rotate: nine rotation drivers + verify-before-revoke execute spine
Implements the Rotator interface across all four rotation patterns, each a self-contained one-file driver self-registering via init(): in-place DB password postgres, mysql (3-stmt unprivileged fallback), redis local keypair + propagate sshkey (ed25519), wireguard (clamped curve25519) provider-API token gitea PAT, mullvad device key cloud-key self-identifying aws IAM access key (hand-rolled SigV4, no SDK dep) Spine (execute.go) enforces Hard Rule #2: backup -> rotate -> verify(new) -> store -> re-read+verify -> revoke-old; dryrun.go keeps --execute gated. Each driver ships a table-driven test proving real cutover (old secret stops authenticating) and asserting no secret substring leaks to argv/Meta/errors. Promotes golang.org/x/crypto to a direct dependency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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package rotate
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import (
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"context"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"incredigo/internal/discover"
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"incredigo/internal/vault"
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)
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// writeFakePsql writes a stub `psql` that emulates password auth against a state
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// file holding the role's CURRENT password. ALTER updates the state (only if the
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// caller authenticated with the current password); SELECT 1 succeeds only when
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// PGPASSWORD matches the current password. This lets a test prove a real cutover:
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// after Rotate the OLD password must stop authenticating.
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func writeFakePsql(t *testing.T, statePath string) string {
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t.Helper()
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dir := t.TempDir()
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p := filepath.Join(dir, "psql")
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script := `#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -euo pipefail
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sql="$(cat)"
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cur="$(cat "` + statePath + `" 2>/dev/null || true)"
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case "$sql" in
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*"ALTER USER"*|*"ALTER ROLE"*)
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if [ "${PGPASSWORD:-}" != "$cur" ]; then echo "FATAL: password authentication failed" >&2; exit 2; fi
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np="$(printf '%s' "$sql" | sed -E "s/.*PASSWORD '([^']*)'.*/\1/")"
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printf '%s' "$np" > "` + statePath + `"
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echo "ALTER ROLE"; exit 0 ;;
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*"SELECT 1"*)
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if [ "${PGPASSWORD:-}" != "$cur" ]; then echo "FATAL: password authentication failed" >&2; exit 2; fi
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echo "1"; exit 0 ;;
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*) echo "unrecognized" >&2; exit 1 ;;
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esac
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`
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if err := os.WriteFile(p, []byte(script), 0o755); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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return p
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}
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func TestPostgresDetect(t *testing.T) {
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pg := &Postgres{}
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if !pg.Detect(discover.Credential{Source: "postgres"}) {
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t.Error("should detect Source=postgres")
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}
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if pg.Detect(discover.Credential{Source: "env"}) {
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t.Error("should not detect Source=env")
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}
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}
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func TestPostgresRotateRealCutover(t *testing.T) {
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state := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "pw")
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if err := os.WriteFile(state, []byte("oldpw"), 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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t.Setenv("PGPASSWORD", "") // ensure the driver, not the env, supplies it
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pg := &Postgres{Bin: writeFakePsql(t, state)}
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v := vault.New()
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defer v.Purge()
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oldDSN := "postgres://labapp:oldpw@127.0.0.1:5432/labdb"
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cred := discover.Credential{Source: "postgres", Identity: "labapp@labdb", Secret: v.Store([]byte(oldDSN))}
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ctx := context.Background()
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newH, err := pg.Rotate(ctx, cred, v)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Rotate: %v", err)
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}
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// The fixture's current password must have changed.
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if cur, _ := os.ReadFile(state); string(cur) == "oldpw" {
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t.Fatal("password not changed by ALTER")
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}
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// New secret authenticates...
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if err := pg.Verify(ctx, newH, v); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("Verify(new) should pass: %v", err)
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}
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// ...and the OLD credential is now dead (real cutover).
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if err := pg.Verify(ctx, cred.Secret, v); err == nil {
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t.Error("Verify(old) must fail after rotation — old password should be revoked")
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} else if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "oldpw") {
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// sanity: error must not leak the secret
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t.Error("error leaked the old password")
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}
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if err := pg.RevokeOld(ctx, cred, v); err != nil {
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t.Errorf("RevokeOld (no-op) returned: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestPostgresRejectsNonPostgresDSN(t *testing.T) {
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pg := &Postgres{Bin: "/bin/false"}
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v := vault.New()
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defer v.Purge()
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cred := discover.Credential{Source: "postgres", Secret: v.Store([]byte("mysql://u:p@h/db"))}
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if _, err := pg.Rotate(context.Background(), cred, v); err == nil {
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t.Error("Rotate should reject a non-postgres scheme")
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}
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}
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