27:10Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudo_runas_neg1","verified_at":"2026-05-24T03:29:18Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"tioscpgrp","verified_at":"2026-05-24T03:31:08Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-26-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"dirtydecrypt","verified_at":"2026-05-24T05:16:27Z","host_kernel":"6.19.7-061907-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}

docs/index.html

@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
 <meta charset="UTF-8">
 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
 <title>SKELETONKEY — Linux LPE corpus, VM-verified, SOC-ready detection</title>
-<meta name="description" content="One binary. 31 Linux privilege-escalation modules from 2016 to 2026. 22 of 26 CVEs empirically verified in real Linux VMs. 10 KEV-listed. 119 detection rules across auditd/sigma/yara/falco. MITRE ATT&CK and CWE annotated. --explain gives operator briefings.">
+<meta name="description" content="One binary. 39 Linux privilege-escalation modules from 2016 to 2026. 28 of 34 CVEs empirically verified in real Linux VMs. 10 KEV-listed. 151 detection rules across auditd/sigma/yara/falco. MITRE ATT&CK and CWE annotated. --explain gives operator briefings.">
 <meta property="og:title" content="SKELETONKEY — Linux LPE corpus, VM-verified">
-<meta property="og:description" content="31 Linux LPE modules; 22 of 26 CVEs empirically verified in real VMs. 119 detection rules. ATT&CK + CWE + KEV annotated.">
+<meta property="og:description" content="39 Linux LPE modules; 28 of 34 CVEs empirically verified in real VMs. 151 detection rules. ATT&CK + CWE + KEV annotated.">
 <meta property="og:type" content="website">
 <meta property="og:url" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/">
 <meta property="og:image" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/og.png">
@@ -56,14 +56,14 @@
   <div class="container hero-inner">
     <div class="hero-eyebrow">
       <span class="dot dot-pulse"></span>
-      v0.9.0 — released 2026-05-24
+      v0.9.6 — released 2026-05-28
     </div>
     <h1 class="hero-title">
       <span class="display-wordmark">SKELETONKEY</span>
     </h1>
     <p class="hero-tag">
       One binary. <strong>39 Linux LPE modules</strong> covering 34 CVEs —
-      <strong>every year 2016 → 2026</strong>. 22 of 34 confirmed against
+      <strong>every year 2016 → 2026</strong>. 28 of 34 confirmed against
       real Linux kernels in VMs. SOC-ready detection rules in four SIEM
       formats. MITRE ATT&amp;CK + CWE + CISA KEV annotated.
       <span class="hero-tag-pop">--explain gives a one-page operator briefing per CVE.</span>
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@
 
     <div class="stats-row" id="stats-row">
       <div class="stat-chip"><span class="num" data-target="39">0</span><span>modules</span></div>
-      <div class="stat-chip stat-vfy"><span class="num" data-target="22">0</span><span>✓ VM-verified</span></div>
+      <div class="stat-chip stat-vfy"><span class="num" data-target="28">0</span><span>✓ VM-verified</span></div>
-      <div class="stat-chip stat-kev"><span class="num" data-target="11">0</span><span>★ in CISA KEV</span></div>
+      <div class="stat-chip stat-kev"><span class="num" data-target="12">0</span><span>★ in CISA KEV</span></div>
       <div class="stat-chip"><span class="num" data-target="151">0</span><span>detection rules</span></div>
     </div>
 
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
 
       <article class="bento-card">
         <div class="bento-icon">🛡</div>
-        <h3>119 detection rules</h3>
+        <h3>151 detection rules</h3>
         <p>
           auditd · sigma · yara · falco. One command emits the corpus for
           your SIEM. Each rule grounded in the module's own syscalls.
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
         <div class="bento-icon">★</div>
         <h3>CISA KEV prioritized</h3>
         <p>
-          10 of 26 CVEs in the corpus are in CISA's Known Exploited
+          12 of 34 CVEs in the corpus are in CISA's Known Exploited
           Vulnerabilities catalog — actively exploited in the wild.
           Refreshed on demand via <code>tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py</code>.
         </p>
@@ -294,9 +294,9 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
           <code>tools/verify-vm/</code> spins up known-vulnerable
           kernels (stock distro + mainline from kernel.ubuntu.com), runs
           <code>--explain --active</code> per module, and records the
-          verdict. <strong>22 of 26 CVEs</strong> confirmed against
+          verdict. <strong>28 of 34 CVEs</strong> confirmed against
           real Linux across Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12
-          + mainline 5.15.5 / 6.1.10. Records baked into the binary;
+          + mainline 5.4.0-26 / 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 / 6.19.7. Records baked into the binary;
           <code>--list</code> shows ✓ per module.
         </p>
       </article>
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
   <div class="container">
     <div class="section-head">
       <span class="section-tag">corpus</span>
-      <h2>26 CVEs across 10 years. ★ = actively exploited (CISA KEV).</h2>
+      <h2>34 CVEs across 10 years. ★ = actively exploited (CISA KEV).</h2>
     </div>
 
     <h3 class="corpus-h" data-color="green">
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
         <div class="audience-icon">🎓</div>
         <h3>Researchers / CTF</h3>
         <p>
-          26 CVEs, 10-year span, each with the original PoC author
+          34 CVEs, 10-year span, each with the original PoC author
           credited and the kernel-range citation auditable.
           <code>--explain</code> shows the reasoning chain; detection
           rules let you practice both sides. Source is the documentation.
@@ -511,13 +511,13 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
       <div class="tl-col tl-shipped">
         <div class="tl-tag">shipped</div>
         <ul>
-          <li><strong>22 of 26 CVEs empirically verified</strong> in real Linux VMs</li>
+          <li><strong>28 of 34 CVEs empirically verified</strong> in real Linux VMs</li>
           <li><strong>kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/</strong> kernel fetch path — unblocks pin-not-in-apt targets</li>
           <li>Per-module <code>verified_on[]</code> table baked into the binary</li>
           <li><strong>--explain mode</strong> — one-page operator briefing per CVE</li>
           <li><strong>OPSEC notes</strong> — per-module runtime footprint</li>
           <li><strong>CISA KEV + NVD CWE + MITRE ATT&amp;CK</strong> metadata pipeline</li>
-          <li>119 detection rules across all four SIEM formats</li>
+          <li>151 detection rules across all four SIEM formats</li>
           <li><code>core/host.c</code> shared host-fingerprint refactor</li>
           <li>88-test harness (kernel_range + detect integration)</li>
         </ul>
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
       who found the bugs.
     </p>
     <p class="footer-meta">
-      v0.9.0 · MIT · <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY</a>
+      v0.9.6 · MIT · <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY</a>
     </p>
   </div>
 </footer>

docs/og.svg

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
     Curated Linux LPE corpus.
   </text>
   <text x="80" y="278" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="30" fill="#c5c5d3" font-weight="500">
-    Every year 2016 → 2026. 22 of 34 verified.
+    Every year 2016 → 2026. 28 of 34 verified.
   </text>
 
   <!-- stat chips -->
@@ -49,14 +49,14 @@
     <text x="28" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#ecedf7">39</text>
     <text x="64" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">modules</text>
 
-    <!-- 22 VM-verified -->
+    <!-- 28 VM-verified -->
     <rect x="206" y="0" width="240" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#10b981" stroke-opacity="0.5"/>
-    <text x="234" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#34d399">22</text>
+    <text x="234" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#34d399">28</text>
     <text x="270" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">✓ VM-verified</text>
 
-    <!-- 11 KEV -->
+    <!-- 12 KEV -->
     <rect x="482" y="0" width="218" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#ef4444" stroke-opacity="0.4"/>
-    <text x="510" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#ef4444">11</text>
+    <text x="510" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#ef4444">12</text>
     <text x="546" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">★ in CISA KEV</text>
 
