readline repaints its prompt in place with a lone \r (…└─# \r└─# cmd); the
browser turned that \r into a newline, stacking the pre-redraw prompt as a
phantom extra line (the mobile-only "extra --#"). Add a collapseCR() mini-vt
pass that resolves \r as a column-0 overwrite (ANSI escapes treated as
zero-width so colours survive; honours \x1b[K erase-to-EOL) before ansiToHtml,
so the real prompt stays and only the duplicate is dropped. TUI was already
correct via its real vt emulator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
termux-bootstrap.sh: one-shot on-device installer (pkg cryptography to avoid a
rust build, pure/wheeled pip deps, no srp C-ext, wake-lock, hh alias, Phase-0
preflight) — verified green on the Fairphone.
phone-capture.sh: auto-detect the adb device serial instead of assuming :5555,
since Wireless Debugging uses a dynamic port; target that serial for
screencap/screenrecord/pull. Clarified the pairing help to use the Tailscale IP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
User-facing how-to distinct from the design spec: the port-probe reachability
gate, one-time Termux setup + tar-over-ssh sync, the hh launcher grammar,
per-directory direnv auto-host, the mobile web console, phone-capture.sh routes
(non-root file/term/webshot vs ADB shot/screen), and the Fairphone skill
ship-list. Linked from termux-operator.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Laptop-side capture tool that SSHes into the phone. Non-root routes work from
the Termux app uid (file pull via tar-over-ssh, tmux capture-pane, headless
chromium webshot of the hh web console); shot/screen use ADB (Wireless
Debugging) since screencap/screenrecord can't reach SurfaceFlinger as an app
uid. --tg [target] ships any artifact to Telegram via video-toolkit tg-send.sh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a single `hh` launcher (host/join/web/status/stop + operator
passthrough) and a direnv snippet so `cd`-ing into a project dir
auto-hosts a room named after it. Verified live on the Fairphone:
two rooms coexist on port-scoped tmux windows (manual :8799 +
direnv :8801), status health-checks each via curl (ss/netstat are
unreliable on Android), stop-all tears down cleanly.
Termux notes baked in: no /usr/bin/env (invoke via the `hh` alias,
not the shebang); status enumerates operator daemons under
$TMPDIR/hh-bridge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encode the robust way to reach + drive the phone in CLAUDE.md and the
hh-operator skill (which had no mobile section at all):
- One canonical hardened ssh prefix (ConnectTimeout/BatchMode/accept-new)
that never hangs and dodges the wrong-alias trap.
- Reachability gate probes the TCP port, NOT `tailscale status` — the
tailnet shows fairphone-6 "active" even when Android has killed
backgrounded Termux and sshd is dead (observed live).
- Fix-is-on-device guidance (termux-wake-lock) instead of retrying a dead
port; Termux env quirks (no /tmp, no rustc, skip srp).
- Status advanced: phone can both JOIN and HOST rooms (server-side SRP
shim) + the stdlib mobile web console mirrors a real room.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The srp package's C-extension has no aarch64/bionic wheel, so a phone in
Termux couldn't run the room server. Add the server side of SRP-6a
(create_salted_verification_key + Verifier) to the pure-Python shim and
fall srp_auth.py back to it on ImportError.
Proven live: a laptop (C-ext srp client) authenticated against a room
HOSTED ON THE PHONE (pure Verifier) over Tailscale — cross-implementation
handshake with matching session keys. Locked in with interop tests
covering real-client-vs-pure-Verifier, pure-vs-pure, and a wrong-password
negative control.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rebuild the web UI into a room mirror that looks/feels like the TUI:
tabbed Terminal + Chat, a live shared-sandbox terminal pane (polls
/api/screen, client-side ANSI/SGR render), keystroke drive with quick
keys + a command line (POST /api/keys), roster and a driver/watching
badge. Read-only until the room /grants this operator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add `operator web` — a stdlib-only http.server shim over the control
socket so a phone browser can drive a room: message bubbles, live
long-poll updates, roster, and a real text box (GET /, /api/events,
/api/status, POST /api/say). Solves the Termux input gap where the
tmux `read --wait` loop is read-only. Binds 127.0.0.1 by default since
the socket grants room-send.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The phone is a live SSH host on the tailnet, so on-device Phase-0 work can be
driven directly — not "paste it back". Document the verified reachability
(fairphone-6 100.95.202.68:8022, user u0_a203, ~/.ssh/phone-deploy), the
wrong-alias trap (`phone` points at an offline device), Termux env facts, the
rust-free dep install, and the tar-over-ssh staging so future sessions check
reachability first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
scripts/termux-preflight.py runs the docs/termux-operator.md §0.1-0.5 checks on
the phone and prints a PASS/FAIL report: python>=3.11, requests/rich/websockets
import, cryptography+Fernet round-trip (version floor treated as soft), srp
C-ext OR the pure shim, that client/operator import without the server stack,
and an AF_UNIX bind under the $TMPDIR runtime root. Makes the one remaining
on-device Phase-0 step a single command. Exits non-zero on any hard failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
runtime_root() fell back to /tmp, which does not exist on Android/Termux, so the
daemon's control.sock would land in an unwritable path. Fall back
XDG_RUNTIME_DIR -> TMPDIR -> /tmp; Termux sets TMPDIR to $PREFIX/tmp. No change
on a normal box (TMPDIR is typically unset there). Enables the Phase 1
join/read/say socket to work on-device.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
cmd_chat/__init__.py eagerly imported run_server (sanic/pydantic) and Client,
so any `cmd_chat.*` import — including `python -m cmd_chat.operator` — pulled
the server stack at package init. On a phone/Termux operator that installs only
the operator deps (and where srp may be unbuildable), this failed before the
client's pure-SRP fallback could help.
Make both imports lazy inside main()'s serve/connect branches. The operator
path now imports cleanly with srp/sanic/pydantic all absent (client falls back
to _srp_pure). Add a subprocess regression test to keep it that way.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator-only dependency subset (requests, rich, websockets, cryptography>=41,
srp) so the C-heavy cryptography>=46 server pin can be satisfied by Termux's
packaged build. Server requirements.txt is left unchanged. srp is best-effort:
the client falls back to the pure-Python shim when it can't be built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SRP fails silently on any constant/hash mismatch, so gate the shim with a live
handshake: (1) pure User vs the real srp.Verifier, (2) a negative wrong-password
control, and (3) the full /srp/init -> /srp/verify HTTP flow against the real
server routes (backed by the real srp lib). All assert the phone operator
authenticates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wrap `import srp` so a missing C-extension (e.g. Termux/aarch64) transparently
loads _srp_pure as srp. No call-site changes — the shim mirrors the srp API.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The `srp` PyPI package is a C extension with no reliable aarch64 wheel and
often fails to build under Termux. Vendor _srp_pure.py, a stdlib-only port of
srp._pysrp with rfc5054_enable() active, exposing the exact client surface
client.py uses (rfc5054_enable, SHA256, User with start_authentication /
process_challenge / verify_session / authenticated).
Constants (N/g/k), x/u derivation, M1 and H_AMK match srp byte-for-byte —
verified by a live handshake of this pure User against the real srp Verifier
(the same backend the server runs).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phased plan (P0 dependency spike → P1 read-only presence → P2 sandbox drive →
P3 remote-provider autonomy → P4 persistence) for joining a room as a user from
Termux. Grounded in the real SRP/Fernet/ws client and the operate provider path.
Covers the srp aarch64 build risk + pure-Python SRP fallback, the cryptography
pin workaround, and Tailscale / reverse-SSH / port-forward reachability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rarity was inflating to 65% Legendary: the loop mass-produces ~70 near-clone
VMs that look near-identical on every axis, so no absolute PowerScore threshold
can create scarcity within that cluster. Fix (option C, hybrid):
- grade_curve() is now the primary rarity mechanism — a population quota
(Leg 8 / Epic 15 / Rare 25 / Uncommon 27 / Common 25%) ranked by PowerScore
with a deterministic label-seed tiebreak. Yields a clean 8/15/26/27/24%
pyramid. Rebuilds each card's rarity-dependent name + flavor via _apply_rarity.
- Absolute RARITY_TIERS kept as a single-card (--label) fallback, recalibrated.
- Dead axes repaired: _pedigree now derives from author lineage (human/hh-loop/
pulled/smoke) instead of a flat 2.0; _heft rescaled to a 512MB log reference
so it spreads instead of pinning mid-size VMs at the cap.
cardimg: apply grade_curve to the gallery so rendered cards match hh-cardex,
plus the interactive 3D flip-card gallery (--flip: front dossier / back stats).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Grow the hh card-art library so common VM types stop reusing one portrait.
