Files
leetcrypt 9109da7ae4 rotate: promote k8s + mongo to LIVE-VM via real-target POCs
Ran live cutover POCs in the sandbox VM against the real target software and
promoted both drivers from MOCK-ONLY to LIVE-VM in the proof table (data, not
driver behaviour):

- k8s: proven against real k3s v1.35 kube-apiserver + token controller
  (lab-provision-k8s.sh). The real apiserver serves a self-signed cert, so the
  driver gained CA-pinned TLS — blob params ca= (base64 PEM, pinned as the only
  trusted root) and insecure=1 (lab-only escape hatch), routed through a new
  clientFor(cr). Neither is test-awareness; a real deployment configures the same
  CA. Added TestK8sTLSTrust covering CA-pinned / insecure / untrusted-rejection
  and the blob round-trip.
- mongo: proven against real mongod 8.0 (lab-provision-mongo.sh).

npm stays MOCK-ONLY by decision (registry.npmjs.org not self-hostable; real
create-token requires the account password in the body) — documented as a
contract gap rather than faking a LIVE-VM. gcp/twilio/flyio remain MOCK-ONLY.

Live POCs surfaced real-target-only behaviour now recorded in the docs: the
apiserver's ~10s successful-auth cache (old token kept working ~7s after Secret
deletion) and real mongosh's stdout prompt. Full suite 104 green, -race clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 21:50:21 -07:00

