rotate: 4 SaaS-token/app-signing drivers + data-separated proof tracking

Add gitlab, cloudflare, ghactions (MOCK-ONLY) and appsecret (LIVE-VM) one-file
Rotators, each with a table-driven cutover-proof + leak-check test. gitlab/
cloudflare/ghactions are in-place SaaS-token rolls (self/rotate, value-roll,
sealed-secret overwrite) so RevokeOld is a no-op; ghactions seals via
nacl/box.SealAnonymous (no new go.mod dep). appsecret regenerates a local app
signing secret and rewrites it in place across every target file (atomic, mode-
preserving, redacted errors), discoverable via exact-match app-signing key names
in env.go.

Keep real-rotation code distinct from mock code: how each driver's cutover was
validated lives as DATA in internal/rotate/proofs.go (single source of truth) +
docs/ROTATION-PROOFS.md, surfaced as a PROOF column in `incredigo rotate` so a
MOCK-ONLY driver can never be mistaken for a LIVE-VM one. appsecret proven LIVE-VM
against real local files in the sandbox VM.

82 tests green, -race clean on rotate/sink/vault.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
leetcrypt
2026-06-18 15:28:05 -07:00
parent f6d145669c
commit b415c43bff
14 changed files with 1809 additions and 9 deletions
+29 -1
View File
@@ -59,8 +59,18 @@ func (e *envScanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, v *vault.Vault) ([]Credential, er
// regardless of the secret-ish heuristic: a weak/empty DB password is
// exactly the kind of leak we must not miss.
source, kind := e.Name(), Kind(KindToken)
secretBlob := val
if dbSrc := dbSourceForURL(val); dbSrc != "" {
source, kind = dbSrc, KindPassword
} else if appSigningKey(k) && len(val) >= 12 {
// An app SIGNING secret (Django SECRET_KEY, Rails secret_key_base, a
// JWT signing secret, …) lives in this very file; tag it Source=
// "appsecret" with a self-contained blob carrying the value AND its
// file path so the local in-place rotator is driver-ready.
source = "appsecret"
secretBlob = "appsecret://local/?" + url.Values{
"key": {k}, "val": {val}, "path": {p},
}.Encode()
} else if !looksSecret(k, val) {
continue
}
@@ -70,7 +80,7 @@ func (e *envScanner) Scan(ctx context.Context, v *vault.Vault) ([]Credential, er
Identity: filepath.Base(p) + " / " + k,
Location: p,
Modified: fi.ModTime(),
Secret: v.Store([]byte(val)),
Secret: v.Store([]byte(secretBlob)),
})
}
f.Close()
@@ -104,6 +114,24 @@ func dbSourceForURL(val string) string {
return ""
}
// appSigningKeys are the env-var names that denote a local application SIGNING secret
// — the kind the appsecret rotator can regenerate in place. Matched case-insensitively
// and exactly (so STRIPE_API_KEY / DB_PASSWORD stay generic env secrets, not appsecrets).
var appSigningKeys = map[string]bool{
"secret_key": true, // Django / Flask
"secret_key_base": true, // Rails
"django_secret_key": true,
"flask_secret_key": true,
"app_key": true, // Laravel
"app_secret": true,
"jwt_secret": true,
"session_secret": true,
"nextauth_secret": true,
"rails_secret": true,
}
func appSigningKey(key string) bool { return appSigningKeys[strings.ToLower(key)] }
func looksSecret(key, val string) bool {
lk := strings.ToLower(key)
for _, h := range sensitiveHints {