59af53dcc0
Implements the Rotator interface across all four rotation patterns, each a self-contained one-file driver self-registering via init(): in-place DB password postgres, mysql (3-stmt unprivileged fallback), redis local keypair + propagate sshkey (ed25519), wireguard (clamped curve25519) provider-API token gitea PAT, mullvad device key cloud-key self-identifying aws IAM access key (hand-rolled SigV4, no SDK dep) Spine (execute.go) enforces Hard Rule #2: backup -> rotate -> verify(new) -> store -> re-read+verify -> revoke-old; dryrun.go keeps --execute gated. Each driver ships a table-driven test proving real cutover (old secret stops authenticating) and asserting no secret substring leaks to argv/Meta/errors. Promotes golang.org/x/crypto to a direct dependency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
177 lines
5.6 KiB
Go
177 lines
5.6 KiB
Go
package rotate
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"bytes"
|
|
"context"
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"encoding/hex"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"net/url"
|
|
"os"
|
|
"os/exec"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
|
|
"incredigo/internal/discover"
|
|
"incredigo/internal/vault"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Postgres rotates a PostgreSQL role password in place. The credential's secret
|
|
// is the full libpq DSN ("postgres://user:pw@host:port/db"); rotation mints a new
|
|
// password, runs ALTER USER over the OLD connection, and stores a rebuilt DSN.
|
|
//
|
|
// In-place engines have no separate "old credential" to retire: the ALTER itself
|
|
// invalidates the old password, so RevokeOld is a no-op and Verify runs
|
|
// immediately after the change (the §3 sealed backup is the recovery path). See
|
|
// docs/ROTATION.md §17.
|
|
//
|
|
// SECURITY: rotation is the one boundary where a secret must leave the vault to
|
|
// authenticate — here it goes to psql via the PGPASSWORD *environment* variable
|
|
// (never disk, never argv, never logged), and the SQL is fed on stdin so the new
|
|
// password never appears in the process argument list (visible via ps/proc). The
|
|
// transient DSN/password strings below are the unavoidable cost of talking to the
|
|
// driver; they are not written anywhere and stderr is redacted before surfacing.
|
|
type Postgres struct {
|
|
Bin string // psql binary; defaults to "psql"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// init registers the postgres driver (idiomatic database/sql-style self-register).
|
|
// Registration only makes the driver *available*; actually changing a credential
|
|
// still requires `rotate --execute` AND INCREDIGO_ALLOW_EXECUTE=1 (see main.go).
|
|
func init() { Register(&Postgres{}) }
|
|
|
|
// Name identifies the driver in plans and audit records.
|
|
func (p *Postgres) Name() string { return "postgres" }
|
|
|
|
// Detect claims credentials a postgres scanner/seed emitted (Source == "postgres").
|
|
func (p *Postgres) Detect(c discover.Credential) bool { return c.Source == "postgres" }
|
|
|
|
func (p *Postgres) bin() string {
|
|
if p.Bin != "" {
|
|
return p.Bin
|
|
}
|
|
return "psql"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Rotate mints a new role password, applies it via ALTER USER over the existing
|
|
// (old) connection, and returns a vault handle to the rebuilt DSN. It does not
|
|
// revoke anything — the in-place ALTER is itself the cutover.
|
|
func (p *Postgres) Rotate(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) (*vault.Handle, error) {
|
|
u, err := openDSN(v, c.Secret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
user := u.User.Username()
|
|
if user == "" {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("postgres: dsn has no user")
|
|
}
|
|
oldPw, _ := u.User.Password()
|
|
|
|
newPw, err := genHex(24)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// New password is hex ([0-9a-f]) so the single-quoted literal cannot break
|
|
// out of the statement; the identifier is double-quote escaped regardless.
|
|
sql := fmt.Sprintf("ALTER USER %s WITH PASSWORD '%s';", quoteIdent(user), newPw)
|
|
if _, err := p.psql(ctx, u, oldPw, sql, newPw); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("postgres: ALTER USER: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nu := *u
|
|
nu.User = url.UserPassword(user, newPw)
|
|
return v.Store([]byte(nu.String())), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify proves the freshly minted DSN authenticates by issuing SELECT 1 with the
|
|
// new password.
|
|
func (p *Postgres) Verify(ctx context.Context, newSecret *vault.Handle, v *vault.Vault) error {
|
|
u, err := openDSN(v, newSecret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
pw, _ := u.User.Password()
|
|
out, err := p.psql(ctx, u, pw, "SELECT 1;", pw)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("postgres verify: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(out, "1") {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("postgres verify: unexpected result")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeOld is a no-op for an in-place engine: the ALTER in Rotate already
|
|
// invalidated the previous password. Defined to satisfy the safety-spine ordering.
|
|
func (p *Postgres) RevokeOld(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) error {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// psql runs one SQL statement against the DSN's host/db as the DSN's user,
|
|
// authenticating with password via PGPASSWORD and feeding sql on stdin (keeping
|
|
// any secret out of argv). redact, if non-empty, is scrubbed from captured output
|
|
// before it can reach an error string.
|
|
func (p *Postgres) psql(ctx context.Context, u *url.URL, password, sql, redact string) (string, error) {
|
|
host := u.Hostname()
|
|
port := u.Port()
|
|
if port == "" {
|
|
port = "5432"
|
|
}
|
|
db := strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/")
|
|
if db == "" {
|
|
db = u.User.Username()
|
|
}
|
|
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, p.bin(),
|
|
"-v", "ON_ERROR_STOP=1", "-X", "-w",
|
|
"-h", host, "-p", port, "-U", u.User.Username(), "-d", db,
|
|
"-tA")
|
|
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "PGPASSWORD="+password)
|
|
cmd.Stdin = strings.NewReader(sql + "\n")
|
|
var out, errb bytes.Buffer
|
|
cmd.Stdout = &out
|
|
cmd.Stderr = &errb
|
|
err := cmd.Run()
|
|
so, se := out.String(), errb.String()
|
|
if redact != "" {
|
|
so = strings.ReplaceAll(so, redact, "***")
|
|
se = strings.ReplaceAll(se, redact, "***")
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return so, fmt.Errorf("%v: %s", err, strings.TrimSpace(se))
|
|
}
|
|
return so, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// openDSN reads a DSN secret from the vault and parses it, rejecting non-postgres
|
|
// schemes. The DSN string is transient and never persisted.
|
|
func openDSN(v *vault.Vault, h *vault.Handle) (*url.URL, error) {
|
|
buf, err := v.Open(h)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
u, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(string(buf.Bytes())))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("postgres: parse dsn: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if u.Scheme != "postgres" && u.Scheme != "postgresql" {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("postgres: unexpected dsn scheme %q", u.Scheme)
|
|
}
|
|
return u, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func genHex(n int) (string, error) {
|
|
b := make([]byte, n)
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
s := hex.EncodeToString(b)
|
|
for i := range b {
|
|
b[i] = 0
|
|
}
|
|
return s, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func quoteIdent(s string) string {
|
|
return `"` + strings.ReplaceAll(s, `"`, `""`) + `"`
|
|
}
|