docs: rewrite README with complete setup, security, and file transfer guide

Clear, concise documentation covering installation, hosting, connection
security (Tailscale/LAN/public), password sharing, file transfer protocol,
CLI reference, helper scripts, and architecture overview.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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leetcrypt 2026-05-26 10:57:39 -07:00
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<div align="center">
# 🤐 CMD-CHAT
# CMD-CHAT
### encrypted terminal chat. no servers. no logs. ram only.
### end-to-end encrypted terminal chat with file transfer
[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
[![Python 3.8+](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.8+-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org/downloads/)
[![Python 3.10+](https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.10+-blue.svg)](https://www.python.org/downloads/)
</div>
---
peer-to-peer encrypted chat that runs in your terminal. you host, you control. close the window — everything's gone.
Encrypted chat that runs in your terminal. You host the server, you control the room. Close the window — everything's gone. Messages and files are encrypted client-side before the server ever sees them.
## why
## Features
every "secure" messenger still stores metadata somewhere. this doesn't. it's just two terminals talking over an encrypted tunnel. nothing written to disk, ever.
- **End-to-end encrypted** — messages encrypted with Fernet (AES-128-CBC + HMAC) before leaving your machine
- **TLS by default** — auto-generated self-signed certs, or bring your own
- **SRP authentication** — password never sent over the network (zero-knowledge proof)
- **Encrypted file transfer** — `/send`, `/accept`, `/reject` with SHA-256 verification
- **RAM only** — nothing written to disk on the server
- **Rate limiting** — brute-force protection on auth endpoints
- **No IP leaks** — client IPs never broadcast to other users
- **Password hidden** — prompted securely via `getpass`, never visible in `ps` or shell history
## how it works
```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SRP AUTHENTICATION │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ CLIENT SERVER │
│ │ │ │
│ │─────── POST /srp/init {username, A} ───────► │ │
│ │ (A = client public ephemeral) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │◄──── {user_id, B, salt, room_salt} ───────── │ │
│ │ (B = server public ephemeral) │ │
│ │ (room_salt = E2E key derivation) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ [client derives room_key via HKDF: │ │
│ │ room_key = HKDF(password, room_salt)] │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ [both sides compute SRP session key │ │
│ │ using password + ephemeral values] │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │─────── POST /srp/verify {user_id, M} ──────► │ │
│ │ (M = client proof) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │◄────────── {H_AMK, session_key} ──────────── │ │
│ │ (H_AMK = server proof) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ [password never transmitted] │ │
│ │ [MITM can't derive session key] │ │
│ │ │ │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ E2E ENCRYPTED CHAT │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │ │ │
│ │═══════ WebSocket /ws/chat?user_id ═════════► │ │
│ │ (authenticated session) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ │ │
│ ┌─┴─┐ ┌──┴──┐ │
│ │ C │──── encrypt(msg, room_key) ───────────►│ S │ │
│ │ L │ │ E │ │
│ │ I │◄─── ciphertext (broadcast) ────────────│ R │ │
│ │ E │ │ V │ │
│ │ N │ decrypt(ciphertext, room_key) │ E │ │
│ │ T │ │ R │ │
│ └─┬─┘ └──┬──┘ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ [server stores ONLY ciphertext] │ │
│ │ [server CANNOT read messages] │ │
│ │ [all clients with same password │ │
│ │ derive identical room_key] │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ Encryption: Fernet (AES-128-CBC + HMAC) │ │
│ │ Key derivation: HKDF-SHA256 │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ [on disconnect: keys wiped from RAM] │ │
│ │ │ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ KEY HIERARCHY │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ password ──┬──► SRP ──► session_key (per-user, auth only) │
│ │ │
│ └──► HKDF(password, room_salt) ──► room_key (shared) │
│ │
│ room_salt: generated once at server start │
│ room_key: deterministic, same for all clients with same pwd │
│ │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
**SRP (Secure Remote Password)** — password is never sent over the network. both sides prove they know it via zero-knowledge proof, then derive identical session keys.
## install
## Install
```bash
python -m venv venv && source venv/bin/activate && pip install -r requirements.txt
git clone https://github.com/diorwave/cmd-chat.git
cd cmd-chat
pip install -r requirements.txt
```
windows:
## Quick Start
**Host a chat room:**
```bash
python -m venv venv ; .\venv\Scripts\activate ; pip install -r requirements.txt
python3 cmd_chat.py serve 0.0.0.0 3000
```
## usage
You'll be prompted for a room password (hidden input). An admin token and TLS cert path will print to the console.
start server:
**Connect to a chat room:**
```bash
python cmd_chat.py serve 0.0.0.0 3000 --password mysecret
python3 cmd_chat.py connect SERVER_IP 3000 yourname --insecure
```
connect:
`--insecure` is needed for self-signed certs. You'll be prompted for the room password.
## Securing Your Connection
### Tailscale (recommended)
Both parties install [Tailscale](https://tailscale.com). Traffic goes through an encrypted WireGuard tunnel. No port forwarding, works across NATs.
