51 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
leetcrypt a34a18f0ca fix(ai): recover schema-echo leak in tool-call arguments
Weak local models (seen with qwen2.5-coder:3b at temp 0) sometimes emit a
parameter's JSON *schema* fragment as its *value*, e.g.
run_shell(command={'type':'string','description':'bash ./add.py'}). _exec_tool
does str(args["command"]), so the stringified dict was run as a command →
exit 127 and a hollow "task done" claim.

Every native tool arg is a plain string, so a dict-valued arg is always this
leak. Add _unleak_str/_clean_args to OllamaProvider: pull the intended string
from a value-ish key (or `description`), ignore JSON-schema scaffolding keys
like `type`, else drop to "" so the tool reports a clean error instead of
running garbage. Applied on both the structured tool_calls path and the
text-recovery path (_coerce_call). New tests/test_agent_providers.py pins it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 15:33:06 -07:00
leetcrypt 2b66da71c5 feat(ai): calibrate native pruning against real Ollama token counts
Phase 4 (final) of the native-harness working-memory sprint. OllamaProvider
.complete_with_tools now returns (text, calls, usage), surfacing the response's
real prompt_eval_count/eval_count (free — already in the payload). The native loop
EMA-smooths real/estimate into self._tok_ratio (clamped [0.5,3.0]) and prunes
against native_token_budget / ratio, so context budgeting tracks the TRUE window
instead of the systematic bias of the len//4 char estimate. Providers that omit
counts leave the ratio at 1.0, so behaviour is unchanged where unavailable — a
free correctness win, no regression. RAM-only, no disk, no new network frames.

Scope note: touches only cmd_chat/agent/ + providers — disjoint from the parallel
feat(operator) work on this branch, so it merges/reverts independently by path.

Sprint: native-harness-working-memory (Phase 4/4) — see also 46e5620, dc6317f
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 14:21:02 -07:00
leetcrypt cb345e5725 feat(ai): two-stage native pruning — digest tool outputs before eviction
Phase 3 of the working-memory sprint. _prune_native_messages now compacts in two
stages instead of only evicting whole turns: Stage 1 digests OLD tool-role outputs
to a one-line summary (exit marker + first error line, else first line) via the new
_digest_tool_output; Stage 2 falls back to oldest-first whole-message eviction only
if still over budget. Tool outputs are the biggest context hog, and digesting keeps
the action->result causal chain intact, so whole-turn eviction (which severs it)
becomes a last resort. The pinned head/TASK and the recent keep_recent window
(including the most recent tool output, verbatim) are still never touched.

Return is now (messages, dropped, digested); the sole caller logs both. Clean-room
counterpart to Goose's tool-output condensation track. RAM-only, no disk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 14:21:02 -07:00
leetcrypt ee66e502b9 feat(ai): RAM working-set + failure ledger + stuck/loop detection
Phase 1+2 of the native-harness working-memory sprint. All per-task state is
process RAM only (dies with the task, same lifecycle as MemoryIndex) — no disk,
consistent with the agent's encrypted-transmission / nothing-saved posture.

Phase 1 — _WorkSet dataclass holds what the loop kept re-deriving: sandbox
cwd/shell, files written/read, a failure ledger (cmd -> exit+category), and the
last good command. Discovered cwd/shell carry across tasks in-process via
self._sbx_known (RAM fallback grounding). _render_workset re-surfaces this into
the repair-turn system prompt so it survives context pruning without a NOTES.md
on disk. Folds the old reads_seen set into wset.files_read.

Phase 2 — semantic stuck/loop detection via _action_signature (run_shell keys on
the command, write_file on path+content-hash so real edits aren't repeats,
read_file on path). Aborts honestly when an action fails >=2x verbatim (model
ignoring REPAIR_STANCE) or the same (action,outcome) repeats >=3x, instead of
burning the turn cap re-running a dead action. Verified fix-and-retry does not
false-trip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 14:21:02 -07:00
leetcrypt 14469a2649 feat(ai): default to qwen2.5-coder:3b for the sandbox task path
Reorder _CODER_MODELS to prefer the 3b coder build over 1.5b. The 3b roughly
doubles the ground-truth pass rate on the verify-then-repair native harness
(bench: 7/9 vs ~4/9 over the 9 non-net tasks) at a modest CPU-latency cost,
so it is auto-selected ahead of 1.5b when present. 7b was evaluated and
rejected: too slow to first-token inside the engage window on the CPU-only box.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 23:12:10 -07:00
leetcrypt dba43e47a2 feat(ai): native-harness repair gate + context discipline
Two clean-room reimplementations layered onto the native `!task` loop
(`_run_native`), aimed at lifting a weak CPU-bound local model's autonomous
pass rate. No code copied from the GPL sources studied; MIT throughout.

