feat(sandbox): podman backend + goose AI harness + noVNC GUI sandbox
Add Podman as a rootless/daemonless sandbox backend alongside Docker, Multipass and Local, and wire Goose in as the default agentic harness for the granted `!task` path (bridge execs `<engine> exec <name> goose run` and streams output to chat; auto-degrades to the simple one-shot injector when goose is absent). Add an optional GUI sandbox track (XFCE + TigerVNC + websockify/noVNC on :6080) summoned via `/sbx <engine> gui`, plus container-side provisioning in sandbox-bootstrap.sh and a host-side ensure-podman.sh prereq helper. Refresh the in-app command help to the backend-led `/sbx <engine> [gui]` grammar and minor ui tweaks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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leetcrypt
@@ -50,5 +50,93 @@ if ! apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends $PKGS; then
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done
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fi
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# ---- Optional GUI desktop over noVNC -----------------------------------------
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# Opt-in via HH_SBX_GUI=1 (set by the launcher for `/sbx <docker|podman> gui`).
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# Containers are headless, so a GUI means: install a lightweight XFCE desktop +
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# a VNC server, and bridge it to a browser-reachable noVNC websocket on port
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# $HH_SBX_GUI_PORT (default 6080). The launcher publishes that port on the host
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# loopback (127.0.0.1) only, so the desktop is reachable from this machine's
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# browser but never the LAN. Heavy (pulls a desktop), hence strictly opt-in.
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if [[ "${HH_SBX_GUI:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
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GUI_PORT="${HH_SBX_GUI_PORT:-6080}"
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GUI_PASS="${HH_SBX_GUI_PASS:-hackhouse}"
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# XFCE (minimal) + a terminal, the X session glue, a VNC server, and the
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# noVNC web client + websockify bridge. All apt — works on Ubuntu/Debian/Kali.
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# tigervnc-tools carries `vncpasswd`, which --no-install-recommends would
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# otherwise drop (it ships only as a recommend of the standalone server) —
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# without it the passwd write below is a silent no-op and VNC never auths.
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apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
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xfce4 xfce4-terminal dbus-x11 xfonts-base x11-xserver-utils \
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tigervnc-standalone-server tigervnc-tools novnc websockify || true
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export USER=root HOME=/root
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# TigerVNC 1.15 (Kali/Debian trixie) reads its config from ~/.config/tigervnc
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# and aborts with a fatal "Could not migrate /root/.vnc" if the legacy ~/.vnc
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# exists, so write straight to the new path. /tmp/.X11-unix must exist + be
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# sticky for the X socket; a fresh container may not have it.
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VNCDIR=/root/.config/tigervnc
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mkdir -p "$VNCDIR" /tmp/.X11-unix
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chmod 1777 /tmp/.X11-unix 2>/dev/null || true
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# Non-interactive VNC password (obfuscated, not strong auth — the real gate is
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# the loopback-only publish + the room password). vncpasswd -f reads stdin.
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printf '%s\n' "$GUI_PASS" | vncpasswd -f > "$VNCDIR/passwd" 2>/dev/null || true
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chmod 600 "$VNCDIR/passwd" 2>/dev/null || true
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cat > "$VNCDIR/xstartup" <<'XS'
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#!/bin/sh
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unset SESSION_MANAGER DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS
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exec dbus-launch startxfce4
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XS
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chmod +x "$VNCDIR/xstartup"
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# Start the VNC server on display :1 (TCP 5901). -localhost no lets websockify
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# (running in the same netns) reach it; nothing outside the container can —
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# only $GUI_PORT is published, and only to host loopback.
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if command -v vncserver >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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vncserver -kill :1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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rm -f /tmp/.X1-lock /tmp/.X11-unix/X1 2>/dev/null || true
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vncserver :1 -geometry 1280x800 -depth 24 -localhost no >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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fi
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# noVNC web client → websocket → local VNC. Daemonize (nohup, detached stdio)
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# so it outlives this `exec bash -s` provision session and keeps serving for
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# the life of the container (PID 1 is `sleep infinity`).
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if command -v websockify >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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NOVNC_WEB=/usr/share/novnc
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[[ -d "$NOVNC_WEB" ]] || NOVNC_WEB=/usr/share/webapps/novnc
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nohup websockify --web="$NOVNC_WEB" "$GUI_PORT" localhost:5901 \
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>/var/log/hh-novnc.log 2>&1 &
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fi
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fi
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# ---- Goose harness (the /ai agent's sandbox `!task` path) --------------------
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# Goose ships as a release binary (not apt), so install it via its official
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# installer into a system path so every container user can run it. Best-effort:
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# a failure here just means the agent falls back to its built-in one-shot
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# injector, so it never blocks provisioning. Skip entirely with HH_SBX_GOOSE=0.
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if [[ "${HH_SBX_GOOSE:-1}" != "0" ]] && ! command -v goose >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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GOOSE_BIN_DIR=/usr/local/bin CONFIGURE=false \
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bash -c 'curl -fsSL https://github.com/block/goose/releases/download/stable/download_cli.sh | bash' \
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|| true
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fi
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fi
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# Container-side Goose config: point it at the host's Ollama via the engine's
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# host gateway (passed in as $HH_OLLAMA_HOST by the launcher). The shared shell
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# runs as root here, so write it under /root — only if absent, so a tuned config
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# survives a re-provision.
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if command -v goose >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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GOOSE_CFG=/root/.config/goose/config.yaml
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if [[ ! -f "$GOOSE_CFG" ]]; then
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mkdir -p "$(dirname "$GOOSE_CFG")"
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cat > "$GOOSE_CFG" <<EOF
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# Written by hh sandbox-bootstrap.sh — Goose runs INSIDE this sandbox and reaches
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# the host Ollama over the engine's host gateway. No host filesystem is mounted.
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GOOSE_PROVIDER: ollama
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GOOSE_MODEL: ${HH_GOOSE_MODEL:-qwen2.5:3b}
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OLLAMA_HOST: ${HH_OLLAMA_HOST:-http://host.containers.internal:11434}
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EOF
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fi
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fi
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mkdir -p "$(dirname "$SENTINEL")"
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date -u +%FT%TZ > "$SENTINEL" # mark done; skip on the next provision pass
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