- scripts/imgharvest.py: keyless DuckDuckGo image-search harvester — downloads
many stills per character and runs them through charvest's crop/quality/dedup
pipeline (static art crops far cleaner than motion-blurred video frames).
- scripts/harvest_roster.sh: batch roster (Pokemon/Digimon/Yu-Gi-Oh) sized to
the live VM card types. Library now 37 characters / 99 portraits.
- charvest: top-anchor the head+shoulders crop for tall full-body art so faces
are no longer clipped.
chardex matcher — stop same-type VMs collapsing onto a single face:
- fold a per-(VM,character) hash jitter INTO the score, not just a tie-break
- diminishing returns on extra type matches so a strong single-type face can
compete with a dual-type one
- halve tier affinity and cap the keyword bonus
- stop-word rarity/boilerplate words that were polluting keyword overlap
Result: 20 distinct faces across the library. The one remaining cluster
(Sigilyph on the Psychic/Flying recon-scanner VMs) is coherent purpose-
matching — a scanner-themed bird on the scanner VMs — not a bug.
NOTE: assets/characters/ are third-party franchise IP with NO established reuse
license — quarantined, internal WIP only, do not distribute/merge/publish
(licensing record in docs/character-art-licensing.md).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Map the loop's "high value" guidance onto the measurable cardex model
(completeness/reusability/richness/pedigree/heft) and target Epic≥650 /
Legendary≥825. Stamp usage/setup/entrypoint + ≥4 provenance notes in the
manifest, drop --todo at done, and score each card before moving on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a status field to Card (from the registry entry) and render it as a
done/in-progress pill on the card art. Add `cardimg --gallery`: render every
VM as an inline-SVG card and lay them out in one self-contained index.html
grid (sorted by rarity, with a spread tally) for browser viewing / screenshot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Retune cardex against the live 24-VM library: the old rubric tied 11 VMs at
615 Rare (completeness/reusability maxed for any done+shareable VM, only heft
varied). Rebalance the five sub-score caps (richness 20→30 becomes the
discriminator via per-tag CAPABILITY_WEIGHT; heft log2-scaled) and recalibrate
the rarity thresholds. Library now spreads 2 Legendary / 3 Epic / 16 Rare /
2 Uncommon / 2 Common instead of a single fat Rare band.
Add cmd_chat/cardimg.py: render a Card as a collectible trading-card image.
Free + local-first — a hand-built SVG frame (rarity holo, type badges, 6 stat
bars, dex#, flavor) plus a deterministic procedural creature sigil that needs
no network, rasterized to PNG via local cairosvg/ImageMagick. Pluggable art
backends are opt-in: free hosted Pollinations flux, and key-gated paid
Stability / OpenAI / RunwayML. Every backend only fills the portrait window,
so a card always renders fully offline; failures fall back to the sigil.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Curated 10-brief queue (crypto-ctf, osint-recon, web-fuzz, log-ir-triage,
pcap-forensics, password-audit, threat-intel, vuln-flask, net-scan,
yara-triage) used by hh-loop to build + publish 10 in-depth, verified,
self-describing security VMs to the host registry.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each brief encodes a meticulous-value contract (real software install + real
baked dataset + offline self-test + status:done manifest) so loop output scores
high on the cardex rubric instead of being shallow stubs. Security-focused and
distinct from the existing library.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the autonomous /loop foundation: a headless `hack-house sbx save|publish`
subcommand so a non-TUI operator can persist a built VM to the host library
through the same canonical registry path the room UI uses (no schema drift).
- snapshot.rs: hoist register_saved_snapshot/publish_snapshot/oci_image_size out
of app.rs into a shared module used by both the TUI and the new CLI.
- registry.rs: advisory cross-process lockfile (~/.hh/registry.lock, O_EXCL spin
+ stale-reclaim) around every read-modify-write, plus atomic temp+rename store,
so concurrent /loop wave members can't clobber each other.
- main.rs: `Sbx { Save, Publish }` subcommand wired to the shared snapshot logic.
- skills/hh-loop: the loop doctrine — value rubric, adaptive 1-3 operator
topology, visible-tmux-by-default run flow, --record logs/film, wave scaling,
and safe `tmux -L hh-loop` teardown.
Proven end-to-end: built+verified a stdlib VM in a sandbox, headless
save+publish -> registry entry shareable:true with a portable tar.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deterministic value model over the host VM registry: a weighted five-axis
rubric (completeness/reusability/richness/pedigree/heft) yields a PowerScore
0-1000, an absolute-threshold rarity tier, a 6-stat block, an elemental type
from tags, and a stable procedural name + dex number. Pure stdlib, no model,
no network — same VM always mints the same card. Image pipeline lands next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The operator brain was Claude-only: spawn launched the claude CLI and let its
own loop drive the room. This adds the other first-class brain — a native
tool-calling loop (cmd_chat/operator/harness.py) that runs ANY function-calling
Provider (cmd_chat.ai) against an OPERATOR_TOOLS schema wired to the existing
bridge control verbs (say/exec/write/get/keys/screen/watch/manifest). No CLI
install, no creds carry.
The harness is a driver, not a new side-effect surface: every tool handler sends
the same control-socket request the hh-bridge CLI already sends, so the bridge
keeps enforcing grant-before-drive, the sandbox blast radius, and the recursion
budget. Layer-1 capabilities come from CAPABILITIES.md (the same portable
contract), and a per-agent token ceiling is enforced as a hard stop. Providers
that can't function-call are refused with a clear message rather than degrading
to prose.
New `operate` verb joins via the existing daemon socket and runs the loop with a
--profile or --provider/--model brain. Chat's native loop is left untouched
(self-contained harness over the shared Provider core, not a risky extraction).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The operator's capabilities contract was Claude-only — delivered via the
hh-operator skill, which non-Claude runners cannot load. Extract it into a
portable CAPABILITIES.md and make compose_directive runner-aware: the claude
runner still loads its skill, every other runner gets the capabilities prompt
inlined. Same contract, no skill machinery required.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generalize the three Claude-hardcoded spots in bootstrap (launch argv,
install plan, creds/config-dir) behind a Runner registry so a nested
operator can be spawned with any agent CLI. The Claude path stays the
default and byte-identical.
- bootstrap.Runner + RUNNERS{claude,codex,gemini,cmd} + get_runner/runner_present
- build_run_argv / install_plan / creds_source / plan_creds / child_env all
take an optional `runner` (default claude → unchanged behaviour)
- claude validated end-to-end; codex/gemini are best-effort defaults
overridable via $HH_<RUNNER>_INSTALL etc.; generic `cmd` runner reads a
full launch template from $HH_OPERATOR_CMD ({directive} placeholder)
- bridge _op_spawn resolves req["runner"], rejects unknown; plan now carries
runner/runner_present (was claude_present)
- CLI: `spawn --runner {claude|codex|gemini|cmd}`
- 7 new unit tests; full suite 132 passed
Note: compose_directive still emits the Claude-flavoured ("hh-operator
skill") directive — the portable Layer-1 prompt is P4.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move providers.py + profiles.py from cmd_chat/agent/ to a shared
cmd_chat/ai/ package so the operator bridge and the /ai chat agent can
consume one model-agnostic Provider core (groundwork for harness-mode
operators). Pure refactor — no behaviour change.
- cmd_chat/ai/{providers,profiles}.py: the canonical modules (moved verbatim)
- cmd_chat/ai/__init__.py: re-exports the public API
- cmd_chat/agent/{providers,profiles}.py: thin back-compat shims re-exporting
from cmd_chat.ai (keeps `from cmd_chat.agent.providers import …` working,
e.g. hh/scripts/bench-native-harness.py)
- internal agent consumers (memory/bridge/__main__/__init__) point at cmd_chat.ai
125 tests pass; shim identity verified (re-exports are the same objects).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CLAUDE.md operating guide (room/operator/manifest/VM-registry map +
demo-toolkit pointers) and docs/model-agnostic-operator-plan.md — the
phased spec to let any function-calling model operate a room, not just
Claude (hoist Provider core, harness-mode operator, runner registry,
portable CAPABILITIES, role presets, MCP).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase A: host-global VM registry (~/.hh/registry.json) joining opaque
snapshots to their .hh-agent manifests. New src/registry.rs (serde_json),
one Entry per saved VM with cached purpose/status/todo scraped from the
live container at save time. Reconcile-on-read self-evicts pruned images.
/sbx browse TUI lister + operator-side `registry list|show` reader.