NightShift-derived verify-then-repair gate:
- `_classify_failure` maps a failing tool result to a (category, fix-hint) so
  the repair nudge names a concrete cause/next-action instead of "exited N".
- `_relevant_excerpt` keeps the error-relevant tail of a FAILING run_shell
  result within the byte budget (the real error is usually at the tail).
- read-dedupe guard short-circuits repeated idempotent `read_file` of a path
  already read this task.

Exoshell-derived context discipline:
- `_prune_native_messages` budgets the whole message list (~chars/4) and
  evicts oldest removable turns first once over `native_token_budget`,
  pinning index 0, the TASK_MARKER goal, and the most-recent turns — the
  native loop previously grew unbounded, silently pushing the goal out of a
  small model's window on long repair runs.
- TASK_MARKER labels the goal so it is never pruned and re-anchors the model.
- REPAIR_STANCE is appended to the turn system prompt after the first failure
  to swap the whole turn into a diagnose-then-act posture.

Validated on qwen2.5-coder:3b: clean unstitched 7/9 (the local ceiling), no
regression vs baseline; unit-tested pruning (pin survival, oldest-first
eviction, under-budget no-op) and stance trigger. The two remaining fails are
exact-match correctness tasks (a count, a fibonacci string), not harness gaps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 23:12:03 -07:00
leetcrypt 99afff41c6 feat(ai): split-tag tool-call recovery + greedy decode — 3x lift on 0.5b
The first harness changes to move the benchmark off the 1/12 noise floor, on
the model that needs it most (qwen2.5:0.5b: 1/12 -> 4/12, 3/12).

- complete_with_tools now decodes the tool loop at temperature 0 (scoped; chat
  keeps default sampling). At Ollama's default 0.8 the weak model sampled away
  from the tool-call format into prose/fabrication; the nudge prompt changes
  between turns so temp 0 still escapes a failed state on retry.
- Greedy decode made 0.5b's leak deterministic, exposing its real shape: not a
  JSON object with a name key, but the name in a <tools> tag and the args in a
  SEPARATE object — <tools>write_file</tools>{"path":…} — ~5 of 12 tasks/run.
  _NAMED_TAG pairs the tag-name with the following args object, gated on the
  known tool set so it still can't fabricate an action.
- Bridge recovers a ```bash block narrated in prose as a run_shell call,
  non-destructive only (FENCE_DESTRUCTIVE guard); fires on prose-leak turns,
  no-op where the model emits structured calls.

Ablation on 0.5b: structured-JSON-only 0/0 -> fenced+temp0 2/0 -> +split-tag
4/3. The lift is concentrated on the weakest model by design — a 3B emits
proper calls and fails on capability/content (unchanged at 1/12), which no
parser can fix. All recovery paths unit-checked for the positive shapes and
the negatives (prose / unknown tool / destructive block) they must ignore.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 13:34:21 -07:00
leetcrypt 92c0a07d56 feat(ai): recover JSON tool-call leaks in any wrapper + benchmark verdict
Generalise OllamaProvider._extract_text_tool_calls to recover a tool-call
JSON object regardless of how a small/quantized model wraps it — qwen's
<tool_call> tags, bare JSON, ```json fences, alternate tags (<tools>,
<function_call>), OpenAI {"function":{…}} nesting, and parameters-vs-arguments.
A new _coerce_call gates recovery on the known tool-name set from the tools
schema, so a stray JSON blob in prose (or a hallucinated make_dir) can never
be coerced into an action. 11-case unit check: 8 leak shapes recover, 3
negatives (prose / unknown tool / random config JSON) ignored.

Benchmark verdict (honest): this does NOT move the weak-CPU-model pass rate
— 3b went 2/1/0 of 12 across three passes (baseline 1/12, noise), 0.5b went
0/0 (baseline 1/12). A direct /api/chat probe shows the hypothesis was wrong
about the FORM of the leak: the weak models emit either malformed structured
tool_calls (write_file content:null) or a fenced bash block in prose with no
tool call at all — not JSON-as-text. The structured-JSON recovery is still a
correct, safe hardening for any model that does leak JSON; the real
weak-model lever (parse ```bash fences -> run_shell) is documented as an
explicit safety decision, not folded in here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 11:07:10 -07:00
leetcrypt 156e9fe176 feat(ai): output-aware nudge loop with DONE: terminator for native harness
Replace the overloaded "text + no tool call = done" terminator that made the
weak CPU model stall mid-task or give up after a failing command. Termination
is now a structural `DONE:` text sentinel; a text-only turn is resolved by an
output-aware verdict (DONE: marker / unresolved non-zero exit / no action /
filler language) and re-prompted with an exit-code-aware nudge, bounded by
MAX_NUDGES on top of max_turns. On exhaustion the summary is honest rather than
echoing the model's false "run successfully" — it reports when no tool ran or a
command exited non-zero. Live-validated on qwen2.5:3b: the multi-step stall is
fixed (proj3 completes end-to-end, ground-truth confirmed); the nudge fires on
a 126; residual give-up is model-bound. 23 offline unit assertions pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 00:31:19 -07:00
leetcrypt a0aa14d7fd feat(ai): run_shell executes in the real shared PTY + tight action context
Two native-harness improvements, both live-validated against qwen2.5:3b
and qwen2.5-coder:7b on a podman/Kali sandbox:

- §3 PTY-sentinel: run_shell now runs in the REAL shared terminal via
  _run_shell_in_pty (stage cmd out-of-band to a hex-token temp file, type
  a `{ sh CMDF; echo $? >RCF; } 2>&1 | tee OUTF` wrapper into the live PTY,
  poll the rc sentinel out-of-band, then read OUTF). The whole room now
  watches commands execute live instead of an inert `# ▸` comment, while
  output + exit code are still captured for the loop. tee+poll (not
  stream-sentinel) avoids deadlocking the serve loop; the wrapper line
  carries only our own temp paths so room text never reaches the shell
  parser. _exec_tool takes ws to reach the PTY.

- NATIVE_CONTEXT=4: action tasks now get a tight, RAG-free window (last few
  transcript turns only, no semantic recall). A weak model fed prior chat
  chatter latched onto nearby noise (wrote a "grant permissions" script for
  "write a bash script"); feeding just the instruction fixes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 00:12:01 -07:00
leetcrypt 70d6e26b24 feat(ai): prompt-anchor native harness for the fast CPU model
Optimize the native tool-calling loop for qwen2.5:3b on CPU, where it
previously invented paths (/ai/bin/bash), ran scripts it never wrote, and
silently dropped valid actions. Three changes:

- NATIVE_SYSTEM rewritten directive: explicit write→chmod→run workflow,
  relative paths only, never run an uncreated file, never guess interpreter
  paths, fix the cause on non-zero exit.
- New _sandbox_facts() probe injects LIVE SANDBOX STATE (real cwd, bash
  path, current files) into the system prompt so the model anchors to
  ground truth instead of guessing.
- OllamaProvider recovers tool calls qwen emits as <tool_call>{json}</…>
  TEXT in content (brace-balanced JSON scan), so a correct action isn't lost.
- Bump Ollama timeout 120→240s: the tool turn is non-streaming and a long
  write_file can exceed a tighter cap on a contended CPU box.

Live-validated (podman/Kali): 0/3 incoherent → reliable write/run with
self-correction on exit=126 for both single- and multi-script tasks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 17:02:39 -07:00
leetcrypt 0b1d09f0b5 feat(ai): visible native harness — PTY mirror + readable chat
Display-mirror hybrid (docs/plan-harness-visibility.md §2): native tool
calls now show up in the shared sandbox terminal again via inert `# `-
prefixed comment lines (comment-prefix = anti-double-run/anti-escape),
mirroring only each command. Chat de-flooded to opener + final summary.
write_file mkdir -p parent dir so relative/absolute paths both work
(fixes the regression where script creation silently failed). ui.rs
fmt_line returns Vec<Line> splitting on \n so multi-line agent output
renders as an indented block instead of one garbled row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 15:44:40 -07:00
leetcrypt 946df65b72 feat(ai): native host-side tool-calling harness (Phase 2)
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Implement the bounded native harness from docs/spec-native-harness.md §1.3 and
make it the default granted-!task path. The model runs host-side (no container→
host Ollama hop); only its tool calls exec in the sandbox.

providers.py:
- OllamaProvider.complete_with_tools(system, messages, tools) -> (text, calls):
  one non-streaming /api/chat turn with a `tools` schema; parses message.tool_calls
  (dict or JSON-string arguments). Caches tool capability (_tools_ok / supports_tools).
- ToolsUnsupported raised when the model rejects `tools` ("does not support tools").

bridge.py:
- NATIVE_SYSTEM + a 3-tool schema (run_shell / write_file / read_file), turn/byte caps.
- _run_native: seed transcript window + task → loop up to max_turns; exec each tool
  call in the sandbox, feed captured output back as a `tool` message; stop on a plain
  answer or the cap; stream per-call progress to chat. Degrades to _run_simple when the
  provider has no complete_with_tools or the model rejects tools.
- _exec_prefix/_exec_capture/_exec_tool: <engine> exec into docker/podman/multipass/local;
  paths passed as positional args + content via stdin (no shell interpolation); combined
  stdout+stderr byte-capped + time-bounded. run_shell is the only intentional shell.
- Guards: DESTRUCTIVE run_shell commands are blocked (not run — no human in the loop;
  use simple + /ai confirm for destructive intent); MAX_COMMANDS budget per task.
- _run_in_sandbox dispatches native|simple; default harness flipped to native.

