docs: nf_tables (CVE-2024-1086) kernel confirmed vulnerable; module gap scoped

Ran the full methodology on the flagship kernel primitive:
- Built Notselwyn's public universal PoC on jammy 5.15.0-25 (below patched
  branch 5.15.149) and ran it: hit the deliberate post-root `kernel BUG at
  mm/slub.c:379` / panic — the cross-cache slab corruption fired. Kernel is
  genuinely exploitable.
- Diffed technique: the module is an honest trigger+groom SCAFFOLD (real
  NFT_GOTO+NFT_DROP double-free + msg_msg cg-96 groom) whose pipapo arb-write is
  FALLBACK-DEPTH (exact pipapo_elem layout is a documented TODO) -> honest
  EXPLOIT_FAIL. Notselwyn uses a heavier universal cross-cache -> dirty-pagetable
  technique (~2000 LOC, multi-file, static libnftnl/libmnl, no per-kernel
  offsets). Completing the module's full-chain is substantial dedicated
  exploit-dev, not a spot-the-bug fix.

The piece that was actually broken and is now fixed+pushed is the offset
resolver (cd9bea6): env-provided offsets were wiped under kptr_restrict, which
blocked the entire --full-chain path. Recorded in docs/EXPLOITED.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0118iUgHY44hdRtANgyCmu7y

docs/EXPLOITED.md

@@ -88,14 +88,50 @@ tamper check).
 |---|---|---|
 | `dirty_pipe` | CVE-2022-0847 | Ubuntu 22.04.0's 5.15.0-25.25 almost certainly carries the backported fix (USN-5317); `detect()` is version-only so says VULNERABLE. Needs a genuinely pre-fix kernel (e.g. 5.13.0-19, or mainline 5.16.10) to verify the exploit. |
 
-## Not yet exploit-tested (the bulk — ~30 modules)
+## Kernel primitives — offset path fixed; `nf_tables` gap scoped (this session)
 
-- **🟡 kernel primitives** (`nf_tables`, `nft_set_uaf`, `nft_payload`,
-  `nft_fwd_dup`, `netfilter_xtcompat`, `af_packet`, `af_packet2`, `af_unix_gc`,
-  `cls_route4`, `fuse_legacy`, `stackrot`, `sequoia`, `nft_pipapo`, `vsock_uaf`,
-  `pintheft`): return `EXPLOIT_FAIL` by design; landing root needs a per-kernel
-  `--dump-offsets` + `--full-chain` (modprobe_path finisher) pass on a vulnerable
-  kernel.
+**Resolver bug fixed (`core/offsets.c`, commit `cd9bea6`).** The documented
+env-var offset override (`SKELETONKEY_MODPROBE_PATH` etc.) was **silently wiped on
+every default host**: `parse_symfile` reads `/proc/kallsyms`, which returns
+all-zero addresses under `kptr_restrict`, and then *unconditionally* zeroed
+`modprobe_path`/`init_task` — clobbering the values `apply_env` had just set. Net
+effect: every `--full-chain` primitive reported "offsets couldn't be resolved"
+even with correct offsets supplied. Now the all-zero path only clears fields it
+tagged `OFFSETS_FROM_KALLSYMS` itself. **This was the blocker for the entire
+primitive full-chain path.** Verified fixed on Ubuntu 22.04.0 / 5.15.0-25:
+`--full-chain` now prints `modprobe_path=0x… (env)`, the finisher engages, and the
+arb-write fires.
+
+**`nf_tables` (CVE-2024-1086) — kernel CONFIRMED vulnerable; module gap scoped.**
+Followed the full methodology (test → confirm kernel → pull PoC → diff):
+- **Kernel is genuinely vulnerable.** Built Notselwyn's public universal PoC
+  (`github.com/Notselwyn/CVE-2024-1086`, musl-static) on jammy 5.15.0-25 (below the
+  patched branch 5.15.149) and ran it: it drove the exploit and hit the deliberate
+  post-exploitation `kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:379` / `Kernel panic` — i.e. the
+  cross-cache slab corruption fired. Kernel confirmed exploitable.
+- **The difference.** The module (its own header is honest about this) is a
+  **trigger + groom scaffold**: it builds the `NFT_GOTO+NFT_DROP` verdict combo
+  that `nft_verdict_init()` fails to reject, fires the double-free, and runs the
+  `msg_msg` cg-96 groom — all real. But its arb-write is "FALLBACK-DEPTH": the
+  exact `pipapo_elem` layout + value-pointer offset needed to redirect the write
+  at `modprobe_path` is a documented TODO, so the write doesn't land → honest
+  `EXPLOIT_FAIL`. Notselwyn's working exploit uses a *different, heavier* technique
+  entirely — **universal cross-cache → dirty-pagetable** (arbitrary physical R/W,
+  no per-kernel offsets), ~2000 LOC across multiple files with static
+  `libnftnl`/`libmnl`.
+- **Scope of the remaining fix.** Making `nf_tables --full-chain` land root means
+  either (a) completing the module's own per-kernel `pipapo_elem` arb-write layout,
+  or (b) porting Notselwyn's universal technique. Both are substantial dedicated
+  exploit-dev — this is the hardest module in the corpus, not a spot-the-bug fix.
+  The offset resolver (above) is the piece that was actually broken and is now
+  fixed + pushed.
+
+- **Other 🟡 kernel primitives** (`nft_set_uaf`, `nft_payload`, `nft_fwd_dup`,
+  `netfilter_xtcompat`, `af_packet`, `af_packet2`, `af_unix_gc`, `cls_route4`,
+  `fuse_legacy`, `stackrot`, `sequoia`, `nft_pipapo`, `vsock_uaf`, `pintheft`):
+  same shape — real trigger/groom scaffolds returning `EXPLOIT_FAIL` by design.
+  The resolver fix unblocks feeding them offsets; each still needs its arb-write
+  primitive completed against a matching vulnerable kernel.
 - **Structural userspace** (`sudoedit_editor`, `sudo_chwoot`, `sudo_host`):
   need specific sudo versions + sudoers config; likely tractable.
 - **2026 CVEs** (`copy_fail` ×5, `dirtydecrypt`, `fragnesia`, `cifswitch`,