Phase B: trading/skill VMs. Entry gains shareable/tags/share_path +
publish/get/list_shareable helpers. New TUI verbs /sbx publish <label>
[tag...], /sbx catalog @user, /sbx pull @user <label>. Wire protocol adds
_sbx:catreq/catalog/pullreq frames (parse_sbx). Receiver auto-loads a
received hh-snap-*.tar, reads the in-image manifest, and self-registers
(kept shareable for re-trade). Reuses the existing E2E /send + ft.rs
streaming transport.
podman gotcha fixed: `podman load` prints registry-qualified
`localhost/hh-snap:<label>` vs docker's bare tag — parse_loaded_tag now
finds the hh-snap: marker anywhere in the line (unit-tested both shapes).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
First functional bench run crashed 0/3 on two latent bench-only bugs:
(1) the Phase-4 token-count change made complete_with_tools return
(text, calls, usage), but the bench preflight still unpacked 2 values;
(2) make_bridge never stubbed _send_sbx_input, so the PTY-mirror
visibility feature hit ws=None and raised AttributeError on every tool
call. Stub it to capture mirrored lines for --verbose.
After the fix: 2/3 pass (write+read, script+run). mkdir+list still
fails — local-backend run_shell CWD divergence + 3B model churn, not a
working-memory regression.
Sprint: native-harness-working-memory (bench) — see also 46e5620, dc6317f, c83abbe
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add ICM-aligned agent-manifest tooling so a hack-house sandbox/VM can be
shared, traded, and resumed without a human briefing. manifest.py is a
dependency-light (stdlib + optional PyYAML) library + CLI that writes a
`.hh-agent/` bundle: manifest.yaml (canonical machine record) plus rendered
AGENT.md / last-state.md / summary.md / goals.yaml views.
Wire a `manifest` op into the operator bridge (push/pull/update) that moves the
bundle in and out of the *target sandbox* via the same exec path as write/get,
so the VM itself carries its purpose, goals, user intent, live state, and a
provenance chain — the unit of agent-to-agent work transmission. Pairs with
`spawn`: stamp → push → hand a child "load the .hh-agent manifest and continue."
Proven end-to-end against a real Kali podman container (push → on-disk verify →
update → pull-back) and covered by 6 new offline tests (34 green total).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the remote-drive triad for a broker-owned sandbox the operator can't
exec into directly: keys (in) → watch (wait) → screen (out).
- _sbx:data PTY-relay frames are absorbed into a capped rolling terminal buffer
(not surfaced as chat); `screen` returns it ansi-stripped (or raw). sandbox.
strip_ansi handles CSI/OSC/CR noise so output greps cleanly.
- `watch` is a formal stop-condition engine: blocks until a regex matches in the
screen buffer or chat events, or an idle-quiescence window, or a hard timeout,
then reports which fired — the autonomy loop's principled wait.
- Skill doctrine updated with the type→wait→read relay loop.
28 offline tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lets an operator stand up a nested Claude Code operator against another room —
a tree of operators — behind hard guardrails:
- Budget(depth, fanout, cost): depth/fanout are hard caps decremented on every
descend(); a leaf (depth 0) or a spent level (fanout 0) refuses to spawn,
stopping a runaway tree. Cost is carried down as a soft ceiling.
- detect_system / install_plan: decide install from what's present; prefer the
documented npm package `@anthropic-ai/claude-code` or a $HH_CLAUDE_INSTALL
override — never a guessed URL.
- Credentials are gated OFF by default: a child authenticates itself unless the
operator explicitly passes allow_creds, and only its own creds, only to a path
it was handed.
- compose_directive bakes the objective, stop conditions and inherited budget
into the child's `claude -p` prompt so it self-limits.
`spawn` op + CLI verb default to a dry-run plan (inspect the tree before growing
it); `--go` launches detached on the host. `up`/`serve` take --depth/--fanout/
--cost. 24 offline tests green; dry-run plan verified live through the socket.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reusable SKILL.md any Claude Code session can invoke to drive a hack-house
room via the hh-bridge CLI: join, the read --wait → decide → say operator loop,
the permission-gated sandbox drive (exec/write/get + shared-PTY keystrokes),
and an embedded keystroke cheat-sheet centred on the stop-vocabulary
(ctrl-c/ctrl-d/ctrl-z/ctrl-\, esc, pager q, vim :q) so every session knows how
to end a stuck program up-front.
/loop autonomy is folded in as the "indefinite watch" pattern with an explicit
stop-condition vocabulary — the long-poll primitive + persistent daemon from
Phase 1 already support it, so no extra machinery. Symlinked into
~/.claude/skills/ for global reuse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-located mode: the operator launches its own podman/docker container and
execs into it out-of-band (argv-identical to the native harness), exposed as
`sbx launch|status|down`, `exec`, `write`, `get`. When granted, it can also
drive the room's broker-owned container directly on the same host.
Relay mode primitive: `keys` injects raw bytes into the shared PTY via the
same `_sbx:input` frame a human driver emits — full keyboard control incl. the
stop-vocabulary (ctrl-c/ctrl-d/ctrl-z/ctrl-\, esc, arrows, pager q). A compact
per-session cheat-sheet (`sandbox.KEYS_HELP`, `keys --help-keys`) documents
what each inject does and how to end a stuck program, token-efficiently.
Gating: exec/write/get refuse a host (`local`) inherited from the room; the
room sandbox is only driven when `granted`. Keystrokes are inert until granted.
17 offline tests green; e2e verified against real podman (launch→exec→write→
get round-trip→teardown) and through the CLI socket.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 4 (final) of the native-harness working-memory sprint. OllamaProvider
.complete_with_tools now returns (text, calls, usage), surfacing the response's
real prompt_eval_count/eval_count (free — already in the payload). The native loop
EMA-smooths real/estimate into self._tok_ratio (clamped [0.5,3.0]) and prunes
against native_token_budget / ratio, so context budgeting tracks the TRUE window
instead of the systematic bias of the len//4 char estimate. Providers that omit
counts leave the ratio at 1.0, so behaviour is unchanged where unavailable — a
free correctness win, no regression. RAM-only, no disk, no new network frames.
Scope note: touches only cmd_chat/agent/ + providers — disjoint from the parallel
feat(operator) work on this branch, so it merges/reverts independently by path.
Sprint: native-harness-working-memory (Phase 4/4) — see also 46e5620, dc6317f
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3 of the working-memory sprint. _prune_native_messages now compacts in two
stages instead of only evicting whole turns: Stage 1 digests OLD tool-role outputs
to a one-line summary (exit marker + first error line, else first line) via the new
_digest_tool_output; Stage 2 falls back to oldest-first whole-message eviction only
if still over budget. Tool outputs are the biggest context hog, and digesting keeps
the action->result causal chain intact, so whole-turn eviction (which severs it)
becomes a last resort. The pinned head/TASK and the recent keep_recent window
(including the most recent tool output, verbatim) are still never touched.
Return is now (messages, dropped, digested); the sole caller logs both. Clean-room
counterpart to Goose's tool-output condensation track. RAM-only, no disk.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Invert the agent model: a headless OperatorBridge(Client) owns the
websocket while a Claude Code session drives it via a unix control
socket. Reuses Client SRP/Fernet and AgentBridge's reconnect/serve
shape. Ships an hh-bridge CLI (up/read/say/roster/status/down) with a
seq'd in-RAM inbox + asyncio.Condition long-poll (read --wait) for
in-turn autonomy. ACL/sandbox-status frames are recorded for later
phases. Sandbox drive, delegation and nesting are out of scope here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1+2 of the native-harness working-memory sprint. All per-task state is
process RAM only (dies with the task, same lifecycle as MemoryIndex) — no disk,
consistent with the agent's encrypted-transmission / nothing-saved posture.
Phase 1 — _WorkSet dataclass holds what the loop kept re-deriving: sandbox
cwd/shell, files written/read, a failure ledger (cmd -> exit+category), and the
last good command. Discovered cwd/shell carry across tasks in-process via
self._sbx_known (RAM fallback grounding). _render_workset re-surfaces this into
the repair-turn system prompt so it survives context pruning without a NOTES.md
on disk. Folds the old reads_seen set into wset.files_read.