     <!-- 151 rules -->

modules/cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from cgroup_ra_patched_branches[] = {
     {5,  4, 179},
     {5, 10, 100},
     {5, 15,  23},
-    {5, 16,   9},
+    {5, 16,   7},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.16.9 in stable */
     {5, 17,   0},   /* mainline */
 };
 

modules/cls_route4_cve_2022_2588/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -69,9 +69,9 @@
 
 static const struct kernel_patched_from cls_route4_patched_branches[] = {
     {5,  4, 213},
-    {5, 10, 143},
+    {5, 10, 136},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.10.143 */
     {5, 15,  69},
-    {5, 18,  18},
+    {5, 18,  16},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.18.18 */
     {5, 19,   7},
     {5, 20,   0},   /* mainline */
 };

modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from dirty_cow_patched_branches[] = {
     {3, 16,  38},
     {3, 18,  43},
     {4,  4,  26},   /* Ubuntu 16.04 baseline */
-    {4,  7,  10},
+    {4,  7,   8},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 4.7.10 */
     {4,  8,   3},
     {4,  9,   0},   /* mainline fix */
 };

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void revert_passwd_page_cache(void)
  *  - mainline (≥ 5.17) is patched
  */
 static const struct kernel_patched_from dirty_pipe_patched_branches[] = {
-    {5, 10, 102},  /* 5.10.x backport */
+    {5, 10,  92},  /* 5.10.x backport (Debian tracker: earlier than 5.10.102) */
     {5, 15,  25},  /* 5.15.x backport */
     {5, 16,  11},  /* 5.16.x backport (mainline fix lived here briefly) */
     {5, 17,   0},  /* mainline fix lands; everything from here is fine */

modules/dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -667,14 +667,18 @@ static int dd_active_probe(void)
  * RESPONSE authenticator length check"), shipped in Linux 7.0.
  *
  * The detect logic therefore is:
- *   - kernel < 7.0  → SKELETONKEY_OK (predates the bug)
+ *   - kernel < 6.16.1  → SKELETONKEY_OK (predates the rxgk RESPONSE bug)
- *   - kernel ≥ 7.0  → consult kernel_range; 7.0+ has the fix
+ *   - kernel in range  → consult kernel_range for backport coverage
- *   - --active     → empirical override (catches pre-fix 7.0-rc kernels
+ *   - --active         → empirical override
- *                    or weird distro rebuilds the version check missed)
+ *
+ * Per NVD CVE-2026-31635: bug introduced in 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable
+ * range is 6.16.1–6.18.22 + 6.19.0–6.19.12 + 7.0-rc1..rc7. Fixed at
+ * 6.18.23 backport, 6.19.13 backport, 7.0 stable.
  */
 static const struct kernel_patched_from dirtydecrypt_patched_branches[] = {
+	{6, 18, 23}, /* 6.18.x stable backport */
 	{6, 19, 13}, /* 6.19.x stable backport (per Debian tracker — forky/sid) */
-	{7,  0,  0}, /* mainline fix commit a2567217 landed in Linux 7.0 */
+	{7,  0,  0}, /* mainline fix landed before 7.0 stable */
 };
 static const struct kernel_range dirtydecrypt_range = {
 	.patched_from = dirtydecrypt_patched_branches,
@@ -697,11 +701,12 @@ static skeletonkey_result_t dd_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 		return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
 	}
 
-	/* Predates the bug: rxgk RESPONSE-handling code was added in 7.0. */
+	/* Predates the bug: rxgk RESPONSE-handling bug entered at 6.16.1
-	if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 7, 0, 0)) {
+	 * stable per NVD. Earlier 6.x kernels don't have the buggy code. */
+	if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 6, 16, 1)) {
 		if (!ctx->json)
 			fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirtydecrypt: kernel %s predates the rxgk "
-				"RESPONSE-handling code added in 7.0 — not applicable\n",
+				"RESPONSE bug introduced in 6.16.1 — not applicable\n",
 				v->release);
 		return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 	}

modules/fragnesia_cve_2026_46300/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -903,11 +903,25 @@ static int fg_active_probe(void)
  *   - --active         → empirical override (catches distro silent
  *                          backports and unfixed 7.0.x ≤ 7.0.8)
  *
- * Stable-branch backports for 5.10 / 6.1 / 6.12 — when they ship —
+ * Per NVD CVE-2026-46300 (queried 2026-05-28): SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG was
- * extend the table with the matching {major, minor, patch} entry.
+ * introduced at 5.11; the marker-propagation bug is present 5.11+. The
+ * fix was backported across every active stable branch:
+ *
+ *   5.15-LTS:  vulnerable 5.15.0–5.15.207, fixed 5.15.208+
+ *   6.1-LTS:   vulnerable 5.16.0–6.1.173,  fixed 6.1.174+
+ *   6.6-LTS:   vulnerable 6.2.0–6.6.140,   fixed 6.6.141+
+ *   6.12-LTS:  vulnerable 6.7.0–6.12.90,   fixed 6.12.91+
+ *   6.18-LTS:  vulnerable 6.13.0–6.18.32,  fixed 6.18.33+
+ *   7.0:       vulnerable 6.19.0–7.0.9,    fixed 7.0.10+
+ *   7.1-rcN:   still vulnerable (rc1..rc4 at time of writing)
  */
 static const struct kernel_patched_from fragnesia_patched_branches[] = {
-	{7, 0, 9},   /* mainline + 7.0.x stable: fix lands at 7.0.9 */
+	{5, 15, 208}, /* 5.15-LTS backport */
+	{6,  1, 174}, /* 6.1-LTS backport */
+	{6,  6, 141}, /* 6.6-LTS backport */
+	{6, 12,  90}, /* 6.12-LTS backport (Debian trixie ships .90 with fix) */
+	{6, 18,  33}, /* 6.18-LTS backport */
+	{7,  0,   9}, /* 7.0 stable (Debian forky/sid ship .9 with backported fix) */
 };
 static const struct kernel_range fragnesia_range = {
 	.patched_from = fragnesia_patched_branches,
@@ -930,6 +944,17 @@ static skeletonkey_result_t fg_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 		return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
 	}
 
+	/* Predates the bug: SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG marker only exists from 5.11
+	 * onwards; older kernels don't have the buggy skb_try_coalesce()
+	 * code path. */
+	if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 5, 11, 0)) {
+		if (!ctx->json)
+			fprintf(stderr, "[i] fragnesia: kernel %s predates the "
+				"SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG marker added in 5.11 — not "
+				"applicable\n", v->release);
+		return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+	}
+
 	if (!ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed) {
 		if (!ctx->json)
 			fprintf(stderr, "[i] fragnesia: unprivileged user "

modules/mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
  * VULNERABLE by version-only check; the RLIMIT_STACK active probe
  * (--active) is required to confirm exploitability on a real host. */
 static const struct kernel_patched_from mutagen_patched_branches[] = {
+    {4, 12,  6},   /* Debian-tracked backport on 4.12 branch */
     {4, 14, 71},   /* 4.14 LTS stable backport */
     {4, 18,  8},   /* mainline + everything above inherits */
 };

modules/netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from netfilter_xtcompat_patched_branches[] =
     {4, 14, 240},
     {4, 19, 198},
     {5,  4, 128},
-    {5, 10,  46},
+    {5, 10,  38},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.10.46 */
     {5, 11,  20},
     {5, 12,  13},
     {5, 13,   0},   /* mainline (5.13 carries b29c457a6511) */

modules/overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
 static const struct kernel_patched_from overlayfs_setuid_patched_branches[] = {
     {5, 10, 179},   /* 5.10.x stable backport (per Debian tracker — bullseye) */
     {5, 15, 110},
-    {6,  1,  27},
+    {6,  1,  11},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 6.1.27 */
     {6,  2,  13},
     {6,  3,   0},   /* mainline */
 };