__main__.py: default harness native (self-degrades to simple, so safe).

Offline-tested: full write/run/read loop on the local backend; destructive block
(rm -rf never executed); ToolsUnsupported → simple fallback. Live Ollama wire
validation deferred to Phase 3 bench (daemon was down). py_compile clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 13:17:21 -07:00
leetcrypt e49dbca451 refactor(ai): strip Goose harness (Phase 1) — native/simple host-side only
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Remove the Goose agentic harness across the codebase per
docs/spec-native-harness.md §3. Goose made N sequential model calls inside the
sandbox (slow on CPU-only hardware) and forced an in-container→host Ollama
gateway that tripped the rootless-Podman slirp4netns loopback bug.

- bridge.py: delete _run_goose/_goose_argv/_goose_present + GOOSE_* consts and
  the present-cache; __init__ now takes harness="simple"/max_turns=5; granted
  !task runs _run_simple until the native loop lands (Phase 2).
- __main__.py: --harness {native,simple} (was {goose,simple}); drop
  --goose-max-turns, add --max-turns; default harness simple.
- app.rs: /ai start accepts native|simple (plain aliases simple) instead of a
  bare plain flag; refresh harness comments.
- sbx.rs: remove the in-container Ollama gateway (Docker host-gateway / Podman
  slirp4netns host-loopback) and the dk_bootstrap OLLAMA_HOST env — kills the
  slirp4netns loopback bug; drop Goose comments.
- bootstrap.sh: drop goose from the prereq probe.
- bootstrap-ai.sh: remove the entire Goose install block, --no-goose flag,
  GOOSE_INSTALLER_URL, host config writer, and goose_bin helper.
- sandbox-bootstrap.sh: remove the in-sandbox Goose binary install + config.
- spec-goose-harness.md: banner — harness portion superseded; Podman stays.

cargo check + py_compile clean. No Goose refs remain (headroom/ untouched).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 13:03:41 -07:00
leetcrypt cf6b0b5b73 fix(ai): agent reconnects instead of vanishing; spec the native harness
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The /ai agent held a single, un-shielded websocket with no retry. Any
close — server restart, ping/idle reap, laptop sleep, a transient blip —
ended the serve loop, so run_async returned and the process exited
silently: the agent dropped from the roster with no /ai stop and no
goodbye.

- run_async now wraps the connection in a backoff-reconnect loop (1s→30s,
  resets after a healthy ≥30s session). The server frees our session+name
  on drop, so each attempt re-runs SRP to mint a fresh token. Only Ctrl-C
  / process kill (KeyboardInterrupt / CancelledError, how /ai stop ends
  us) breaks the loop.
- _serve shields each frame via _handle_frame so one malformed/poisoned
  frame — or a handler error — can't unwind the loop; ConnectionClosed
  and cancellation propagate up to the reconnect loop.
- Forgiving keepalive (ping_interval=20, ping_timeout=60) so a heavy
  CPU-only Ollama generation doesn't trip a false drop.

Also adds docs/spec-native-harness.md: replace the heavyweight Goose
harness with a lightweight host-side Ollama-native tool-calling loop
(model runs host-side, only commands exec in the sandbox — the
slirp4netns→host-Ollama bug disappears), and a file-by-file plan to strip
all Goose integration. Supersedes the harness portion of
spec-goose-harness.md (Podman backend stays).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 12:49:04 -07:00
leetcrypt 20091a9c26 feat(sandbox): podman backend + goose AI harness + noVNC GUI sandbox
Add Podman as a rootless/daemonless sandbox backend alongside Docker,
Multipass and Local, and wire Goose in as the default agentic harness
for the granted `!task` path (bridge execs `<engine> exec <name> goose
run` and streams output to chat; auto-degrades to the simple one-shot
injector when goose is absent).

Add an optional GUI sandbox track (XFCE + TigerVNC + websockify/noVNC on
:6080) summoned via `/sbx <engine> gui`, plus container-side provisioning
in sandbox-bootstrap.sh and a host-side ensure-podman.sh prereq helper.

