run_circuit_fixture stands up an isolated docker N-hop nested-SSH chain, pipes a
seed-deterministic self-generated payload through it, verifies end-to-end
delivery, captures + checksums a per-hop pcap, emits R3 events, and always tears
the circuit down. Containment is load-bearing: assert_isolated refuses
local/unknown engines up front, every hop is built through the ForwarderPlan
guard, only our own fixture bytes move between our own containers, and the runner
is wired for docker only (multipass e2e refused, not faked). Adds the sor-hop
fixture image (alpine + sshd + tcpdump, lab-relay only) and a docker-gated
acceptance test that skips where no daemon/image is present. Instrument-validation
gate item 1 GREEN: live 3-hop delivery verified, 3 distinct hops, pcaps checksum.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Land only the offline-validatable half of R7 (instrument-validation gate items
3 and 4): the detectors the gate calibrates on synthetic fixtures, never on
confirmatory-cell data. Pure stdlib functions over in-memory series — no pcaps,
no engine, no traffic, no VM fabric.
- analysis/detectors.py: shannon_entropy_bits (RQ2 anonymity-set entropy),
pearson/score_matrix/auc/linkage_auc, bridge_correlation_auc (RQ1
linkability scorer), and synthetic_bridge_fixture (seed-deterministic
known-linked / known-unlinked ground truth via the R1 SorRng).
Calibration green: entropy returns exactly log2(N) for N equiprobable senders
(gate item 4); a known-linked control pair scores AUC=1.0 and the unlinked
estimator is unbiased at chance (ensemble mean over 40 seeds = 0.498 ~ 0.5,
gate item 3). Detectors are calibrated on synthetic fixtures only — no fitting.
The traffic-moving R7 pieces (churn.py VM spin/kill, live selector rebuild loop,
metrics.json emission) are HELD for R4/R6 + a live grid and are absent here.
Python SOR suite 66 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Land only the containment-refusal half of R4: the guard every SOR forwarder
must pass before it does anything — assert engine != local, or refuse. It moves
no traffic, opens no socket, spawns no engine, and builds no SSH chain.
- forwarder.py: assert_isolated (raises on local and on any engine off the
manifest allow-list), isolation_prefix (docker/multipass exec argv, no host
path), ForwarderPlan (construction IS the gate — no plan for local/unknown/
no-container). Allow-list imported from provenance so forwarder and manifest
cannot disagree about what counts as isolated.
- There is no code path in this module that returns an exec prefix for the host;
containment is structural, not a runtime flag.
The traffic-moving half of R4 (gate item 1: 3-hop self-traffic e2e delivery +
per-hop pcaps across the grid) is deliberately NOT implemented — HELD for a live
isolated engine + grid. This guard is fully verifiable offline.
Acceptance (gate item 5) green: local/unknown/no-container refused; isolated
engine accepted with the correct isolation prefix. Python forwarder suite 12
passed; full SOR Python suite 49 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add the in-band, signature-gated consent handshake that governs whether a
node may be recruited into a measured SOR circuit, plus a per-recipient
sealed box so a hop credential decrypts only with the host's X25519 key.
- crypto.rs: seal_to_pubkey/open_sealed (ephemeral X25519 -> HKDF-SHA256 ->
Fernet AEAD), reusing the existing fernet crate (no new symmetric primitive).
- sor/consent.rs: signed ConsentRequest (Ed25519 persona), node_evaluate
(reject unless the signature verifies), CircuitBuilder that recruits a hop
only on an accept it can open; parse_sor_frame with never-panic proptests.
- net.rs: {"_sor":...} control frames are live-only and classified out-of-band
by the SOR layer (parse_sor), never surfaced as chat/app events.
- cmd_chat/sor/consent.py + bridge _sor case: bit-compatible Python mirror;
the agent only observes/classifies consent frames — it never auto-accepts
and stands up no forwarder (forwarding is R4, isolated-engine-only).
Acceptance check (roadmap R5) green both languages: host recruits a hop only
after an explicit accept; a reject leaves no entry; the credential opens only
with the host key (third party cannot); unsigned/forged request -> rejected.
Cross-language KDF parity pinned by a shared known-answer vector.
Rust 75 passed; Python SOR suite 37 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the tamper-evident event stream that makes every DV auditable. Each
measurable moment is appended as one JSON object per line to an append-only
output/sor-runs/<ts>/events.jsonl over the closed vocabulary {consent_request,
consent_accept, consent_reject, circuit_build, hop_add, bridge_forward,
churn_kill, churn_spawn, rebuild_start, rebuild_done}; on close the file is
SHA-256'd and the digest is sealed exactly once into manifest.json (the single
sanctioned None->hash completion of the manifest).
Records carry only metadata (fingerprints, byte counts, latencies, decisions),
never message plaintext, so the zero-knowledge relay property is preserved. The
deterministic replay_fixture_circuit emits a seed-driven event stream with no
engine, socket, or traffic (containment-safe) and is the basis of
instrument-validation gate item 6.
- cmd_chat/sor/events.py: EventLog (append-only, per-record schema),
replay_fixture_circuit, replay_and_seal.
