Files
incredigo/internal/browserrot/sidecar/index.js
T
leetcrypt c2f08d1a21 browserrot: Node stealth sidecar + AI self-heal (M-B1..M-B3, LIVE-VM)
Extends the Phase A-tier-1 site-side rotation engine with an optional Node
browser-sidecar and a deterministic self-heal tier, all proven LIVE-VM against
the local lab change-password form. go-rod stays the default; the sidecar is a
swap-in Driver behind the same Session/Driver/Rotator interfaces — no spine
change, backup + verify-new-before-revoke-old + proof gates all apply unchanged.

M-B1 sidecar parity: internal/browserrot/sidecar/ (index.js JSON-RPC over stdio,
  patchright real-fingerprint Chromium, playwright-core fallback) + sidecar.go
  Driver/Session. A shared test harness runs go-rod and the sidecar through the
  identical live rotation proof.
M-B2 stealth: patchright removes navigator.webdriver; humanized input (Bezier
  mouse paths + per-key typing jitter, no ML trajectory generation per plan §5).
M-B3 self-heal: Healer interface + heal-retry fill/click/text wrappers; on a
  rotted selector, heal.js relocates the field from DOM structure ONLY (never a
  value) and the engine rewrites + persists the recipe (recipes.go RecipeBook)
  so the next run is Tier-1 again. Deterministic heuristic is the proven Tier-2;
  Stagehand LLM strategy is opt-in + UNPROVEN. Leak-check asserts no secret ever
  reaches a heal request (redacted IPC transcript).

Secret seam documented honestly: fill carries base64 secret bytes across exactly
one local stdio boundary, typed and wiped, never logged/persisted/sent to a
model. MFA/CAPTCHA still degrade to the human worklist (Hard Rule 5).

14 tests green, -race clean; lab/lab-provision-browserrot.sh proves both drivers.
M-B4 (first REAL self-owned site) deliberately NOT started — needs per-credential
authorization (safe-candidate ladder).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 08:51:28 -07:00

247 lines
10 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
// incredigo browserrot Node sidecar.
//
// A single sidecar process == a single browser Session (one browser, one page),
// spawned and torn down by the Go side (internal/browserrot/sidecar.go). It speaks
// newline-delimited JSON-RPC over stdio:
//
// stdin <- {"id":N,"method":"open|goto|fill|click|text|heal|close","params":{...}}
// stdout -> {"id":N,"result":{...}} | {"id":N,"error":"message"}
//
// HARD RULES honored here (mirror the Go engine + CLAUDE.md):
// * Secrets arrive base64-encoded in `fill.params.secret` and cross exactly ONE local
// process boundary. They are decoded, typed into a field, and dropped. They are
// NEVER logged, NEVER written to disk, NEVER put in a heal/act request to a model.
// * stdout carries ONLY JSON-RPC frames. All diagnostics go to stderr. A secret value
// is never emitted on either stream.
// * MFA/CAPTCHA are not bypassed here: on a challenge the success marker simply won't
// match and the Go engine keeps the old secret (see browserrot.go Rotate).
'use strict';
// ---- driver loading: patchright (real fingerprint) preferred, playwright-core fallback.
function loadChromium() {
try {
const pw = require('patchright');
return { chromium: pw.chromium, driver: 'patchright' };
} catch (_) {
const pw = require('playwright-core');
return { chromium: pw.chromium, driver: 'playwright-core' };
}
}
function log(...a) { process.stderr.write('[sidecar] ' + a.join(' ') + '\n'); }
// ---- humanized input (M-B2). Deliberately simple: randomized per-key delay, a short
// pre-action settle, and a plain cubic-Bézier mouse path to the target before a click.