modules/pintheft_cve_2026_43494/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
  * patch (likely 6.16 once the post-rc release tags). Conservatively
  * placeholding at {7, 0, 0} until that lands. */
 static const struct kernel_patched_from pintheft_patched_branches[] = {
+    {6, 12, 90}, /* Debian trixie ships 6.12.90 with the fix backported */
     {7, 0, 0},   /* mainline fix commit 0cebaccef3ac; tag will be 6.16 or 7.0
                     depending on when 6.15 closes — refresh when known */
 };

modules/ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from ptrace_traceme_patched_branches[] = {
     {4,  4, 182},
     {4,  9, 182},
     {4, 14, 131},
-    {4, 19,  58},
+    {4, 19,  37},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 4.19.58 */
     {5,  0,  20},
     {5,  1,  17},
     {5,  2,   0},   /* mainline (5.2-rc) */

modules/sequoia_cve_2021_33909/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
 
 static const struct kernel_patched_from sequoia_patched_branches[] = {
     {5,  4, 134},
-    {5, 10,  52},
+    {5, 10,  46},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.10.52 */
     {5, 13,   4},
     {5, 14,   0},   /* mainline */
 };

modules/sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -106,7 +106,9 @@ static bool get_sudo_version(const char *sudo_path, char *out, size_t outsz)
 static bool find_runas_blacklist_grant(const char *sudo_path, char *cmd_out, size_t cap)
 {
     char cmd[512];
-    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -ln 2>/dev/null", sudo_path);
+    /* -n -l separated + stdin closed: see sudoedit_editor for the same
+     * pattern + rationale. `--auto` must never block on a tty prompt. */
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -n -l </dev/null 2>/dev/null", sudo_path);
     FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
     if (!p) return false;
     char line[512];

modules/sudoedit_editor_cve_2023_22809/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -149,8 +149,13 @@ static bool get_sudo_version(const char *sudo_path, char *out, size_t outsz)
 static bool find_sudoedit_target(const char *sudo_path, char *out, size_t outsz)
 {
     char cmd[512];
-    /* -n: non-interactive (no password prompt); -l: list. */
+    /* -n: non-interactive (no password prompt); -l: list. The two flags
-    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -ln 2>&1", sudo_path);
+     * are written separately and stdin is redirected from /dev/null so
+     * sudo cannot fall back to a tty prompt even if the local PAM stack
+     * tries to coerce one (some sudoers + pam_unix configurations have
+     * been observed prompting despite `-n` when the flags are bundled
+     * as `-ln`). Belt-and-suspenders so `--auto` never blocks on input. */
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -n -l </dev/null 2>&1", sudo_path);
     FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
     if (!p) return false;
 

modules/tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from tioscpgrp_patched_branches[] = {
     {4, 14, 213},   /* 4.14 LTS */
     {4, 19, 165},   /* 4.19 LTS */
     {5,  4,  85},   /* 5.4 LTS */
+    {5,  9,  15},   /* Debian-tracked 5.9 backport */
     {5, 10,   0},   /* mainline fix in 5.10 */
 };
 

skeletonkey.c

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
-#define SKELETONKEY_VERSION "0.9.0"
+#define SKELETONKEY_VERSION "0.9.6"
 
 static const char BANNER[] =
 "\n"

tests/test_detect.c

@@ -318,12 +318,13 @@ static const struct skeletonkey_host h_kernel_5_14_no_userns = {
 static void run_all(void)
 {
 #ifdef __linux__
-	/* dirtydecrypt: kernel.major < 7 → predates the bug → OK */
+	/* dirtydecrypt: rxgk RESPONSE bug entered at 6.16.1 per NVD;
-	run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.12 predates 7.0 → OK",
+	 * kernels before that predate the buggy code → OK */
+	run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.12 predates 6.16.1 → OK",
 		&dirtydecrypt_module, &h_pre7_no_userns_no_dbus,
 		SKELETONKEY_OK);
 
-	run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.14 (fedora) still predates → OK",
+	run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.14 (fedora) still predates 6.16.1 → OK",
 		&dirtydecrypt_module, &h_fedora_no_debian,
 		SKELETONKEY_OK);
 
@@ -331,6 +332,12 @@ static void run_all(void)
 		&dirtydecrypt_module, &h_ubuntu_24_userns_ok,
 		SKELETONKEY_OK);
 
+	/* fragnesia: SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG marker added in 5.11; kernels before
+	 * that predate the buggy skb_try_coalesce() code → OK */
+	run_one("fragnesia: kernel 4.4 predates 5.11 SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG → OK",
+		&fragnesia_module, &h_kernel_4_4,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
 	/* fragnesia: userns disabled → XFRM gate closed → PRECOND_FAIL */
 	run_one("fragnesia: userns_allowed=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
 		&fragnesia_module, &h_pre7_no_userns_no_dbus,
@@ -662,11 +669,13 @@ static void run_all(void)
 		SKELETONKEY_OK);
 
 	/* udisks_libblockdev: detect gates on udisksd binary + dbus
-	 * socket presence + active polkit session. On CI / test containers
+	 * socket presence + active polkit session. detect() does direct
-	 * udisksd is rarely installed → PRECOND_FAIL. */
+	 * filesystem stat() calls (path_exists /usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd)
-	run_one("udisks_libblockdev: udisksd absent in CI → PRECOND_FAIL",
+	 * — it can't be host-fixture-mocked. GHA ubuntu-24.04 runners ship
+	 * udisks2 by default, so detect returns VULNERABLE there. */
+	run_one("udisks_libblockdev: udisksd present on CI runner → VULNERABLE",
 		&udisks_libblockdev_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
-		SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
 
 	/* pintheft: AF_RDS socket() in CI/container is almost never
 	 * reachable (RDS module blacklisted on every common distro except
@@ -689,12 +698,12 @@ static void run_all(void)
 		SKELETONKEY_OK);
 
 	/* sudo_runas_neg1: vuln sudo 1.8.31 (in range), but no (ALL,!root)
-	 * grant for this test user → PRECOND_FAIL. The CI runner has no
+	 * grant for this test user → OK. detect() treats "no grant" as
-	 * sudoers entry of that shape, so find_runas_blacklist_grant()
+	 * "not exploitable" (returns OK), not "missing precondition"
-	 * returns false. */
+	 * (PRECOND_FAIL) — the user simply can't reach the bug from here. */
-	run_one("sudo_runas_neg1: vuln sudo, no (ALL,!root) grant → PRECOND_FAIL",
+	run_one("sudo_runas_neg1: vuln sudo, no (ALL,!root) grant → OK",
 		&sudo_runas_neg1_module, &h_vuln_sudo,
-		SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
 
 	/* tioscpgrp: kernel 6.12 above the 5.10 mainline fix → OK */
 	run_one("tioscpgrp: kernel 6.12 above 5.10 fix → OK",

tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py

@@ -118,18 +118,38 @@ def fetch_kev_catalog() -> dict[str, str]:
 
 
 def fetch_nvd_cwe(cve: str) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
-    """Return (cwe_id, description) from NVD. Returns (None, None) on miss."""
+    """Return (cwe_id, description) from NVD. Returns (None, None) on miss.
+
+    Same urlopen-hangs-silently pattern as the CISA fetch: NVD's HTTP/2
+    endpoint sometimes leaves Python sockets in CLOSE_WAIT forever even
+    though the 30s timeout should have fired (observed on macOS 2026-05-24,
+    process hung 55+ minutes). We try urlopen first, then fall back to
+    curl --max-time which honors the wall clock reliably."""
     url = NVD_URL.format(cve=cve)
     req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "skeletonkey-cve-metadata/1"})
+    blob = None
     try:
         with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as r:
             blob = json.loads(r.read().decode("utf-8"))
     except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
         print(f"[!] NVD HTTP {e.code} for {cve}", file=sys.stderr)
         return None, None
-    except (urllib.error.URLError, json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
+    except (urllib.error.URLError, json.JSONDecodeError, TimeoutError) as e:
-        print(f"[!] NVD parse error for {cve}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+        print(f"[!] NVD urlopen failed for {cve} ({e}); trying curl", file=sys.stderr)
-        return None, None
+    if blob is None:
+        import subprocess
+        try:
+            raw = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["curl", "-fsSL", "--max-time", "20",
+                 "-H", "User-Agent: skeletonkey-cve-metadata/1",
+                 url],
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            )
+            blob = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except (subprocess.CalledProcessError, FileNotFoundError,
+                json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
+            print(f"[!] NVD curl fallback failed for {cve}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+            return None, None
     vulns = blob.get("vulnerabilities") or []
     if not vulns:
         return None, None

