Files
incredigo/internal/rotate/gitea.go
T
leetcrypt 59af53dcc0 rotate: nine rotation drivers + verify-before-revoke execute spine
Implements the Rotator interface across all four rotation patterns, each a
self-contained one-file driver self-registering via init():

  in-place DB password   postgres, mysql (3-stmt unprivileged fallback), redis
  local keypair + propagate  sshkey (ed25519), wireguard (clamped curve25519)
  provider-API token         gitea PAT, mullvad device key
  cloud-key self-identifying  aws IAM access key (hand-rolled SigV4, no SDK dep)

Spine (execute.go) enforces Hard Rule #2: backup -> rotate -> verify(new) ->
store -> re-read+verify -> revoke-old; dryrun.go keeps --execute gated. Each
driver ships a table-driven test proving real cutover (old secret stops
authenticating) and asserting no secret substring leaks to argv/Meta/errors.
Promotes golang.org/x/crypto to a direct dependency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 14:48:24 -07:00

257 lines
8.5 KiB
Go

package rotate
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"incredigo/internal/discover"
"incredigo/internal/vault"
)
// Gitea rotates a Gitea personal access token (PAT) via the Gitea API by
// CREATING a new token, verifying it, then DELETING the old one — the canonical
// provider-API rotation pattern (create-new → verify → revoke-old), and the first
// driver whose RevokeOld is a real destructive API call.
//
// The credential's secret is a single self-contained line (so it round-trips
// through the existing single-line gopass sink unchanged):
//
// https://<user>:<token>@<host>[:port]/?name=<token-name>[&pw=<mgmt-password>]
//
// - <token> the PAT being rotated (the userinfo password).
// - <user> the Gitea username (userinfo user).
// - scheme+host the API base (http for the loopback sandbox; https in prod).
// - name= the token's Gitea NAME — required to DELETE it (the API deletes
// by name/id, and the token VALUE can't be mapped back to a name).
// incredigo writes the new name on every rotation, so the chain is
// self-sustaining; a bare discovered token with no name degrades to
// the guided worklist for the old-token deletion.
// - pw= OPTIONAL Gitea account password. Gitea historically requires
// BASIC auth (password) to create/delete tokens; if present it is
// used for those management calls. If absent, the driver tries
// token auth (works on Gitea versions that allow a scoped token to
// manage tokens). Verify always uses the token itself.
//
// SECURITY: the token (and optional mgmt password) live only in the vault and the
// query string of the in-vault secret; they never reach Identity/Meta/logs. HTTP
// bodies carrying the new token are drained into the vault, not stringified beyond
// the unavoidable JSON decode.
type Gitea struct {
// HTTPClient is injectable for tests / custom TLS. Defaults to a 15s-timeout
// client using http.DefaultTransport.
HTTPClient *http.Client
}
// init self-registers the driver. Availability alone changes nothing; the
// `rotate --execute` + INCREDIGO_ALLOW_EXECUTE=1 gate still applies.
func init() { Register(&Gitea{}) }
// Name identifies the driver in plans and audit records.
func (g *Gitea) Name() string { return "gitea" }
// Detect claims credentials tagged Source == "gitea".
func (g *Gitea) Detect(c discover.Credential) bool { return c.Source == "gitea" }
func (g *Gitea) client() *http.Client {
if g.HTTPClient != nil {
return g.HTTPClient
}
return &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
}
// giteaSecret is the parsed credential blob. None of its fields are ever logged.
type giteaSecret struct {
base string // scheme://host[:port]
user string
token string
name string // token name (for DELETE)
pw string // optional mgmt password (basic auth)
}
// parseGiteaSecret reads the single-line blob from the vault and decomposes it.
func parseGiteaSecret(v *vault.Vault, h *vault.Handle) (giteaSecret, error) {
buf, err := v.Open(h)
if err != nil {
return giteaSecret{}, err
}
u, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(string(buf.Bytes())))
if err != nil {
return giteaSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("gitea: parse secret url: %w", err)
}
if u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
return giteaSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("gitea: unexpected scheme %q", u.Scheme)
}
if u.User == nil {
return giteaSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("gitea: secret has no user:token")
}
tok, _ := u.User.Password()
if tok == "" {
return giteaSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("gitea: secret has no token")
}
q := u.Query()
return giteaSecret{
base: u.Scheme + "://" + u.Host,
user: u.User.Username(),
token: tok,
