4d0a0e24437e0b068a7d5d884ad81bdda87a6d4e
9 Commits
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4d0a0e2443 |
modules: add nft_catchall (CVE-2026-23111, nf_tables catch-all abort UAF)
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The newest nftables LPE: a use-after-free in the nf_tables transaction-
abort path. An inverted condition (a stray '!') in
nft_map_catchall_activate() makes the abort path process active catch-all
map elements instead of skipping them; a catch-all GOTO element drives a
chain's use-count to zero so a following DELCHAIN frees it while the
catch-all verdict still references it -> UAF, escalatable from an
unprivileged user (userns + nftables) via modprobe_path/selinux_state ROP.
Fixed upstream by f41c5d1; CWE-416, CVSS 7.8; not in CISA KEV. Public
reproduction by FuzzingLabs.
Takes the corpus to 43 modules / 38 CVEs.
🟡 reconstructed trigger, primitive-only, NOT VM-verified — same contract
as nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086). detect() version-gates (catch-all elems
~5.13; Debian backports 6.1.164/6.12.73/6.18.10, 7.0+ inherits) AND
requires unprivileged user_ns clone (else PRECOND_FAIL). exploit() forks
an isolated child, builds a verdict map with a catch-all GOTO element,
provokes an aborting batch to drive the abort-path UAF, observes slabinfo,
and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL — the per-kernel leak + R/W + modprobe_path ROP
is not bundled. kernel_range table verified drift-clean against the live
Debian tracker (the 6.18 branch / 6.18.10 fix is the real forky/sid
backport; the earlier 7.0.10 figure was wrong).
Wired: registry, Makefile, safety rank (35), 6 detect() test rows (version
+ userns gating), CVE_METADATA.json + cve_metadata.c + KEV_CROSSREF.md
(sorted insert, CWE-416/T1068/not-KEV), README + CVES.md + website counts
(43/38) + yellow pill, RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.11, verify-vm target. Credit:
FuzzingLabs + upstream fix f41c5d1. Version 0.9.11.
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ada56b0db3 |
modules: add cifswitch (CVE-2026-46243, Asim Manizada's CIFSwitch)
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release / release (push) Blocked by required conditions
CIFSwitch is the newest kernel-7-era LPE not already in the corpus: a
~19-year-old logic flaw in fs/smb/client/cifs_spnego.c where the
cifs.spnego request-key type accepts key descriptions created by
userspace (add_key(2)/request_key(2)) without verifying the request came
from the in-kernel CIFS client. The description's authority-bearing
fields (pid/uid/creduid/upcall_target) are trusted by the root cifs.upcall
helper; with user+mount namespace tricks an unprivileged user coerces
cifs.upcall into loading an attacker NSS module as root. Fixed upstream by
3da1fdf4efbc (merged 7.1-rc5); CWE-20; not in CISA KEV.
Takes the corpus to 42 modules / 37 CVEs.
🟡 honest port — full chain not VM-verified. detect() gates on the kernel
version (Debian backports 5.10.257/6.1.174/6.12.90/7.0.10) AND on the
cifs userspace path (cifs.upcall / cifs.spnego request-key rule), so a
vulnerable kernel without cifs-utils is PRECOND_FAIL not a false positive
(override via SKELETONKEY_CIFS_ASSUME_PRESENT=1/0). exploit() fires only
the non-destructive add_key(2) cifs.spnego probe (no upcall, loads
nothing, revoked immediately) and returns EXPLOIT_FAIL without a euid-0
witness — the namespace+NSS root-pop is not bundled until VM-verified.
--mitigate blocklists the cifs module; --cleanup reverts.
Wired everywhere: registry, Makefile, safety rank (86), 6 detect() test
rows (env-driven precondition override), CVE_METADATA.json + cve_metadata.c
+ KEV_CROSSREF.md (sorted insert, CWE-20/T1068/not-KEV), README + CVES.md
+ website counts (42/37) and a yellow module pill, RELEASE_NOTES v0.9.10,
verify-vm target (sweep pending). Credit: Asim Manizada. Version 0.9.10.
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28a9289989 |
fix: normalize CVE_METADATA.json to sorted order (drift-check)
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release / release (push) Blocked by required conditions
The weekly drift-check stayed red after v0.9.9's KEV+CWE fixes because of a latent ordering bug: sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462), added in v0.9.8, was appended to the end of CVE_METADATA.json instead of its sorted position. check_drift compares the record list in discover_cves() sorted order, so the misplaced entry read as drift independent of its field values. Regenerated via tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py — sorted order restored, all field values reconfirmed against CISA KEV + NVD in a clean fetch. |
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e457b22c1f |
release v0.9.9: install.sh needs no sudo + CVE metadata drift fix
install.sh never escalates to sudo. The installer defaulted to
/usr/local/bin and fell back to `sudo mv`, prompting for a password on
exactly the unprivileged accounts a privilege-escalation tool targets. It
now uses /usr/local/bin only when already writable and otherwise installs
to a per-user $HOME/.local/bin (honoring XDG_BIN_HOME), no sudo ever. An
explicit SKELETONKEY_PREFIX is honored and errors rather than escalating.