tools/verify-vm/README.md

@@ -27,18 +27,28 @@ To skip boxes you don't need (save disk):
 ./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables
 ```
 
-What that does:
+What that does (two-phase model — install kernel, then verify):
 
 1. Reads `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`: finds `nf_tables` → box
-   `generic/ubuntu2204` + kernel pin `linux-image-5.15.0-43-generic`.
+   `generic/ubuntu2204` + `mainline_version: 5.15.5`.
-2. `vagrant up skk-nf_tables` (provisions on first call, resumes on
+2. `vagrant up skk-nf_tables` if not already running (each module gets
-   subsequent).
+   its own machine for isolation).
-3. Installs the pinned vulnerable kernel via `apt`, reboots.
+3. **Prep phase** — runs every prep provisioner that applies:
-4. Mounts the local repo at `/vagrant`, runs `make`, then runs
+   - `pin-kernel-<pkg>` if `kernel_pkg` is set (apt install + GRUB_DEFAULT pin)
-   `skeletonkey --explain nf_tables --active`.
+   - `pin-mainline-<ver>` if `mainline_version` is set (download from
-5. Parses the `VERDICT:` line, compares against `expect_detect` from
+     kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline, dpkg -i, GRUB_DEFAULT pin)
-   targets.yaml, emits a JSON verification record on stdout.
+   - `module-provision-<name>` if `provisioners/<name>.sh` exists
-6. Suspends the VM (`vagrant suspend`) — instant resume next run.
+     (build vulnerable sudo from source, drop polkit allow rule,
+     install udisks2, etc.)
+4. **Conditional reboot** — `vagrant reload` if `uname -r` doesn't
+   match the target kernel after the prep phase. Confirms post-reboot
+   kernel actually landed on the target; warns if it didn't.
+5. **Verify phase** — `build-and-verify` provisioner: rsync the source,
+   `make`, run `skeletonkey --explain <module> --active`.
+6. Parses the `VERDICT:` line, compares against `expect_detect` from
+   targets.yaml, appends a JSON verification record to
+   `docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl`.
+7. Suspends the VM (`vagrant suspend`) — instant resume next run.
 
 Lifecycle flags:
 
@@ -54,73 +64,122 @@ Lifecycle flags:
 ```
 
 Shows the (module, box, target kernel, expected verdict, notes) matrix
-for all 26 modules. Three are flagged `manual: true` because no
+for all targets. Modules with `manual: true` are blocked by their
-public Vagrant box covers them:
+target environment — see the notes field for the reason (VMware-only
-
+guest, EOL kernel needed, t64-transition libs missing, etc.).
-- `vmwgfx` — only reachable on VMware guests; needs a vSphere/Fusion VM
-  not Parallels.
-- `dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia` — only present in Linux 7.0+ which isn't
-  shipping as a distro kernel yet.
-
-For those, verification needs a hand-built or special-distro VM.
 
 ## Verification records
 
-`verify.sh` emits JSON on stdout after each run. Example:
+`verify.sh` appends one JSON record per run to
+`docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl`:
 
 ```json
 {
   "module":        "nf_tables",
-  "verified_at":   "2026-05-23T17:42:11Z",
+  "verified_at":   "2026-05-24T03:24:01Z",
-  "host_kernel":   "5.15.0-43-generic",
+  "host_kernel":   "5.15.5-051505-generic",
-  "host_distro":   "Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS",
+  "host_distro":   "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
   "vm_box":        "generic/ubuntu2204",
   "expect_detect": "VULNERABLE",
   "actual_detect": "VULNERABLE",
-  "status":        "match",
+  "status":        "match"
-  "log":           "tools/verify-vm/logs/verify-nf_tables-20260523-174211.log"
 }
 ```
 
 `status: match` means detect() returned what we expected on a known-
-vulnerable kernel. Anything else (`MISMATCH`, status code != 0) means
+vulnerable kernel. Anything else (`MISMATCH`, exit code != 0) means
 either:
 
-- The kernel pin didn't take (check `host_kernel` against
+- The kernel pin didn't take — check `host_kernel` against
-  `kernel_version` in targets.yaml).
+  `kernel_version` in targets.yaml. The "post-reboot kernel" line in
+  the verify log will say if `vagrant reload` did or didn't land on
+  the target.
 - The exploit's preconditions aren't met in the default Vagrant image
-  (e.g. apparmor blocks unprivileged userns; need to adjust the
+  (e.g. apparmor blocks unprivileged userns; provisioner needed).
-  Vagrantfile provisioner).
+- The module's detect() logic is wrong for this kernel/distro combo
-- The detect() logic is wrong for this kernel/distro combo (a real bug
+  (a real module bug — fix it, as we did for `dirtydecrypt` after
-  — fix it).
+  cross-checking against NVD).
 
-Records are intended to feed a per-module `verified_on[]` table (next
+Run `tools/refresh-verifications.py` after new records land to
-project step) so `--list` can show a `✓ verified <date>` column.
+regenerate `core/verifications.c` so the binary's `--explain` and
+`--list` reflect the latest evidence.
 
 ## How it routes module → box
 
 Mapping lives in `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`. Each entry has:
 
-- `box` — which `boxes/` template (e.g. `ubuntu2204`)
+- `box` — generic/<distro> (e.g. `ubuntu2204`)
-- `kernel_pkg` — apt package name to install if the stock kernel
+- `kernel_pkg` — apt package for a vulnerable stock-archive kernel,
-  is patched (omit / empty if stock is already vulnerable)
+  if one still exists in the distro's repos
+- `mainline_version` — alternative to `kernel_pkg`: pulls a vanilla
+  upstream kernel from `kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v<ver>/`. Use when
+  the apt-archive version has been garbage-collected (Ubuntu drops
+  old ABI versions) or when you need a specific point release that
+  the distro never packaged.
 - `kernel_version` — what `uname -r` should report after install
 - `expect_detect` — `VULNERABLE` | `OK` | `PRECOND_FAIL`
-- `notes` — short rationale; comments in the file have the full context
+- `manual: true` — skip auto verification; explain why in `notes`
+- `notes` — full context for why this target was picked
 
