Begin the coven evolution of cmd-chat (see docs/spec-collaborative-sandbox.md): a Rust/ratatui client for the unchanged Python Sanic server, plus the multi-user + zero-knowledge groundwork. P0 — crypto parity (the spec's #1 risk), proven three ways: - Hand-rolled SRP-6a (NG_2048, SHA-256, rfc5054 padding) matching pysrp byte-for-byte, incl. the fixed b"chat" SRP identity and minimal-vs-256B width quirks. Golden-vector unit test + offline selftest. - Live handshake against the running server (H_AMK verified). - Cross-language E2E: Python client decrypts a Rust-encrypted Fernet message. P2 — multi-user coven (server): - CMD_CHAT_MAX_USERS capacity cap (default 4, infra-for-more). - Authoritative roster + user_joined broadcasts. - Free the slot/username on ws disconnect (was held until 1h stale sweep). Also: fix requirements.txt (was UTF-16, unparseable by pip). coven/ : Rust crate (crypto.rs proven; main.rs spike CLI: selftest/handshake/srpm) docs/ : full feature spec for the 6 requested features. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
238 lines
8.7 KiB
Rust
238 lines
8.7 KiB
Rust
//! SRP-6a + room-key crypto, byte-for-byte compatible with the Python
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//! `srp` library (NG_2048, SHA-256, `rfc5054_enable()`) and `cryptography`
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//! HKDF→Fernet as used by the Sanic server / reference client.
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//!
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//! Reference (pysrp `_pysrp.py`):
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//! x = SHA256( salt || SHA256(I || ":" || P) )
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//! k = SHA256( PAD(N) || PAD(g) ) (rfc5054: PAD to len(N))
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//! A = g^a mod N
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//! u = SHA256( PAD(A) || PAD(B) )
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//! S = (B - k*g^x)^(a + u*x) mod N
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//! K = SHA256( S )
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//! M = SHA256( (H(N) xor H(PAD(g))) || SHA256(I) || salt || A || B || K )
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//! HAMK= SHA256( A || M || K )
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//! Note: A and B inside M / HAMK use *minimal* big-endian bytes (no padding);
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//! only k and u pad to len(N) (= 256 bytes for NG_2048).
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use num_bigint::BigUint;
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use num_traits::Zero;
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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/// RFC 5054 / pysrp NG_2048 safe prime.
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const N_HEX: &str = "\
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AC6BDB41324A9A9BF166DE5E1389582FAF72B6651987EE07FC3192943DB56050A37329CBB4\
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A099ED8193E0757767A13DD52312AB4B03310DCD7F48A9DA04FD50E8083969EDB767B0CF60\
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95179A163AB3661A05FBD5FAAAE82918A9962F0B93B855F97993EC975EEAA80D740ADBF4FF\
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747359D041D5C33EA71D281E446B14773BCA97B43A23FB801676BD207A436C6481F1D2B907\
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8717461A5B9D32E688F87748544523B524B0D57D5EA77A2775D2ECFA032CFBDBF52FB37861\
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60279004E57AE6AF874E7303CE53299CCC041C7BC308D82A5698F3A8D0C38271AE35F8E9DB\
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FBB694B5C803D89F7AE435DE236D525F54759B65E372FCD68EF20FA7111F9E4AFF73";
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/// The SRP identity used by every cmd-chat / coven room (server hardcodes this).
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/// The user's chosen display name is independent of this value.
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pub const SRP_IDENTITY: &[u8] = b"chat";
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fn n() -> BigUint {
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BigUint::parse_bytes(N_HEX.as_bytes(), 16).expect("valid N")
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}
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fn g() -> BigUint {
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BigUint::from(2u32)
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}
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fn sha256(parts: &[&[u8]]) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut h = Sha256::new();
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for p in parts {
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h.update(p);
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}
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h.finalize().to_vec()
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}
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/// Left-pad `b` with zero bytes to exactly `width` bytes.
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fn pad(b: &[u8], width: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
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if b.len() >= width {
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return b.to_vec();
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}
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let mut out = vec![0u8; width - b.len()];
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out.extend_from_slice(b);
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out
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}
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fn bytes_to_long(b: &[u8]) -> BigUint {
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BigUint::from_bytes_be(b)
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}
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/// pysrp `long_to_bytes`: minimal big-endian, empty for zero.
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fn long_to_bytes(x: &BigUint) -> Vec<u8> {
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if x.is_zero() {
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return Vec::new();
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}
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x.to_bytes_be()
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}
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/// Multiplier k = SHA256(PAD(N) || PAD(g)), padded to len(N).
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fn compute_k(n: &BigUint) -> BigUint {
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let width = long_to_bytes(n).len();
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let nb = pad(&long_to_bytes(n), width);
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let gb = pad(&long_to_bytes(&g()), width);
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bytes_to_long(&sha256(&[&nb, &gb]))
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}
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/// x = SHA256(salt || SHA256(I || ":" || P)).
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fn gen_x(salt: &[u8], username: &[u8], password: &[u8]) -> BigUint {
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let inner = sha256(&[username, b":", password]);
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bytes_to_long(&sha256(&[salt, &inner]))
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}
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/// (H(N) xor H(PAD(g))) used inside M.
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fn hn_xor_g(n: &BigUint) -> Vec<u8> {
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let width = long_to_bytes(n).len();
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let h_n = sha256(&[&long_to_bytes(n)]);
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let h_g = sha256(&[&pad(&long_to_bytes(&g()), width)]);
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h_n.iter().zip(h_g.iter()).map(|(a, b)| a ^ b).collect()
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}
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/// Client-side SRP-6a state.