The documented one-liner prepends ~/.local/bin to PATH so it resolves on a
fresh login, and the quickstart drops the misleading sudo from --scan /
--audit / --auto.
CVE metadata drift (the failing weekly drift-check):
- CVE-2022-0492 (cgroup_release_agent) entered CISA KEV 2026-06-02;
corpus now 13 of 36 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs.
- CVE-2026-46333 (ptrace_pidfd) gained CWE-269 from NVD (was unclassified
at module-add time).
Refreshed CVE_METADATA.json, generated cve_metadata.c, and KEV_CROSSREF.md;
README + website KEV counts and version bumped to 0.9.9.
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dd5f4fa06d |
modules: add sudo_host (CVE-2025-32462, Stratascale sudo --host policy bypass)
Second new module this cycle; sibling of sudo_chwoot (CVE-2025-32463, same Stratascale/Rich Mirch disclosure). sudo's -h/--host option — meant only to pair with -l/--list — was honored when running a command, so a sudoers rule scoped to a host other than the current machine (and not ALL) is usable via 'sudo -h <host> <cmd>' for local root. Affects sudo 1.8.8 -> 1.9.17p0; fixed 1.9.17p1. CWE-863, CVSS 8.8 (not in KEV). detect(): version-gate [1.8.8, 1.9.17p0] via ctx->host->sudo_version (the host-restricted rule itself isn't probeable unprivileged, so VULNERABLE means 'vulnerable sudo present'). exploit(): discovers an abusable host-restricted rule from readable sudoers (or SKELETONKEY_SUDO_HOST), witnesses with 'sudo -n -h <host> id -u', pops 'sudo -h <host> /bin/bash' (SKELETONKEY_SUDO_CMD) only on a uid-0 witness; honest EXPLOIT_FAIL + operator guidance otherwise. Shared 'sudo' family; structural, arch=any; safety rank 96. auditd/sigma/falco rules, NOTICE.md (Rich Mirch / Stratascale) + MODULE.md, 4 detect() test rows. Wiring: registry, Makefile, cve_metadata (+JSON), verify-vm/targets.yaml (ubuntu1804 sudo 1.8.21p2 target, sweep pending). Docs: README + CVES.md + docs/index.html counts 40->41 modules / 35->36 CVEs; not-yet-verified lists + corpus pill. |
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bd63aabd64 |
modules: add ptrace_pidfd (CVE-2026-46333, Qualys ptrace/pidfd_getfd cred-steal)
New module for Qualys's 2026-05-20 disclosure: a __ptrace_may_access logic flaw leaves a process dropping privileges briefly reachable past its dumpable boundary; pidfd_getfd(2) steals root-opened fds / authenticated channels from it. Default-distro, no userns, arch-agnostic (fd-steal, no shellcode). detect(): version-pinned, predates-gate at pidfd_getfd's 5.6 introduction; kernel_range from Debian backports (5.10.251/6.1.172/6.12.88/7.0.7), drift-check clean. exploit(): spawns a setuid victim, pidfd_open()s it, sweeps pidfd_getfd() over its fd table during the cred-drop window, reports any uid-0-owned fd captured from a non-root context. Honest EXPLOIT_FAIL without a euid-0 witness; not yet VM-verified. mitigate(): yama ptrace_scope=2; cleanup() reverts. auditd/sigma/falco rules, NOTICE.md (Qualys TRU credit) + MODULE.md, safety rank 84. Wiring: registry, Makefile, cve_metadata (+JSON source), verify-vm/targets.yaml (ubuntu2204 + mainline 5.15.5 target, sweep pending). Docs: README + CVES.md + docs/index.html counts 39->40 modules / 34->35 CVEs; added to not-yet-verified lists + corpus pill. |
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4454d8148e |
release v0.9.4: drift unblock, fragnesia range fix, infra docs
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- Sync docs/CVE_METADATA.json + KEV_CROSSREF.md to match the
hand-applied core/cve_metadata.c entries from v0.9.3. Nightly
drift-check (red since 2026-05-25) now passes. Pintheft's CWE
landed as CWE-787 from NVD (was NULL in the hand-applied entry).
- Fix fragnesia (CVE-2026-46300) range table. Per NVD: bug entered
at 5.11 SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG, vulnerable through 5.15.207 / 6.1.173 /
6.6.140 / 6.12.90 / 6.18.32 / 7.0.9, fixed at .208/.174/.141/
.91/.33/.10. Prior table had one entry {7,0,9} — off-by-one and
missing every other backport. Added predates-5.11 introduction gate
+ test row.