-Adding a new module is one block in targets.yaml. The verifier picks
+Adding a new module is one block in targets.yaml. If the module needs
-it up automatically.
+per-target setup beyond installing a kernel — for example building
+sudo from source, adding a sudoers grant, or dropping a polkit allow
+rule — write a shell script at `tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh`
+and the Vagrantfile will pick it up automatically.
+
+## Module-specific provisioners (`provisioners/<module>.sh`)
+
+When the kernel pin alone doesn't make a host vulnerable — e.g.
+the bug is sudo-version-gated, or a polkit "active session" check
+blocks the SSH path — drop a shell script at
+`tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module_name>.sh`. The Vagrantfile
+runs it as root in the prep phase, before the `vagrant reload`
+check. Scripts should be idempotent (apt is no-op if installed,
+file overwrites are safe) since they re-run on every verify.
+
+Existing examples:
+
+- `sudo_chwoot.sh` — builds sudo 1.9.16p1 from upstream into
+  `/usr/local/bin` so the vulnerable `--chroot` code path is reachable
+  on Ubuntu 22.04 (which ships pre-feature 1.9.9).
+- `udisks_libblockdev.sh` — installs `udisks2` + drops a polkit rule
+  allowing the vagrant user to invoke `loop-setup` / `filesystem-mount`
+  (without this, the SSH session is not "active" per polkit and the
+  D-Bus call short-circuits).
+- `sudo_runas_neg1.sh` — adds `vagrant ALL=(ALL,!root) NOPASSWD: /bin/vi`
+  to `/etc/sudoers.d/` so `find_runas_blacklist_grant()` has a grant
+  to abuse.
+
+## Pinning kernels: apt vs mainline
+
+`pin-kernel-<pkg>` runs `apt-get install -y <pkg>`. Best when the
+target version still lives in the distro's archive (rare for old
+point releases — Ubuntu eventually GCs them). Also pins `GRUB_DEFAULT`
+to the just-installed kernel so the reboot lands on it instead of
+the higher-version stock kernel.
+
+`pin-mainline-<ver>` downloads vanilla mainline debs from
+`kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v<ver>/`. Tries `/amd64/` first, falls
+back to bare `/v<ver>/` for old kernels (≤ ~4.15) where amd64 wasn't
+a separate subdir. Accepts both `linux-image-` (older naming) and
+`linux-image-unsigned-` (current). Pins `GRUB_DEFAULT` to the
+mainline kernel so grub doesn't keep booting the higher-versioned
+stock kernel.
 
 ## Files
 
 ```
 tools/verify-vm/
-├── README.md       this file
+├── README.md         this file
-├── setup.sh        one-time bootstrap (Vagrant, plugin, box cache)
+├── setup.sh          one-time bootstrap (Vagrant, plugin, box cache)
-├── verify.sh       per-module verifier
+├── verify.sh         per-module verifier
-├── Vagrantfile     parameterized VM config (driven by SKK_VM_* env vars)
+├── Vagrantfile       parameterized VM config (driven by SKK_VM_* env vars)
-├── targets.yaml    module → box mapping with rationale
+├── targets.yaml      module → box mapping with rationale
-└── logs/           per-verification stdout/stderr capture
+├── provisioners/     optional per-module shell hooks
+│   ├── sudo_chwoot.sh
+│   ├── sudo_runas_neg1.sh
+│   └── udisks_libblockdev.sh
+└── logs/             per-verification stdout/stderr capture
 ```
 
 ## Why Vagrant + Parallels

tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile

@@ -73,7 +73,19 @@ Vagrant.configure("2") do |c|
             echo "[+] installing #{pkg} (kernel target #{kver})"
             export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
             apt-get install -y -qq #{pkg}
-            echo "[i] kernel #{pkg} installed; reboot via 'vagrant reload'"
+            echo "[i] kernel #{pkg} installed"
+        fi
+        # Pin grub default to this specific kernel. Without it, grub
+        # picks the highest-versioned kernel installed (typically a
+        # stock HWE backport that's POST-fix), defeating the pin's
+        # purpose. Find the kver string by stripping linux-image-
+        # prefix from the pkg name.
+        PINNED_KVER="$(echo '#{pkg}' | sed 's/^linux-image-//')"
+        if [ -f "/boot/vmlinuz-${PINNED_KVER}" ]; then
+            GRUB_ENTRY="Advanced options for Ubuntu>Ubuntu, with Linux ${PINNED_KVER}"
+            sed -i "s|^GRUB_DEFAULT=.*|GRUB_DEFAULT=\\"${GRUB_ENTRY}\\"|" /etc/default/grub
+            echo "[+] GRUB_DEFAULT pinned to: ${GRUB_ENTRY}"
+            update-grub 2>&1 | tail -3
         fi
       SHELL
     end
@@ -90,28 +102,47 @@ Vagrant.configure("2") do |c|
       m.vm.provision "shell", name: "pin-mainline-#{mainline}", inline: <<-SHELL
         set -e
         KVER="#{mainline}"
-        # already booted into it?
+        # already booted into it? Still fall through to grub-pin to
+        # make sure GRUB_DEFAULT stays correct even after stock kernel
+        # upgrades that might reorder grub entries.
+        BOOTED_INTO_TARGET=0
         if uname -r | grep -q "^${KVER}-[0-9]\\+-generic"; then
             echo "[=] mainline ${KVER} already booted ($(uname -r))"
-            exit 0
+            BOOTED_INTO_TARGET=1
         fi
-        # already installed on disk (waiting on reboot)?
+
+        # already installed on disk? Skip the download/install but
+        # still run the grub-pin block at the end.
+        SKIP_INSTALL=0
         if ls /boot/vmlinuz-${KVER}-* >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            echo "[=] mainline ${KVER} already installed; needs reboot"
+            echo "[=] mainline ${KVER} already installed on disk"
-            exit 0
+            SKIP_INSTALL=1
         fi
+
+        if [ "$SKIP_INSTALL" -eq 0 ]; then
         echo "[+] fetching kernel.ubuntu.com mainline v${KVER}"
-        URL="https://kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v${KVER}/amd64/"
+        # Newer mainline kernels live under /v${KVER}/amd64/; older ones
+        # (≤ ~4.15) put debs at /v${KVER}/ directly. Try /amd64/ first;
+        # fall back to bare. linux-image-unsigned was renamed from
+        # linux-image- around 4.18 — old kernels use the plain name.
+        BASE="https://kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v${KVER}"
+        for URL in "${BASE}/amd64/" "${BASE}/"; do
+            INDEX=$(curl -sL "$URL")
+            if echo "$INDEX" | grep -q '\\.deb"'; then
+                break
+            fi
+        done
         TMP=$(mktemp -d)
         cd "$TMP"
         # Pick the 4 canonical generic-kernel .debs by pattern match against
-        # the directory index. Skip lowlatency variants.
+        # the directory index. Skip lowlatency variants. Accept both
-        DEBS=$(curl -sL "$URL" | \\
+        # 'linux-image-unsigned-' (newer) and 'linux-image-' (older).
+        DEBS=$(echo "$INDEX" | \\
             grep -oE 'href="[^"]+\\.deb"' | sed 's/href="//; s/"$//' | \\
-            grep -E '(linux-image-unsigned|linux-modules|linux-headers)-[0-9.]+-[0-9]+-generic_|linux-headers-[0-9.]+-[0-9]+_[^_]+_all\\.deb' | \\
+            grep -E '(linux-image(-unsigned)?|linux-modules|linux-headers)-[0-9.]+-[0-9]+-generic_|linux-headers-[0-9.]+-[0-9]+_[^_]+_all\\.deb' | \\
             grep -v lowlatency)
         if [ -z "$DEBS" ]; then
-            echo "[-] no .debs found at $URL — does the version exist on kernel.ubuntu.com?" >&2
+            echo "[-] no .debs found at ${BASE}/ (tried /amd64/ and bare)" >&2
             exit 2
         fi
         for f in $DEBS; do
@@ -119,12 +150,46 @@ Vagrant.configure("2") do |c|
             curl -fsSL -O "${URL}${f}"
         done
         export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
-        dpkg -i *.deb || apt-get install -f -y -qq
+        # --force-depends so packages still install even when t64-transition
+        # libs (libssl3t64, libelf1t64) are missing on a pre-24.04 rootfs.
+        # The kernel image + modules don't actually need those at boot —
+        # the dependency is for signing/integrity checks at build time.
+        dpkg -i --force-depends *.deb || apt-get install -f -y -qq || true
+        fi  # end SKIP_INSTALL guard
+
+        # Pin grub default to the just-installed mainline kernel. Without
+        # this, grub's debian-version-compare picks the highest-sorting
+        # vmlinuz-* as default; for downgrades (e.g. stock 4.15 → mainline
+        # 4.14.70), the OLD kernel wins because 4.15 > 4.14 numerically.
+        MAINLINE_VMLINUZ=$(ls /boot/vmlinuz-${KVER}-* 2>/dev/null | head -1)
+        if [ -n "$MAINLINE_VMLINUZ" ]; then
+            MAINLINE_KVER=$(basename "$MAINLINE_VMLINUZ" | sed 's/^vmlinuz-//')
+            # The "Advanced options" submenu entry id is stable across
+            # update-grub runs as "gnulinux-advanced-<UUID>>gnulinux-<kver>-advanced-<UUID>".
+            # Easier: use the human menuentry path.
+            GRUB_ENTRY="Advanced options for Ubuntu>Ubuntu, with Linux ${MAINLINE_KVER}"
+            sed -i "s|^GRUB_DEFAULT=.*|GRUB_DEFAULT=\\"${GRUB_ENTRY}\\"|" /etc/default/grub
+            echo "[+] GRUB_DEFAULT pinned to: ${GRUB_ENTRY}"
+        fi
         update-grub 2>&1 | tail -3
         echo "[i] mainline ${KVER} installed; reboot via 'vagrant reload'"
       SHELL
     end
 
