leetcrypt
15aa2027c4
The docker/podman headless-container desktop (XFCE + TigerVNC + websockify + noVNC published on host 127.0.0.1:6080) is removed. It was unreliable: the desktop stack installed asynchronously during provisioning with every step wrapped in `|| true` (silent failures), while the host port mapping existed the moment the container ran — so opening the browser before websockify bound 6080 inside the container reset the connection (ERR_CONNECTION_RESET), with no readiness signal and no loud failure. Containers also can't be rendered as a real desktop by VirtualBox (no framebuffer/display), so the only desktop path that stays is the native VirtualBox VM GUI. Removed: - sbx.rs: GUI_PORT const; PortHolder/port_holder()/kill_port_holder() (the port-consent gate existed only for the noVNC publish); the `gui` param + `-p 127.0.0.1:6080:6080` block in prepare(); HH_SBX_GUI env in dk_bootstrap(); the `gui` param on provision(). - app.rs: PendingGuiLaunch + PortPrompt structs; the port_prompt App field; the `gui` field on PendingSudoLaunch; the port-consent modal + the sudo-submit port check; want_gui/gui parsing + the container-GUI launch message; `gui` threaded through spawn_launch and all call sites. - sandbox-bootstrap.sh: the entire HH_SBX_GUI=1 desktop block. - ui.rs / usage strings: dropped "[gui]"/"noVNC desktop" from the docker/podman help and the /sbx usage line. Kept (unchanged): the VirtualBox VM GUI — gui_launch() (VBoxManage startvm --type gui), launch_vbox_gui, `/sbx vbox gui <vm>` and the `/sbx gui` alias. The `gui` keyword is still stripped from positionals so `/sbx vbox gui <vm>` parses. cargo check passes clean (no warnings). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
hack-house
encrypted collaborative sessions with a summoned sandbox
zero-knowledge server · end-to-end fernet · srp · ratatui
they want you dependent. we want you free.
hack-house is the evolution of cmd-chat: a multi-user, end-to-end-encrypted
terminal session where a small crew shares chat, files, and — when
summoned — a disposable sandboxed Linux box they drive together, with real
Linux permissions and an owner who can delegate the keys.
The server never sees plaintext. Everything — messages, files, terminal output — is relayed as opaque ciphertext. Close the window, the house empties.
status
This is the Rust client (ratatui) for the unchanged Python (Sanic) server. The
wire protocol is JSON-over-WebSocket; SRP + HKDF→Fernet are byte-for-byte
compatible with the Python srp / cryptography stack.
| phase | feature | state |
|---|---|---|
| P0 | Rust↔Python SRP / Fernet crypto parity | ✅ proven (golden vectors + live + cross-lang E2E) |
| P2 | multi-user session (cap 4, infra for more) + authoritative roster | ✅ done |
| P1 | ratatui UI (chat, roster, themes, help overlay) | ✅ done |
| P3 | sandbox box (local / docker / multipass) + shared PTY | ✅ done |
| P4 | permissions (app drive ACL + VM unix users / sudo) | ✅ done |
| P5 | file + directory transfer into the shared session | ✅ done |
crypto parity — the load-bearing proof
$ hack-house selftest # offline: Rust SRP ≡ Python srp golden vectors
$ hack-house handshake <ip> <port> <name> --password <pw> --no-tls
/srp/verify ok — server identity proven (H_AMK ✓)
round-trip ✓ decrypted: "the house is open"
tools/gen_vectors.py regenerates the golden vectors from the live Python
library (must match the server's _ctsrp backend with rfc5054_enable()).
note: the SRP identity is always the fixed room identity
b"chat"; the display name is carried only in JSON, never in the SRP proof. The Pythonsrppackage'srfc5054_enable()toggles the active backend's flag — vectors must be generated with the same backend the server actually loads (_ctsrp).
license
MIT · malware bless · hack the planet