// NO ML trajectory generation (BROWSERROT-PLAN §5 — DMTG discriminators make learned
// trajectories *more* detectable; plain Bézier+jitter is the right call for a self-login).
function jitter(min, max) { return min + Math.floor(Math.random() * (max - min)); }
async function settle(page) { await page.waitForTimeout(jitter(40, 140)); }
// bezierMove walks the mouse from its last position to (x,y) along a cubic Bézier with
// two randomized control points, in a handful of jittered steps.
async function bezierMove(page, x, y) {
const start = bezierMove._last || { x: jitter(0, 60), y: jitter(0, 60) };
const c1 = { x: start.x + (x - start.x) * 0.3 + jitter(-40, 40), y: start.y + (y - start.y) * 0.3 + jitter(-40, 40) };
const c2 = { x: start.x + (x - start.x) * 0.7 + jitter(-40, 40), y: start.y + (y - start.y) * 0.7 + jitter(-40, 40) };
const steps = jitter(14, 26);
for (let i = 1; i <= steps; i++) {
const t = i / steps, mt = 1 - t;
const px = mt*mt*mt*start.x + 3*mt*mt*t*c1.x + 3*mt*t*t*c2.x + t*t*t*x;
const py = mt*mt*mt*start.y + 3*mt*mt*t*c1.y + 3*mt*t*t*c2.y + t*t*t*y;
await page.mouse.move(px, py);
await page.waitForTimeout(jitter(4, 16));
}
bezierMove._last = { x, y };
}
// humanClick moves along a Bézier path into a random point inside the element, then clicks.
async function humanClick(page, loc) {
const box = await loc.boundingBox();
if (box) {
await bezierMove(page, box.x + box.width * (0.3 + Math.random() * 0.4),
box.y + box.height * (0.3 + Math.random() * 0.4));
}
await loc.click();
}
class SidecarSession {
constructor() {
this.browser = null;
this.context = null;
this.page = null;
this.driver = null;
this.stealth = false;
this.timeoutMs = 30000;
}
async open(params) {
const { chromium, driver } = loadChromium();
this.driver = driver;
this.stealth = !!params.stealth;
if (params.timeoutMs) this.timeoutMs = params.timeoutMs;
const launchOpts = {
headless: params.headless !== false,
args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage'],
};
if (params.executablePath) launchOpts.executablePath = params.executablePath;
this.browser = await chromium.launch(launchOpts);
// A fresh context per session == fresh profile, so no cookies/state leak between
// accounts (parity with go-rod's fresh-browser-per-Open).
this.context = await this.browser.newContext();
this.page = await this.context.newPage();
// Navigation gets the full budget; element LOCATION gets a shorter one so a rotted
// selector fails fast and Tier-2 heal kicks in promptly (rather than blocking the whole
// per-op timeout). Configurable for slow SPAs.
this.locateMs = params.locateTimeoutMs || Math.min(this.timeoutMs, 8000);
this.page.setDefaultNavigationTimeout(this.timeoutMs);
this.page.setDefaultTimeout(this.locateMs);
return { ok: true, driver: this.driver, stealth: this.stealth };
}
async goto(params) {
await this.page.goto(params.url, { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' });
await this.page.waitForLoadState('networkidle').catch(() => {});
return { finalURL: this.page.url() };
}
async fill(params) {
// secret is base64 to survive JSON transport intact and to mark it as sensitive.
const secret = Buffer.from(params.secret || '', 'base64');
const loc = this.page.locator(params.selector).first();
await loc.waitFor({ state: 'visible' });
await settle(this.page);
if (this.stealth) {
// paced, per-key typing — looks human and satisfies JS-validated forms.
await humanClick(this.page, loc);
await loc.fill(''); // clear
await loc.pressSequentially(secret.toString('utf8'), { delay: jitter(35, 110) });
} else {
await loc.fill(secret.toString('utf8'));
}
secret.fill(0); // best-effort wipe of the decoded buffer
return { ok: true };
}
async click(params) {
const loc = this.page.locator(params.selector).first();
await loc.waitFor({ state: 'visible' });
await settle(this.page);
if (this.stealth) { await humanClick(this.page, loc); } else { await loc.click(); }
return { ok: true };
}
// probe returns a snapshot of common automation-detection signals so a test can assert
// the stealth posture (e.g. navigator.webdriver absent under patchright). It reads only
// page globals — no secret is involved.