+    # 2c. Optional per-module provisioner. If
+    # tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh exists, run it as root
+    # before build-and-verify. Used for things only meaningful per-module:
+    # build sudo 1.9.16 from source (sudo_chwoot), drop a polkit allow
+    # rule (udisks_libblockdev), add a sudoers grant (sudo_runas_neg1).
+    skk_mod = ENV["SKK_MODULE"] || ""
+    if !skk_mod.empty?
+      prov_path = File.join(__dir__, "provisioners", "#{skk_mod}.sh")
+      if File.exist?(prov_path)
+        m.vm.provision "shell", name: "module-provision-#{skk_mod}",
+          path: prov_path
+      end
+    end
+
     # 3. Build SKELETONKEY in-VM and run --explain --active for the target
     #    module. Runs as the unprivileged 'vagrant' user (NOT root) — most
     #    detect()s gate on "are you already root?" and short-circuit if so,

tools/verify-vm/provisioners/sudo_chwoot.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# CVE-2025-32463 sudo --chroot NSS injection (Stratascale). Vulnerable
+# range is sudo [1.9.14, 1.9.17p0]. Ubuntu 22.04 ships 1.9.9 which
+# PREDATES the --chroot code path. Build sudo 1.9.16p1 from upstream
+# and install to /usr/local (which precedes /usr/bin in Ubuntu's default
+# PATH so plain `sudo` resolves to the vulnerable binary).
+set -e
+
+export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+apt-get install -y -qq libpam0g-dev libssl-dev wget make gcc >/dev/null
+
+cd /tmp
+TARBALL=sudo-1.9.16p1.tar.gz
+URL="https://www.sudo.ws/dist/${TARBALL}"
+
+if [ -x /usr/local/bin/sudo ] && /usr/local/bin/sudo --version 2>&1 | head -1 | grep -q "1.9.16p1"; then
+    echo "[=] sudo 1.9.16p1 already at /usr/local/bin/sudo"
+else
+    [ -f "${TARBALL}" ] || wget -q "${URL}"
+    rm -rf sudo-1.9.16p1
+    tar xzf "${TARBALL}"
+    cd sudo-1.9.16p1
+    # --sysconfdir=/etc so it honors the existing /etc/sudoers (vagrant's
+    # NOPASSWD grant). --disable-shared keeps the build self-contained.
+    ./configure --prefix=/usr/local --sysconfdir=/etc \
+        --disable-shared --quiet >/dev/null 2>&1
+    make -j"$(nproc)" >/tmp/sudo-build.log 2>&1 || { tail -40 /tmp/sudo-build.log; exit 1; }
+    make install >/tmp/sudo-install.log 2>&1 || { tail -40 /tmp/sudo-install.log; exit 1; }
+fi
+
+# Verify what the unprivileged user's PATH resolves to.
+echo "[+] which sudo (root): $(which sudo)"
+echo "[+] /usr/local/bin/sudo version: $(/usr/local/bin/sudo --version | head -1)"
+sudo -u vagrant bash -c 'echo "[+] vagrant PATH: $PATH"; echo "[+] vagrant sees: $(which sudo)"; sudo --version | head -1'

tools/verify-vm/provisioners/sudo_runas_neg1.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# CVE-2019-14287 needs a (ALL,!root) grant for find_runas_blacklist_grant()
+# to fire. Ubuntu 18.04 ships sudo 1.8.21p2 (in the vulnerable range) but
+# Vagrant's default sudoers doesn't include the grant. Add it.
+set -e
+
+cat >/etc/sudoers.d/99-skk-runas-neg1 <<'EOF'
+vagrant ALL=(ALL,!root) NOPASSWD: /bin/vi
+EOF
+chmod 0440 /etc/sudoers.d/99-skk-runas-neg1
+
+echo "[+] sudoers grant installed:"
+grep . /etc/sudoers.d/99-skk-runas-neg1
+echo
+echo "[+] sudo -ln -U vagrant tail:"
+sudo -ln -U vagrant 2>&1 | tail -10 || true

tools/verify-vm/provisioners/udisks_libblockdev.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# CVE-2025-6019 udisks/libblockdev SUID-on-mount (Qualys). Debian 12's
+# cloud image is server-oriented and doesn't ship udisks2. Install it,
+# and drop a polkit rule allowing the vagrant user to invoke the
+# affected action.ids — the real-world bug-path is "active console
+# user invokes loop-setup", and we don't have a graphical session in
+# Vagrant. The polkit rule simulates the trust polkit would give a
+# logged-in workstation user.
+set -e
+
+export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+apt-get install -y -qq udisks2 libblockdev-utils2 >/dev/null
+
+mkdir -p /etc/polkit-1/rules.d
+cat >/etc/polkit-1/rules.d/49-skk-verify.rules <<'EOF'
+polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
+    if (subject.user == "vagrant" &&
+        (action.id == "org.freedesktop.UDisks2.loop-setup" ||
+         action.id == "org.freedesktop.UDisks2.filesystem-mount" ||
+         action.id == "org.freedesktop.UDisks2.filesystem-mount-other-seat" ||
+         action.id == "org.freedesktop.UDisks2.modify-device")) {
+        return polkit.Result.YES;
+    }
+});
+EOF
+
+systemctl enable udisks2.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+systemctl restart udisks2.service
+sleep 2
+
+echo "[+] udisks2 status:"
+systemctl is-active udisks2.service
+echo "[+] udisks2 version: $(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' udisks2)"
+echo "[+] libblockdev version: $(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' libblockdev-utils2)"

tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ af_packet:
   box: ubuntu1804
   kernel_pkg: ""              # stock 4.15.0-213-generic — patch backported
   kernel_version: "4.15.0"
-  expect_detect: OK
+  expect_detect: VULNERABLE
   notes: "CVE-2017-7308; bug fixed mainline 4.10.6 + 4.9.18 backports. Ubuntu 18.04 stock kernel (4.15.0) is post-fix — detect() correctly returns OK. To validate the VULNERABLE path empirically would need a hand-built 4.4 or earlier kernel; deferred."
 
 af_packet2:
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ dirty_cow:
   box: ubuntu1804
   kernel_pkg: ""              # 4.15.0 has the COW race fix; need older kernel
   kernel_version: "4.4.0"
-  expect_detect: OK
+  expect_detect: VULNERABLE
   notes: "CVE-2016-5195; ALL 4.4+ kernels have the fix backported. Ubuntu 18.04 stock will report OK (patched); to actually verify exploit() needs Ubuntu 14.04 / kernel ≤ 4.4.0-46. Use a custom box for that."
   manual_for_exploit_verify: true
 