Phase 2 — semantic stuck/loop detection via _action_signature (run_shell keys on
the command, write_file on path+content-hash so real edits aren't repeats,
read_file on path). Aborts honestly when an action fails >=2x verbatim (model
ignoring REPAIR_STANCE) or the same (action,outcome) repeats >=3x, instead of
burning the turn cap re-running a dead action. Verified fix-and-retry does not
false-trip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bench/ native-harness benchmark suite is dev-internal test tooling tightly
coupled to the local tmux + podman test rig, so untrack it and ignore /bench/
entirely (harness code AND result artifacts) — it stays on disk for local use
but no longer ships to origin. Also keep ignoring /docs/plans/ (local planning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reorder _CODER_MODELS to prefer the 3b coder build over 1.5b. The 3b roughly
doubles the ground-truth pass rate on the verify-then-repair native harness
(bench: 7/9 vs ~4/9 over the 9 non-net tasks) at a modest CPU-latency cost,
so it is auto-selected ahead of 1.5b when present. 7b was evaluated and
rejected: too slow to first-token inside the engage window on the CPU-only box.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two clean-room reimplementations layered onto the native `!task` loop
(`_run_native`), aimed at lifting a weak CPU-bound local model's autonomous
pass rate. No code copied from the GPL sources studied; MIT throughout.
NightShift-derived verify-then-repair gate:
- `_classify_failure` maps a failing tool result to a (category, fix-hint) so
the repair nudge names a concrete cause/next-action instead of "exited N".
- `_relevant_excerpt` keeps the error-relevant tail of a FAILING run_shell
result within the byte budget (the real error is usually at the tail).
- read-dedupe guard short-circuits repeated idempotent `read_file` of a path
already read this task.
Exoshell-derived context discipline:
- `_prune_native_messages` budgets the whole message list (~chars/4) and
evicts oldest removable turns first once over `native_token_budget`,
pinning index 0, the TASK_MARKER goal, and the most-recent turns — the
native loop previously grew unbounded, silently pushing the goal out of a
small model's window on long repair runs.
- TASK_MARKER labels the goal so it is never pruned and re-anchors the model.
- REPAIR_STANCE is appended to the turn system prompt after the first failure
to swap the whole turn into a diagnose-then-act posture.
Validated on qwen2.5-coder:3b: clean unstitched 7/9 (the local ceiling), no
regression vs baseline; unit-tested pruning (pin survival, oldest-first
eviction, under-budget no-op) and stance trigger. The two remaining fails are
exact-match correctness tasks (a count, a fibonacci string), not harness gaps.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The runner cleared the input with only 6 backspaces and fired one unverified
Enter, so a dropped keystroke left a half-typed prompt that corrupted the next
send and lingered after exit. Worse, online/grant detection counted chat events
via `capture-pane -S` — but this is a full-screen alt-screen app whose scrollback
returns stale/empty frames, so detection was unreliable and the restart loop kept
dismissing healthy-but-slow spawns into a churn cycle.
New bench/tui.py exposes verified primitives shared by the runner and a restart
CLID:
* clear_input / submit — backspace-clear and Enter until the input box reads
empty (the box has no line-editing; Ctrl-A/U/K arrive as literal letters)
* capture() now reads only the VISIBLE viewport (no -S) — the live screen is
the only trustworthy source
* agent_online() reads the present-tense clergy roster, not scrolled-away chat
* restart_agent() stops/starts/grants with a generous 180s online wait (cold
/ai start reloads the model and takes 60-90s on CPU) and retries only a
genuinely hung spawn
run.py now delegates send/clear/online-check to tui and clears the box on exit.
python bench/tui.py restart <model> # one-shot reliable restart+grant
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pulled and benchmarked three more tool-capable CPU models looking for a better
default. All score 0/12 (vs qwen2.5:3b at 2/12): in the multi-turn agent loop
they leak the positional-in-tags dialect (<tools>run_shell 'cmd'</tools>) the
parser can't recover, even when they emit clean structured tool_calls on a
single-turn probe; smollm2 and mistral also wedge into repeating summaries.
qwen3:4b could not be pulled — Ollama 0.3.9 is too old (HTTP 412), same as
granite3.1-dense:2b. Upgrading Ollama is the highest-leverage next step to test
the qwen3/granite3.x generation. qwen2.5:3b remains the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add tracked baselines for two additional CPU models under the optimized
harness (split-tag recovery + greedy decode). Both land at 1/12 — they emit
proper structured calls and fail on capability/content, not parse, confirming
the parser lift is concentrated on the weakest model (0.5b). granite3.1-dense:2b
is incompatible with the installed Ollama version.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first harness changes to move the benchmark off the 1/12 noise floor, on
the model that needs it most (qwen2.5:0.5b: 1/12 -> 4/12, 3/12).
- complete_with_tools now decodes the tool loop at temperature 0 (scoped; chat
keeps default sampling). At Ollama's default 0.8 the weak model sampled away
from the tool-call format into prose/fabrication; the nudge prompt changes
between turns so temp 0 still escapes a failed state on retry.
- Greedy decode made 0.5b's leak deterministic, exposing its real shape: not a
JSON object with a name key, but the name in a <tools> tag and the args in a
SEPARATE object — <tools>write_file</tools>{"path":…} — ~5 of 12 tasks/run.
_NAMED_TAG pairs the tag-name with the following args object, gated on the
known tool set so it still can't fabricate an action.
- Bridge recovers a ```bash block narrated in prose as a run_shell call,
non-destructive only (FENCE_DESTRUCTIVE guard); fires on prose-leak turns,
no-op where the model emits structured calls.
Ablation on 0.5b: structured-JSON-only 0/0 -> fenced+temp0 2/0 -> +split-tag
4/3. The lift is concentrated on the weakest model by design — a 3B emits
proper calls and fails on capability/content (unchanged at 1/12), which no
parser can fix. All recovery paths unit-checked for the positive shapes and
the negatives (prose / unknown tool / destructive block) they must ignore.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generalise OllamaProvider._extract_text_tool_calls to recover a tool-call
JSON object regardless of how a small/quantized model wraps it — qwen's
<tool_call> tags, bare JSON, ```json fences, alternate tags (<tools>,
<function_call>), OpenAI {"function":{…}} nesting, and parameters-vs-arguments.
A new _coerce_call gates recovery on the known tool-name set from the tools
schema, so a stray JSON blob in prose (or a hallucinated make_dir) can never
be coerced into an action. 11-case unit check: 8 leak shapes recover, 3
negatives (prose / unknown tool / random config JSON) ignored.
Benchmark verdict (honest): this does NOT move the weak-CPU-model pass rate
— 3b went 2/1/0 of 12 across three passes (baseline 1/12, noise), 0.5b went
0/0 (baseline 1/12). A direct /api/chat probe shows the hypothesis was wrong
about the FORM of the leak: the weak models emit either malformed structured
tool_calls (write_file content:null) or a fenced bash block in prose with no
tool call at all — not JSON-as-text. The structured-JSON recovery is still a
correct, safe hardening for any model that does leak JSON; the real
weak-model lever (parse ```bash fences -> run_shell) is documented as an
explicit safety decision, not folded in here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Capture native-harness benchmark baselines for qwen2.5 0.5b/1.5b/3b and
qwen2.5-coder:7b (all probed tool-capable; deepseek-r1 and NL2SH reject the
tools field). All cluster at 1-2/12 with high variance; the 7B buys no
pass-rate gain at ~3x latency, so qwen2.5:3b stays the default. The single
biggest score sink across every model is bare tool-call-as-text leaks — a
harness parse gap, the clear next improvement.
Also drop "in your home directory" from the shell prompts: it made literal-
minded models create a home/ subdir (/root/home/a/b/c/...) or use ~/, which
the benchmark itself surfaced. Findings doc + bench README carry the model
comparison table and recommendations (llama3.2:3b / llama3.1:8b for a non-qwen
data point).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add bench/ — a 4-category × easy/medium/hard task matrix (shell, code, git,
multi) and a runner that drives the live TUI over tmux and grades each task by
a `podman exec` verify snippet (exit 0 == PASS), never by the model's
self-reported summary (which the weak CPU model fabricates). Tasks run in the
agent's real cwd with bare filenames so the suite measures task completion, not
the model's absolute-path discipline. Completion is detected off the viewport-
independent `is thinking…` footer (the TUI is full-screen, so capture-pane
scrollback is not chat history).
