50fa79407d
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Public, sanitized mirror of an AI orchestration command center: agents, skills, MCP servers, slash-command workflows. All infrastructure identifiers, hostnames, mesh IPs/subnets, repo paths, maintainer identity, and hardware fleet specifics scrubbed to <placeholders>; session debug logs and host-specific memory removed. No live credentials. Verified clean by automated leak sweep. See SANITIZATION.md. churchofmalware.org . authorized research only
102 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
102 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/sh
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# CoM Enterprise — PreToolUse Validation Hook
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# Intercepts commands before execution and blocks dangerous patterns.
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# Claude Code passes tool input as JSON on stdin.
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# POSIX-compatible (works in Git Bash on Windows and native bash on Linux).
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# Exit 0 = allow, Exit 2 = block (exit 2 = block without error message)
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# Read JSON input from stdin and extract the command field
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INPUT=$(cat)
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COMMAND=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | node -e "let d='';process.stdin.on('data',c=>d+=c);process.stdin.on('end',()=>{try{const j=JSON.parse(d);const cmd=j.command||j.cmd||(j.tool_input&&j.tool_input.command)||'';console.log(cmd);}catch(e){console.log('');}})" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
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# Block pipe-to-shell patterns (supply chain attack vector)
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case "$COMMAND" in
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*curl*\|*sh*|*curl*\|*bash*|*wget*\|*sh*|*wget*\|*bash*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Pipe-to-shell detected. Download first, inspect, then execute." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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# Block --no-verify (bypasses git hooks / safety checks)
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case "$COMMAND" in
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*--no-verify*)
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echo "BLOCKED: --no-verify bypasses safety hooks. Remove the flag or get explicit approval." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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# Block insecure permission changes
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case "$COMMAND" in
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*chmod\ 777*|*chmod\ -R\ 777*)
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echo "BLOCKED: chmod 777 is world-writable. Use specific permissions (e.g., 755, 644)." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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# Block destructive operations on critical paths
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case "$COMMAND" in
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*rm\ -rf\ /*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Recursive delete on root path. This is catastrophic." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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*rm\ -rf\ .git*|*rm\ -rf\ .claude*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Deleting project infrastructure (.git or .claude). Requires manual confirmation." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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*rm\ -rf\ src/*|*rm\ -rf\ crates/*|*rm\ -rf\ core/*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Recursive delete on source directories. Requires explicit approval." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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# Block disk-destroying commands
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case "$COMMAND" in
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*dd\ if=/dev/zero*|*mkfs*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Disk formatting / overwrite command detected." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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# Block force-push to main
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case "$COMMAND" in
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*git\ push\ --force*|*git\ push\ -f*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Force-push detected. Use --force-with-lease or get explicit approval." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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# Block Windows-specific destructive operations
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case "$COMMAND" in
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*powershell*Remove-Item*-Recurse*-Force*C:\\*|*powershell*Remove-Item*-Recurse*-Force*X:\\*)
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echo "BLOCKED: PowerShell recursive force-delete on system drive." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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*powershell*Set-ExecutionPolicy*Unrestricted*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Setting unrestricted execution policy. Use RemoteSigned or AllSigned." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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*reg*delete*HKLM*|*reg*delete*HKCU*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Registry deletion. Requires explicit approval." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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*bcdedit*|*bcdboot*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Boot configuration modification. Requires explicit approval." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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*netsh*advfirewall*set*state*off*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Disabling Windows Firewall. Requires explicit approval." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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# Block credential exposure patterns
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case "$COMMAND" in
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*cat*.env*|*type*.env*|*echo*TOKEN*|*echo*SECRET*|*echo*PASSWORD*)
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echo "BLOCKED: Potential credential exposure to stdout. Use env vars instead." >&2
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exit 2
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;;
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esac
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# All checks passed
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exit 0
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