Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
leetcrypt 7a06d57bb3 browserrot: Phase A-tier-1 site-side rotation engine (go-rod)
Deterministic, headless browser-driven password rotation:
discover change page via RFC 8615 / links, inject old+new over CDP
(no model in the loop), submit, and re-login to verify the new
password before commit. Implements rotate.Rotator so the mandatory
backup gate, verify-before-revoke ordering, and proof gate apply
unchanged; RevokeOld is a no-op (the site invalidates the old pw).

Proof-as-data per Site: the engine is LIVE-VM (real headless
Chromium vs a real local change-password form, via
lab-provision-browserrot.sh / TestIntegration_realBrowserRotation);
real-site selector tables stay UNPROVEN and nothing auto-registers
into production rotate yet. 14 packages, -race clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-18 12:43:56 -07:00
leetcrypt 59af53dcc0 rotate: nine rotation drivers + verify-before-revoke execute spine
Implements the Rotator interface across all four rotation patterns, each a
self-contained one-file driver self-registering via init():

  in-place DB password   postgres, mysql (3-stmt unprivileged fallback), redis
  local keypair + propagate  sshkey (ed25519), wireguard (clamped curve25519)
  provider-API token         gitea PAT, mullvad device key
  cloud-key self-identifying  aws IAM access key (hand-rolled SigV4, no SDK dep)

Spine (execute.go) enforces Hard Rule #2: backup -> rotate -> verify(new) ->
store -> re-read+verify -> revoke-old; dryrun.go keeps --execute gated. Each
driver ships a table-driven test proving real cutover (old secret stops
authenticating) and asserting no secret substring leaks to argv/Meta/errors.
Promotes golang.org/x/crypto to a direct dependency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 14:48:24 -07:00
leetcrypt 71a74e7166 guide: read-only guided manual-rotation layer (links + worklist + TUI)
Advances the guided-rotation goal without rotating anything.

- internal/links: offline change-password URL generation — curated per-service
  table + RFC 8615 /.well-known/change-password + parent-domain fallback; derives
  a web host from a credential (git/netrc "user @ host", docker registry, aws)
- internal/worklist: secrets-free rotation worklist (source, identity, auto/manual,
  link) + Markdown renderer
- internal/tui: Bubble Tea walk-through (one credential per screen, open link,
  mark done/skip, progress) — READ-ONLY, enters/stores no secret
- cmd: `incredigo worklist` (offline, stdout/--out) and `incredigo guide` (TUI)
- tests: link derivation, worklist build/markdown + no-secret-column, TUI
  navigation/done/quit/view

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 14:58:23 -07:00
leetcrypt 425c299359 Initial commit: Incredigo — local-first RAM-only credential custody
v1: discover → migrate → expiry tracking → sealed export/import.

- vault: memguard mlock/DONTDUMP arena, handle indirection, zeroize-on-drop
- discover: registry + 8 read-only scanners (aws, env, netrc, ssh, docker,
  kube, git) and a file/dir harvester (--path)
- sink: gopass streaming insert; length-prefixed bundle framing; Sealer
  interface with three impls — age (default, authenticated), hmac
  (authenticated, openssl-only encrypt-then-MAC), openssl (CBC fallback,
  unauthenticated; OpenSSL 3.x enc refuses AEAD)
- policy: local expiry engine, 60d/8w threshold parser
- audit: redacted append-only JSONL, injectable clock
- export/import: passphrase from no-echo prompt or $INCREDIGO_PASSPHRASE into
  locked memory; secrets stream gopass<->Sealer as bytes, never Go strings
- tests: scanner leak-checks, vault zeroize, bundle round-trip via fake gopass;
  go test ./... green, -race clean

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 07:57:34 -07:00