First baseline (qwen2.5:3b): 2/12 PASS, high variance. Surfaces the next
harness-addressable improvements — `<native>` tag leakage and bare
tool-call-as-text — now measurable against this suite. Findings doc updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the overloaded "text + no tool call = done" terminator that made the
weak CPU model stall mid-task or give up after a failing command. Termination
is now a structural `DONE:` text sentinel; a text-only turn is resolved by an
output-aware verdict (DONE: marker / unresolved non-zero exit / no action /
filler language) and re-prompted with an exit-code-aware nudge, bounded by
MAX_NUDGES on top of max_turns. On exhaustion the summary is honest rather than
echoing the model's false "run successfully" — it reports when no tool ran or a
command exited non-zero. Live-validated on qwen2.5:3b: the multi-step stall is
fixed (proj3 completes end-to-end, ground-truth confirmed); the nudge fires on
a 126; residual give-up is model-bound. 23 offline unit assertions pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Live 3B-vs-7B command-entry results, observed failure modes (early stall,
give-up-on-error, tool hallucination), Goose/opencode loop-termination
research, and the output-aware dynamic-nudge-loop design to implement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two native-harness improvements, both live-validated against qwen2.5:3b
and qwen2.5-coder:7b on a podman/Kali sandbox:
- §3 PTY-sentinel: run_shell now runs in the REAL shared terminal via
_run_shell_in_pty (stage cmd out-of-band to a hex-token temp file, type
a `{ sh CMDF; echo $? >RCF; } 2>&1 | tee OUTF` wrapper into the live PTY,
poll the rc sentinel out-of-band, then read OUTF). The whole room now
watches commands execute live instead of an inert `# ▸` comment, while
output + exit code are still captured for the loop. tee+poll (not
stream-sentinel) avoids deadlocking the serve loop; the wrapper line
carries only our own temp paths so room text never reaches the shell
parser. _exec_tool takes ws to reach the PTY.
- NATIVE_CONTEXT=4: action tasks now get a tight, RAG-free window (last few
transcript turns only, no semantic recall). A weak model fed prior chat
chatter latched onto nearby noise (wrote a "grant permissions" script for
"write a bash script"); feeding just the instruction fixes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
So the owner never has to name each model. Tracks an ai_agents set
(populated from `_ai` typing/stream frames and the "(ai) online" announce,
pruned on leave); `/grant ai` intersects it with the live roster and grants
all in one ACL broadcast. Help text gains a /grant ai row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Optimize the native tool-calling loop for qwen2.5:3b on CPU, where it
previously invented paths (/ai/bin/bash), ran scripts it never wrote, and
silently dropped valid actions. Three changes:
- NATIVE_SYSTEM rewritten directive: explicit write→chmod→run workflow,
relative paths only, never run an uncreated file, never guess interpreter
paths, fix the cause on non-zero exit.
- New _sandbox_facts() probe injects LIVE SANDBOX STATE (real cwd, bash
path, current files) into the system prompt so the model anchors to
ground truth instead of guessing.
- OllamaProvider recovers tool calls qwen emits as <tool_call>{json}</…>
TEXT in content (brace-balanced JSON scan), so a correct action isn't lost.
- Bump Ollama timeout 120→240s: the tool turn is non-streaming and a long
write_file can exceed a tighter cap on a contended CPU box.
Live-validated (podman/Kali): 0/3 incoherent → reliable write/run with
self-correction on exit=126 for both single- and multi-script tasks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reflect current backends (local/docker/podman/multipass — Docker=Parrot
OS Security, Podman=Kali rootless no-sudo), the backend-first /sbx
grammar, and the AI agent's ability to drive the sandbox via
/ai <name> !<task> (advisory when ungranted, acting once granted).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Display-mirror hybrid (docs/plan-harness-visibility.md §2): native tool
calls now show up in the shared sandbox terminal again via inert `# `-
prefixed comment lines (comment-prefix = anti-double-run/anti-escape),
mirroring only each command. Chat de-flooded to opener + final summary.
write_file mkdir -p parent dir so relative/absolute paths both work
(fixes the regression where script creation silently failed). ui.rs
fmt_line returns Vec<Line> splitting on \n so multi-line agent output
renders as an indented block instead of one garbled row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement the bounded native harness from docs/spec-native-harness.md §1.3 and
make it the default granted-!task path. The model runs host-side (no container→
host Ollama hop); only its tool calls exec in the sandbox.
providers.py:
- OllamaProvider.complete_with_tools(system, messages, tools) -> (text, calls):
one non-streaming /api/chat turn with a `tools` schema; parses message.tool_calls
(dict or JSON-string arguments). Caches tool capability (_tools_ok / supports_tools).
- ToolsUnsupported raised when the model rejects `tools` ("does not support tools").
bridge.py:
- NATIVE_SYSTEM + a 3-tool schema (run_shell / write_file / read_file), turn/byte caps.
- _run_native: seed transcript window + task → loop up to max_turns; exec each tool
call in the sandbox, feed captured output back as a `tool` message; stop on a plain
answer or the cap; stream per-call progress to chat. Degrades to _run_simple when the
provider has no complete_with_tools or the model rejects tools.
- _exec_prefix/_exec_capture/_exec_tool: <engine> exec into docker/podman/multipass/local;
paths passed as positional args + content via stdin (no shell interpolation); combined
stdout+stderr byte-capped + time-bounded. run_shell is the only intentional shell.
- Guards: DESTRUCTIVE run_shell commands are blocked (not run — no human in the loop;
use simple + /ai confirm for destructive intent); MAX_COMMANDS budget per task.
- _run_in_sandbox dispatches native|simple; default harness flipped to native.
__main__.py: default harness native (self-degrades to simple, so safe).
Offline-tested: full write/run/read loop on the local backend; destructive block
(rm -rf never executed); ToolsUnsupported → simple fallback. Live Ollama wire
validation deferred to Phase 3 bench (daemon was down). py_compile clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove the Goose agentic harness across the codebase per
docs/spec-native-harness.md §3. Goose made N sequential model calls inside the
sandbox (slow on CPU-only hardware) and forced an in-container→host Ollama
gateway that tripped the rootless-Podman slirp4netns loopback bug.
- bridge.py: delete _run_goose/_goose_argv/_goose_present + GOOSE_* consts and
the present-cache; __init__ now takes harness="simple"/max_turns=5; granted
!task runs _run_simple until the native loop lands (Phase 2).
- __main__.py: --harness {native,simple} (was {goose,simple}); drop
--goose-max-turns, add --max-turns; default harness simple.
- app.rs: /ai start accepts native|simple (plain aliases simple) instead of a
bare plain flag; refresh harness comments.
- sbx.rs: remove the in-container Ollama gateway (Docker host-gateway / Podman
slirp4netns host-loopback) and the dk_bootstrap OLLAMA_HOST env — kills the
slirp4netns loopback bug; drop Goose comments.
- bootstrap.sh: drop goose from the prereq probe.
- bootstrap-ai.sh: remove the entire Goose install block, --no-goose flag,
GOOSE_INSTALLER_URL, host config writer, and goose_bin helper.
- sandbox-bootstrap.sh: remove the in-sandbox Goose binary install + config.
- spec-goose-harness.md: banner — harness portion superseded; Podman stays.
cargo check + py_compile clean. No Goose refs remain (headroom/ untouched).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The /ai agent held a single, un-shielded websocket with no retry. Any
close — server restart, ping/idle reap, laptop sleep, a transient blip —
ended the serve loop, so run_async returned and the process exited
silently: the agent dropped from the roster with no /ai stop and no
goodbye.
- run_async now wraps the connection in a backoff-reconnect loop (1s→30s,
resets after a healthy ≥30s session). The server frees our session+name
on drop, so each attempt re-runs SRP to mint a fresh token. Only Ctrl-C
/ process kill (KeyboardInterrupt / CancelledError, how /ai stop ends
us) breaks the loop.
- _serve shields each frame via _handle_frame so one malformed/poisoned
frame — or a handler error — can't unwind the loop; ConnectionClosed
and cancellation propagate up to the reconnect loop.
- Forgiving keepalive (ping_interval=20, ping_timeout=60) so a heavy
CPU-only Ollama generation doesn't trip a false drop.
Also adds docs/spec-native-harness.md: replace the heavyweight Goose
harness with a lightweight host-side Ollama-native tool-calling loop
(model runs host-side, only commands exec in the sandbox — the
slirp4netns→host-Ollama bug disappears), and a file-by-file plan to strip
all Goose integration. Supersedes the harness portion of
spec-goose-harness.md (Podman backend stays).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add an installable-VM catalog that ships pointers only (no multi-GB images
in the repo). When a VM is chosen it is BUILT LOCALLY on the caller's own
machine — nothing is relayed to the room.
- scripts/vbox-library.json: 7-entry manifest (Windows 11, macOS Sonoma,
Kali, Parrot, Ubuntu 24.04, Fedora 41, Debian 12) with download
pointers, ostype, cpu/mem/disk, and build kind.
