diff --git a/docs/paper-site/index.html b/docs/paper-site/index.html
index b9cfce5..bc5c120 100644
--- a/docs/paper-site/index.html
+++ b/docs/paper-site/index.html
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ anonymity set rather than growing it (RQ2-P1, a Holm-significant <em>negative</e
 plainly — nulls and negatives are results.</p>
 </blockquote>
 <hr />
-<h2 id="abstract-skeleton-quantitative-claims-held-until-data-rq2-ratification">Abstract <em>(skeleton — quantitative claims held until data + RQ2 ratification)</em></h2>
+<h2 id="abstract">Abstract</h2>
 <p>Onion-routing systems typically admit any relay that meets a directory's technical criteria;
 they do not model <strong>relay consent</strong> — a host's in-band, per-circuit choice to carry a given
 flow. We build and measure a <strong>consent-gated, federated, nested-SSH relay data plane</strong> in which
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ every hop must explicitly accept or reject each circuit through a signed in-band
 (Ed25519-authenticated, X25519 per-hop credentials), and in which relays are organized into
 <strong>houses</strong> that federate either through a shared <strong>bridge</strong> or through a <strong>directory</strong>. Treating
 this as a <em>measurement instrument</em> for a trust model's exposure (not a service that provides
-anonymity), we ask two confirmatory questions on a lab grid of two phones and a laptop: <strong>(RQ1)</strong>
+anonymity), we ask two confirmatory questions on a single-laptop isolated-docker grid (two non-forwarding phones pinned): <strong>(RQ1)</strong>
 does a shared bridge introduce a measurable flow-linkability leak between a circuit's entry and
 exit segments, and does cover padding remove it; <strong>(RQ2)</strong> does federating relays across houses
 <strong>grow or shrink</strong> the anonymity set an adversary faces, and is any effect explained by
@@ -635,8 +635,7 @@ linkability (RQ1) and the anonymity-set effect of federation (RQ2) on a lab grid
 when consent-gated federation helps or harms anonymity. <strong>On this instrument the answer is a
 double null/negative: no bridge leak to close, and federation that measurably <em>reduces</em> the
 anonymity set</strong> — reported here without spin as the paper's evidentiary core.</p>
-<p><strong>Scope.</strong> Claims are deliberately restricted to the tested lab topology and scale (two phones +
-laptop, few houses); this is not an internet-scale or global-passive-adversary result (§7).
+<p><strong>Scope.</strong> Claims are deliberately restricted to the tested lab topology and scale (a single laptop's isolated-docker containers; two phones pinned but non-forwarding; few houses); this is not an internet-scale or global-passive-adversary result (§7).
 The paired <strong>churn-resilience</strong> question (RQ3) and a QUIC/<code>ssh3</code> transport arm [Michel2023] are
 pre-registered but held for a companion paper; this lead paper covers G4 + RQ1 + RQ2 only.</p>
 <hr />
@@ -700,7 +699,14 @@ by the freeze. Key mechanisms:</p>
 <hr />
 <h2 id="4-methods-pre-registered-frozen">4. Methods (pre-registered; frozen)</h2>
 <p>This study is a <strong>confirmatory factorial controlled comparison</strong>; the design, variables, seeds,
-detectors, and analysis were frozen and hashed on 2026-07-19 before any confirmatory cell ran.</p>
+detectors, and analysis were frozen and hashed on 2026-07-19 before any confirmatory cell ran.
+It was designed, pre-registered, and executed under the <strong>Interpretable Context Methodology</strong>
+(ICM) [VanClief2026], a staged-pipeline framework in which each phase — literature, hypothesis,
+design/pre-registration, build, execution, analysis, and write-up — is a numbered stage whose
+frozen <code>output/</code> is the sole input to the next. ICM is the structural mechanism behind the
+freeze-before-data discipline used throughout this section: the pre-registration was frozen and
+SHA-256-sealed in the design stage before the build and execution stages could consume it, so the
+provenance chain (§4.4) is auditable by construction rather than by convention.</p>
 <h3 id="41-design-matrix">4.1 Design matrix</h3>
 <p>Cells are organised per RQ with the other factors held at their declared control:</p>
 <ul>
@@ -744,7 +750,10 @@ completion — <strong>no optional stopping, no interim looks</strong>; an uninf
 <strong>inconclusive</strong>, never extended to chase significance.</p>
 <p><strong>Apparatus (disclosed).</strong> All relay hops ran as <strong>isolated Docker containers on a single engine
 host</strong> (the laptop; <code>grid/device-map.json</code>, <code>isolated_engine_host_count = 1</code>, Docker 27.5.1). The
-two phones were <strong>consenting endpoints, not forwarders</strong>. Node distinctness is thus container-level
+two phones were <strong>pinned consenting-node labels, not forwarders</strong> (probed reachable once at grid-pin;
+carried no measured traffic — the device map records both phones with <code>can_host_engine = false</code> /
+<code>isolated_engine_available = false</code>, i.e. structurally unable to run an isolated forwarder). Node
+distinctness is thus container-level
 (≥ 3 distinct containers per circuit), and matched-N is pinned from the containerised node count
 per manifest; cross-machine effects are out of scope (§7).</p>
