35f19c007a
Each driver is real-service code only (no test awareness; tests inject just an HTTPClient/Bin), following the established patterns: - mongo: in-place changeUserPassword over the old connection; no secret on argv (host/db on the URI, both passwords on stdin, output scrubbed). - npm: create token -> /-/whoami -> delete-by-key; blob records the key. - gcp: service-account KEY rotation; mints an RS256 JWT signed with the SA's own private key (crypto/rsa, stdlib) to self-auth the IAM create/verify/delete. - twilio: API Key create -> get -> delete, Basic auth (KeySid/secret). - flyio: GraphQL — a managing token mints/deletes the rotated deploy token. - k8s: create a service-account-token Secret, await the populated token, verify against the SA, delete the old Secret (invalidates the old token). All 6 register their honest proof level (MOCK-ONLY) in proofs.go + ROTATION-PROOFS.md; mongo/npm/k8s are LIVE-VM candidates pending real-target VM POCs. Emulators enforce credential validity (gcp verifies the JWT signature), tests assert Verify(old) fails after revoke + a secret-leak canary. Full suite: 103 green, -race clean on rotate/sink/vault. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
227 lines
7.5 KiB
Go
227 lines
7.5 KiB
Go
package rotate
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"bytes"
|
|
"context"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"io"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"net/url"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"incredigo/internal/discover"
|
|
"incredigo/internal/vault"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// NPM rotates an npm registry access token via the registry token API by CREATING a
|
|
// new token, verifying it, then DELETING the old one — the canonical provider-API
|
|
// rotation pattern (create-new → verify → revoke-old):
|
|
//
|
|
// POST /-/npm/v1/tokens (Bearer old) -> {token, key}
|
|
// GET /-/whoami (Bearer new) -> {username}
|
|
// DELETE /-/npm/v1/tokens/token/<key>(Bearer old)
|
|
//
|
|
// The registry deletes tokens by their KEY (a sha512 id); the token VALUE cannot be
|
|
// mapped back to a key, so the key is recorded in the blob (incredigo writes the new
|
|
// key on every rotation, keeping the chain self-sustaining). A bare discovered token
|
|
// with no key degrades to the guided worklist for the old-token deletion.
|
|
//
|
|
// The credential's secret is a single self-contained line:
|
|
//
|
|
// npm://<host>/?user=<user>&token=<token>&key=<key>
|
|
//
|
|
// - scheme "npm" maps to https; "http"/"https" are accepted so a test can point
|
|
// at a loopback emulator.
|
|
// - <host> the registry host; "registry" (or empty) defaults to registry.npmjs.org.
|
|
// - token= the access token being rotated (Bearer auth).
|
|
// - key= the token's registry key/id — required to DELETE the old token.
|
|
// - user= optional username (Verify checks /-/whoami matches it when present).
|
|
//
|
|
// SECURITY: the token lives only in the vault blob and the Bearer header; it never
|
|
// reaches Identity/Meta/logs/argv. Response bodies carrying the new token are decoded
|
|
// straight into the rebuilt blob.
|
|
type NPM struct {
|
|
// HTTPClient is injectable for tests / custom TLS. Defaults to a 15s-timeout
|
|
// client using http.DefaultTransport.
|
|
HTTPClient *http.Client
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// init self-registers the driver. Availability alone changes nothing; the
|
|
// `rotate --execute` + INCREDIGO_ALLOW_EXECUTE=1 gate still applies.
|
|
func init() { Register(&NPM{}) }
|
|
|
|
// Name identifies the driver in plans and audit records.
|
|
func (n *NPM) Name() string { return "npm" }
|
|
|
|
// Detect claims credentials tagged Source == "npm".
|
|
func (n *NPM) Detect(c discover.Credential) bool { return c.Source == "npm" }
|
|
|
|
func (n *NPM) client() *http.Client {
|
|
if n.HTTPClient != nil {
|
|
return n.HTTPClient
|
|
}
|
|
return &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// npmSecret is the parsed credential blob. None of its fields are ever logged.
