hack-house/cmd_chat/client
leetcrypt 2c4a4f9a22
Some checks are pending
CI / rust client (hh) (macos-latest) (push) Waiting to run
CI / rust client (hh) (ubuntu-latest) (push) Waiting to run
CI / rust coverage (push) Waiting to run
CI / python server (3.10) (push) Waiting to run
CI / python server (3.11) (push) Waiting to run
CI / python server (3.12) (push) Waiting to run
CI / headless e2e smoke (push) Waiting to run
CI / dependency audit (push) Waiting to run
CI / secret scanning (push) Waiting to run
harden(ft,auth,net): cap transfers/frames, evict stale SRP, distrust XFF
M1: enforce the declared transfer size (clamped to MAX_SIZE) on chunk
receipt in both the Rust and Python clients — a malicious sender can no
longer grow the receive buffer unboundedly.
M2: only honor X-Forwarded-For when TRUST_PROXY is set, so a direct
client can't spoof a source IP to dodge the per-IP rate limiter.
M3: evict unverified SRP sessions after a 60s TTL on each new handshake,
preventing half-finished auths from exhausting memory.
M4: drop WS frames larger than 256 KB before they hit the store or
broadcast, bounding per-message memory and flood blast radius.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-05 06:59:16 -07:00
..
__init__.py feat(agent): model-agnostic AI agent bridge (PoC) + pin lets-hack demo to main 2026-06-01 02:05:48 -07:00
client.py harden(ft,auth,net): cap transfers/frames, evict stale SRP, distrust XFF 2026-06-05 06:59:16 -07:00