Refresh the in-app command help to the backend-led `/sbx <engine> [gui]`
grammar and minor ui tweaks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 10:38:18 -07:00
leetcrypt 9222fa8ad7 feat(ai): name agents after their model, not hardcoded "oracle"
Agents now join under their model tag (e.g. "qwen2.5:3b" — model name +
parameter size) or profile label, derived at /ai start and tracked on
App.agent_name, so the roster shows what's actually answering. Updates the
broker re-grant + /ai stop revoke paths, the Python --name default
(falls back to provider.model), and the demo/bootstrap/README/docs refs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-06 17:26:17 -07:00
leetcrypt 3a54578f0a perf(net): near-real-time sandbox for non-host viewers
Two causes made a shared shell's PTY stream lag for non-host viewers and
then arrive "all at once":

1. Nagle's algorithm — PTY echo/keystrokes/chat are tiny frames; Nagle +
   delayed-ACK (amplified by Tailscale RTT) coalesced them into bursts.
   Set TCP_NODELAY on the client websocket (Plain/--no-tls path) and on
   each server connection's socket (via ws.io_proto.transport).

2. Head-of-line blocking — ConnectionManager.broadcast awaited each
   send() serially under a global lock, so the slowest viewer gated
   delivery to everyone AND stalled the server's read of the broker's
   next frame, backing the stream up. Give each connection its own
   bounded outbound queue + writer task; broadcast now only enqueues and
   never waits on a socket. A peer that overflows its backlog (4096) is
   evicted (close 1013) and resyncs on reconnect rather than buffering
   without bound or being fed a gapped terminal stream. Init snapshot is
   enqueued as the guaranteed-first frame (send_state -> state_frame).

Adds tests/test_manager.py (FIFO, slow-client isolation, wedged
eviction, reconnect replacement). Also fmt-clean sbx.rs/theme.rs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-06 17:11:51 -07:00
leetcrypt d6d44128c0 feat(sbx,ai): snapshot all backends w/ local export; robust AI + rejoin
- /sbx save [--local] and new /sbx vmsave/vmsnaps: snapshot Docker,
  Multipass, and VirtualBox; --local also writes a portable artifact
  (docker .tar / VBox .ova) under hh-snapshots/ that survives pruning.
- sandbox reappears for anyone who leaves and rejoins (host replays
  status + screen snapshot + ACL on Joined); SbxStatus ready handler is
  now idempotent so it never wipes scrollback.
- received files auto-bridge into the hosted sandbox (ft::tar_path).
- AI agent: translate Ollama's cryptic 404 into model/host/fix guidance.
- bootstrap installs the AI layer (Ollama + default model) by default,
  with consent gates; --no-ai opts out, --yes skips prompts.
- help menu lists the new save/vm flags.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-06 16:47:57 -07:00
leetcrypt 2c4a4f9a22 harden(ft,auth,net): cap transfers/frames, evict stale SRP, distrust XFF
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M1: enforce the declared transfer size (clamped to MAX_SIZE) on chunk
receipt in both the Rust and Python clients — a malicious sender can no
longer grow the receive buffer unboundedly.
M2: only honor X-Forwarded-For when TRUST_PROXY is set, so a direct
client can't spoof a source IP to dodge the per-IP rate limiter.
M3: evict unverified SRP sessions after a 60s TTL on each new handshake,
preventing half-finished auths from exhausting memory.
M4: drop WS frames larger than 256 KB before they hit the store or
broadcast, bounding per-message memory and flood blast radius.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-05 06:59:16 -07:00
leetcrypt dc23e0b44e fix(client): prevent path traversal on file receive
The Python client saved an incoming transfer under the offerer-controlled
`name` field verbatim, so a peer could supply `../../…` or an absolute path
and write a file anywhere the user can (arbitrary write → RCE). Reduce the
name to a bare basename before joining it to the download dir, matching the
Rust client's existing behaviour.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-04 22:55:50 -07:00
leetcrypt 07e9c30846 feat(sbx,ui): VM snapshot save/load + collapsible clustered help menu
- /sbx save|load|snaps: docker commit → hh-snap:<label> image that
  survives /sbx stop; load relaunches a fresh sandbox from it; multipass
  delegates to `multipass snapshot`. Local backend unsupported.
- Help overlay redesigned into topical clusters (SANDBOX, AI AGENTS,
  PERMISSIONS, FILES, APPEARANCE, KEYS, ROSTER GLYPHS), collapsed by
  default; up/down highlight a cluster, left/right/Enter expand-collapse
  it (tmux-style), PgUp/PgDn scroll overflow, Esc closes.
- docstring: example uses --model qwen2.5:3b (the locally-pulled model),
  not llama3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 23:03:00 -07:00
leetcrypt 69bce5ead8 feat(ai): stream agent replies token-by-token to the room
Closes the cross-language half of token streaming (perf-plan A3). On the
CPU-only box perceived latency is time-to-first-token, so showing the reply
as it generates makes a slow model feel live.