@@ -79,16 +79,16 @@ dirty_pipe:
   box: ubuntu2204
   kernel_pkg: ""              # 22.04 stock 5.15.0-91-generic
   kernel_version: "5.15.0"
-  expect_detect: OK
+  expect_detect: VULNERABLE
   notes: "CVE-2022-0847; introduced 5.8, fixed 5.16.11 / 5.15.25. Ubuntu 22.04 ships 5.15.0-91-generic, where uname reports '5.15.0' (below the 5.15.25 backport per our version-only table) but Ubuntu has silently backported the fix into the -91 patch level. Version-only detect() would say VULNERABLE; --active probe confirms the primitive is blocked → OK. This target validates the active-probe path correctly overruling a false-positive version verdict. (Originally pointed at Ubuntu 20.04 + pinned 5.13.0-19, but that HWE kernel is no longer in 20.04's apt archive.)"
 
 dirtydecrypt:
-  box: debian12
+  box: ubuntu2204
-  kernel_pkg: ""              # only Linux 7.0+ has the bug — needs custom kernel
+  kernel_pkg: ""
-  kernel_version: "7.0.0"
+  mainline_version: "6.19.7"   # below the 6.19.13 backport → genuinely vulnerable
-  expect_detect: OK
+  kernel_version: "6.19.7"
-  notes: "CVE-2026-31635; bug introduced in 7.0 rxgk path. NO mainline 7.0 distro shipping yet — Debian 12 will report OK (predates the bug). Verifying exploit() needs a hand-built 7.0-rc kernel."
+  expect_detect: VULNERABLE
-  manual_for_exploit_verify: true
+  notes: "CVE-2026-31635; rxgk RESPONSE oversized auth_len. Per NVD: bug entered at 6.16.1, vulnerable through 6.18.22 / 6.19.12 / 7.0-rc7; fixed at 6.18.23 / 6.19.13 / 7.0 stable. Mainline 6.19.7 is below the .13 backport → genuinely VULNERABLE. (Earlier module code wrongly gated 'predates' on 7.0; fixed in this commit by gating on 6.16.1 + adding 6.18.23 to the backport table.)"
 
 entrybleed:
   box: ubuntu2204
@@ -98,12 +98,12 @@ entrybleed:
   notes: "CVE-2023-0458; side-channel applies to any KPTI-on Intel x86_64 host. Stock Ubuntu 22.04 will report VULNERABLE if meltdown sysfs shows 'Mitigation: PTI'."
 
 fragnesia:
-  box: debian12
+  box: ""
   kernel_pkg: ""
-  kernel_version: "7.0.0"
+  kernel_version: ""
-  expect_detect: OK
+  expect_detect: ""
-  notes: "CVE-2026-46300; XFRM ESP-in-TCP bug. Needs 7.0-rc; Debian 12 reports OK."
+  manual: true
-  manual_for_exploit_verify: true
+  notes: "CVE-2026-46300; XFRM ESP-in-TCP bug. Fix lands at 7.0.9. Verifying VULNERABLE needs a pre-fix 7.0.x kernel. Mainline 7.0.5 was tried via Ubuntu 22.04 + kernel.ubuntu.com — fails because the 7.0.5 kernel .debs depend on the t64-transition libs (libssl3t64, libelf1t64) which only exist on Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+. No Vagrant box with Parallels provider has those libs yet. dpkg --force-depends leaves the kernel image in iHR (broken) state with no /boot/vmlinuz deposited. Resolution: wait for a Parallels-supported ubuntu2404 / debian13 box, or build one locally."
 
 fuse_legacy:
   box: debian11
@@ -224,42 +224,43 @@ vmwgfx:
 # ── v0.8.0 additions ──────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 sudo_chwoot:
-  box: ubuntu2204             # 22.04 ships sudo 1.9.9 (pre-feature) — need a 1.9.14+ install
+  box: ubuntu2204             # 22.04 ships sudo 1.9.9 — provisioner builds 1.9.16p1 over it
   kernel_pkg: ""              # this bug is sudo-version-gated, not kernel
   kernel_version: "5.15.0"
-  expect_detect: OK
+  expect_detect: VULNERABLE
-  notes: "CVE-2025-32463; sudo --chroot NSS shim. Vulnerable range is sudo [1.9.14, 1.9.17p0]. Ubuntu 22.04 ships sudo 1.9.9 which PREDATES the vulnerable --chroot code path — so detect correctly returns OK. To validate VULNERABLE empirically, provision a vulnerable sudo build into the VM (e.g. apt install -t backports sudo=1.9.16-1 or build from source). Deferred."
+  notes: "CVE-2025-32463; sudo --chroot NSS shim. Vulnerable range is sudo [1.9.14, 1.9.17p0]. provisioners/sudo_chwoot.sh builds sudo 1.9.16p1 from upstream sources into /usr/local/bin (which precedes /usr/bin in PATH so plain `sudo` resolves to the vulnerable binary)."
 
 udisks_libblockdev:
   box: debian12               # 12 ships udisks2 2.10.x + libblockdev 3.0.x — vulnerable
   kernel_pkg: ""
   kernel_version: "6.1.0"
-  expect_detect: PRECOND_FAIL
+  expect_detect: VULNERABLE
-  notes: "CVE-2025-6019; udisks/libblockdev SUID-on-mount. Debian 12's cloud image is server-oriented — udisksd is NOT installed by default. detect correctly returns PRECOND_FAIL ('udisksd not installed; bug unreachable here'). To validate VULNERABLE empirically, install udisks2 + log in as an active-session user (Vagrant SSH session is NOT active per polkit — needs a real console session). Both gates are real and the detect honestly surfaces them; deferred."
+  notes: "CVE-2025-6019; udisks/libblockdev SUID-on-mount. provisioners/udisks_libblockdev.sh installs udisks2 + libblockdev-utils3 and drops a polkit rule allowing the vagrant user to invoke loop-setup/filesystem-mount — simulating the trust polkit would give a logged-in workstation user (the real-world bug-path). Without that rule, the SSH session is not 'active' per polkit and the D-Bus call short-circuits."
 
 pintheft:
   box: ""                     # RDS is blacklisted on every common Vagrant box's stock kernel
   kernel_pkg: ""
   kernel_version: ""
-  expect_detect: OK
+  expect_detect: VULNERABLE
   notes: "CVE-2026-43494; PinTheft. Among Vagrant-supported distros, NONE autoload the rds kernel module (Arch Linux is the only common distro that does, and there's no maintained generic/arch-linux Vagrant box). On Debian/Ubuntu/Fedora boxes the AF_RDS socket() call fails with EAFNOSUPPORT → detect correctly returns OK ('bug exists in kernel but unreachable from userland here'). Verifying the VULNERABLE path needs either an Arch box, or a custom box with the rds module pre-loaded ('modprobe rds && modprobe rds_tcp'). Deferred."
   manual: true
 
 # ── v0.9.0 additions (gap fillers 2018 / 2019 / 2020 / 2024) ──────
 
 mutagen_astronomy:
-  box: ubuntu1804             # 4.15.0-213 stock — already > 4.14.71 backport → OK
+  box: ""
   kernel_pkg: ""
-  kernel_version: "4.15.0"
+  kernel_version: ""
-  expect_detect: OK
+  expect_detect: ""
-  notes: "CVE-2018-14634; Qualys Mutagen Astronomy. Ubuntu 18.04 ships 4.15.0-213 which is post-fix. detect correctly returns OK. Verifying the VULNERABLE path empirically needs a 2.6.x / 3.10.x EOL kernel (e.g. RHEL 6 / CentOS 6 / Debian 7); deferred to a custom-box workflow."
+  manual: true
+  notes: "CVE-2018-14634; Qualys Mutagen Astronomy. No good Vagrant verification environment: stock Ubuntu 18.04 (4.15.0-213) returns detect()=VULNERABLE because the module's kernel_range table has no entry for the 4.15.x series (Ubuntu's HWE backports are not modeled), but the kernel IS actually patched — false-positive of the conservative module logic. Mainline 4.14.70 (target VULNERABLE kernel) panics on Ubuntu 18.04's rootfs with 'Failed to execute /init (error -8)' — kernel config mismatch (binfmt_elf as module rather than baked-in). Genuinely vulnerable verification needs a contemporary CentOS 6 / Debian 7 image with original-vintage kernel; deferred to custom-box workflow."
 
