leetcrypt
c9cdd2feca
Previously, launching a sandbox on a machine without the backend binary died with a raw "not installed" error and no path forward. Now the missing backend can be installed in-line, gated on explicit consent, so a fresh checkout can go from zero to a running sandbox without leaving the TUI. Folded into the existing `/sbx launch` verb rather than a new command (menu is already dense): `/sbx launch docker|multipass [image] install`. The `install` token opts in; without it the user gets an actionable error naming the exact retry. The token is filtered out of positional image parsing so it never shadows a custom image. The install runs off-thread inside the existing spawn_launch task, before provisioning, so the TUI never blocks and the *launching guard is cleared via BrokerMsg on failure. A fresh Docker install also leaves its daemon up, so launch proceeds straight through. Scripts (detect-first, never silent, --plan dry-run, idempotent if already present): - ensure-multipass.sh (new): Linux→snap (clear failure if snapd absent), macOS→brew cask, Windows→winget. - ensure-docker.sh: new --install mode using Docker's OFFICIAL, GPG-verified apt repo (docker-ce) on Debian/Ubuntu, with dnf (Fedora/RHEL) and pacman (Arch) fallbacks. Deliberately avoids piping get.docker.com into a root shell. Existing daemon-start path intact. sbx.rs: docker_installed()/multipass_installed() detectors and ensure_docker_install()/ensure_multipass_install() wrappers; ENSURE_MULTIPASS const. ui.rs: help text documents the [install] option on both backends. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
hack-house
encrypted collaborative sessions with a summoned sandbox
zero-knowledge server · end-to-end fernet · srp · ratatui
they want you dependent. we want you free.
hack-house is the evolution of cmd-chat: a multi-user, end-to-end-encrypted
terminal session where a small crew shares chat, files, and — when
summoned — a disposable sandboxed Linux box they drive together, with real
Linux permissions and an owner who can delegate the keys.
The server never sees plaintext. Everything — messages, files, terminal output — is relayed as opaque ciphertext. Close the window, the house empties.
status
This is the Rust client (ratatui) for the unchanged Python (Sanic) server. The
wire protocol is JSON-over-WebSocket; SRP + HKDF→Fernet are byte-for-byte
compatible with the Python srp / cryptography stack.
| phase | feature | state |
|---|---|---|
| P0 | Rust↔Python SRP / Fernet crypto parity | ✅ proven (golden vectors + live + cross-lang E2E) |
| P2 | multi-user session (cap 4, infra for more) + authoritative roster | ✅ done |
| P1 | ratatui UI (chat, roster, themes, help overlay) | ✅ done |
| P3 | sandbox box (local / docker / multipass) + shared PTY | ✅ done |
| P4 | permissions (app drive ACL + VM unix users / sudo) | ✅ done |
| P5 | file + directory transfer into the shared session | ✅ done |
crypto parity — the load-bearing proof
$ hack-house selftest # offline: Rust SRP ≡ Python srp golden vectors
$ hack-house handshake <ip> <port> <name> --password <pw> --no-tls
/srp/verify ok — server identity proven (H_AMK ✓)
round-trip ✓ decrypted: "the house is open"
tools/gen_vectors.py regenerates the golden vectors from the live Python
library (must match the server's _ctsrp backend with rfc5054_enable()).
note: the SRP identity is always the fixed room identity
b"chat"; the display name is carried only in JSON, never in the SRP proof. The Pythonsrppackage'srfc5054_enable()toggles the active backend's flag — vectors must be generated with the same backend the server actually loads (_ctsrp).
license
MIT · malware bless · hack the planet