59af53dcc0
Implements the Rotator interface across all four rotation patterns, each a self-contained one-file driver self-registering via init(): in-place DB password postgres, mysql (3-stmt unprivileged fallback), redis local keypair + propagate sshkey (ed25519), wireguard (clamped curve25519) provider-API token gitea PAT, mullvad device key cloud-key self-identifying aws IAM access key (hand-rolled SigV4, no SDK dep) Spine (execute.go) enforces Hard Rule #2: backup -> rotate -> verify(new) -> store -> re-read+verify -> revoke-old; dryrun.go keeps --execute gated. Each driver ships a table-driven test proving real cutover (old secret stops authenticating) and asserting no secret substring leaks to argv/Meta/errors. Promotes golang.org/x/crypto to a direct dependency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
164 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
164 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
package rotate
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"strings"
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"incredigo/internal/discover"
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"incredigo/internal/vault"
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)
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// Redis rotates a Redis instance's password in place, the same in-place pattern as
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// Postgres/MySQL. The credential's secret is a redis URL
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// ("redis://:pw@host:port" or "redis://user:pw@host:port/db"); rotation mints a new
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// password and runs
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//
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// CONFIG SET requirepass <newpw>
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//
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// over the OLD (authenticated) connection. CONFIG SET is itself the cutover — the
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// old password stops authenticating new connections immediately — so RevokeOld is a
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// no-op and the §3 sealed backup is the recovery path (see docs/ROTATION.md §17).
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//
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// SECURITY: the OLD password reaches redis-cli only via the REDISCLI_AUTH
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// *environment* variable (never argv, never disk). The command — which carries the
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// NEW password — is fed on stdin so the new password never appears in the process
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// argument list. The new password is hex ([0-9a-f]) so it needs no quoting and
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// cannot inject extra tokens. Captured output is scrubbed of the new password
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// before any error surfaces.
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//
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// NOTE: this rotates the legacy single `requirepass` secret (the default-user
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// password), which is the form vibe coders actually leak in REDIS_URL. ACL-user
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// rotation (`ACL SETUSER`) is a separate future surface.
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type Redis struct {
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Bin string // redis-cli binary; defaults to "redis-cli"
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}
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// init registers the driver. Registration only makes it available; changing a
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// credential still requires `rotate --execute` AND INCREDIGO_ALLOW_EXECUTE=1.
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func init() { Register(&Redis{}) }
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// Name identifies the driver in plans and audit records.
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func (r *Redis) Name() string { return "redis" }
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// Detect claims credentials a redis scanner/seed emitted (Source == "redis").
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func (r *Redis) Detect(c discover.Credential) bool { return c.Source == "redis" }
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func (r *Redis) bin() string {
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if r.Bin != "" {
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return r.Bin
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}
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return "redis-cli"
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}
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// Rotate mints a new password, applies it via CONFIG SET requirepass over the
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// existing (old) connection, and returns a vault handle to the rebuilt URL.
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func (r *Redis) Rotate(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) (*vault.Handle, error) {
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u, err := openRedisURL(v, c.Secret)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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oldPw, _ := u.User.Password()
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newPw, err := genHex(24)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if _, err := r.redis(ctx, u, oldPw, "CONFIG SET requirepass "+newPw, newPw); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("redis: CONFIG SET requirepass: %w", err)
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}
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nu := *u
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nu.User = url.UserPassword(u.User.Username(), newPw)
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return v.Store([]byte(nu.String())), nil
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}
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// Verify proves the freshly minted URL authenticates by issuing PING with the new
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// password.
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func (r *Redis) Verify(ctx context.Context, newSecret *vault.Handle, v *vault.Vault) error {
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u, err := openRedisURL(v, newSecret)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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pw, _ := u.User.Password()
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out, err := r.redis(ctx, u, pw, "PING", pw)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("redis verify: %w", err)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(out, "PONG") {
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return fmt.Errorf("redis verify: unexpected result")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// RevokeOld is a no-op for an in-place engine: the CONFIG SET in Rotate already
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// invalidated the previous password. Defined to satisfy the safety-spine ordering.
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func (r *Redis) RevokeOld(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) error {
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return nil
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}
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// redis runs one command against the URL's host/port, authenticating via
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// REDISCLI_AUTH and feeding the command on stdin (keeping any secret out of argv).
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// redact, if non-empty, is scrubbed from captured output before it can reach an
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// error string.
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func (r *Redis) redis(ctx context.Context, u *url.URL, password, command, redact string) (string, error) {
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host := u.Hostname()
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port := u.Port()
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if port == "" {
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port = "6379"
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}
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args := []string{"--no-raw", "-h", host, "-p", port}
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if db := strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/"); db != "" {
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args = append(args, "-n", db)
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}
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if user := u.User.Username(); user != "" {
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args = append(args, "--user", user)
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}
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, r.bin(), args...)
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cmd.Env = os.Environ()
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if password != "" {
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cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "REDISCLI_AUTH="+password)
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}
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cmd.Stdin = strings.NewReader(command + "\n")
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var out, errb bytes.Buffer
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cmd.Stdout = &out
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cmd.Stderr = &errb
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err := cmd.Run()
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so, se := out.String(), errb.String()
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if redact != "" {
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so = strings.ReplaceAll(so, redact, "***")
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se = strings.ReplaceAll(se, redact, "***")
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}
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// redis-cli prints server error replies as a "(error) ..." line on stdout and
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// often still exits 0 (auth/command failures included), so surface stdout that
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// looks like an error even when the process exits clean.
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if err == nil && strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(so), "(error)") {
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return so, fmt.Errorf("redis error: %s", strings.TrimSpace(so))
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}
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if err != nil {
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return so, fmt.Errorf("%v: %s", err, strings.TrimSpace(se+" "+so))
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}
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return so, nil
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}
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// openRedisURL reads a redis URL secret from the vault and parses it, accepting the
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// redis:// and rediss:// schemes. The URL string is transient and never persisted.
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func openRedisURL(v *vault.Vault, h *vault.Handle) (*url.URL, error) {
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buf, err := v.Open(h)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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u, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(string(buf.Bytes())))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("redis: parse url: %w", err)
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}
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if u.Scheme != "redis" && u.Scheme != "rediss" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("redis: unexpected url scheme %q", u.Scheme)
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}
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return u, nil
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}
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