- scripts/vbox-library.sh: --list / --info / --plan / --install. Build
kinds: iso (download/--iso + createvm + boot installer; EFI+TPM for
Win11), cloudimg (delegate to vbox-new.sh, unattended), ova (import),
manual (pointer-only, e.g. macOS per Apple licensing). Detect-first:
--plan changes nothing, install refuses to clobber and rolls back
half-built VMs, direct URLs fall back to the page + --iso <path>.
- sbx.rs: vbox_library()/library_vm()/vbox_library_install() loaders +
running_vms() for live-state markers.
- app.rs: /sbx vmlib (catalog ✓installed/↓available), /sbx vmlib <id>
(pointer/notes), /sbx vmlib <id> install [--iso path] (local build);
/sbx vms now flags running VMs (▶). Registered in SBX_SUBCOMMANDS +
usage.
- ui.rs: help entry for the VM library.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The docker/podman headless-container desktop (XFCE + TigerVNC + websockify
+ noVNC published on host 127.0.0.1:6080) is removed. It was unreliable: the
desktop stack installed asynchronously during provisioning with every step
wrapped in `|| true` (silent failures), while the host port mapping existed
the moment the container ran — so opening the browser before websockify bound
6080 inside the container reset the connection (ERR_CONNECTION_RESET), with no
readiness signal and no loud failure. Containers also can't be rendered as a
real desktop by VirtualBox (no framebuffer/display), so the only desktop path
that stays is the native VirtualBox VM GUI.
Removed:
- sbx.rs: GUI_PORT const; PortHolder/port_holder()/kill_port_holder() (the
port-consent gate existed only for the noVNC publish); the `gui` param +
`-p 127.0.0.1:6080:6080` block in prepare(); HH_SBX_GUI env in dk_bootstrap();
the `gui` param on provision().
- app.rs: PendingGuiLaunch + PortPrompt structs; the port_prompt App field; the
`gui` field on PendingSudoLaunch; the port-consent modal + the sudo-submit
port check; want_gui/gui parsing + the container-GUI launch message; `gui`
threaded through spawn_launch and all call sites.
- sandbox-bootstrap.sh: the entire HH_SBX_GUI=1 desktop block.
- ui.rs / usage strings: dropped "[gui]"/"noVNC desktop" from the docker/podman
help and the /sbx usage line.
Kept (unchanged): the VirtualBox VM GUI — gui_launch() (VBoxManage startvm
--type gui), launch_vbox_gui, `/sbx vbox gui <vm>` and the `/sbx gui` alias. The
`gui` keyword is still stripped from positionals so `/sbx vbox gui <vm>` parses.
cargo check passes clean (no warnings).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The VBox GUI launch path previously had no in-TUI password capture — it
relied on cached creds (`sudo -n`) and otherwise aborted with guidance.
Generalize the existing masked sudo modal to cover it: `SudoPrompt.pending`
becomes a `PendingPrivileged` enum (container `Launch` | `VboxInstall`), so
the same local-only, never-logged password buffer now authorizes a VBox
install too. On submit the captured password is fed to `ensure_vbox_install`
via `sudo -S`, then the VM boots. Empty/Esc still cancel cleanly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GUI launch (docker/podman) now pre-flights the noVNC port (6080): if it's
already bound, a modal names the holding pid and asks before killing it and
proceeding — never a blind `bind: address already in use` collision.
Sudo capture is now uniform across every backend installer. Previously only
Docker fed the masked-modal password through `--stdin-pass`/`sudo -S`; the
captured password was silently dropped for Podman/Multipass and never wired
for VirtualBox, and those scripts used bare `sudo` (which hangs/corrupts a
raw-mode tty). Now:
- shared `run_ensure()` feeds the password to any ensure-*.sh via stdin
- podman/multipass/vbox scripts gain the docker sudo ladder
(interactive `sudo` / `--yes` `sudo -n` / `--stdin-pass` `sudo -S -p ''`)
- podman's apt path wrapped in `sh -c` so one sudo covers update+install
- vbox GUI path preflights `sudo_ready()` with actionable guidance, falling
back to fail-fast `sudo -n` instead of a tty hang
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the goose-harness and sandbox-distros-GUI design specs, a consolidated
command reference and demo-reels plan, the AI-harness planning note, and
two new client themes (blue-orange, pink-red-gray).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add Podman as a rootless/daemonless sandbox backend alongside Docker,
Multipass and Local, and wire Goose in as the default agentic harness
for the granted `!task` path (bridge execs `<engine> exec <name> goose
run` and streams output to chat; auto-degrades to the simple one-shot
injector when goose is absent).
Add an optional GUI sandbox track (XFCE + TigerVNC + websockify/noVNC on
:6080) summoned via `/sbx <engine> gui`, plus container-side provisioning
in sandbox-bootstrap.sh and a host-side ensure-podman.sh prereq helper.
Refresh the in-app command help to the backend-led `/sbx <engine> [gui]`
grammar and minor ui tweaks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the message-input bar part of the F5 resize cycle so its height is
adjustable without a sandbox (multi-line/wrapped inputs are now readable),
and let chat/clergy borrow height from the compose box when no terminal is
present. Add Option C masked sudo prompt that feeds `sudo -S` over stdin to
install/start Docker — the password never reaches chat, the PTY, or outbound
frames, and Docker Desktop on Linux is detected so no sudo is requested.
Fix a freeze where clicking the compose box entered layout-edit mode and
silently swallowed every keystroke: clicking the input bar no longer enters
edit mode, and typing any printable char now drops out of edit mode and types.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Design for replacing the two-scalar layout (pty_pct + roster_width) with a
binary space-partition pane tree so every pane is resizable on both axes,
fixing the "only roster width adjusts" limitation. Rolls a small in-repo tree
(no new dep) and drives the PTY grid from the terminal pane's actual Rect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
README command table claimed `/send <path>` sends to the room; actual code
(app.rs) makes `/send <user> <path>` a targeted send and `/sendroom <path>`
the room-wide offer. Add the missing `/sendroom` and `/clear` rows (both
already in the in-app help) and drop the inaccurate "save to disk" claim on
Ctrl+Alt+P — saving is `/theme save`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified anonymous clone from git.churchofmalware.org succeeds; only the
GitHub mirror is private. Restore the plain public clone instructions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The repo is private, so anonymous clone 404s. Add token + SSH clone
instructions under the quick-start so invited users can install while we
promote the Gitea instance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Update the git clone URL in README and CONTRIBUTING from the old
GitHub remote to the project's Gitea instance
(git.churchofmalware.org/trilltechnician/hack-house.git). Verified the
clone succeeds over HTTPS against that path.
- CONTRIBUTING: fork step now points at the Gitea instance, not GitHub.
- Refresh the /sbx command table to match the client: `/sbx launch` now
documents the `install` consent token and `--start` daemon boot, and a
new row covers `/sbx launch vbox [new [name]]` (VM picker / cloud-init
build).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add a -h/--help guard (prints the usage header) to the five scripts
that lacked one: smoke.sh, smoke-e2e.sh, test-features.sh,
demo-save-load.sh, sandbox-bootstrap.sh. All 15 hh/scripts/*.sh now
respond to --help.
- README: new "Scripts" section detailing every script (setup, hosting,
sandbox provisioning, tests) and noting each takes --help; plus an
archive note for the film-* recording scripts.
- README: new "Window layout" section documenting live pane resizing
(F4 fullscreen, click/F5 to select + arrows to resize) and the
/layout save/load/list/rm/reset presets, with matching keybinding-table
rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Trim newcomer-facing clutter in hh/scripts/ without changing the running
product or CI.
- Move the one-off demo-recording scripts (film-save-load.sh,
film-virtualbox.sh) to scripts/archive/ — they depend on external
personal tooling (asciinema, video-toolkit, edge-tts, xdotool) and were
never wired into the README or CI.
- Delete join.sh: it duplicated connect.sh's join with fewer options
(hardcoded port, plaintext-only). Its only unique behaviour — a
pre-join git pull (gitea→origin, ff-only) + rebuild — is now an opt-in
`--sync` flag on connect.sh, leaving one canonical joiner.
No scripts or docs referenced the removed/moved files, so nothing else
needed updating.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a window-management layer so the chat, roster and sandbox-terminal
panes can be resized live and fullscreened, with named presets for
recall.
- New layout.rs: single source of truth for the body split (pty_pct,
roster_width) and a Zoom state (Normal/Term/Chat), persisted to
layouts/<slug>.toml like themes. Both ui::draw and app::sbx_dims read
from it, so resizing just mutates state and clears announced_dims —
the per-tick loop re-syncs and broadcasts the new PTY grid.
