From bb39a28009dc81f54df8913b855b2c7fde4007c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Church of Malware <3+ek0ms@noreply.git.churchofmalware.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 16:44:37 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Upload files to "ghidra-12.1.2-rce-ace-calc-poc/docs"

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+# Classification
+
+## Closest Verified ACE
+
+**Swift demangler analyzer path, conditional.**
+
+The execution sink is a native process launch of a configured Swift demangler
+tool. The condition is that analysis reaches the Swift demangler path and the
+Swift tool directory resolves to attacker-controlled executable content.
+
+This is ACE because the execution is local to the Ghidra user context and does
+not require a remote channel.
+
+## Closest Verified RCE
+
+**TraceRMI debugger-agent channel, conditional.**
+
+The execution sinks are debugger-agent methods that call debugger command
+interpreters or Python evaluation paths. The condition is that an untrusted peer
+can drive an already created TraceRMI control channel, or can cause an agent to
+connect to an untrusted controller.
+
+This is RCE in that condition because the command originates across a
+debugger/IPC boundary and executes in the debugger-agent context.
+
+## Closest Default-Reachable RCE-Class Surface
+
+**SevenZipJBinding native parser exposure, not verified code execution.**
+
+Archive bytes can reach native 7-Zip parsing code inside the Ghidra JVM. That
+is an RCE-class parser surface, but this repository does not claim a
+Ghidra-specific calc exploit for it.
+