```bash
python cmd_chat.py connect SERVER_IP 3000 username mysecret
# Host
python3 cmd_chat.py serve 0.0.0.0 3000
# Friend connects using your Tailscale IP
python3 cmd_chat.py connect 100.x.x.x 3000 theirname --insecure
```
![Example](example.gif)
Find your Tailscale IP: `tailscale ip -4`
## features
### LAN (same network)
- **ram only** — nothing touches disk
- **rsa + aes** — key exchange + symmetric encryption
- **no central server** — direct p2p connection
- **srp auth** — password never sent over network
Use your local IP. Both devices must be on the same WiFi/network.
## license
```bash
python3 cmd_chat.py connect 192.168.1.x 3000 theirname --insecure
```
### Public Internet
Requires port forwarding on your router (TCP port 3000 to your machine). Use `--cert` and `--key` with a real certificate for production use.
```bash
python3 cmd_chat.py connect PUBLIC_IP 3000 theirname --insecure
```
Find your public IP: `curl ifconfig.me`
## Sharing the Room Password
The password must be shared outside the chat. Never send it over an unencrypted channel.
1. **In person** — tell them verbally
2. **Signal** — disappearing message set to 30 seconds
3. **One-time link** — [onetimesecret.com](https://onetimesecret.com) (self-destructs after one view)
4. **Split it** — send half via Telegram, half via SMS
## Chat Commands
| Command | Action |
|---------|--------|
| `/send <filepath>` | Propose a file transfer to the room |
| `/accept` | Accept a pending file offer |
| `/reject` | Decline a pending file offer |
| `q` | Disconnect |
### File Transfer
Files are chunked (64KB), encrypted with the room key, and relayed through the server as opaque ciphertext. The server never sees file names, contents, or metadata.
```
alice> /send report.pdf
bob> "alice wants to send report.pdf (1.2 MB) — /accept or /reject"
bob> /accept
Receiving: 100% (1.2 MB/1.2 MB)
File saved: ./downloads/report.pdf — SHA-256 verified
```
- Max file size: 50 MB
- Files saved to `./downloads/` relative to where the client was launched
- SHA-256 integrity check on every transfer
## CLI Reference
### Server
```bash
python3 cmd_chat.py serve <bind_ip> <port> [options]
```
| Flag | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `--password`, `-p` | Room password (prompted if omitted) |
| `--cert` | Path to TLS certificate |
| `--key` | Path to TLS private key |
| `--no-tls` | Disable TLS (local dev only) |
### Client
```bash
python3 cmd_chat.py connect <server_ip> <port> <username> [options]
```
| Flag | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `--password`, `-p` | Room password (prompted if omitted) |
| `--insecure`, `-k` | Skip TLS cert verification (self-signed certs) |
| `--no-tls` | Connect without TLS |
### Environment Variable
Set `CMD_CHAT_PASSWORD` to skip the password prompt for both server and client.
## Helper Scripts
### `./lab/host-chat.sh`
One-command server setup. Detects your IPs (Tailscale, LAN, public), prints the exact connect command your friend needs, then starts the server.
```bash
./lab/host-chat.sh # TLS on port 4000
./lab/host-chat.sh --port 5000 # custom port
./lab/host-chat.sh --no-tls # disable TLS
```
### `./lab/setup-lab.sh`
Spins up a tmux session with the server and two chat clients side-by-side for local testing.
```bash
./lab/setup-lab.sh # default lab
./lab/setup-lab.sh --no-tls --port 4001 # plain HTTP
./lab/setup-lab.sh --user1 alice --user2 bob
./lab/setup-lab.sh --teardown # clean up
```
Attach with `tmux attach -t cmd-chat-lab`. Switch panes with `Ctrl+B` then arrow keys.
## How It Works
```
CLIENT SERVER CLIENT
│ │ │
│── POST /srp/init {A} ──────────► │ │
│◄── {B, salt, room_salt} ──────── │ │
│ │ │
│ derive room_key = HKDF(password, room_salt) │
│ │ │
│── POST /srp/verify {M} ────────► │ │
│◄── {H_AMK, ws_token} ─────────── │ │
│ │ │
│══ WSS /ws/chat?ws_token ════════► │ ◄══════════════════════════════│
│ │ │
│ encrypt(msg, room_key) ────────► │ ──── ciphertext ────────────► │
│ │ decrypt(ciphertext, room_key)
│ │ │
│ server stores ONLY ciphertext │ │
│ server CANNOT read messages │ │
```
**SRP (Secure Remote Password)** — both sides prove they know the password without transmitting it. A network observer learns nothing.
**Room Key** — derived independently by each client via `HKDF(password, room_salt)`. All clients with the same password get the same key. The server never has the key.
**WebSocket Auth** — HMAC-SHA256 token issued after SRP verification. Prevents session hijacking.
## Admin
The server prints an admin token at startup. Use it to clear message history:
```bash
curl -k -X DELETE https://SERVER:3000/clear \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>"
```
## License
MIT