Extends the Phase A-tier-1 site-side rotation engine with an optional Node browser-sidecar and a deterministic self-heal tier, all proven LIVE-VM against the local lab change-password form. go-rod stays the default; the sidecar is a swap-in Driver behind the same Session/Driver/Rotator interfaces — no spine change, backup + verify-new-before-revoke-old + proof gates all apply unchanged. M-B1 sidecar parity: internal/browserrot/sidecar/ (index.js JSON-RPC over stdio, patchright real-fingerprint Chromium, playwright-core fallback) + sidecar.go Driver/Session. A shared test harness runs go-rod and the sidecar through the identical live rotation proof. M-B2 stealth: patchright removes navigator.webdriver; humanized input (Bezier mouse paths + per-key typing jitter, no ML trajectory generation per plan §5). M-B3 self-heal: Healer interface + heal-retry fill/click/text wrappers; on a rotted selector, heal.js relocates the field from DOM structure ONLY (never a value) and the engine rewrites + persists the recipe (recipes.go RecipeBook) so the next run is Tier-1 again. Deterministic heuristic is the proven Tier-2; Stagehand LLM strategy is opt-in + UNPROVEN. Leak-check asserts no secret ever reaches a heal request (redacted IPC transcript). Secret seam documented honestly: fill carries base64 secret bytes across exactly one local stdio boundary, typed and wiped, never logged/persisted/sent to a model. MFA/CAPTCHA still degrade to the human worklist (Hard Rule 5). 14 tests green, -race clean; lab/lab-provision-browserrot.sh proves both drivers. M-B4 (first REAL self-owned site) deliberately NOT started — needs per-credential authorization (safe-candidate ladder). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
lab/ — reproduce the rotation proofs (FAKE creds only)
These scripts stand up real target software in a throwaway VM and drive
incredigo rotate --execute against fake credentials in an isolated gopass
store. They are how the LIVE-VM proof levels in
../internal/rotate/proofs.go /
../docs/ROTATION-PROOFS.md were earned, and let anyone
reproduce them from a clean machine.
Safety: every script uses
GNUPGHOME=$HOME/.lab-gnupg+GOPASS_HOMEDIR=$HOME/.lab-gopass(a no-protection throwaway key) and fake creds. Nothing here can touch a real gopass store or a real provider. Run them in a disposable VM anyway.
Quick start (Multipass, Ubuntu 24.04)
multipass launch 24.04 --name incredigo-sbx --disk 15G --memory 4G
# build a static binary and install it in the VM:
CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /tmp/incredigo ./cmd/incredigo
multipass transfer /tmp/incredigo incredigo-sbx:/home/ubuntu/incredigo
multipass exec incredigo-sbx -- sudo install -m755 /home/ubuntu/incredigo /usr/local/bin/incredigo
# install the real gopass release (NOT Ubuntu's apt 'gopass', which is a pass clone):
# https://github.com/gopasspw/gopass/releases -> /usr/local/bin/gopass
# copy the lab dir in and run a proof, e.g. postgres:
multipass transfer -r lab incredigo-sbx:/home/ubuntu/lab
multipass exec incredigo-sbx -- bash -lc 'cd lab && INCREDIGO_BIN=/usr/local/bin/incredigo bash lab-provision-pg.sh'
multipass exec incredigo-sbx -- bash -lc '
export GNUPGHOME=$HOME/.lab-gnupg GOPASS_HOMEDIR=$HOME/.lab-gopass
export INCREDIGO_PASSPHRASE=lab-seal-pass INCREDIGO_ALLOW_EXECUTE=1
incredigo rotate --execute --prefix imported/'
LIVE-VM provisioners (real target software)
| Script | Proves driver | Target |
|---|---|---|
lab-provision-pg.sh |
postgres |
real PostgreSQL |
lab-provision-dbclones.sh |
mysql, redis |
real MariaDB + redis-server (self-asserting cutover) |
lab-provision-wg.sh |
wireguard |
real wireguard-tools |
lab-provision-gitea.sh |
gitea |
real Gitea 1.25 (self-owned PAT) |
lab-provision-appsec.sh |
appsecret |
real local config files |
lab-provision-mongo.sh |
mongo |
real mongod/mongosh 8.0 |
lab-provision-k8s.sh |
k8s |
real k3s v1.35 |
MOCK-ONLY provisioners (emulator / mock — same code path, not the real provider)