 <h3 id="44-frozen-detectors-and-the-instrument-validation-gate">4.4 Frozen detectors and the instrument-validation gate</h3>
@@ -940,14 +949,17 @@ without being explained away.</p>
 <hr />
 <h2 id="7-limitations-threats-to-validity">7. Limitations &amp; threats to validity</h2>
 <ul>
-<li><strong>Scale / adversary model (External).</strong> The grid is two phones + a laptop and few houses; this
+<li><strong>Scale / adversary model (External).</strong> The grid is a single laptop (isolated-docker) with two non-forwarding phones pinned, and few houses; this
   is <strong>not</strong> internet-scale and <strong>not</strong> a global passive adversary. Claims are scoped to the
   tested topology/scale; entropy CIs are wide at small node counts (accepted, node counts
   reported).</li>
 <li><strong>Node distribution (External, disclosed).</strong> All relay hops executed as <strong>isolated Docker
   containers on a single engine host</strong> (the laptop; <code>isolated_engine_host_count = 1</code>, recorded in
-  <code>grid/device-map.json</code>). The two phones were <strong>consenting endpoints, not forwarders</strong> — they
-  cannot host an isolated engine. Node <em>distinctness</em> for RQ1/RQ2 is therefore container-level
+  <code>grid/device-map.json</code>). The two phones were <strong>pinned consenting-node labels, not forwarders</strong> — they
+  cannot host an isolated engine (<code>grid/device-map.json</code> records both phones with
+  <code>can_host_engine = false</code> / <code>isolated_engine_available = false</code>), were verified reachable only by a
+  single grid-pin probe, and carried no measured traffic. Node <em>distinctness</em> for RQ1/RQ2 is therefore
+  container-level
   (≥ 3 distinct containers per circuit), not physical-machine-level; matched-N is pinned from the
   containerised node count per manifest. This satisfies the containment law (every forwarder runs
   in an isolated engine, <code>engine ≠ local</code>) but means cross-machine timing effects are <strong>out of
@@ -1032,8 +1044,11 @@ estimate, CI gate, or decision is substituted. The frozen prereg SHA is unchange
 <li><strong>[Mittal2012b]</strong> Mittal, P., Caesar, M., &amp; Borisov, N. (2012). X-Vine. <em>NDSS 2012</em>.
   arXiv:1109.0971.</li>
 <li><strong>[Zhou2011]</strong> Zhou, P., et al. (2011/2013). STor. arXiv:1110.5794.</li>
+<li><strong>[VanClief2026]</strong> Van Clief, J., &amp; McDermott, D. (2026). Interpretable Context Methodology:
+  Folder Structure as Agentic Architecture. arXiv:2603.16021. <em>(Methodology framework under which
+  this study was staged, pre-registered, and executed.)</em></li>
 </ul>
-<p><em>(Full bibliography: <code>~/coding/sci-method/stages/01-literature/output/sor-consent-bibliography.md</code>.
+<p><em>(Full bibliography: <code>docs/sor-consent-bibliography.md</code> (vendored in-repo).
 Integrity flags carried forward: [Stutzbach2006] secondary-sourced; [Constantinides2026] recent
 preprint — neither is load-bearing in this lead paper.)</em></p></article>
   </details>
@@ -1383,7 +1398,7 @@ confirmatory battery and have both passed on a <strong>dry, synthetic, offline</
   companion's frozen-detector method both <em>caught</em> the unique-bridge artifact and <em>promotes</em> the
   corrected mechanism finding into the surviving family. Lead RQ1-P1 and RQ2-P1 survive regardless.</li>
 <li><strong>Scope &amp; limitations.</strong> Both findings are scoped to the lab grid (1-house / bridge-off control,
-  2 phones + laptop, self-generated fixture traffic) and inherit the lead paper's external-validity
+  single-laptop isolated-docker, two non-forwarding phones, self-generated fixture traffic) and inherit the lead paper's external-validity
   caveats. Specific to this companion: (i) the RQ2-P3 mix is an <strong>as-instrumented</strong> concentration
   effect on the ratified exit-signature posterior, not an internet-scale claim; (ii) the RQ3 nulls
   are <strong>grid-bound</strong> — the perf null follows from a baseline retention ceiling under the pinned
diff --git a/docs/stage-07-companion-methods.md b/docs/stage-07-companion-methods.md
index b90a5b0..db84cc4 100644
--- a/docs/stage-07-companion-methods.md
+++ b/docs/stage-07-companion-methods.md
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ confirmatory battery and have both passed on a **dry, synthetic, offline** pass:
   companion's frozen-detector method both *caught* the unique-bridge artifact and *promotes* the
   corrected mechanism finding into the surviving family. Lead RQ1-P1 and RQ2-P1 survive regardless.
 - **Scope & limitations.** Both findings are scoped to the lab grid (1-house / bridge-off control,
-  2 phones + laptop, self-generated fixture traffic) and inherit the lead paper's external-validity
+  single-laptop isolated-docker, two non-forwarding phones, self-generated fixture traffic) and inherit the lead paper's external-validity
   caveats. Specific to this companion: (i) the RQ2-P3 mix is an **as-instrumented** concentration
   effect on the ratified exit-signature posterior, not an internet-scale claim; (ii) the RQ3 nulls
   are **grid-bound** — the perf null follows from a baseline retention ceiling under the pinned
diff --git a/docs/stage-07-paper-draft.md b/docs/stage-07-paper-draft.md
index 062ce51..0c8db48 100644
--- a/docs/stage-07-paper-draft.md
+++ b/docs/stage-07-paper-draft.md
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 
 ---
 