|
|
type npmSecret struct {
|
|
base string // scheme://host
|
|
user string
|
|
token string
|
|
key string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func parseNPMSecret(v *vault.Vault, h *vault.Handle) (npmSecret, error) {
|
|
buf, err := v.Open(h)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return npmSecret{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
u, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(string(buf.Bytes())))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return npmSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("npm: parse secret url: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if u.Scheme != "npm" && u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
|
|
return npmSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("npm: unexpected scheme %q", u.Scheme)
|
|
}
|
|
scheme := u.Scheme
|
|
host := u.Host
|
|
if scheme == "npm" {
|
|
scheme = "https"
|
|
}
|
|
if host == "" || host == "registry" {
|
|
host = "registry.npmjs.org"
|
|
}
|
|
q := u.Query()
|
|
s := npmSecret{base: scheme + "://" + host, user: q.Get("user"), token: q.Get("token"), key: q.Get("key")}
|
|
if s.token == "" {
|
|
return npmSecret{}, fmt.Errorf("npm: secret has no token")
|
|
}
|
|
return s, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// build re-encodes an npmSecret into the single-line blob form (scheme normalised back
|
|
// to "npm" so the in-vault form stays stable).
|
|
func (s npmSecret) build() string {
|
|
host := hostOf(s.base)
|
|
if host == "registry.npmjs.org" {
|
|
host = "registry"
|
|
}
|
|
u := &url.URL{Scheme: "npm", Host: host, Path: "/"}
|
|
q := url.Values{}
|
|
if s.user != "" {
|
|
q.Set("user", s.user)
|
|
}
|
|
q.Set("token", s.token)
|
|
if s.key != "" {
|
|
q.Set("key", s.key)
|
|
}
|
|
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
|
|
return u.String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Rotate creates a NEW registry token (authenticating with the old token) and returns
|
|
// a vault handle to a rebuilt blob carrying the new token + new key. It does not revoke
|
|
// the old token.
|
|
func (n *NPM) Rotate(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) (*vault.Handle, error) {
|
|
s, err := parseNPMSecret(v, c.Secret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// readonly:false, no cidr restriction — a like-for-like automation token.
|
|
body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"readonly": false, "cidr_whitelist": []string{}})
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, s.base+"/-/npm/v1/tokens", bytes.NewReader(body))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.token)
|
|
|
|
resp, err := n.client().Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("npm: create token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer func() { io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); resp.Body.Close() }()
|
|
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("npm: create token: unexpected status %s", resp.Status)
|
|
}
|
|
var created struct {
|
|
Token string `json:"token"`
|
|
Key string `json:"key"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&created); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("npm: decode created token: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if created.Token == "" {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("npm: create token: empty token in response")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ns := s
|
|
ns.token = created.Token
|
|
ns.key = created.Key
|
|
return v.Store([]byte(ns.build())), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify proves the newly minted token authenticates by calling GET /-/whoami with it.
|
|
func (n *NPM) Verify(ctx context.Context, newSecret *vault.Handle, v *vault.Vault) error {
|
|
s, err := parseNPMSecret(v, newSecret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, s.base+"/-/whoami", nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.token)
|
|
resp, err := n.client().Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("npm verify: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer func() { io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); resp.Body.Close() }()
|
|
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("npm verify: /-/whoami status %s", resp.Status)
|
|
}
|
|
var who struct {
|
|
Username string `json:"username"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&who); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("npm verify: decode whoami: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if who.Username == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("npm verify: token did not resolve to a user")
|
|
}
|
|
if s.user != "" && !strings.EqualFold(who.Username, s.user) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("npm verify: token authenticates as %q, expected %q", who.Username, s.user)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeOld deletes the OLD token by key. The old token is still valid at this point
|
|
// (revoke runs only after the new token is stored+verified), so it authenticates its
|
|
// own deletion.
|
|
func (n *NPM) RevokeOld(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) error {
|
|
s, err := parseNPMSecret(v, c.Secret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if s.key == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("npm revoke: old token has no recorded key — delete it manually (guided)")
|
|
}
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodDelete,
|
|
s.base+"/-/npm/v1/tokens/token/"+url.PathEscape(s.key), nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+s.token)
|
|
resp, err := n.client().Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("npm revoke: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer func() { io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body); resp.Body.Close() }()
|
|
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("npm revoke: delete token status %s", resp.Status)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|