310 lines
10 KiB
Go

package rotate
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"incredigo/internal/discover"
"incredigo/internal/vault"
)
// K8s rotates a Kubernetes ServiceAccount token (the legacy, individually-revocable
// kind backed by a Secret of type kubernetes.io/service-account-token) by CREATING a
// new token Secret, verifying the minted token authenticates, then DELETING the old
// Secret — the provider-API rotation pattern (create-new → verify → revoke-old).
//
// Bound TokenRequest tokens cannot be revoked individually, so rotation targets the
// Secret-backed token whose deletion immediately invalidates it. The credential blob:
//
// k8s://<host:port>/?ns=<namespace>&sa=<serviceaccount>&secret=<secret-name>&token=<token>
//
// - scheme "k8s" maps to https; "http"/"https" are accepted for a loopback emulator.
// - <host> the apiserver host:port.
// - ns= the namespace holding the SA + token Secret.
// - sa= the ServiceAccount name (the new Secret is annotated to it).
// - secret= the token Secret's name — required to DELETE the old token.
// - token= the bearer token value (rotated).
// - ca= OPTIONAL base64(std) of the cluster CA PEM bundle. A real apiserver
// serves a self-signed cert, so the driver pins this CA as the only
// trusted root for the TLS handshake. Omit for a loopback emulator.
// - insecure=1 OPTIONAL escape hatch: skip TLS verification entirely (lab only).
//
// AUTH: every call authenticates with a token Bearer header against the apiserver. The
// rotating SA needs RBAC to create/delete Secrets in its namespace. The new token is
// read (base64) from the controller-populated Secret straight into the vault; it never
// reaches Identity/Meta/logs/argv.
type K8s struct {
// HTTPClient is injectable for tests / custom CA. A real apiserver needs a client
// configured with the cluster CA; defaults to a 15s-timeout client otherwise.
HTTPClient *http.Client
}
// init self-registers the driver. Availability alone changes nothing; the
// `rotate --execute` + INCREDIGO_ALLOW_EXECUTE=1 gate still applies.
func init() { Register(&K8s{}) }
// Name identifies the driver in plans and audit records.
func (k *K8s) Name() string { return "k8s" }
// Detect claims credentials tagged Source == "k8s".
func (k *K8s) Detect(c discover.Credential) bool { return c.Source == "k8s" }
// clientFor returns the HTTP client for a given credential. An injected client
// (tests / explicit CA config) always wins. Otherwise it builds a 15s client whose
// TLS trust is pinned to the credential's ca= bundle (a real apiserver's self-signed
// cert), or with verification disabled when insecure=1 is set (lab only).
func (k *K8s) clientFor(cr k8sCred) (*http.Client, error) {
if k.HTTPClient != nil {
return k.HTTPClient, nil
}
tlsCfg := &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}
switch {
case cr.insecure:
tlsCfg.InsecureSkipVerify = true
case cr.ca != "":
pem, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(cr.ca)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("k8s: decode ca bundle: %w", err)
}
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pem) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("k8s: ca bundle contained no usable certificates")
}
tlsCfg.RootCAs = pool
}
return &http.Client{
Timeout: 15 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg},
}, nil
}
// k8sCred is the parsed credential blob. None of its fields are ever logged.
type k8sCred struct {
base string // scheme://host:port
ns string
sa string
secret string // token Secret name
token string
ca string // base64(std) cluster CA PEM bundle (optional)
insecure bool // skip TLS verification (lab only)
}
func parseK8sCred(v *vault.Vault, h *vault.Handle) (k8sCred, error) {
buf, err := v.Open(h)
if err != nil {
return k8sCred{}, err
}
u, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(string(buf.Bytes())))
if err != nil {
return k8sCred{}, fmt.Errorf("k8s: parse secret url: %w", err)
}
if u.Scheme != "k8s" && u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
return k8sCred{}, fmt.Errorf("k8s: unexpected scheme %q", u.Scheme)
}
scheme := u.Scheme
if scheme == "k8s" {
scheme = "https"
}
if u.Host == "" {
return k8sCred{}, fmt.Errorf("k8s: secret has no apiserver host")
}
q := u.Query()
c := k8sCred{base: scheme + "://" + u.Host, ns: q.Get("ns"), sa: q.Get("sa"), secret: q.Get("secret"), token: q.Get("token"), ca: q.Get("ca"), insecure: q.Get("insecure") == "1"}
if c.ns == "" || c.sa == "" {
return k8sCred{}, fmt.Errorf("k8s: secret missing namespace or serviceaccount")
}
if c.token == "" {
return k8sCred{}, fmt.Errorf("k8s: secret has no token")
}
return c, nil
}
// build re-encodes a k8sCred into the single-line blob form (scheme normalised back
// to "k8s").
func (c k8sCred) build() string {
u := &url.URL{Scheme: "k8s", Host: hostPortOf(c.base), Path: "/"}
q := url.Values{}
q.Set("ns", c.ns)
q.Set("sa", c.sa)
if c.secret != "" {
q.Set("secret", c.secret)
}
q.Set("token", c.token)
if c.ca != "" {
q.Set("ca", c.ca)
}
if c.insecure {
q.Set("insecure", "1")
}
u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
return u.String()
}
// hostPortOf strips the scheme from a scheme://host:port base.
func hostPortOf(base string) string {
if i := strings.Index(base, "://"); i >= 0 {
return base[i+3:]
}
return base
}
// k8sSecretObj is the subset of a core/v1 Secret the driver reads or writes.
type k8sSecretObj struct {
Metadata struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Annotations map[string]string `json:"annotations,omitempty"`
} `json:"metadata"`
Type string `json:"type,omitempty"`
Data map[string]string `json:"data,omitempty"`
}
// do issues an authenticated apiserver request and returns the body. The credential
// carries the TLS trust config (ca=/insecure=) used to build the client.
func (k *K8s) do(ctx context.Context, cr k8sCred, method, urlStr string, body []byte) ([]byte, int, error) {
var r io.Reader
if body != nil {
r = bytes.NewReader(body)
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, urlStr, r)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+cr.token)
if body != nil {
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
}
cl, err := k.clientFor(cr)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
resp, err := cl.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
rb, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
return rb, resp.StatusCode, nil
}
func (c k8sCred) secretsURL(name string) string {
base := c.base + "/api/v1/namespaces/" + url.PathEscape(c.ns) + "/secrets"
if name != "" {
return base + "/" + url.PathEscape(name)
}
return base
}
// Rotate creates a NEW token Secret for the SA (authenticated by the OLD token), waits
// for the controller to populate its token, and returns a vault handle to the rebuilt
// blob carrying the new Secret name + token. It does not delete the old Secret.
func (k *K8s) Rotate(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) (*vault.Handle, error) {
cr, err := parseK8sCred(v, c.Secret)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
suffix, err := genHex(4)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
newName := cr.sa + "-token-" + suffix
obj := k8sSecretObj{Type: "kubernetes.io/service-account-token"}
obj.Metadata.Name = newName
obj.Metadata.Annotations = map[string]string{"kubernetes.io/service-account.name": cr.sa}
body, _ := json.Marshal(obj)
_, code, err := k.do(ctx, cr, http.MethodPost, cr.secretsURL(""), body)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("k8s: create token secret: %w", err)
}
if code != http.StatusCreated && code != http.StatusOK {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("k8s: create token secret: status %d", code)
}
// Wait for the token-controller to populate .data.token.
token, err := k.awaitToken(ctx, cr, newName)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
nc := cr
nc.secret = newName
nc.token = token
return v.Store([]byte(nc.build())), nil
}
// awaitToken polls the new Secret until its .data.token is present, decoding it.
func (k *K8s) awaitToken(ctx context.Context, cr k8sCred, name string) (string, error) {
for attempt := 0; attempt < 10; attempt++ {
rb, code, err := k.do(ctx, cr, http.MethodGet, cr.secretsURL(name), nil)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("k8s: read token secret: %w", err)
}
if code == http.StatusOK {
var got k8sSecretObj
if err := json.Unmarshal(rb, &got); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("k8s: decode token secret: %w", err)
}
if enc := got.Data["token"]; enc != "" {
tok, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(enc)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("k8s: decode token data: %w", err)
}
return string(tok), nil
}
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return "", ctx.Err()
case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("k8s: token secret never populated a token")
}
// Verify proves the new token authenticates by GETting the ServiceAccount with it.
func (k *K8s) Verify(ctx context.Context, newSecret *vault.Handle, v *vault.Vault) error {
cr, err := parseK8sCred(v, newSecret)
if err != nil {
return err
}
saURL := cr.base + "/api/v1/namespaces/" + url.PathEscape(cr.ns) + "/serviceaccounts/" + url.PathEscape(cr.sa)
_, code, err := k.do(ctx, cr, http.MethodGet, saURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("k8s verify: %w", err)
}
if code != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("k8s verify: get serviceaccount status %d", code)
}
return nil
}
// RevokeOld deletes the OLD token Secret, which invalidates the old token. The old
// token is still valid at this point (revoke runs only after the new token is
// stored+verified), so it authenticates its own Secret's deletion.
func (k *K8s) RevokeOld(ctx context.Context, c discover.Credential, v *vault.Vault) error {
cr, err := parseK8sCred(v, c.Secret)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if cr.secret == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("k8s revoke: old token has no recorded secret name — delete it manually (guided)")
}
_, code, err := k.do(ctx, cr, http.MethodDelete, cr.secretsURL(cr.secret), nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("k8s revoke: %w", err)
}
if code != http.StatusOK && code != http.StatusNoContent {
return fmt.Errorf("k8s revoke: delete token secret status %d", code)
}
return nil
}