- Agent: OllamaProvider.stream() runs on a worker thread; bridge relays
  cumulative previews as throttled (~5/sec) `_ai:"stream"` control frames,
  then a `done` frame clears the preview as the final persisted chat message
  is posted. Providers without stream() fall back to blocking complete().
- Rust client: new Net::AiStream variant + parse_ai branch; App.ai_stream
  map holds the in-progress text per agent; draw_chat renders it as a dim,
  italic preview bubble below history. Cleared on done and on agent leave.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 22:42:08 -07:00
leetcrypt 26c651e9ac perf(ai): CPU-tuned local inference + qwen2.5-coder sandbox path
Tier A/B/C wins for the CPU-only Ollama box (no GPU → optimize TTFT and
tokens/sec, not VRAM):

- Separate qwen2.5-coder provider for the sandbox `!task` path; chat keeps
  the general model. Auto-selected when chat is Ollama and a coder build is
  present, override with --code-model.
- OllamaProvider num_ctx default 8192→4096 (8192 was a GPU-mindset default
  that inflates prefill/TTFT on CPU); expose num_thread; add --num-ctx,
  --num-thread, --num-predict. token_budget default 3000→2000 to fit.
- OllamaProvider.stream() generator over Ollama's stream=True chat endpoint
  (provider half of token streaming; agent/Rust rendering is a follow-up).
- Few-shot request→shell exemplars in SANDBOX_SYSTEM to anchor the small
  model's fenced-command output.
- Matryoshka embedding truncation: OllamaEmbedder truncate_dim=256 (--embed-dim)
  for faster pure-Python cosine and less RAM; query+stored share the dim.
- docs/ai-perf-plan.md records all 8 items with status and the server-side
  env (OLLAMA_NUM_PARALLEL=1, keep_alive) that must be set where ollama serve runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 22:37:59 -07:00
leetcrypt e5e1ad8dee feat(ai): in-RAM semantic recall (RAG) for conversation context
Give the agent recall of things said beyond the verbatim window, without
breaking the RAM-only philosophy — nothing is persisted to disk.

- MemoryIndex: a capped, in-memory pool of embedded messages with pure-Python
  cosine search (no numpy). Retains far more than the rolling transcript so old
  lines can be surfaced on demand; oldest evicted past the cap to bound RAM.
- OllamaEmbedder: local embeddings via nomic-embed-text, on by default and
  independent of the chat provider (reuses the Ollama host when chat is Ollama).
- Bridge: captured room messages (live + backfilled) are embedded on a
  background worker so a slow embedder can't stall frame draining. On a /ai
  question the agent retrieves top-k relevant lines, drops weak (<min_score) and
  windowed-duplicate hits, and prepends them as a clearly-fenced "recalled
  context" preamble — kept at user role, never elevated to system, so untrusted
  room text informs without instructing. Falls back to recency-only if the
  embedder is unreachable.
- CLI: --no-rag, --embed-model, --embed-host, --rag-top-k.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 17:59:01 -07:00
leetcrypt 85fde59292 perf(ai): keep the Ollama model warm and honor a real num_ctx
OllamaProvider now sends keep_alive (default 30m) so the model stays resident
in VRAM between /ai calls instead of cold-reloading, and sets explicit options
(num_ctx 8192, num_predict 512) — Ollama otherwise caps context at 2048, which
would silently truncate the larger backfilled window.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 17:43:02 -07:00
leetcrypt 9b85255d80 feat(ai): backfill context on join + token-budget window
The server already ships the full RAM message backlog in the init frame; the
agent was discarding it. _seed_transcript now decrypts that history with the
room key (skipping our own lines, control frames, and undecryptable blobs) so
the agent has context the moment it joins instead of starting amnesiac.

_window() replaces the fixed last-12 slice on both the answer and sandbox
paths: it walks newest-to-oldest and keeps messages up to --token-budget
(approx, ~4 chars/token), still capped at --context-window count. Keeps small
local models inside their effective context. Nothing touches disk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 17:43:02 -07:00
leetcrypt 47019dd630 feat(ai): let agents drive the sandbox on request (/ai <name> !<task>)
Agents can now run commands and build files in the shared sandbox, but
only when explicitly invoked with the `!` verb and only while the owner
has granted drive. Reuses the existing driver ACL + `_sbx:input` frames:
the Python agent emits the same input frames a human driver does, gated
by the broker's `app.drivers` check — no new transport.