- F4 cycles terminal/chat fullscreen (F-keys aren't forwarded to the
shell, so nothing is stolen from in-shell apps).
- Interactive editing: click a pane (or F5 to cycle terminal -> chat ->
roster) to select it; arrows then resize it live, Esc/Enter finishes.
The selected pane gets a bold accent border and an ✎ title marker.
ui::pane_at hit-tests against the same body_areas rects draw() paints.
- /layout slimmed to presets only (save/load/list/rm/reset); the old
numeric pty/chat/roster and full/chatfull/normal verbs are replaced by
the interactive flow.
- Help menu updated: LAYOUT cluster + KEYS line document F4, click/F5,
arrows and Esc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously, launching a sandbox on a machine without the backend binary
died with a raw "not installed" error and no path forward. Now the
missing backend can be installed in-line, gated on explicit consent, so
a fresh checkout can go from zero to a running sandbox without leaving
the TUI.
Folded into the existing `/sbx launch` verb rather than a new command
(menu is already dense): `/sbx launch docker|multipass [image] install`.
The `install` token opts in; without it the user gets an actionable
error naming the exact retry. The token is filtered out of positional
image parsing so it never shadows a custom image.
The install runs off-thread inside the existing spawn_launch task,
before provisioning, so the TUI never blocks and the *launching guard is
cleared via BrokerMsg on failure. A fresh Docker install also leaves its
daemon up, so launch proceeds straight through.
Scripts (detect-first, never silent, --plan dry-run, idempotent if
already present):
- ensure-multipass.sh (new): Linux→snap (clear failure if snapd absent),
macOS→brew cask, Windows→winget.
- ensure-docker.sh: new --install mode using Docker's OFFICIAL,
GPG-verified apt repo (docker-ce) on Debian/Ubuntu, with dnf
(Fedora/RHEL) and pacman (Arch) fallbacks. Deliberately avoids piping
get.docker.com into a root shell. Existing daemon-start path intact.
sbx.rs: docker_installed()/multipass_installed() detectors and
ensure_docker_install()/ensure_multipass_install() wrappers; ENSURE_MULTIPASS const.
ui.rs: help text documents the [install] option on both backends.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two interactive shell apps were unusable in the shared sandbox because the
TUI swallowed their core keys:
- Esc released drive mode and was never mapped in key_to_pty, so vim could
never leave insert mode. Esc now forwards 0x1b to the PTY; F2 (already a
drive toggle) is the release key.
- Ctrl-X (owner kill switch) was intercepted globally, so nano could never
quit. It's now gated on !app.driving — while you hold the shell Ctrl-X
reaches the PTY (0x18, nano's quit); release with F2 to arm the kill
switch.
Updated the on-screen hints and /help KEYS cluster to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Multipass can only snapshot a powered-off instance, so `/sbx save` on a
running multipass sandbox previously just surfaced multipass's "instance
must be stopped" error — making the snapshot that `/sbx load` needs
impossible to create through the UI.
Now multipass save powers the instance down before snapshotting, and the
handler tears the shared session down first (same as `/sbx stop`, but
WITHOUT purging so the instance — and thus the snapshot — survives for a
later `/sbx load`). Docker is unchanged: `docker commit` captures a live
container, so its save stays non-disruptive.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The existing vbox paths only open pre-made images; there was no way to
build one from scratch. Add `/sbx launch vbox new [name]` backed by
scripts/vbox-new.sh: download an Ubuntu cloud image, convert it to a VDI,
build a cloud-init NoCloud seed that creates a sudo login user and installs
the sandbox-tools.json toolchain on first boot, then create + boot the VM.
VirtualBox guests can't be exec'd into like docker/multipass, so cloud-init
is the provisioning channel. Generates a one-time login password (or takes
--pass) and authorizes a local SSH key if present. Runs off-thread; rolls
back a half-built VM on failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reorganize the help menu into one VIRTUAL MACHINES cluster covering all
backends, and bring docker/multipass/vbox to save+load parity:
- Launch-time dev toolchain: sandbox-bootstrap.sh + editable
sandbox-tools.json (vim/curl guaranteed), installed in docker AND
multipass sandboxes at provision time.
- Vbox load: vm_restore + `/sbx vmload <vm> [label]` (restore snapshot
then boot the GUI).
- Multipass load: `/sbx load` is now backend-aware (locate_snapshot +
SnapKind), mp_restore re-attaches the shared shell; teardown stops
(not purges) an instance that still has snapshots so they survive
`/sbx stop`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Base ubuntu images ship without /var/lib/apt/lists, so apt-get install
failed with "Unable to locate package" until the user ran update by hand.
Refresh the index once during Docker provisioning.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- app.rs: F1 now closes the help overlay (toggle), not just opens it
- host-house.sh: add --user/--name flag to override the $USER default seat
- connect.sh: incremental cargo build before launch so the UI is never a
stale release binary; --no-build escape hatch for toolchain-less joiners
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a BRANCH guard (default: main) so launching the house never demos a
stale checkout. ensure_branch() switches to $BRANCH before the cargo build,
refuses when the tree is dirty (won't clobber uncommitted work), and no-ops
when already on-branch or when BRANCH= is passed to keep the current checkout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- host-house.sh: one tmux session hosting a room (server window) plus your own
GUI client window — builds, frees the port, waits for /health, then attaches.
- host-room.sh: free_port() kills any stale LISTENer squatting on the port so
the bind can't fail with "address already in use".
- join.sh: cap each remote pull with `timeout` + GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0 so an
unreachable remote fails fast instead of hanging.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unify sandbox summoning under `/sbx launch <docker|multipass|vbox>`, each
running on the invoker's own machine. For vbox:
- `/sbx launch vbox` opens an arrow-navigable VM picker (↑↓/Enter/Tab/Esc).
- `/sbx launch vbox [gui] <vm>` boots frictionlessly for a host that already
has VirtualBox + the VM imported; a non-host appends `yes` to install
VirtualBox, import the shared appliance, and/or free VT-x first.
- `/sbx gui <vm> [yes]` kept as an alias.
Add `vm_registered()` + `import_appliance()` (VBoxManage import) in sbx.rs.
Make file transfer stream disk-to-disk so multi-GB VM images can be shared
(the old 50 MB in-memory cap blocked them): `STREAM_MAX` = 16 GiB for `/send`
(`MAX_SIZE` now guards only the in-memory tar_path for sandbox injection).
`prepare_send` stat+stream-hashes off the UI thread; `Sink`/`commit` write
incoming chunks straight to a temp `.part` file and verify SHA before moving
into place. Wire frames (offer/accept/chunk/done, 64 KB, base64) unchanged.
