ptrace_traceme: working CVE-2019-13272 exploit — lands real root (x86_64)
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The bundled sequence had the mechanism backwards (it PTRACE_ATTACHed the
now-root parent) and never rooted anything. Replaced it with the proven Jann
Horn (Project Zero #1903) / bcoles technique:

  - a "middle" process execs setuid pkexec (euid 0 for a window);
  - its child spins until it sees middle is euid 0, calls PTRACE_TRACEME
    (recording middle's ROOT creds as ptracer_cred — the bug), then execs
    pkexec itself. The traced setuid exec is NOT degraded because ptracer_cred
    is root, so the child becomes real root, still traced;
  - staged execveat() self-re-exec injects the payload as root.

The staged self-re-exec needs the exploit to exist as its own binary with an
argv[0] stage dispatcher, so the proven PoC is embedded verbatim
(ptrace_helper_src.h — only spawn_shell() changed, to plant a root-owned proof
+ setuid bash instead of only an interactive shell), compiled on the target at
runtime with unique -DSK_PROOF/-DSK_ROOTBASH paths, run, and verified by
stat()'ing the root-owned artifacts (never self-report).

Verified out-of-band on Ubuntu 18.04.0 / 4.15.0-50: `skeletonkey --exploit
ptrace_traceme` as uid 1000 -> EXPLOIT_OK + a -rwsr-xr-x root:root bash.
Real-world precondition, honestly reported: pkexec must authorize an
auto-discovered implicit-active=yes helper, which needs an active local session
(desktop) or a permissive polkit policy; over inactive ssh it returns "Not
authorized" and the module reports EXPLOIT_FAIL with that diagnosis. Gated on a
C compiler + pkexec; x86_64 only (register-level injection). cleanup() removes
the artifacts. Unit harness green (33 + 115).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y
This commit is contained in:
KaraZajac
2026-07-23 22:14:19 -04:00
parent 1bdbe011b0
commit 635f7d2d24
4 changed files with 830 additions and 202 deletions
+2
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@@ -51,3 +51,5 @@
{"module":"sudoedit_editor","verified_at":"2026-07-24T00:00:00Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-25-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.0, sudo 1.9.9-1ubuntu2 + sudoers sudoedit grant","vm_box":"ubuntu2204-cloudimg/qemu-kvm","verified_kind":"exploit","exploit_result":"EXPLOIT_OK","root_witness":"uid=0(root) via su skel; /etc/passwd gained skel::0:0 (after 2 fixes: chdir / + helper basename match)","status":"root"}
{"module":"sudo_host","verified_at":"2026-07-24T00:00:00Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-25-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.0, sudo 1.9.9-1ubuntu2 + host-restricted sudoers rule","vm_box":"ubuntu2204-cloudimg/qemu-kvm","verified_kind":"exploit","exploit_result":"EXPLOIT_OK","root_witness":"uid=0(root) via sudo -h fakehost01; module works as shipped (needs host-restricted rule + resolvable host)","status":"root"}
{"module":"nf_tables","verified_at":"2026-07-24T00:00:00Z","host_kernel":"5.15.0-25-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 22.04.0","vm_box":"ubuntu2204-cloudimg/qemu-kvm","verified_kind":"exploit","exploit_result":"EXPLOIT_FAIL","root_witness":"none - offset resolver FIXED (env modprobe_path now resolves + finisher engages + pipapo arb-write fires), but the reconstructed double-free arb-write does not reliably land the write. Honest FAIL. Primitive needs slab-groom hardening.","status":"primitive_fires_no_root"}
{"module":"ptrace_traceme","verified_at":"2026-07-24T02:02:00Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-50-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.0","vm_box":"bionic-cloudimg/qemu-kvm","verified_kind":"reference_poc","exploit_result":"ROOT","root_witness":"out-of-band: uid=0(root) + root-owned setuid /tmp/rootbash written by injected shell. bcoles poc.c (pkexec + PTRACE_TRACEME + inject midpid). Kernel CONFIRMED vulnerable. Barrier was polkit authorization (active-session gate) — isolated via a permissive pkla for the backlight helper action; technique itself works.","status":"kernel_confirmed_technique_works_needs_module_port"}
{"module":"ptrace_traceme","verified_at":"2026-07-24T02:12:00Z","host_kernel":"4.15.0-50-generic","host_distro":"Ubuntu 18.04.0","vm_box":"bionic-cloudimg/qemu-kvm","verified_kind":"exploit","exploit_result":"EXPLOIT_OK","root_witness":"out-of-band: skeletonkey --exploit ptrace_traceme (as uid 1000) planted root-owned /tmp/.sk-ptrace-<pid>.proof and a -rwsr-xr-x root:root setuid bash. Ported the proven Jann Horn/bcoles PoC (embedded, runtime-compiled). Precondition: active local session / permissive polkit so pkexec authorizes the helper (isolated via pkla on the headless VM).","status":"working"}