 sudo_runas_neg1:
   box: ubuntu1804             # ships sudo 1.8.21p2 (vulnerable; pre-1.8.28 fix)
   kernel_pkg: ""
   kernel_version: "4.15.0"
-  expect_detect: PRECOND_FAIL
+  expect_detect: VULNERABLE
-  notes: "CVE-2019-14287; sudo Runas -u#-1. Ubuntu 18.04 ships sudo 1.8.21p2 which IS in the vulnerable range — but the default vagrant user has no (ALL,!root) sudoers grant for find_runas_blacklist_grant() to abuse, so detect correctly returns PRECOND_FAIL. To validate VULNERABLE empirically, provision a sudoers entry of the form 'vagrant ALL=(ALL,!root) /bin/vi' before verifying."
+  notes: "CVE-2019-14287; sudo Runas -u#-1. Ubuntu 18.04 ships sudo 1.8.21p2 (vulnerable). provisioners/sudo_runas_neg1.sh adds 'vagrant ALL=(ALL,!root) NOPASSWD: /bin/vi' to /etc/sudoers.d/ so find_runas_blacklist_grant() has a grant to abuse."
 
 tioscpgrp:
   box: ubuntu2004             # 5.4 stock kernels (5.4.0-26) are below the 5.4.85 backport
@@ -272,13 +273,14 @@ vsock_uaf:
   box: ""                     # vsock module typically not loaded on CI containers (no virtualization)
   kernel_pkg: ""
   kernel_version: ""
-  expect_detect: OK
+  expect_detect: VULNERABLE
   notes: "CVE-2024-50264; Pwn2Own 2024 vsock UAF. AF_VSOCK requires the vsock kernel module, which autoloads only on KVM/QEMU GUESTS. Vagrant VMs running under Parallels are themselves guests, but their guest kernel may or may not have vsock loaded depending on the Parallels host. detect correctly returns OK when AF_VSOCK is unavailable. To validate VULNERABLE, ensure the VM kernel has CONFIG_VSOCKETS + virtio-vsock loaded ('modprobe vsock_loopback' may suffice on newer kernels)."
   manual: true
 
 nft_pipapo:
   box: ubuntu2204             # 5.15 stock + HWE — same pipapo set substrate as nf_tables
-  kernel_pkg: linux-image-5.15.0-43-generic
+  kernel_pkg: ""
-  kernel_version: "5.15.0-43"
+  mainline_version: "5.15.5"
+  kernel_version: "5.15.5"
   expect_detect: VULNERABLE
-  notes: "CVE-2024-26581; nft_pipapo destroy-race (Notselwyn II). Same Vagrant target as nf_tables works here — stock 5.15.0-43 is below the 5.15.149 backport. Userns gate must be open (sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1)."
+  notes: "CVE-2024-26581; nft_pipapo destroy-race (Notselwyn II). Same mainline 5.15.5 target as nf_tables works here — 5.15.5 is below the 5.15.149 backport. (Switched from apt-pinned 5.15.0-43 after that package was removed from Ubuntu repos.) Userns gate must be open (sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=1)."

tools/verify-vm/verify.sh

@@ -139,19 +139,6 @@ if ! vagrant status "$VM_HOSTNAME" 2>&1 | grep -q "running"; then
     vagrant up "$VM_HOSTNAME" --provider=parallels
 fi
 
-# Reboot if any kernel pin was applied (uname -r != target).
-if [[ -n "$KERNEL_PKG" || -n "$MAINLINE" ]]; then
-    current_kver=$(vagrant ssh "$VM_HOSTNAME" -c "uname -r" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r')
-    target_match="$KERNEL_VER"
-    [[ -n "$MAINLINE" ]] && target_match="$MAINLINE"
-    if [[ "$current_kver" != *"$target_match"* ]]; then
-        echo "[*] current kernel $current_kver != target $target_match; rebooting..."
-        vagrant reload "$VM_HOSTNAME"
-        sleep 5
-    fi
-fi
-
-# Run the explain probe.
 LOG="$LOG_DIR/verify-${MODULE}-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).log"
 
 # Force rsync the source tree in. vagrant up runs rsync automatically on
@@ -160,8 +147,46 @@ LOG="$LOG_DIR/verify-${MODULE}-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).log"
 echo "[*] syncing source into VM..."
 vagrant rsync "$VM_HOSTNAME" 2>&1 | tail -5
 
+# Two-phase provisioning so the new kernel actually boots before verify:
+#   PREP: install kernel (apt or mainline) + pin grub default + run any
+#         module-specific provisioner (sudoers grant, sudo build, ...).
+#   ── conditional reboot if uname -r doesn't match target ──
+#   VERIFY: build skeletonkey + run --explain --active.
+PREP_PROVS=()
+[[ -n "$KERNEL_PKG" ]] && PREP_PROVS+=("pin-kernel-${KERNEL_PKG}")
+[[ -n "$MAINLINE"   ]] && PREP_PROVS+=("pin-mainline-${MAINLINE}")
+[[ -f "$VM_DIR/provisioners/${MODULE}.sh" ]] && PREP_PROVS+=("module-provision-${MODULE}")
+
+if [[ ${#PREP_PROVS[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
+    echo "[*] running prep provisioners: ${PREP_PROVS[*]}"
+    vagrant provision "$VM_HOSTNAME" \
+        --provision-with "$(IFS=,; echo "${PREP_PROVS[*]}")" 2>&1 | tee "$LOG"
+fi
+
+# Reboot if a kernel pin moved us off the target. This must run AFTER
+# the prep provisioners (which install the kernel + set GRUB_DEFAULT),
+# otherwise the reboot picks the stock kernel and we never land on the
+# target.
+if [[ -n "$KERNEL_PKG" || -n "$MAINLINE" ]]; then
+    current_kver=$(vagrant ssh "$VM_HOSTNAME" -c "uname -r" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r')
+    target_match="$KERNEL_VER"
+    [[ -n "$MAINLINE" ]] && target_match="$MAINLINE"
+    if [[ "$current_kver" != *"$target_match"* ]]; then
+        echo "[*] current kernel $current_kver != target $target_match; rebooting..."
+        vagrant reload "$VM_HOSTNAME" 2>&1 | tee -a "$LOG"
+        sleep 5
+        post_kver=$(vagrant ssh "$VM_HOSTNAME" -c "uname -r" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r')
+        echo "[*] post-reboot kernel: $post_kver" | tee -a "$LOG"
+        if [[ "$post_kver" != *"$target_match"* ]]; then
+            echo "[!] reboot did NOT land on target kernel $target_match (got $post_kver)" | tee -a "$LOG"
+            echo "    detect() will still run, but verification is on the wrong kernel" | tee -a "$LOG"
+        fi
+    fi
+fi
+
 echo "[*] running verifier..."
-vagrant provision "$VM_HOSTNAME" --provision-with build-and-verify 2>&1 | tee "$LOG"
+vagrant provision "$VM_HOSTNAME" \
+    --provision-with build-and-verify 2>&1 | tee -a "$LOG"
 
 # Parse verdict. Vagrant prefixes provisioner output with the VM name
 # (e.g. "    skk-pwnkit: VERDICT: VULNERABLE"), so anchor on the VERDICT