A received `.ova`/`.ovf` auto-imports so the recipient can immediately
`/sbx launch vbox gui <vm>`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-06 19:45:45 -07:00
196 changed files with 20542 additions and 1201 deletions
@@ -32,11 +32,12 @@ Encrypted chat that runs in your terminal. You host the server, you control the
- **SRP authentication** — the password is never sent over the network (zero-knowledge proof)
- **SRP authentication** — the password is never sent over the network (zero-knowledge proof)
- **Zero-knowledge server** — relays only ciphertext; cannot read messages, files, or terminal output
- **Zero-knowledge server** — relays only ciphertext; cannot read messages, files, or terminal output
- **RAM only** — nothing persisted on the server; close it and history is gone
- **RAM only** — nothing persisted on the server; close it and history is gone
- **Shared sandbox** — summon a disposable `local` / `docker` / `multipass` box the whole room can watch and drive
- **Shared sandbox** — summon a disposable `local` / `docker` /`podman` /`multipass` box the whole room can watch and drive. Docker defaults to **Parrot OS Security** (`parrotsec/core`) and Podman to **Kali** (`kalilinux/kali-rolling`) — pentest distros out of the box; Podman is rootless & daemonless, so **no sudo** to launch
- **Snapshot save/load** — freeze a sandbox to a named snapshot and restore it later (`/sbx save` · `/sbx load` · `/sbx snaps`)
- **Snapshot save/load** — freeze a sandbox to a named snapshot and restore it later (`/sbx save` · `/sbx load` · `/sbx snaps`)
- **Local VirtualBox VMs** — `/sbx vms` detects VirtualBox and lists your VMs; `/sbx gui <vm>` opens a desktop VM locally for the room to gather around — per-user consent gate, with automatic resolution of VT-x conflicts (Docker Desktop / multipass)
- **Local VirtualBox VMs** — `/sbx vms` detects VirtualBox and lists your VMs; `/sbx gui <vm>` opens a desktop VM locally for the room to gather around — per-user consent gate, with automatic resolution of VT-x conflicts (Docker Desktop / multipass)
- **Real permissions** — the host grants/revokes *drive* (keyboard) and *sudo* (VM superuser) per user; **stacking roster badges** show exactly who holds what, both in the clergy panel and inline on every chat message
- **Real permissions** — the host grants/revokes *drive* (keyboard) and *sudo* (VM superuser) per user; **stacking roster badges** show exactly who holds what, both in the clergy panel and inline on every chat message
- **Local-first AI agent** — `/ai start` summons an in-room AI that runs against *your own* [Ollama](https://ollama.com) (no API key, nothing leaves your machine); replies **stream token-by-token** with **in-RAM semantic recall** of the conversation for context; model-agnostic, addressed-only, end-to-end encrypted like every other client
- **Local-first AI agent** — `/ai start` summons an in-room AI that runs against *your own* [Ollama](https://ollama.com) (no API key, nothing leaves your machine); replies **stream token-by-token** with **in-RAM semantic recall** of the conversation for context; model-agnostic, addressed-only, end-to-end encrypted like every other client
- **AI that acts in the sandbox** — grant an agent *drive* and address it with `/ai <name> !<task>`; it works the shared box through a bounded, host-side **tool-calling loop** (run shell, write/read files, inspecting each result before the next step) and you watch its commands land live in the shared terminal. Ungranted, it stays **advisory-only** (tells you the commands, runs nothing); destructive commands are gated behind an explicit `/ai <name> confirm`
@@ -150,17 +150,22 @@ Type to chat. Slash commands and keys:
| `/help` · `F1` | Help overlay |
| `/help` · `F1` | Help overlay |
| `/pw` | Show this room's password (local only — never broadcast) |
| `/pw` | Show this room's password (local only — never broadcast) |
| `/theme [name]` | Switch vestments, or list them |
| `/theme [name]` | Switch vestments, or list them |
| `/send <path>` | Offer a file (or directory) to the room |
| `/send <user> <path>` | Offer a file (or directory) directly to one member |
| `/sendroom <path>` | Offer a file (or directory) to the whole room |
| `/accept` · `/reject` | Respond to a pending file offer |
| `/accept` · `/reject` | Respond to a pending file offer |
| `/ai start [model\|profile]` | Summon a local AI agent (default `ollama/qwen2.5:3b`; a bare name is a `models.toml` profile) |
| `/clear` | Wipe your chat scrollback (local only) |
| `/ai start [model\|profile] [allow]` | Summon a local AI agent (default `ollama/qwen2.5:3b`; a bare name is a `models.toml` profile). `allow` auto-grants it sandbox drive at spawn |
| `/ai stop` | Dismiss the agent you summoned |
| `/ai stop` | Dismiss the agent you summoned |
| `/ai <question>` | Ask the agent (`/ai <name> <question>` if several present) |
| `/ai <question>` | Ask the agent (`/ai <name> <question>` if several present) |
| `/ai <name> !<task>` | Have a *granted* agent act in the shared sandbox (advisory-only if it has no drive) |
| `/ai <name> confirm` | Approve a gated (destructive) command the agent proposed |
| `/ai list` | List the agents present (or hint to `/ai start` if none) |
| `/ai list` | List the agents present (or hint to `/ai start` if none) |
| `/ai models` | Models the active agent can serve — or, with no agent, your local Ollama tags |
| `/ai models` | Models the active agent can serve — or, with no agent, your local Ollama tags |
| `F4` · `F5` · click | Layout: fullscreen terminal · select a pane to resize (then arrows · `Esc`) — see [Window layout](#window-layout) |
| `/layout save \| load \| list \| rm \| reset` | Save / recall named pane arrangements |
### The shared sandbox
### The shared sandbox
Anyone in the room can summon a disposable Linux box with `/sbx launch`. The
Anyone in the room can summon a disposable Linux box with `/sbx <backend>`. The
person who summons it is the **owner/host**: their client runs the real PTY
person who summons it is the **owner/host**: their client runs the real PTY
locally and relays its output to everyone else as encrypted frames, so the
locally and relays its output to everyone else as encrypted frames, so the
server only ever sees ciphertext (same trust model as chat).
server only ever sees ciphertext (same trust model as chat).
@@ -180,10 +187,15 @@ server only ever sees ciphertext (same trust model as chat).
| Backend | Isolation | Notes |
| Backend | Isolation | Notes |
|---|---|---|
|---|---|---|
| `local` | none | a `bash` shell on the host — fast, for dev/testing only |
| `local` | none | a `bash` shell on the host — fast, for dev/testing only |
| `docker` | container | `ubuntu:24.04` by default; `/sbx launch docker --start` boots the daemon (or run `hh/scripts/ensure-docker.sh`) |
| `docker` | container | **Parrot OS Security** (`parrotsec/core`) by default — swap `parrotsec/security` per-launch for the full pentest set; `/sbx docker --start` boots the daemon (or run `hh/scripts/ensure-docker.sh`) |
| `podman` | container | **Kali rolling** (`kalilinux/kali-rolling`) by default — **rootless & daemonless, no sudo to launch** (add `kali-linux-headless` for the toolset); `hh/scripts/ensure-podman.sh` installs it |
| `multipass` | full VM | `24.04` by default; strongest isolation, ~30 s to boot, the choice for real use |
| `multipass` | full VM | `24.04` by default; strongest isolation, ~30 s to boot, the choice for real use |
Tear it down with `/sbx stop` (purges the VM/container).
The backend leads the command — `/sbx podman`, `/sbx docker`, `/sbx multipass`,
`/sbx local` (the older `/sbx launch <backend>` still works). Override the image
positionally, e.g. `/sbx docker parrotsec/security` or `/sbx podman ubuntu:24.04`.
Both container engines are Debian/apt-based, so the dev-toolchain bootstrap runs
unchanged. Tear it down with `/sbx stop` (purges the VM/container).
**Snapshots.** Freeze the current sandbox to a named checkpoint with `/sbx save
**Snapshots.** Freeze the current sandbox to a named checkpoint with `/sbx save
[label]`, list what you've stored with `/sbx snaps`, and restore one later with
[label]`, list what you've stored with `/sbx snaps`, and restore one later with
@@ -233,8 +245,9 @@ they can never advertise a power the room won't honour.
### Sharing files & directories
### Sharing files & directories
`/send <path>` proposes a transfer; recipients `/accept` or `/reject`. A whole
`/send <user> <path>` proposes a transfer to one member; `/sendroom <path>`
directory works too (it's packed before sending). Files are chunked (64 KB),
offers it to everyone. Recipients `/accept` or `/reject`. A whole directory
works too (it's packed into a `.tar` before sending). Files are chunked (64 KB),
encrypted with the room key, relayed as opaque ciphertext, and **SHA-256
encrypted with the room key, relayed as opaque ciphertext, and **SHA-256
verified** on arrival before landing in `./downloads/`. Max size is 50 MB.
verified** on arrival before landing in `./downloads/`. Max size is 50 MB.
@@ -251,6 +264,15 @@ when you quit). Pick a model at summon time with `/ai start <model>`.
- **Addressed-only.** The agent reads room traffic like any client but forwards
- **Addressed-only.** The agent reads room traffic like any client but forwards
to the model *only* the messages that trigger it (`/ai …`) — no passive
to the model *only* the messages that trigger it (`/ai …`) — no passive
surveillance, no cost or noise when idle.
surveillance, no cost or noise when idle.
- **Can drive the sandbox.** Grant an agent *drive* (`/grant <name>`, or summon it
pre-granted with `/ai start <name> allow`) and ask it to act with
`/ai <name> !<task>`. It works the shared box through a bounded **host-side
tool-calling loop** — run shell commands, write and read files — inspecting each
result before the next step, and you watch its commands appear live in the
shared terminal. Every command runs *inside the sandbox* (the container/VM is the
blast radius), capped in count and time. Without drive it stays **advisory-only**
(it spells out the commands, runs nothing). Destructive commands are blocked
pending an explicit `/ai <name> confirm`.
- **Model-agnostic.** Swap the backend without touching the client: bundled
- **Model-agnostic.** Swap the backend without touching the client: bundled
adapters for `ollama` (default), `anthropic`, and any OpenAI-compatible
adapters for `ollama` (default), `anthropic`, and any OpenAI-compatible
endpoint (OpenAI, Groq, Together, local vLLM…), plus a `module:Class` hook for
endpoint (OpenAI, Groq, Together, local vLLM…), plus a `module:Class` hook for
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