async probe() {
const sig = await this.page.evaluate(() => ({
webdriver: navigator.webdriver === true,
hasChrome: !!window.chrome,
plugins: navigator.plugins.length,
languages: (navigator.languages || []).join(','),
headlessUA: /Headless/.test(navigator.userAgent),
}));
return { driver: this.driver, signals: sig };
}
async text(params) {
const loc = this.page.locator(params.selector).first();
await loc.waitFor({ state: 'visible' });
return { text: (await loc.textContent()) || '' };
}
// heal (Tier-2, M-B3): relocate a field by natural-language description. Receives ONLY
// a description + sanitized DOM structure — never a secret. Wired to Stagehand when
// available; otherwise reports unavailable so the Go engine fails closed.
async heal(params) {
return healField(this.page, params);
}
async close() {
try { if (this.context) await this.context.close(); } catch (_) {}
try { if (this.browser) await this.browser.close(); } catch (_) {}
return { ok: true };
}
}
// healField is defined in heal.js so Stagehand stays an optional dependency.
let healField;
try {
healField = require('./heal.js').healField;
} catch (_) {
healField = async () => { throw new Error('heal unavailable: install @browserbasehq/stagehand and set an LLM key'); };
}
// ---- JSON-RPC dispatch loop over stdio -------------------------------------------
const session = new SidecarSession();
async function dispatch(msg) {
const { id, method, params } = msg;
try {
let result;
switch (method) {
case 'open': result = await session.open(params || {}); break;
case 'goto': result = await session.goto(params || {}); break;
case 'fill': result = await session.fill(params || {}); break;
case 'click': result = await session.click(params || {}); break;
case 'text': result = await session.text(params || {}); break;
case 'probe': result = await session.probe(params || {}); break;
case 'heal': result = await session.heal(params || {}); break;
case 'close': result = await session.close(params || {}); break;
default: throw new Error('unknown method: ' + method);
}
reply({ id, result });
} catch (err) {
// err.message must never contain a secret: fill()/click() only ever surface the
// selector, and secret bytes live only in the local `secret` buffer above.
reply({ id, error: String((err && err.message) || err) });
if (method === 'close') process.exit(0);
}
if (method === 'close') process.exit(0);
}
function reply(obj) { process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(obj) + '\n'); }
// Optional REDACTED transcript (tests/audit only; off unless INCREDIGO_SIDECAR_TRANSCRIPT
// is set). It records method + params with any `secret` field replaced by a byte-count
// placeholder, so a leak test can prove heal requests carry no secret WITHOUT ever writing
// a real secret to disk (hard rule 3).
const fs = require('fs');
const TRANSCRIPT = process.env.INCREDIGO_SIDECAR_TRANSCRIPT || '';
function record(msg) {
if (!TRANSCRIPT) return;
const redacted = { id: msg.id, method: msg.method, params: {} };
const p = msg.params || {};
for (const k of Object.keys(p)) {
redacted.params[k] = (k === 'secret')
? '<redacted ' + Buffer.from(String(p[k]), 'base64').length + 'b>'
: p[k];
}
try { fs.appendFileSync(TRANSCRIPT, JSON.stringify(redacted) + '\n'); } catch (_) {}
}
let buf = '';
process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
process.stdin.on('data', (chunk) => {
buf += chunk;
let nl;
while ((nl = buf.indexOf('\n')) >= 0) {
const line = buf.slice(0, nl).trim();
buf = buf.slice(nl + 1);
if (!line) continue;
let msg;
try { msg = JSON.parse(line); } catch (e) { log('bad JSON frame:', e.message); continue; }
record(msg);
dispatch(msg);
}
});
process.stdin.on('end', async () => { await session.close().catch(() => {}); process.exit(0); });
process.on('uncaughtException', (e) => { log('uncaught:', e.message); });
process.on('unhandledRejection', (e) => { log('unhandled:', (e && e.message) || e); });
log('ready');