- cmd_chat/sor/provenance.py: seal_manifest (seal-once events SHA + stop ts).
- tests: replay -> schema-valid JSONL whose SHA matches the manifest;
append-only (original prefix byte-identical after further appends);
seed-determinism modulo timestamps; seal-once immutability.
Live emit wiring into the _sor handlers lands with R4/R5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
write_manifest() freezes at circuit-experiment start everything needed to
reproduce and audit a SOR run and writes an immutable
output/sor-runs/<ts>/manifest.json: the R1 --sor-seed, topology/selector/churn
schedule id, one persona fingerprint per participating node, worktree git SHA,
isolated engine kind + image digest, pip/cargo dependency freeze, and
start/stop timestamps. The events.jsonl SHA-256 field is reserved for R3.
Provenance only: no forwarder, no engine spawned. Defense-in-depth to keep
containment load-bearing, the schema refuses to record a non-isolated
("local") engine at run or node level; the binding assertion still lands with
the R4 forwarder.
- cmd_chat/sor/provenance.py: Node/RunManifest, node_fingerprint (bit-for-bit
mirror of persona.rs::fingerprint_of), git/deps capture, explicit
dependency-free schema validator.
- hh/src/persona.rs: fingerprint_of known-vector parity test.
- tests: R2 acceptance predicate (manifest present + schema-valid, non-empty
seed, >=1 fingerprint/node), immutability, containment rejection of local
engines, and cross-language fingerprint parity.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the single stochasticity source for the SOR measurement instrument so
every later stochastic decision (path selection R4, churn/selector R7, padding
jitter R4) is driven by one --sor-seed and is byte-reproducible run-to-run —
the R1 acceptance check and instrument-validation gate item 2.
- hh/src/sor/mod.rs: SplitMix64 + SHA-256 domain-separated sub-streams +
unbiased Lemire bounded sampling -> deterministic select_path/bringup.
Pure bookkeeping: no forwarder, no socket, no engine. Isolated-engine
containment assertions land with the R4 forwarder.
- hh/src/main.rs: `sor-bringup --sor-seed` emits the deterministic
circuit-build sequence as JSON (observable reproducibility).
- cmd_chat/sor/config.py: bit-for-bit Python mirror so the seed means the
same thing on both sides.
- Tests (Rust proptest+unit, Python pytest): SplitMix64 known-answer vector,
same-seed determinism, seed divergence, bounded/no-panic, and a shared
cross-language parity vector asserted identically in both suites.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two causes made a shared shell's PTY stream lag for non-host viewers and
then arrive "all at once":
1. Nagle's algorithm — PTY echo/keystrokes/chat are tiny frames; Nagle +
delayed-ACK (amplified by Tailscale RTT) coalesced them into bursts.
Set TCP_NODELAY on the client websocket (Plain/--no-tls path) and on
each server connection's socket (via ws.io_proto.transport).
2. Head-of-line blocking — ConnectionManager.broadcast awaited each
send() serially under a global lock, so the slowest viewer gated
delivery to everyone AND stalled the server's read of the broker's
next frame, backing the stream up. Give each connection its own
bounded outbound queue + writer task; broadcast now only enqueues and
never waits on a socket. A peer that overflows its backlog (4096) is
evicted (close 1013) and resyncs on reconnect rather than buffering
without bound or being fed a gapped terminal stream. Init snapshot is
enqueued as the guaranteed-first frame (send_state -> state_frame).
Adds tests/test_manager.py (FIFO, slow-client isolation, wedged
eviction, reconnect replacement). Also fmt-clean sbx.rs/theme.rs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- add /pw (alias /password): reveal this room's password locally (never
broadcast); surfaced in the F1 help overlay and the join hint
- direnv-autostart/: cd-to-launch a single real-user session via direnv;
password is minted in memory at launch (never written to disk, matching the
RAM-only model) and scoped to the child process. setup.sh installs direnv,
hooks bash/zsh, and `direnv allow`s the dir
- lets-hack.sh: boot a FRESH server by default (replacing any live one) with a
--reuse opt-out; add -h/--help/-help; guard against killing the tmux session
you're attached to; switch-client into the coven when run inside tmux
- rename coven→clergy across rust/python/scripts; tests/test_coven.py→test_clergy.py
- snapshots in-progress hack-house client work (sandbox, themes, net, ui)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CRITICAL fixes:
- Auto-generated self-signed TLS certs (HTTPS/WSS by default)
- Removed session_key from /srp/verify response (was sent in plaintext)
- Replaced with HMAC-SHA256 ws_token for WebSocket authentication
HIGH fixes:
- WebSocket auth now validates ws_token via hmac.compare_digest()
- /clear endpoint requires Bearer admin_token (printed at server start)
- Password no longer required as CLI arg — supports env var + getpass prompt
- Removed user_ip from Message model (no longer broadcast to clients)
MEDIUM fixes:
- Rate limiter on /srp/init and /srp/verify (10 req/min/IP)
- MessageStore capped at 1000 messages (prevents RAM DoS)
- access_log disabled (was leaking request metadata)
LOW fixes:
- Username sanitization against rich markup injection
- Dead code removed from helpers.py
All 79 tests passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
leetcrypt