Guardrails: a regex gate holds destructive commands until `/ai <name>
confirm`; blast-radius caps (20 cmds / 8KB); the agent echoes its plan to
the room before running (audit trail). Owner controls: `/grant`, `/ai
start <model> allow` to pre-grant on spawn, and a Ctrl-X panic kill
switch (revoke all non-owner drive + Ctrl-C the shell). The broker now
re-broadcasts the ACL on join so a freshly-summoned agent actually
receives its grant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 16:42:24 -07:00
leetcrypt 65df12de9e feat(ai): model profiles, capability discovery, and agentless /ai list|models
Make connecting any model a config step, not a code change:
- models.toml named profiles (api_key_env names an env var, never the key)
- providers gain available_models(); add preflight + --list-models/--check
- /ai list and /ai models in-room; client probes local Ollama for
  /ai models when no agent is running, and /ai list hints to summon one
- docs/providers.md provider guide + examples/echo_provider.py
- README: command table, AI section, layout updated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-01 15:25:07 -07:00
leetcrypt 05bdc2d802 feat(ai): /ai start|stop agent control + in-room typing indicator
Owner of the spawning client can summon/dismiss a local AI agent from inside
the room (default ollama/qwen2.5:3b); the agent emits encrypted typing frames
that drive a "thinking" spinner in the client.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-01 11:38:15 -07:00
leetcrypt 54b7637ec8 feat(agent): model-agnostic AI agent bridge (PoC) + pin lets-hack demo to main
Add cmd_chat/agent: a headless client that joins a room via SRP, decrypts
broadcasts, and answers /ai <question> through a pluggable model provider
(ollama default + anthropic + openai-compatible + module:Class). Server and
zero-knowledge guarantees unchanged; the agent is just another encrypted client.

Also pin the lets-hack demo to a detached worktree of main (default) so running
it from dev still demos stable main without touching the working checkout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-01 02:05:48 -07:00
leetcrypt 5de493e895 feat(hh): /pw command, RAM-only direnv autostart, robust lets-hack; coven→clergy
- add /pw (alias /password): reveal this room's password locally (never
  broadcast); surfaced in the F1 help overlay and the join hint
- direnv-autostart/: cd-to-launch a single real-user session via direnv;
  password is minted in memory at launch (never written to disk, matching the
  RAM-only model) and scoped to the child process. setup.sh installs direnv,
  hooks bash/zsh, and `direnv allow`s the dir
- lets-hack.sh: boot a FRESH server by default (replacing any live one) with a
  --reuse opt-out; add -h/--help/-help; guard against killing the tmux session
  you're attached to; switch-client into the coven when run inside tmux
- rename coven→clergy across rust/python/scripts; tests/test_coven.py→test_clergy.py
- snapshots in-progress hack-house client work (sandbox, themes, net, ui)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-31 22:29:17 -07:00
leetcrypt 82a04f3e12 feat(coven): SRP/Fernet crypto parity + multi-user coven foundation ⛧
Begin the coven evolution of cmd-chat (see docs/spec-collaborative-sandbox.md):
a Rust/ratatui client for the unchanged Python Sanic server, plus the
multi-user + zero-knowledge groundwork.

P0 — crypto parity (the spec's #1 risk), proven three ways:
- Hand-rolled SRP-6a (NG_2048, SHA-256, rfc5054 padding) matching pysrp
  byte-for-byte, incl. the fixed b"chat" SRP identity and minimal-vs-256B
  width quirks. Golden-vector unit test + offline selftest.
- Live handshake against the running server (H_AMK verified).
- Cross-language E2E: Python client decrypts a Rust-encrypted Fernet message.

P2 — multi-user coven (server):
- CMD_CHAT_MAX_USERS capacity cap (default 4, infra-for-more).
- Authoritative roster + user_joined broadcasts.
- Free the slot/username on ws disconnect (was held until 1h stale sweep).

Also: fix requirements.txt (was UTF-16, unparseable by pip).

coven/ : Rust crate (crypto.rs proven; main.rs spike CLI: selftest/handshake/srpm)
docs/  : full feature spec for the 6 requested features.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-30 11:47:25 -07:00
leetcrypt 70ddca8a1f feat: encrypted file transfer with propose/accept flow
New commands: /send <filepath>, /accept, /reject

Protocol:
- Sender proposes file (name, size, SHA-256 hash)
- Recipient sees offer and chooses /accept or /reject
- On accept: file chunked (64KB), encrypted with room key, sent over WebSocket
- On receive: chunks reassembled, SHA-256 verified, saved to ./downloads/
- Server never sees file content (E2E encrypted, same as messages)

Limits: 50MB max file size. Files saved with collision-safe naming.
No server changes — server remains a dumb encrypted relay.