-## Abstract *(skeleton — quantitative claims held until data + RQ2 ratification)*
+## Abstract
 
 Onion-routing systems typically admit any relay that meets a directory's technical criteria;
 they do not model **relay consent** — a host's in-band, per-circuit choice to carry a given
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ every hop must explicitly accept or reject each circuit through a signed in-band
 (Ed25519-authenticated, X25519 per-hop credentials), and in which relays are organized into
 **houses** that federate either through a shared **bridge** or through a **directory**. Treating
 this as a *measurement instrument* for a trust model's exposure (not a service that provides
-anonymity), we ask two confirmatory questions on a lab grid of two phones and a laptop: **(RQ1)**
+anonymity), we ask two confirmatory questions on a single-laptop isolated-docker grid (two non-forwarding phones pinned): **(RQ1)**
 does a shared bridge introduce a measurable flow-linkability leak between a circuit's entry and
 exit segments, and does cover padding remove it; **(RQ2)** does federating relays across houses
 **grow or shrink** the anonymity set an adversary faces, and is any effect explained by
@@ -95,8 +95,7 @@ when consent-gated federation helps or harms anonymity. **On this instrument the
 double null/negative: no bridge leak to close, and federation that measurably *reduces* the
 anonymity set** — reported here without spin as the paper's evidentiary core.
 
