Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
leetcrypt b415c43bff rotate: 4 SaaS-token/app-signing drivers + data-separated proof tracking
Add gitlab, cloudflare, ghactions (MOCK-ONLY) and appsecret (LIVE-VM) one-file
Rotators, each with a table-driven cutover-proof + leak-check test. gitlab/
cloudflare/ghactions are in-place SaaS-token rolls (self/rotate, value-roll,
sealed-secret overwrite) so RevokeOld is a no-op; ghactions seals via
nacl/box.SealAnonymous (no new go.mod dep). appsecret regenerates a local app
signing secret and rewrites it in place across every target file (atomic, mode-
preserving, redacted errors), discoverable via exact-match app-signing key names
in env.go.

Keep real-rotation code distinct from mock code: how each driver's cutover was
validated lives as DATA in internal/rotate/proofs.go (single source of truth) +
docs/ROTATION-PROOFS.md, surfaced as a PROOF column in `incredigo rotate` so a
MOCK-ONLY driver can never be mistaken for a LIVE-VM one. appsecret proven LIVE-VM
against real local files in the sandbox VM.

82 tests green, -race clean on rotate/sink/vault.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 15:28:05 -07:00
leetcrypt 1c0896347b discover: broaden discovery to feed the new drivers
Per the standing directive (dynamic discovery per credential type as each
driver lands):
- env.go: tag DB connection URLs by scheme (postgres/postgresql, mysql/mariadb,
  redis/rediss) with a user:password authority, routing DATABASE_URL/REDIS_URL/
  MYSQL_URL straight to the in-place DB drivers, kept regardless of the
  secret-name heuristic.
- aws.go: emit the driver-ready single-line blob (was the bare secret) and
  resolve region from env / ~/.aws/config.
- ssh.go: content-based key detection (not just id_*) + ~/.ssh/config
  IdentityFile parsing.
- tea.go: new scanner mapping Gitea `tea` CLI config to a driver-ready PAT blob.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18 14:48:30 -07:00
leetcrypt 425c299359 Initial commit: Incredigo — local-first RAM-only credential custody
v1: discover → migrate → expiry tracking → sealed export/import.

- vault: memguard mlock/DONTDUMP arena, handle indirection, zeroize-on-drop
- discover: registry + 8 read-only scanners (aws, env, netrc, ssh, docker,
  kube, git) and a file/dir harvester (--path)
- sink: gopass streaming insert; length-prefixed bundle framing; Sealer
  interface with three impls — age (default, authenticated), hmac
  (authenticated, openssl-only encrypt-then-MAC), openssl (CBC fallback,
  unauthenticated; OpenSSL 3.x enc refuses AEAD)
- policy: local expiry engine, 60d/8w threshold parser
- audit: redacted append-only JSONL, injectable clock
- export/import: passphrase from no-echo prompt or $INCREDIGO_PASSPHRASE into
  locked memory; secrets stream gopass<->Sealer as bytes, never Go strings
- tests: scanner leak-checks, vault zeroize, bundle round-trip via fake gopass;
  go test ./... green, -race clean

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 07:57:34 -07:00