All 79 existing tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-26 00:01:51 -07:00
leetcrypt e7bacc93da fix(security): comprehensive security hardening — TLS, HMAC WS auth, rate limiting, IP leak prevention
CRITICAL fixes:
- Auto-generated self-signed TLS certs (HTTPS/WSS by default)
- Removed session_key from /srp/verify response (was sent in plaintext)
- Replaced with HMAC-SHA256 ws_token for WebSocket authentication

HIGH fixes:
- WebSocket auth now validates ws_token via hmac.compare_digest()
- /clear endpoint requires Bearer admin_token (printed at server start)
- Password no longer required as CLI arg — supports env var + getpass prompt
- Removed user_ip from Message model (no longer broadcast to clients)

MEDIUM fixes:
- Rate limiter on /srp/init and /srp/verify (10 req/min/IP)
- MessageStore capped at 1000 messages (prevents RAM DoS)
- access_log disabled (was leaking request metadata)

LOW fixes:
- Username sanitization against rich markup injection
- Dead code removed from helpers.py

All 79 tests passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 20:30:40 -07:00
mirai 467d942877 New storage scheme 2026-01-06 21:42:50 +08:00
mirai 264d19e932 NO LOGS 2026-01-03 12:00:52 +03:00
mirai 0756aab53f Final notes 2026-01-02 23:25:02 +03:00
mirai 5cbe355660 feat: add SRP authentication, improve security
- Replace RSA key exchange with SRP (Secure Remote Password)
- Password never transmitted over network
- Add unit tests for endpoints
- Fix datetime.UTC compatibility for Python < 3.11
- Fix logger.exception usage
- Update README with new auth flow diagram
2026-01-02 23:09:00 +03:00
mirai 95f8a192b5 feat: complete client-server architecture refactoring
Server:
- Split into views, routes, helpers, models modules
- Merged /ws/talk and /ws/update into single /ws/chat endpoint
- Replaced polling with push-based broadcast model
- Added username uniqueness validation on connect
- Fixed run_server arguments bug (workers parameter)
- Removed deprecated loop argument from Sanic listeners
- Replaced datetime.utcnow() with timezone-aware datetime.now(timezone.utc)

Client:
- Rewrote client as single-file module
- Migrated from websocket-client to websockets (asyncio)
- Fixed websocket-client conflict with asyncio event loop on Windows
- Added progress indicators for key generation, exchange, connection
- Added animated 3D spinning cube in UI
- Updated RSA key from 512 to 2048 bits

CLI:
- Removed unnecessary asyncio.run() wrapper
- Simplified entry point
2026-01-02 14:42:33 +03:00
mirai 6411df575e Updated to modern version of Optional type 2025-11-18 10:46:15 +04:00
mirai 64b0967292 Fix renderer typing, preserve message text, and harden crypto key handling
Fix abstract renderer signatures and add small stubs so type checkers can
see expected attributes (e.g. username, _decrypt). This removes several
mypy false-positives that were caused by mixin/ABC mismatches.
Preserve message text containing ':' by using split(':', 1) in both
DefaultClientRenderer and RichClientRenderer.
Normalize renderer APIs: print_chat(...) now takes the response mapping
and returns None (matches runtime behavior).
Make RSA symmetric-key request more robust: read r.content instead of a
fixed-size r.raw.read(999), avoiding truncated key material.
Improve _connect_ws exception handling in client to ensure a valid
Exception is re-raised if connection attempts fail.
Correct server/service typing: memory_msgs is now typed as
list[Message] and we null-check incoming payload text before creating a
new Message.
Replace manual package list in setup.py with setuptools.find_packages()
so packaging uses valid Python package names.
Installed types-requests in the project venv so mypy no longer flags the
requests import.
Verification: ran python -m compileall and mypy cmd_chat — no issues
remain.
Notes:

Wire format still uses Python literal evaluation in some places (existing
behavior); switching to JSON for client/server payloads is recommended as a
follow-up for robustness and security.
2025-11-05 19:29:24 +05:30
mirai c3467b89ae removed temporary files 2025-10-03 21:08:43 +03:00
mirai 82a78e7053 Update client.py 2025-10-03 20:58:44 +03:00
mirai b0ff612023 Password update 2025-09-10 19:58:59 +03:00
mirai 6a044ecaf8 Working on 1.1.22 2023-12-03 16:18:09 +03:00
mirai 316a0e3e1e Reworked setup.py, now you can run cmd_chat directly. Reworked sanic http webserver to make it work. Update readme, etc... 2023-11-27 14:30:01 +03:00
mirai c5fa982f65 Add CLI run options, update README 2023-11-27 06:50:16 +03:00
mirai 8c4799c634 Removed eval, fixed security vulnerability 2023-11-27 05:45:45 +03:00
mirai 4554d76d0b PyPi Update 2023-03-08 19:26:21 +03:00