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pub struct SrpClient {
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username: Vec<u8>,
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password: Vec<u8>,
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n: BigUint,
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k: BigUint,
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a: BigUint,
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pub a_pub: BigUint, // A
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}
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impl SrpClient {
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/// New client with a random 256-byte ephemeral `a` (high bit set, per pysrp).
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pub fn new(username: &[u8], password: &[u8]) -> Self {
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let mut buf = [0u8; 256];
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rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rand::thread_rng(), &mut buf);
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buf[0] |= 0x80;
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Self::with_a(username, password, &buf)
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}
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/// Deterministic constructor for test vectors.
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pub fn with_a(username: &[u8], password: &[u8], a_bytes: &[u8]) -> Self {
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let n = n();
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let k = compute_k(&n);
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let a = bytes_to_long(a_bytes);
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let a_pub = g().modpow(&a, &n);
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Self {
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username: username.to_vec(),
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password: password.to_vec(),
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n,
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k,
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a,
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a_pub,
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}
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}
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/// Wire bytes for A (minimal big-endian).
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pub fn a_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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long_to_bytes(&self.a_pub)
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}
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/// Process the server challenge (salt, B). Returns (M, K, H_AMK_expected).
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/// `M` is sent to the server; `h_amk` is compared to the server's reply.
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pub fn process_challenge(
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&self,
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salt: &[u8],
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b_bytes: &[u8],
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) -> anyhow::Result<Challenge> {
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let n = &self.n;
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let width = long_to_bytes(n).len();
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let big_b = bytes_to_long(b_bytes);
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if (&big_b % n).is_zero() {
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anyhow::bail!("SRP safety check failed: B mod N == 0");
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}
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let a_min = long_to_bytes(&self.a_pub);
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let b_min = long_to_bytes(&big_b);
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let u = bytes_to_long(&sha256(&[&pad(&a_min, width), &pad(&b_min, width)]));
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if u.is_zero() {
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anyhow::bail!("SRP safety check failed: u == 0");
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}
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let x = gen_x(salt, &self.username, &self.password);
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let v = g().modpow(&x, n);
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// base = (B - k*v) mod N, kept non-negative.
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let kv = (&self.k * &v) % n;
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let base = ((&big_b % n) + n - kv) % n;
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let exp = &self.a + &u * &x;
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let s = base.modpow(&exp, n);
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let k_key = sha256(&[&long_to_bytes(&s)]);
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let m = sha256(&[
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&hn_xor_g(n),
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&sha256(&[&self.username]),
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salt,
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&a_min,
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&b_min,
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&k_key,
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]);
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let h_amk = sha256(&[&a_min, &m, &k_key]);
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Ok(Challenge {
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m,
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session_key: k_key,
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h_amk,
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})
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}
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}
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pub struct Challenge {
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pub m: Vec<u8>,
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pub session_key: Vec<u8>,
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pub h_amk: Vec<u8>,
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}
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// ── Room key: HKDF-SHA256(password, salt=room_salt, info) → Fernet ──────────
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/// Derive the shared room Fernet key exactly as the reference client:
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/// `Fernet(urlsafe_b64( HKDF(SHA256, 32, room_salt, "cmd-chat-room-key")(pw) ))`.
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pub fn room_fernet(password: &[u8], room_salt: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<fernet::Fernet> {
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use base64::Engine;
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let hk = hkdf::Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(Some(room_salt), password);
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let mut okm = [0u8; 32];
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hk.expand(b"cmd-chat-room-key", &mut okm)
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.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("hkdf expand failed"))?;
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let key_b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE.encode(okm);
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fernet::Fernet::new(&key_b64).ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid fernet key"))
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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// Golden vectors generated from the live Python `srp` (_ctsrp backend),
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// rfc5054 enabled, NG_2048, SHA-256. See tools/gen_vectors.py.
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const PW: &[u8] = b"labtest";
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const USER: &[u8] = b"chat";
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const SALT_HEX: &str = "0a1b2c3d";
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const A_HEX: &str = "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";
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const B_HEX: &str = "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";
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const M_HEX: &str = "6e733ba88eb86c52e3be89207d2815a65b4dea8116f668af5de1b66ce1f047dd";
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const HAMK_HEX: &str = "649a7d46bb9210483e0489b7f9e6fb300a6cddd6381b018fa81770076169a837";
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const K_HEX: &str = "a12218af3fda651aa3c094a4db474a5eee919496c3ae8d38a4f6be1104ed4928";
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fn a_bytes() -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut v = vec![0x80u8];
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v.extend(std::iter::repeat(0x22u8).take(31));
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v
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}
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#[test]
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fn srp_matches_pysrp_vectors() {
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let c = SrpClient::with_a(USER, PW, &a_bytes());
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assert_eq!(hex::encode(c.a_bytes()), A_HEX, "A mismatch");
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let salt = hex::decode(SALT_HEX).unwrap();
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let b = hex::decode(B_HEX).unwrap();
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let ch = c.process_challenge(&salt, &b).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(hex::encode(&ch.session_key), K_HEX, "K mismatch");
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assert_eq!(hex::encode(&ch.m), M_HEX, "M mismatch");
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assert_eq!(hex::encode(&ch.h_amk), HAMK_HEX, "H_AMK mismatch");
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}
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}
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