name: q.Get("name"),
pw: q.Get("pw"),
}, nil
}
// build re-encodes a giteaSecret into the single-line blob form.
func (s giteaSecret) build() string {
u := &url.URL{
Scheme: schemeOf(s.base),
Host: hostOf(s.base),
User: url.UserPassword(s.user, s.token),
Path: "/",
}
q := url.Values{}
q.Set("name", s.name)
if s.pw != "" {
q.Set("pw", s.pw)
}
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
return u.String()
}
func schemeOf(base string) string {
if i := strings.Index(base, "://"); i >= 0 {
return base[:i]
}
return "https"
}
func hostOf(base string) string {
if i := strings.Index(base, "://"); i >= 0 {
return base[i+3:]
}
return base
}
// Rotate creates a NEW token at the Gitea API (authenticating with the old token
// or, if a mgmt password is present, basic auth), and returns a vault handle to a
// rebuilt blob carrying the new token + new name. It does not revoke the old token.
func (g *Gitea) Rotate(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) (*vault.Handle, error) {
s, err := parseGiteaSecret(v, c.Secret)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
newName := fmt.Sprintf("incredigo-rotated-%d", time.Now().Unix())
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
"name": newName,
"scopes": []string{"write:user", "read:user"}, // enough to manage tokens on Gitea ≥1.19; ignored by older
})
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost,
s.base+"/api/v1/users/"+url.PathEscape(s.user)+"/tokens", bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
g.authManage(req, s)
resp, err := g.client().Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("gitea: create token: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("gitea: create token: unexpected status %s", resp.Status)
}
var created struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
SHA1 string `json:"sha1"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&created); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("gitea: decode created token: %w", err)
}
if created.SHA1 == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("gitea: create token: empty token in response")
}
ns := s // carry base/user/pw forward
ns.token = created.SHA1
ns.name = created.Name
if ns.name == "" {
ns.name = newName
}
return v.Store([]byte(ns.build())), nil
}
// Verify proves the newly minted token authenticates by calling GET /api/v1/user
// with it and checking the returned login matches.
func (g *Gitea) Verify(ctx context.Context, newSecret *vault.Handle, v *vault.Vault) error {
s, err := parseGiteaSecret(v, newSecret)
if err != nil {
return err
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, s.base+"/api/v1/user", nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "token "+s.token)
resp, err := g.client().Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("gitea verify: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("gitea verify: GET /user status %s", resp.Status)
}
var who struct {
Login string `json:"login"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&who); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("gitea verify: decode user: %w", err)
}
if s.user != "" && who.Login != "" && !strings.EqualFold(who.Login, s.user) {
return fmt.Errorf("gitea verify: token authenticates as %q, expected %q", who.Login, s.user)
}
return nil
}
// RevokeOld deletes the OLD token by name. The old token is still valid at this
// point (revoke runs only after the new token is stored+verified), so it is used
// to authenticate its own deletion unless a mgmt password is configured.
func (g *Gitea) RevokeOld(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) error {
s, err := parseGiteaSecret(v, c.Secret)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if s.name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("gitea revoke: old token has no recorded name — delete it manually (guided)")
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodDelete,
s.base+"/api/v1/users/"+url.PathEscape(s.user)+"/tokens/"+url.PathEscape(s.name), nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
g.authManage(req, s)
resp, err := g.client().Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("gitea revoke: %w", err)
}
defer func() { io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); resp.Body.Close() }()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("gitea revoke: delete token status %s", resp.Status)
}
return nil
}
// authManage sets auth for token-management calls (create/delete): basic auth with
// the mgmt password if present (Gitea's historical requirement), else token auth.
func (g *Gitea) authManage(req *http.Request, s giteaSecret) {
if s.pw != "" {
req.SetBasicAuth(s.user, s.pw)
return
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "token "+s.token)
}