Remove the Goose agentic harness across the codebase per
docs/spec-native-harness.md §3. Goose made N sequential model calls inside the
sandbox (slow on CPU-only hardware) and forced an in-container→host Ollama
gateway that tripped the rootless-Podman slirp4netns loopback bug.
- bridge.py: delete _run_goose/_goose_argv/_goose_present + GOOSE_* consts and
the present-cache; __init__ now takes harness="simple"/max_turns=5; granted
!task runs _run_simple until the native loop lands (Phase 2).
- __main__.py: --harness {native,simple} (was {goose,simple}); drop
--goose-max-turns, add --max-turns; default harness simple.
- app.rs: /ai start accepts native|simple (plain aliases simple) instead of a
bare plain flag; refresh harness comments.
- sbx.rs: remove the in-container Ollama gateway (Docker host-gateway / Podman
slirp4netns host-loopback) and the dk_bootstrap OLLAMA_HOST env — kills the
slirp4netns loopback bug; drop Goose comments.
- bootstrap.sh: drop goose from the prereq probe.
- bootstrap-ai.sh: remove the entire Goose install block, --no-goose flag,
GOOSE_INSTALLER_URL, host config writer, and goose_bin helper.
- sandbox-bootstrap.sh: remove the in-sandbox Goose binary install + config.
- spec-goose-harness.md: banner — harness portion superseded; Podman stays.
cargo check + py_compile clean. No Goose refs remain (headroom/ untouched).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
hack-house
encrypted collaborative sessions with a summoned sandbox
zero-knowledge server · end-to-end fernet · srp · ratatui
they want you dependent. we want you free.
hack-house is the evolution of cmd-chat: a multi-user, end-to-end-encrypted
terminal session where a small crew shares chat, files, and — when
summoned — a disposable sandboxed Linux box they drive together, with real
Linux permissions and an owner who can delegate the keys.
The server never sees plaintext. Everything — messages, files, terminal output — is relayed as opaque ciphertext. Close the window, the house empties.
status
This is the Rust client (ratatui) for the unchanged Python (Sanic) server. The
wire protocol is JSON-over-WebSocket; SRP + HKDF→Fernet are byte-for-byte
compatible with the Python srp / cryptography stack.
| phase | feature | state |
|---|---|---|
| P0 | Rust↔Python SRP / Fernet crypto parity | ✅ proven (golden vectors + live + cross-lang E2E) |
| P2 | multi-user session (cap 4, infra for more) + authoritative roster | ✅ done |
| P1 | ratatui UI (chat, roster, themes, help overlay) | ✅ done |
| P3 | sandbox box (local / docker / multipass) + shared PTY | ✅ done |
| P4 | permissions (app drive ACL + VM unix users / sudo) | ✅ done |
| P5 | file + directory transfer into the shared session | ✅ done |
crypto parity — the load-bearing proof
$ hack-house selftest # offline: Rust SRP ≡ Python srp golden vectors
$ hack-house handshake <ip> <port> <name> --password <pw> --no-tls
/srp/verify ok — server identity proven (H_AMK ✓)
round-trip ✓ decrypted: "the house is open"
tools/gen_vectors.py regenerates the golden vectors from the live Python
library (must match the server's _ctsrp backend with rfc5054_enable()).
note: the SRP identity is always the fixed room identity
b"chat"; the display name is carried only in JSON, never in the SRP proof. The Pythonsrppackage'srfc5054_enable()toggles the active backend's flag — vectors must be generated with the same backend the server actually loads (_ctsrp).
license
MIT · malware bless · hack the planet