| Script | Driver | Emulator |
|---|---|---|
lab-provision-aws.sh + lab-verify-aws.sh + moto-probe.py |
aws |
moto (mock AWS) |
Phase-B passwords engine POCs
| Script | Manager |
|---|---|
lab-provision-keepass.sh |
KeePassXC (keepassxc-cli) |
lab-provision-bitwarden.sh + vw-register.py |
Vaultwarden + bw CLI |
lab-provision-browsercsv.sh + csv-commit-probe.py |
Chrome/Firefox CSV (staging only) |
lab-provision-browserrot.sh |
Phase A-tier-1 site-side rotation engine (internal/browserrot) — real headless Chromium against a throwaway local change-password form (fake cred) |
tui-probe.py |
drives the guide Bubble Tea TUI under a pty |
Multi-reference blast-and-cutover (gitea)
| Script | Proves | Depends on |
|---|---|---|
lab-gitea-blast-vm.sh |
the gitea blast-and-cutover — one rotation rewrites the token in every on-disk reference in lockstep | lab-provision-gitea.sh (real local Gitea) |
lab-gitea-blast-vm.sh is the LIVE-VM proof for the cutover a real in-use Gitea PAT
needs: it embeds one seed token verbatim in three real-world reference shapes (a fake
~/.git-credentials line, an embedded git-remote URL in a repo .git/config, and a
tea config), stages a driver-ready blob carrying one ref=<file> per reference, runs
rotate --execute, then asserts every reference was rewritten old→new, the new token
is alive (200), the old is revoked (401), and the rewritten .git-credentials still
authenticates at the git transport (not 401). Ordering is the point: incredigo mints
the new token, proves it authenticates, then rewrites the refs, and revokes the old
one last — so a dead token is never written into a git config.
Run it after the provisioner:
multipass exec incredigo-sbx -- bash /home/ubuntu/lab/lab-provision-gitea.sh
multipass exec incredigo-sbx -- bash /home/ubuntu/lab/lab-gitea-blast-vm.sh # -> GITEA_BLAST_VM_OK
Two documented follow-ons (surfaced by this proof, not yet built):
- gopass-entry-sync — the same PAT also lives in other gopass entries; the driver rewrites only files named in
ref=, so a spine hook is needed to pass old+new token to a gopass-sweep step. Surface in the blast report; do not auto-rewrite yet.- token-scope-cloning — the driver mints the new token with fixed
write:user/read:userscopes; a token used for git operations needs its repo scopes preserved (clone the old token's scopes on create, like thesendgriddriver).
Custody / smoke
lab-rung1-appsecret-host.sh— safe-candidate ladder rung 1, the host dress rehearsal: the first end-to-end run of the realrotate --executespine on the host toolchain (real gopass, backup gate, audit, seal flow) against a throwaway scratch app (dummy.env+config.yml, fake secret). Walks dry-run → blast → execute → asserts the in-place cutover (old gone, one new value in both files, stored blob updated) → shows the old value is recoverable from the sealed backup. Isolated store, zero real-cred risk.appsecretstays LIVE-VM — a real-cred rotation is what earns LIVE-REAL. (ROADMAP M2 rung 1.)lab-restore-drill.sh— proves the sealed.agebackup is a real recovery path on the host against real gopass (isolated throwaway store, fake creds): seed → seal → destroy every entry →import→ assert byte-equal restoration + no plaintext in the bundle. The safety net for no-op-RevokeOlddrivers (e.g.appsecret), where the backup is the only rollback. Prerequisite for the first real rotation (ROADMAP M2).lab-store.sh— throwaway key + gopass store + fake.env/.aws/consumer files.lab-run.sh— scan→status→migrate→export→import→rotate --dry-run --blast→worklist.lab-harness.sh,incredigo-lab-setup.sh— older combined harness variants.
Notes carried over
- Ubuntu apt
gopassis the wrong tool (apassclone). Install gopasspw/gopass. - Multipass snap cannot read
/tmp— stage under$HOMEbeforemultipass transfer. rotate --prefixmust be theimported/root (source = first path segment after it).- Headless runs need
INCREDIGO_PASSPHRASE(seal/backup passphrase, separate from GPG).