-**Scope.** Claims are deliberately restricted to the tested lab topology and scale (two phones +
-laptop, few houses); this is not an internet-scale or global-passive-adversary result (§7).
+**Scope.** Claims are deliberately restricted to the tested lab topology and scale (a single laptop's isolated-docker containers; two phones pinned but non-forwarding; few houses); this is not an internet-scale or global-passive-adversary result (§7).
 The paired **churn-resilience** question (RQ3) and a QUIC/`ssh3` transport arm [Michel2023] are
 pre-registered but held for a companion paper; this lead paper covers G4 + RQ1 + RQ2 only.
 
@@ -172,6 +171,13 @@ by the freeze. Key mechanisms:
 
 This study is a **confirmatory factorial controlled comparison**; the design, variables, seeds,
 detectors, and analysis were frozen and hashed on 2026-07-19 before any confirmatory cell ran.
+It was designed, pre-registered, and executed under the **Interpretable Context Methodology**
+(ICM) [VanClief2026], a staged-pipeline framework in which each phase — literature, hypothesis,
+design/pre-registration, build, execution, analysis, and write-up — is a numbered stage whose
+frozen `output/` is the sole input to the next. ICM is the structural mechanism behind the
+freeze-before-data discipline used throughout this section: the pre-registration was frozen and
+SHA-256-sealed in the design stage before the build and execution stages could consume it, so the
+provenance chain (§4.4) is auditable by construction rather than by convention.
 
 ### 4.1 Design matrix
 
@@ -218,7 +224,10 @@ completion — **no optional stopping, no interim looks**; an uninformative cell
 
 **Apparatus (disclosed).** All relay hops ran as **isolated Docker containers on a single engine
 host** (the laptop; `grid/device-map.json`, `isolated_engine_host_count = 1`, Docker 27.5.1). The
-two phones were **consenting endpoints, not forwarders**. Node distinctness is thus container-level
+two phones were **pinned consenting-node labels, not forwarders** (probed reachable once at grid-pin;
+carried no measured traffic — the device map records both phones with `can_host_engine = false` /
+`isolated_engine_available = false`, i.e. structurally unable to run an isolated forwarder). Node
+distinctness is thus container-level
 (≥ 3 distinct containers per circuit), and matched-N is pinned from the containerised node count
 per manifest; cross-machine effects are out of scope (§7).
 
@@ -391,14 +400,17 @@ without being explained away.
 