- Update tools/verify-vm/README.md to document the v0.9.x infra:
mainline kernel pinning via kernel.ubuntu.com, per-module
provisioner hooks, two-phase prep→reboot→verify with post-reboot
kernel confirmation, GRUB_DEFAULT pinning.
- Add curl fallback for NVD lookups in refresh-cve-metadata.py.
Mirrors the CISA path's existing fallback. Prevents the silent
Python urlopen hang seen during v0.9.3 prep (55-min stuck on
CLOSE_WAIT socket; 30s timeout never fired).
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fa0228df9b |
release v0.9.3: CVE metadata refresh (KEV 10→12) + dirtydecrypt bug fix
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CVE metadata refresh:
- Added 8 entries to core/cve_metadata.c for the v0.8.0 + v0.9.0 module
CVEs. Two are CISA-KEV-listed:
- CVE-2018-14634 mutagen_astronomy (2026-01-26, CWE-190)
- CVE-2025-32463 sudo_chwoot (2025-09-29, CWE-829)
- Populated via direct curl when refresh-cve-metadata.py's Python urlopen
hung on CISA's HTTP/2 endpoint for ~55 min — same data, different
transport.
dirtydecrypt module bug fix:
- dd_detect() was wrongly gating 'predates the bug' on kernel < 7.0
- Per NVD CVE-2026-31635: bug entered at 6.16.1 stable; vulnerable
through 6.18.22 / 6.19.12 / 7.0-rc7; fixed at 6.18.23 / 6.19.13 / 7.0
- Fix: predates-gate now uses 6.16.1; patched_branches[] adds {6,18,23}
- Re-verified: dirtydecrypt now correctly returns VULNERABLE on mainline
6.19.7 instead of OK. Previously a false negative on real vulnerable
kernels.
Footer goes from '10 in CISA KEV' to '12 in CISA KEV'. Verified count
stays at 28 but dirtydecrypt's record is now a TRUE VULNERABLE match
(was OK match).
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e4a600fef2 |
module metadata: CWE + ATT&CK + CISA KEV triage from federal sources
Adds per-CVE triage annotations that turn SKELETONKEY's JSON output
into something a SIEM/CTI/threat-intel pipeline can route on, and a
KEV badge in --list so operators see at-a-glance which modules
cover actively-exploited bugs.
New tool — tools/refresh-cve-metadata.py:
- Discovers CVEs by scanning modules/<dir>/ (no hardcoded list).
- Fetches CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
(https://www.cisa.gov/.../known_exploited_vulnerabilities.csv).
- Fetches CWE classifications from NVD's CVE API 2.0
(services.nvd.nist.gov), throttled to the anonymous
5-req/30s limit (~3 minutes for 26 CVEs).
- Hand-curated ATT&CK technique mapping (T1068 default; T1611 for
container escapes, T1082 for kernel info leaks — MITRE doesn't
publish a clean CVE→technique feed).
- Generates three outputs:
docs/CVE_METADATA.json machine-readable, drift-checkable
docs/KEV_CROSSREF.md human-readable table
core/cve_metadata.c auto-generated lookup table
- --check mode diffs the committed JSON against a fresh fetch for
CI drift detection.
New core API — core/cve_metadata.{h,c}:
struct cve_metadata { cve, cwe, attack_technique, attack_subtechnique,
in_kev, kev_date_added };
const struct cve_metadata *cve_metadata_lookup(const char *cve);
Lookup keyed by CVE id, not module name — the metadata is properties
of the CVE (two modules covering the same bug see the same metadata).
The opsec_notes field stays on the module struct because exploit
technique varies per-module (different footprints).
Output surfacing:
- --list: new KEV column shows ★ for KEV-listed CVEs.
- --module-info (text): prints cwe / att&ck / 'in CISA KEV: YES (added
YYYY-MM-DD)' between summary and operations.
- --module-info / --scan (JSON): emits a 'triage' subobject with the
full record, plus an 'opsec_notes' field at top level when set.
Initial snapshot:
- 10 of 26 modules cover KEV-listed CVEs (dirty_cow, dirty_pipe,
pwnkit, sudo_samedit, ptrace_traceme, fuse_legacy, nf_tables,
overlayfs, overlayfs_setuid, netfilter_xtcompat).
- 24 of 26 have NVD CWE mappings; 2 unmapped (NVD has no weakness
record for CVE-2019-13272 and CVE-2026-46300 yet).
- All 26 mapped to an ATT&CK technique.
Verification:
- macOS local: 33 kernel_range + clean build, --module-info shows
'in CISA KEV: YES (added 2024-05-30)' for nf_tables, --list KEV
column renders.
- Linux (docker gcc:latest): 33 + 54 = 87 passes, 0 fails.
Follow-up commits will add per-module OPSEC notes and --explain mode.
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