incredigo/CLAUDE.md

incredigo — project directive for Claude sessions

incredigo is a local-first, encrypted, RAM-only credential custody tool (Go). The folder is still named credrot/; the module/binary are incredigo.

Read this first, then DESIGN.md (architecture + threat model) and — if present locally — docs/ROTATION.md (rotation design; gitignored, shared individually, not on the upstream repo).

North-star goal

A user or organization can rotate their credentials with one tool, two modes:

• Mode A — rotate what's already in gopass.
• Mode B — ingest creds first (scanners / --path / browser CSV), then rotate.

Both must run interactively or fully headless ($INCREDIGO_PASSPHRASE, no TTY): do the automatable rotations unattended, and emit a guided worklist (+ links) for the credentials that legitimately require a human. See docs/ROTATION.md Part II.

Where development is (2026-06-15)

• v1 shipped: discover → migrate → expiry → sealed export/import. 8 scanners (aws, env, netrc, ssh, docker, kube, git, file/--path); sealers age (default), hmac, openssl. Tests green, -race clean.
• Rotation: design + safety-spine only. internal/rotate has the Rotator interface, the mandatory backup gate (Snapshot), and a dry-run incredigo rotate. Zero rotation drivers exist; --execute is refused. Nothing changes a credential at any service yet — keep it that way until explicitly authorized.

Hard rules (do not violate — this tool holds real credentials)

1. Backup before rotate, always. No rotation may run unless rotate.Snapshot has produced a verified sealed backup of the affected entries first. The gate aborts the run on any backup/verify failure. This is non-negotiable.
2. Verify-new-before-revoke-old. Order: backup → rotate → verify the new secret authenticates → store in gopass → re-read → only then revoke the old. Never gopass rm an old value before the new one is proven (SSH/DB = lockout risk).
3. No plaintext secrets on disk. Ever. Secrets live only in the memguard vault and stream as bytes. Browser passwords → worklist of non-secret metadata (site, username, change-URL), never a .txt password dump. Raw export is a loudly-warned, flag-gated opt-in only.
4. gopass test isolation = GOPASS_HOMEDIR, NOT PASSWORD_STORE_DIR. gopass ignores PASSWORD_STORE_DIR; gopass init --path … repoints the user's real root mount and breaks their store. Always isolate tests with export GOPASS_HOMEDIR=$(mktemp -d) + a throwaway GNUPGHOME. Better: unit-test against a fake gopass binary via sink.Gopass{Bin: …} (see internal/sink/bundle_test.go, internal/rotate/backup_test.go).
5. Do no harm / self-owned only. Browser automation targets only the user's own accounts, with their authorization. Never bypass MFA/CAPTCHA — hand off to the human. Nothing here may resemble credential stuffing or account takeover.
6. Dry-run by default; destructive steps are opt-in, audited, reversible. The redacted audit log records every action. Computer-use/vision automation must inject secrets locally and never stream them into the model loop.
7. The PGP passphrase is the root of trust. It unlocks every gopass secret. The TUI and docs MUST warn prominently: lose it → everything is unrecoverable; leak it → everything is exposed. Tell users to back up the GPG key and use a strong passphrase. Treat this warning as a required UX element, not optional.

Build / test / run

go build ./...            # green required before commit
go vet ./...
go test ./...             # all packages; -race clean on vault/sink/rotate
go build -o /tmp/incredigo ./cmd/incredigo

Never run incredigo migrate/export/rotate against the user's real gopass to "test" — use an isolated GOPASS_HOMEDIR (rule 4).

Architecture

cmd/incredigo        cobra CLI: scan|migrate|status|export|import|rotate
internal/vault       memguard arena (mlock/DONTDUMP, zeroize, handles)
internal/discover    Scanner registry + one file per source
internal/sink        gopass streaming, bundle framing, Sealer (age/hmac/openssl)
internal/policy      expiry engine
internal/audit       redacted append-only JSONL
internal/rotate      Rotator interface + MANDATORY backup gate (no drivers yet)

Extension points stay one-file-each: a Scanner, a Sealer, a Rotator. Drivers and the backup gate live in Go; the AI router + browser long-tail belong in a skill/MCP layer on top (do not put an LLM in the deterministic destructive hot path).

Chosen stack (2026 research, see ROTATION.md §13)

• TUI: Charm Bubble Tea + Bubbles + Lipgloss (masked input via textinput).
• Browser automation: go-rod (default) → playwright-go (reliability) → Anthropic Computer Use (vision fallback, secrets kept out of the loop).
• Per-site links: .well-known/change-password (RFC 8615) + a curated table.

Conventions

• Match surrounding Go style; comment the why for any security-relevant choice.
• New code ships with tests (table-driven scanners; leak-checks asserting no secret substring reaches Identity/Meta/logs).
• Commits: end messages with the Co-Authored-By: Claude … trailer. Push only when asked. Remote is gitea only, never GitHub (https://100.117.177.50:3030/trill-technician/incredigo).
• Design docs (docs/ROTATION.md) are kept local/gitignored by request; DESIGN.md, README.md, docs/SECURITY.md, docs/ADDING_A_SCANNER.md are tracked.