 ## 7. Limitations & threats to validity
 
-- **Scale / adversary model (External).** The grid is two phones + a laptop and few houses; this
+- **Scale / adversary model (External).** The grid is a single laptop (isolated-docker) with two non-forwarding phones pinned, and few houses; this
   is **not** internet-scale and **not** a global passive adversary. Claims are scoped to the
   tested topology/scale; entropy CIs are wide at small node counts (accepted, node counts
   reported).
 - **Node distribution (External, disclosed).** All relay hops executed as **isolated Docker
   containers on a single engine host** (the laptop; `isolated_engine_host_count = 1`, recorded in
-  `grid/device-map.json`). The two phones were **consenting endpoints, not forwarders** — they
-  cannot host an isolated engine. Node *distinctness* for RQ1/RQ2 is therefore container-level
+  `grid/device-map.json`). The two phones were **pinned consenting-node labels, not forwarders** — they
+  cannot host an isolated engine (`grid/device-map.json` records both phones with
+  `can_host_engine = false` / `isolated_engine_available = false`), were verified reachable only by a
+  single grid-pin probe, and carried no measured traffic. Node *distinctness* for RQ1/RQ2 is therefore
+  container-level
   (≥ 3 distinct containers per circuit), not physical-machine-level; matched-N is pinned from the
   containerised node count per manifest. This satisfies the containment law (every forwarder runs
   in an isolated engine, `engine ≠ local`) but means cross-machine timing effects are **out of
@@ -487,7 +499,10 @@ estimate, CI gate, or decision is substituted. The frozen prereg SHA is unchange
 - **[Mittal2012b]** Mittal, P., Caesar, M., & Borisov, N. (2012). X-Vine. *NDSS 2012*.
   arXiv:1109.0971.
 - **[Zhou2011]** Zhou, P., et al. (2011/2013). STor. arXiv:1110.5794.
+- **[VanClief2026]** Van Clief, J., & McDermott, D. (2026). Interpretable Context Methodology:
+  Folder Structure as Agentic Architecture. arXiv:2603.16021. *(Methodology framework under which
+  this study was staged, pre-registered, and executed.)*
 
-*(Full bibliography: `~/coding/sci-method/stages/01-literature/output/sor-consent-bibliography.md`.
+*(Full bibliography: `docs/sor-consent-bibliography.md` (vendored in-repo).
 Integrity flags carried forward: [Stutzbach2006] secondary-sourced; [Constantinides2026] recent
 preprint — neither is load-bearing in this lead paper.)*
diff --git a/output/sor-confirmatory/20260720T060132Z/grid/device-map.json b/output/sor-confirmatory/20260720T060132Z/grid/device-map.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bfb5be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/output/sor-confirmatory/20260720T060132Z/grid/device-map.json
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+{
+  "assessment": "GO on isolated docker host",
+  "containment": {
+    "external_target": "none",
+    "hops_run_in": "isolated docker containers only (never a phone/host forwarder)",
+    "live_vm_churn_on_rq1_rq2": "none (RQ1/RQ2 use no churn; churn_schedule_id=none)",
+    "self_traffic_only": true
+  },
+  "degraded": false,
+  "devices": [
+    {
+      "arch": "x86_64",
+      "can_host_engine": true,
+      "engine_version": "27.5.1",
+      "house_role": "house-A docker host + hop pool",
+      "isolated_engine_available": true,
+      "kind": "laptop",
+      "name": "laptop",
+      "ssh_reachable": true
+    },
+    {
+      "arch": "aarch64",
+      "can_host_engine": false,
+      "engine_version": null,
+      "house_role": "house-B consenting node (phone)",
+      "isolated_engine_available": false,
+      "kind": "phone",
+      "name": "fp6",
+      "ssh_reachable": true
+    },
+    {
+      "arch": "aarch64",
+      "can_host_engine": false,
+      "engine_version": null,
+      "house_role": "house-C consenting node (Termux, no docker)",
+      "isolated_engine_available": false,
+      "kind": "phone",
+      "name": "tril",
+      "ssh_reachable": true
+    }
+  ],
+  "devices_down": [],
+  "generated_utc": "2026-07-20T06:01:52Z",
+  "isolated_engine_host_count": 1,
+  "local_docker_version": "27.5.1",
+  "matched_N_note": "RQ1/RQ2 isolated hops are containerised on the docker host (>=3 distinct containers = distinct nodes). Physical-phone distribution is optional; the confirmatory matched-N (single-house N = federated total consenting nodes) is pinned from the containerised node count at run time and recorded per manifest.",
+  "reachable_count": 3,
+  "schema": "sor-device-map/1",
+  "scope": "RQ1+RQ2 lead-paper grid pin (CLAUDE.md \u00a7Containment)",
+  "topology_matchedN_honourable": true
+}